MICM priorities

Current situation

The main threat to the population is insurgent group activity throughout Garland. The Eriyan National Liberation Front (ENLF) has influence and operates in North Eri Province and in the southern (forested) part of North East province, and the Eriyan Independence Movement Fighters (EIMF) operates mainly in South Eri Province.

Threat to Force/Mandate

Negative attitudes towards UNMMIG is increasing, due to the deteriorating security situation in Eastern Garland. The local population (LP) partially blames the UN for this situation.

Armed groups most likely COA

Armed groups (AG) will expand their influence in the area IVO IDP camps CONVILLE and BYRA. UNHCR/UNMMIG convoys along main supply route (MSR) N52 and M9 will likely be ambushed/hindered frequently, as long as AGs have freedom of movement (FoM) in these areas (due to insufficient presence of national security forces).

Armed groups most dangerous COA

Ability of adversary actors to boost their support from the local communities in the absence of government forces or administrative agencies. Effective in denying UN Forces/NGO/IO access to strongholds, creating urban NO-GO areas. Successful tactics include IED, urban ambushes using indirect fire support and/or sniping against civilians and military targets, including UN personnel. Such a situation could easily turn attitudes against international support, and further challenge the Garland Government.

Armed group – assessment

It is assessed that AGs will continue to operate in groups of between 10-30 people, although they have the capacity to launch attacks comprising in excess of 60 personnel for specific operations.

CCIRs / Intel requirements (gaps & purposes)

AG increased support by the local population (LP) (enforced and voluntarily), political affiliations of LP, IED situation on MSR.

FoM on MSR, road conditions and protection needs for logistic and humanitarian convoys.

Alternative options to MSRs.

FC initial guidance

Task

Prepare wider staff annexes - by:

1. Task acquisition: Focus on armed groups' activities and FoM along MSR in Sector East, monitor any increase of IDP movement heading towards central parts of Sector East and GARVILLE area.

2. Task acquisition: visibility of regional governance and the delivery of basic state functions in GARLAND; additional AG presence in cross-border areas to EASTLAND and possible affiliation with local population, hampering of humanitarian assistance in NORTH and SOUTH ERI.

3. Be prepared to acquire information to assess security situation in NORTH and/or SOUTH ERI area, IOT support humanitarian assistance in populated areas close to the border with EASTLAND.

PIRs confirmed

PIR 1: What are the threats against the local population (LP) in Sector East?

PIR 2: What are the LP's attitudes towards the UNMMIG mission in Sector East?

PIR 3: What are the armed groups main activities in Sector East?