



# Reinforcement Training Package

## United Nations Operational Logistics

for United Nations Peace Operations

This Reinforcement Training Package (RTP) for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations has been developed by the Integrated Training Service (ITS) of the UN Department of Peace Operations.

This version has **not** been released for use by Member States in their Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. This version is solely for use by UN to deliver training to UN personnel.

Related training can be found online at the Peacekeeping Resource Hub: <http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community>. A link to receive your comments and suggestions for improvement can be found in the resource hub at the same location.

This document is limited to use within the United Nations for staff training. It may **not** be reproduced without special permission from the copyright holder. This document is not to be sold.

All photographs have been sourced from the UN and the public domain, unless otherwise indicated.

© UN 2021

Integrated Training Service

Department of Peace Operations

United Nations

New York, NY, 10017, USA

I n s t r u c t o r

# Guidance



---

General Guidance

# Participant Training Guide




---

Reference Material

## Table of Contents

<b>1</b>	<b><i>Structure and Responsibilities of the UN from HQ down into Mission</i></b> .....	<b>12</b>
1.1	<b>Why UNHQ structure is relevant to logistics in field missions</b> .....	<b>12</b>
1.2	<b>The United Nations System</b> .....	<b>13</b>
1.2.1	Organs of the UN.....	13
1.2.2	General Assembly (GA) .....	14
1.2.3	Security Council (SC) .....	16
1.2.4	Economic and Social Council.....	17
1.2.5	Trusteeship Council .....	17
1.2.6	International Court of Justice (ICJ) .....	17
1.2.7	Secretariat.....	18
1.3	<b>Understanding the Secretariat (UNHQ)</b> .....	<b>18</b>
1.3.1	Department of Peace Operations (DPO) .....	19
1.3.2	Department of Operational Support (DOS) .....	25
1.3.3	DOS Organisational Chart .....	26
1.4	<b>Command and Control of UN Logistics</b> .....	<b>27</b>
1.4.1	Authority, Command and Control Policy (AC2) .....	28
1.5	<b>General concepts to for a Commander and Planner to understand</b> .....	<b>30</b>
<b>2</b>	<b><i>General structure and components of a UN Peace Operations Mission – Force, Police, MSD, Civilian</i></b> .....	<b>32</b>
2.1	<b>Structure</b> .....	<b>32</b>
2.1.1	Head of Mission (HOM).....	32
2.1.2	Components.....	32
2.2	<b>AC2 within the mission</b> .....	<b>34</b>
2.2.1	Key terms:.....	34

2.2.2	Mission Integration and Control Arrangements .....	38
2.2.3	Lines of Authority, Command and Control.....	42
<b>2.3</b>	<b>Influence of COE on Command and Control.....</b>	<b>48</b>
2.3.1	Combined Effect of COE and AC2 on logistic planning and operational control .....	50
2.3.2	General issues of cooperation across contingents (units) within a component (military or police) 50	
2.3.3	General issues of cooperation across components.....	51
<b>2.4</b>	<b>Mission Support Division (MSD) .....</b>	<b>52</b>
2.4.1	Office of the Director of Mission Support (ODMS).....	53
2.4.2	Office of the Chief of Operations and Resource Management (CORM).....	53
2.4.3	Office of the Chief Service Delivery Management (CSDM).....	54
2.4.4	Office of Chief Supply Chain Management (CSCM).....	54
2.4.5	Enabling Units.....	71
<b>3</b>	<b>Chapter 3 – Logistic functions within a UN field mission .....</b>	<b>74</b>
<b>3.1</b>	<b>Sources of logistics support.....</b>	<b>74</b>
<b>3.2</b>	<b>Types of Support.....</b>	<b>75</b>
3.2.1	Integral Support.....	75
3.2.2	Close Support .....	75
3.2.3	General Support.....	76
3.2.4	Mounting Support. ....	76
<b>3.3</b>	<b>Integral Support / Unit Level Support.....</b>	<b>76</b>
<b>3.4</b>	<b>Common UN Logistic Support Concepts .....</b>	<b>77</b>
3.4.1	Self-Reliance Concept – .....	77
3.4.2	The Force Logistic Support Group Concept. ....	77
3.4.3	Civilian Service Support Concept. ....	78
<b>3.5</b>	<b>Medical.....</b>	<b>78</b>
3.5.1	Medical Support Principles .....	79
3.5.2	Levels of Medical Support.....	80
3.5.3	CASEVAC .....	82
<b>3.6</b>	<b>Supply .....</b>	<b>84</b>
3.6.1	Introduction .....	84
3.6.2	Levels of support .....	85
3.6.3	Key terminology – UN Supply functions .....	85
3.6.4	General Guidelines for Supply Planning.....	85
3.6.5	Classes of Supply .....	86
3.6.6	Materiel Acquisition Procedures.....	87
3.6.7	Request Procedures (other than Water, Rations, Ammunition, Explosives and Fuel) .....	88
3.6.8	Methods of supply.....	89
3.6.9	UN Supply Mechanism (Pull vs Push) .....	90
3.6.10	Supply other than Ammunition, Fuel, Rations and Water.....	90
3.6.11	Rations and Catering .....	93
3.6.12	Catering (including Catering Equipment).....	95
3.6.13	Water.....	96
3.6.14	Fuel / POL.....	97
3.6.15	Distribution .....	98
<b>3.7</b>	<b>Equipment Maintenance.....</b>	<b>99</b>
3.7.2	Dry and Wet Lease options.....	99

<b>3.8</b>	<b>Equipment Maintenance functions</b> .....	<b>103</b>
3.8.1	Example Equipment Maintenance Framework .....	103
3.8.2	Recovery .....	105
3.8.3	Request for Repair.....	105
3.8.4	Recovery Request.....	106
<b>3.9</b>	<b>Equipment Acquisition, Disposal</b> .....	<b>106</b>
<b>3.10</b>	<b>Engineering</b> .....	<b>108</b>
3.10.1	Tailoring Engineering Support.....	109
3.10.2	Obtaining Construction Material.....	109
3.10.3	Field Mission Engineering Support Organisation .....	110
3.10.4	Major and Minor Engineering responsibilities .....	110
3.10.5	Environmental Compliance and Waste Management.....	117
<b>3.11</b>	<b>Guidelines for Accommodation and other Facilities/Utilities</b> .....	<b>119</b>
3.11.1	Standards of Accommodation.....	120
3.11.2	Ensuring appropriate planning in accommodation .....	122
3.11.3	Considerations for planning a new site/infrastructure .....	122
3.11.4	Infrastructure Maintenance.....	123
3.11.5	Non-base Infrastructure. ....	123
3.11.6	Bridges.....	125
<b>3.12</b>	<b>Aviation</b> .....	<b>125</b>
3.12.1	Aviation Tasking .....	126
3.12.2	Aviation Tasking Priorities. ....	128
<b>3.13</b>	<b>Transport</b> .....	<b>130</b>
3.13.1	Transport Section .....	130
3.13.2	Joint Movements Coordination Cell (JMCC) .....	131
3.13.3	Movement Control (MOVCON).....	131
3.13.4	Military Transport Units – .....	131
3.13.5	Lines of Support: Transport Terminology.....	131
3.13.6	Modes of Transport .....	132
3.13.7	Movement types.....	134
<b>3.14</b>	<b>Field Technology/Communications</b> .....	<b>138</b>
3.14.1	Why is Field Technology/Communications in a document on logistics? .....	138
3.14.2	Field Technology Services (FTS).....	138
<b>3.15</b>	<b>Welfare</b> .....	<b>141</b>
<b>3.16</b>	<b>Finance / Budget</b> .....	<b>142</b>
3.16.1	Mission Budgets.....	142
3.16.2	Responsibilities.....	143
3.16.3	Reimbursement .....	144
<b>3.17</b>	<b>Procurement cycle</b> .....	<b>144</b>
3.17.1	Why should a Commander or Planner be concerned with Procurement?.....	144
3.17.2	Acquisition Planning .....	144
3.17.3	Emergency Procurement.....	145
3.17.4	Field Mission specific.....	146
<b>ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 3 COE/MOU/SUR: UNDERSTANDING THE CAPABILITY FREEDOMS AND CONSTRAINTS</b>		
.....		<b>148</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Principles of UN Logistics</b> .....	<b>167</b>

<b>4.1</b>	<b>Traditional UN Principles of Logistics.....</b>	<b>167</b>
4.1.1	Impact of UN Principles of Logistics .....	171
<b>4.2</b>	<b>Unique factors affecting logistic support in UN missions .....</b>	<b>172</b>
<b>4.3</b>	<b>UN Mission Culture – effects on Planning .....</b>	<b>176</b>
4.3.1	Differences in professional culture .....	176
<b>4.4</b>	<b>Planning Words of Wisdom from the Missions.....</b>	<b>179</b>
4.4.1	How best to describe the differences between UN mission support versus home-nation logistic support? .....	179
4.4.2	What factors must be considered to make the best use of TCC/PCC and UN logistic support/ resources collectively to achieve the mandate?.....	179
4.4.3	How will the UN logistics support concept (including changes in command and control) change how operations are planned and resourced compared to TCC/PCC commanders' previous expectations?.....	180
4.4.4	What considerations are required to ensure good integration between Military/Police and Mission Support pillars to ensure Military/Police elements have the best advice at the right time?.....	180
4.4.5	How, where, and when might planning practices change to incorporate consultation with Mission Support at the appropriate phases of planning?.....	180
4.4.6	Describe logistic planning considerations .....	181
4.4.7	Name important concepts in conducting the Logistic aspects of / inputs to military or police planning. ....	181
4.4.8	Recommended Tools/templates, .....	181
4.4.9	What Constraints / Restraints have you observed. ....	182
<b>5</b>	<b>Logistic Planning in support of UN Operations.....</b>	<b>183</b>
<b>5.1</b>	<b>Logistic Planning support to Operational Planning .....</b>	<b>183</b>
5.1.1	Planning process .....	183
<b>5.2</b>	<b>Logistic Intelligence / Common Operating Picture .....</b>	<b>185</b>
5.2.1	Policy and Guidance .....	185
5.2.2	Key Definitions:.....	186
5.2.3	Planning including Logistics Intelligence.....	187
5.2.4	Logistics Intelligence .....	187
5.2.5	Process.....	188
<b>5.3</b>	<b>The Logistic Estimate.....</b>	<b>189</b>
5.3.1	Planning considerations – 5DR .....	191
5.3.2	Deductions.....	194
5.3.3	Coordination – .....	198
5.3.4	Interoperability – .....	199
5.3.5	Gender considerations.....	200
<b>5.4</b>	<b>Reconnaissance within a Field Mission .....</b>	<b>202</b>
5.4.1	Prompts and checklists for logistics reconnaissance .....	202
	<b>ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 5 – TRANSLATING MILITARY LOGISTIC TERMINOLOGY.....</b>	<b>214</b>
	<b>References .....</b>	<b>216</b>
	<b>Glossary.....</b>	<b>218</b>

The United Nations Operational Logistics Participant Training Guide (OPLOG Guide) has been prepared as a research document to support uniformed personnel when preparing to deploy to a United Nations Peacekeeping mission. This word document has been prepared as research to support the preparation of the Reinforcement Training Package on Operational Logistics (RTP OPLOG). This guide is based on material provided by current field missions.

### *Mission specific practice*

There are many aspects of operational logistics which are guided by extant UN policy and guidance. This training will introduce these concepts, with a Training Guide that serves like an aide-memoire. The Training Guide will not replicate these policies in full. This is in part to reflect that policy changes over time. More importantly it reflects those missions will have developed a mission-specific application of this policy. Once in mission, the professional commander, planner or logistician must find the mission-specific version of policy and guidance to understand any local nuance.

### *Common terminology*

An enduring challenge when working in a multinational environment is having a common set of terminology to aid professional planners in planning and negotiating support. In addition to providing an aide-memoire to current UN policy and practice, this training guide offers terminology and principles as a lingua franca. These terms and principles are intended to support (but never constrain) missions in negotiating for optimal mission support across military, police and civilian pillars.

While some concepts are common across all missions, a considerable proportion of operational logistics information is specific to each individual mission. Missions retain the authority to make and change some decisions in order to respond to exigencies of the mission. In such cases, this training will offer planning principles and suggest which part of the mission organisation should be contacted to understand mission-specific details. For the avoidance of ambiguity, where this training material disagrees with UN policy, UN policy has primacy.

This training is part of the training package. It serves as a reference for Instructors and Participants to aid understanding of the array of policies, guidance and local practice which personnel must navigate when deployed and seeking to plan and coordinate with logistic resources in UN peace operations. It cannot provide specific logistic solutions to specific support problems, as each situation will vary by time, resources and circumstance.

**IMPORTANT:** This document is not official UN policy, guidance or SOP.

### *Structure/Purpose and Scope*



The Training Guide is based around a set of chapters addressing the logistic functions and practices applicable for any peacekeeping field mission. It considers the unique polices, practices and structures which apply to a UN mission which military and police commanders, planners and logisticians could not reasonably anticipate even when well qualified and experienced in their field.

The overall training package focuses on the understanding of logistic support (both freedoms and constraints) needed by an operational planner. The information has been gathered having regard for the needs of a commander, planner and logistician at Contingent Headquarters, Sector Headquarters and, to a limited extent, the understanding needed by the headquarters of an individual unit (in order to understand their freedoms and limitations for tactical action). The training package provides advice and information to staff officers and unit staff deployed in missions on how to make best use of logistic support arrangements to best deliver operational outcomes in support of the mission's mandate.

This Training Guide does not seek to address the tasks to be performed by a Troop or Police Contributing Country in the course of preparing and deploying units and individuals. This material is covered separately in the *Generic Guidelines for Troop Contributing Countries Deploying Military Units to the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions*<sup>1</sup>. This training guide does not override national military doctrine nor address any military or police tactics, techniques or procedures which remain the prerogative of individual Member States. Nor is it the intent of this training guide to direct how individual units should conduct their internal (integral) support. However, by providing information about support arrangements, it may assist a unit commander (or their planner) in making decisions. Troop and Police Contributing Countries will benefit from this Training Guide, as will their national military staffs, schools and units, as they become better able to support the preparation of commanders, staff officers, individual police officers and units in understanding how UN logistic support arrangements will affect operational planning.

This research for the training package has been directed at the operational level, and focuses where possible on principles, recognising that missions must and will have developed specific policies and procedures appropriate for that mandate, region and environment. The handbook serves to enhance interoperability between components of the mission, and to support integration in between military, police and civilian planning elements.

Workshops were conducted with military, police and civilian personnel from current UN DPO missions in order to capture best practices and the practical application of policy and guidance in missions.

---

<sup>1</sup> Last published in 2008, and being rewritten at the time of publication.

This Training Guide is structured as follows:

**Chapter 1 – Logistic Authority, Command and Control at UN level.** This chapter addresses those aspects of UNHQ structure that affect the way logistic support is provided in missions. This includes the role of the Security Council and General Assembly in making support decisions; key sections within the Secretariat who represent the mission or provide guidance through policy, and the role of the Authority, Command and Control Policy

**Chapter 2 – Logistic Authority Command and Control at the UN level.** This chapter introduces the structure, key appointments and key organisations relevant to logistic support and planning. Mission Support Division is explained in detail. Key concepts including Authority Command and Control, Delegation of Authority and Contingent Owned Equipment framework are explained. The combined impact of these policy frameworks on logistic support is explained. Annex A to Chapter 2 introduces the key components of the COE framework, including the relationship between MOU and SUR which drives day to day self-sustainment and, thus, unit support requirements.

**Chapter 3 – Logistic Functions.** This chapter divides logistics support operations into sub-functions including supply, transport, equipment maintenance, movement control medical, engineering and aviation (lift), and explains how each is (usually) managed in UN missions.

**Chapter 4 – Principles of UN Logistics.** This chapter considers in detail how the structure, policies and practices of the United Nations requires changes in the approach to logistic planning. It includes considerations of structure, policy and culture. This chapter includes advice passed from current senior uniformed logistic staff, and their Mission Support counterparts.

**Chapter 5 – Logistics Estimate.** While noting that many countries have excellent logistic planning doctrine, they vary by country, and military and police staff come from very different disciplines. This chapter offers a simple common framework for considering logistic support problems.

The chapters are divided into sections, sub-sections, and paragraphs for aid of referencing. A glossary and **index** is provided at the end of the document for ease of reference.

### *Relationship to other Official Documents*

This training guide is not a formal manual or policy. It is a summary of existing policies and guidance collated to aid participants undertaking the Operational Logistics RTP.

Accordingly, formal UN manuals and policy always have primacy. References have been provided throughout the document to the applicable policy or manual at the time of writing.

This training guide gives general examples, whereas every mission has specific local mission policies and standard operating practices. This training guide serves to explain the drivers of logistic planning to aid a planner in day to day activities. However, any specific policies/of the mission in which the user is deployed will have primacy, and should be sought out on arrival in mission. Local mission practices will vary, although the principles will remain the same. Above all, any military or police commander, planner or logistician is encouraged to engage early and often with their respective experts in Mission Support Division in order to ensure that any specific mission considerations have been incorporated.

To avoid any confusion in logistic matters: this reference complements but does not cover the material addressed in the *United Nations Military Unit Manual for Logistics Units*. It does not supersede the *2019 Authority Command and Control Policy*, or the *2020 COE Manual*.


# 1 Structure and Responsibilities of the UN from HQ down into Mission

## 1.1 Why UNHQ structure is relevant to logistics in field missions

From a Field mission perspective, UNHQ is a remote entity. This section introduces those aspects of UNHQ and the UN System which directly affect logistic support in mission, either because they are decision makers on key policy, or they represent the interests of the mission to decision makers.

This is important to understand, as a commander or planner could consume valuable time and staff effort debating over a procedure or rule in mission which is being driven by a decision that can only be changed at the Secretariat, General Assembly or Security Council. A commander or staff officer needs to understand this, in order to prioritise staff effort. Depending on the nature and criticality of the matter, a change that requires General Assembly (or sub-committee) approval (including changes to budget), may take multiple staff/troop rotations to resolve, and may require diplomatic coordination, and should be considered with a long-term perspective.

## 1.2 The United Nations System



This diagram illustrates how very many departments and offices are involved in the UN System. Consider where Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and Department of Operational Support (DOS) sits within this diagram. Consider the relative effort thus involved in raising a matter to the General Assembly outside of scheduled decision-making sessions.

### 1.2.1 Organs of the UN

It is important to understand the organs of the United Nations when understanding Logistics in Peacekeeping Missions. This is because many key considerations in mission are a function of decisions made at this level. Understanding these organs will assist a

<sup>2</sup> <https://iseek.un.org/node/698697/> contains translations in the six official languages

commander or planner to understand the level of engagement which would be required if a change in decision is sought.

The main organs of the UN are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the UN Secretariat. All were established in 1945 when the UN was founded<sup>3</sup>.

### 1.2.2 General Assembly (GA)

The General Assembly is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the UN. All 193 Member States <sup>4</sup>of the UN are represented in the General Assembly, making it the only UN body with universal representation. Each year, in September, the full UN membership meets in the General Assembly Hall in New York for the annual General Assembly session, and general debate, which many heads of state attend and address. Decisions on important questions, such as those on peace and security, admission of new members and budgetary matters, require a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. Decisions on other questions are by simple majority. The General Assembly, each year, elects a GA President to serve a one-year term of office. While the GA meets annually, many decisions are made or recommended at sub-committees which meet throughout the year.

Each of the 193 Member States in the Assembly has one vote. Votes taken on designated important issues— such as recommendations on peace and security, the election of Security Council and Economic and Social Council members, and budgetary questions— require a two-thirds majority of Member States, but other questions are decided by a simple majority.

The subsidiary organs of the General Assembly are divided into categories: Boards, Commissions, Committees, Councils and Panels, and Working Groups and others. After discussing the items on the agenda, seeking where possible to harmonize the various approaches of States, the subsidiary organs present their recommendations, usually in the form of draft resolutions and decisions, to a plenary meeting of the Assembly for its consideration.<sup>5</sup>

Two key committees that a commander or planner should be aware of are: the C34 (which reports to the 4<sup>th</sup> Committee) and the 5<sup>th</sup> Committee.

---

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/>

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.un.org/fr/member-states/index.html>

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/subsidiary/index.shtml>

Most staff officers or planners would have no direct engagement with these committees, but it is essential to understand at what level some key decisions are made. A decision which requires engagement outside the Mission requires considerably different approach than a decision which is within the discretion of the Mission leadership.

### 1.2.2.1 *5<sup>th</sup> Committee*

Administrative and Budgetary Committee is colloquially called the Fifth Committee. The Fifth Committee is the Committee of the General Assembly with responsibilities for administrative and budgetary matters. Based on the reports of the Fifth Committee, the General Assembly considers and approves the budget of the Organization in accordance with Chapter IV, Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations<sup>6</sup>.

### 1.2.2.2 *C34*

C34 is one of the General Assembly's tools for overseeing peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security Council. Established in 1965, the committee consists of 147 Member States involved in peacekeeping missions and observing members such as the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).

The Committee typically holds a substantive session in New York beginning in February and ending in March. At this session it reviews progress on its previous proposals, as well as consider new efforts to increase the capacity of the United Nations' peacekeeping operations. At the end of the session the Committee provides policy recommendations through its *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*.<sup>[6]</sup>

The Committee reports to the General Assembly on its work through the Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization).<sup>[6][7]</sup>

### 1.2.2.3 *Why should a commander or planner understand the GA?*

Many aspects of UN Policy are directed or underpinned by a General Assembly resolution. Examples include (but are not limited to)

*That all pre-deployment training of military and police personnel is the responsibility of Member States (GA 39/47 of 2009)*

To achieve change on these elements of policy, a mission would need to represent this issue up through the Secretariat, and through stakeholder Member States. A unit or force would need to represent the matter through their Permanent Mission to the United Nations. A change might require lobbying by the HOM, Force Commander and

---

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.un.org/en/ga/fifth/index.shtml>

affected Member States. Change is unlikely to be achieved within an individual commander's tenure.

A change in capacity or capability requirements in a mission would be debated in the C34, such as the introduction of an intelligence capability, or a gender engagement unit.

To achieve a change which has implications for the budget of a mission, the staff must be aware of the timeframes and decision-making bodies associated with changes to budget. Changes requiring an increase in budget (other than for an emergency matter), will not be resolved within a funding cycle. Such changes would require addressing substantiation through Fifth Committee for the following (or later) year's budget. This requires commanders, staff officers, police advisers and units to think in terms of funding cycles which are longer than their own rotation cycles, and which would may be aided by engagement through T/PCC's Permanent Missions, in addition to any arguments projected through the mission chain of command.

### 1.2.3 Security Council (SC)

The Security Council has primary responsibility, under the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has 15 Members (**5 permanent and 10 non-permanent members**). Each Member has one vote. Under the Charter, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions. The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Security Council has a **Presidency**, which rotates, and changes, every month.<sup>7</sup>

The **Security Council Military Staff Committee** is a United Nations Security Council subsidiary body whose role is defined by the United Nations Charter. The role of the Committee is "to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament."<sup>8</sup> It meets at least fortnightly to discuss the situation in the various missions

#### 1.2.3.1 *Why is the SC important to a commander or planner?*

The SC makes determinations regarding the mission's mandate, which is the ultimate 'mission statement' and "constraint" on what a mission is empowered and authorised to do. The Mandate sets the direction for the mission. If an action cannot be related to the

---

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/>

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/subsidiary/msc>



mandate, it is not authorised. Accordingly, the mandate drives issues such as rules of engagement (ROE), directions for the use of force (DUF), and prioritisation of allocation of resources. Issues of military requirements for a mission must be directed to the Security Council through the SC Military Staff Committee. DPO Office of Military Affairs represents military requirements to decision makers.

#### 1.2.4 Economic and Social Council

The **Economic and Social Council** is the principal body for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and recommendations on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as implementation of internationally agreed development goals. It serves as the central mechanism for activities of the UN system and its specialized agencies in the economic, social and environmental fields, supervising subsidiary and expert bodies. It has **54 Members**, elected by the General Assembly for overlapping three-year terms. It is the United Nations' central platform for reflection, debate, and innovative thinking on **sustainable development**.<sup>9</sup>

On a day to day level, a commander or planner will not normally need to consider the ESC, however there are organisations which may be stakeholders to your mission which fall under the ESC. This diversity of command may explain differences in priorities.

#### 1.2.5 Trusteeship Council

The Trusteeship Council was established in 1945 by the UN Charter, under Chapter XIII, to provide international supervision for 11 Trust Territories that had been placed under the administration of seven Member States, and ensure that adequate steps were taken to prepare the Territories for self-government and independence. By 1994, all Trust Territories had attained self-government or independence. The Trusteeship Council suspended operation on 1 November 1994. By a resolution adopted on 25 May 1994, the Council amended its rules of procedure to drop the obligation to meet annually and agreed to meet as occasion required -- by its decision or the decision of its President, or at the request of a majority of its members or the General Assembly or the Security Council.<sup>10</sup> This organ will not be dissolved unless the Charter is amended.

A commander or planner in a mission will not need to consider the Trusteeship Council. This handbook will not refer further to this organ.

#### 1.2.6 International Court of Justice (ICJ)

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Its seat is at the Peace Palace in the Hague (Netherlands). It is the only one of the six

---

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/>

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/>

principal organs of the United Nations not located in New York (United States of America). The Court's role is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies.

A commander or planner will not need to consider the ICJ. This handbook will not refer further to this organ.

### 1.2.7 Secretariat

The Secretariat comprises the Secretary-General and tens of thousands of international UN staff members who carry out the day-to-day work of the UN as mandated by the General Assembly and the Organization's other principal organs. The Secretary-General is chief administrative officer of the Organization, appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council for a five-year, renewable term.<sup>11</sup>

#### 1.2.7.1 *Why is the Secretariat important to a commander or planner?*

The Secretariat is the formal name of what is colloquially referred to as **United Nations Headquarters or UNHQ** and serves as close as can be described as the ultimate headquarters of any peacekeeping mission.

The Secretariat is vast and includes the management structures of many different UN organisations. The Secretariat includes, amongst many others, the **Department of Peace Operations** and the **Department of Operational Support**, the two departments which have the most influence on day to day operations within a mission, and who represent Field Mission requirements to decision makers.

## 1.3 Understanding the Secretariat (UNHQ)

The Secretariat, one of the main organs of the UN, is organized along departmental lines, with each department or office having a distinct area of action and responsibility. To have an understanding of the vast number of departments within the Secretariat, click this link: <https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/secretariat/index.html>

Within the Secretariat, the several key departments relevant to a commander or planner. These include the Department of Peace Operations, the Department of Operational Support. These Departments are structured very differently to a military strategic headquarters, and functions are managed differently, having regard to the responsibilities to report to the SC, GA and committees mentioned above.

---

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/>

### 1.3.1 Department of Peace Operations (DPO)

Previously known as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), DPO provides political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations around the world and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates. DPO is responsible for developing policy, planning and conducting peace-keeping operations; and acting as focal point between the Secretariat and Member States on all operational and administrative aspects of peacekeeping.

- Provides political and executive direction to UN Peace Operations
- Maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates.
- Integrate the efforts of UN, governmental and non-governmental entities.
- Provides guidance and support on military, police, mine action and other relevant issues to other UN political and peacebuilding missions.


Peacekeeping is political and its ultimate success depends on active and sustainable political processes or the real prospect of a peace process. The Department works to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental and non-governmental entities in the context of peacekeeping operations. DPO also provides guidance and support on military, police, mine action and other relevant issues to other UN political and peacebuilding missions<sup>12</sup>.

DPO structure is provided here. Note that the Department of Peace Operations operates hand in hand with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs through the operation of regional offices. These are not germane to logistic planning, however, and will not be discussed further.

---

<sup>12</sup> <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/department-of-peace-operations>

Chapter 1 – Structure and responsibilities from UN HQ to Mission



*Note in this diagram how Police and Military advisors work through quite distinct chains of command in the Headquarters. The sections which have been highlighted are further explained below*

### 1.3.1.1 *Police Division*

The Police Division was established in 2000 and is part of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions. <sup>13</sup>

It comprises the Office of the Police Adviser, the Strategic Policy and Development Section, the Selection and Recruitment Section, Mission Management and Support Section and the Standing Police Capacity. The Police Division is led by the United Nations Police Adviser.

The Police Division creates policy and guidance and is responsible for defining the parameters of international police peacekeeping. It also provides technical advice to the police components of UN peace operations. The Police Division further improves efforts to recruit, select, deploy and rotate highly qualified staff in missions and increasing the number of female officers in the UN police. In addition, it is developing partnerships for more effective delivery of its mandates.

#### 1.3.1.1.1 *Standing Police Capacity*

The United Nations Police Standing Police Capacity (SPC) is one of four sections of the Police Division. It assists in the fulfilment of the strategic mission of the UN Police by providing rapidly deployable, effective, and coherent policing expertise to UN peace operations during the start-up, reinforcement and transition phases, post conflict and other crisis situations.

The SPC provides officers with specialist knowledge and experience, including police reform and restructuring, public order, transnational organized crime, community-oriented policing, legal affairs, analysis, training, planning, logistics, budget and funds management, human resources, information and communication technology, investigations and gender advisory services. When deployed, SPC staff can serve in multi-hatted functions to:

- Provide start-up capability for new police components of UN peace operations.
- Assist existing UN peace operations through the provision of police and other law enforcement advice and expertise, including in preparation for transition and drawdown.
- The SPC may also conduct operational assessments and evaluations of UN police components as well as other relevant mandated duties as approved by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

---

<sup>13</sup> <https://police.un.org/en/un-police-division>

### 1.3.1.2 Office of Military Affairs

The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) works to deploy the most appropriate and effective military capability in peacekeeping missions. The core task of OMA is to provide military expertise to:

- DPO, DOS and other parts of the Secretariat and the UN System when requested,
- Member States and
- Military components in the United Nations peacekeeping missions

OMA is made up of the Office of the Military Advisor, three Services and two Teams, as listed below. It employs 100 seconded military and 27 civilian staff from over 50 member states who work to support the efficient and effective delivery of military capabilities for United Nations peacekeeping operations.

#### 1.3.1.2.1 Why does a Commander or Planner care about OMA

As detailed below in the discussion on AC2, OMA provides an advisory function to USG DPO. It might be equated more closely to the advisory function performed by military advisers in a government's Department of Defence, rather than performing the functions of a Joint Operations Command.

#### 1.3.1.2.2 Military Advisor (MILAD)

The MILAD is responsible for advising the Secretary-General, through the USG DPO, on the military implications of United Nations resolutions, plans, and mandates for operations in the field; and advises Force Commanders/Heads of Military Components on the implementation of these plans and mandates.

#### 1.3.1.2.3 The Force Generation Service (FGS)

The Service comprises a force generation team, a Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) team and a military personnel team. The core functions are:

- Act as the principal military point of contact with troop-contributing countries conducting the force generation process, including the generation and rotation of all military contingents and individuals, and supporting the selection process for senior UN military appointments;
- Participate in the contingent-owned equipment negotiation process, conclude memorandums of understanding for the timely deployment of troops and, when necessary, for the force adjustment, and provide technical advice on contingent-owned equipment claims by Member States, as required;

- Initiate and maintain records of service and performance for individuals and statistics and country profiles for all UN military deployments;
- Maintain records of the troop-contributing countries certification on code and conduct, screening and human rights-compliance for each unit before deployment / rotation;
- Develop, in collaboration with the Department of Operational Support, generic guidelines for troop-contributing countries and mission-specific military guidelines related to force requirements;
- Coordinate reconnaissance visits for troop-contributing countries providing contingents to peacekeeping operations;
- Conduct, with the support of the Department of Operational Support, assessment and advisory visits and pre-deployment visits to assess the capabilities and readiness of units before deployment;
- Maintain and update records of pledges made by Member States in the PCRS for the provision of troops, equipment and services to peacekeeping operations.

#### 1.3.1.2.4 The Military Planning Service (MPS)

The Service comprises three geographically based planning teams, a long-term planning team and specialist aviation and maritime operational planners. Its main functions are:

- Provide military-strategic planning advice to the Military Adviser;
- Conduct military-strategic planning for emerging and existing Department-led operations;
- Produce military guidance documents, including the command directive, military rules of engagement, military-strategic concepts of operation, and Statement of Unit Requirements;
- Monitor the military plans to reduce the time required to plan for major changes, including mission termination;
- Specify the force or operational requirements for individual military personnel, military formed units and unit equipment in new or revised concepts of operation and contingency plans.

#### 1.3.1.2.5 The Current Military Operations Service (CMOS)

The Service comprises three geographically based teams. Its core functions are:

- Provide advice to the heads of the military components of Department-led operations on technical aspects of military operations, such as contingency planning, force rotations and operational reporting, in coordination with the integrated operational teams, to ensure that military aspects are properly integrated or coordinated;
- Interact with permanent missions of Member States on all military technical operational issues, significant incidents, accidents, injuries, deaths, repatriations and other current issues;
- Provide the Military Adviser and, through the Under Secretary for Peace Operations (USG DPO) senior leadership at UN Headquarters with military information and analysis related to current events;
- Coordinate visits by Member States, the military and police advisers community and senior military staff from Headquarters to peacekeeping operations, brief visiting military individuals, groups or delegations and coordinate the briefing and debriefing process for senior military officials in peacekeeping operations;
- Coordinate responses by the Office of Military Affairs to disciplinary issues involving military personnel.

#### 1.3.1.2.6 Assessment Team (AT)

The core function of the Assessment Team is to gather, analyse and assess information on:

- The military situation in the areas of Department-led operations;
- Military threats to current and potential operations;

in close coordination with the United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre, Integrated Operational Teams, the Department of Safety and Security, Member States and other designated interlocutors.

#### 1.3.1.2.7 Policy and Doctrine Team (PDT)

The core functions of the Policy and Doctrine Team are:

- Contribute to the development of UN system-wide frameworks and doctrines relating to peacekeeping;
- Develop standards, policies and training material to strengthen performance of the military components deployed in peace operations;
- Serve as focal point for liaison and partnerships with military elements of international and regional organizations as well as for civil-military coordination with



humanitarian organizations, think tanks, and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes.<sup>1415</sup>

### 1.3.2 Department of Operational Support (DOS)

Previously known as the Department of Field Support (DFS) DOS provides operational support to all UN Secretariat entities, including advisory, operational and transactional support services and, where needed, exercises delegated authority on behalf of clients. DOS supports the entire UN Secretariat, consisting of almost 100 entities located around the globe.<sup>16</sup>

DOS consists of three offices working in the areas of Support Operations, including human resources, health-care management and capacity-building, Supply Chain Management and Information and Communication Technology. Operational Support means supply chain, engineering, environmental management as well as information and communication technology.

Apart from the divisions, UN Field Support also includes a Global Service Centre located in Brindisi, Italy and Valencia, Spain, a Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda, as well as a Joint Support Office in Kuwait. They perform location-independent functions, i.e., services that can be provided on a shared basis and/or provided from anywhere. The Global Service Centre mainly focuses on delivering operational support to missions regarding supply chain, engineering, environmental management as well as information and communication technology. In Entebbe and Kuwait, transactional and administrative support in the areas Human Resources and Finance is provided to field missions. In addition to these service centres, the Regional Procurement Office (RPO) support regional procurement from Entebbe, Uganda.<sup>17</sup>

The primary components of DOS which affect uniformed logistics support needs in mission fall within Supply Chain Management branch and are discussed further below.

The primary Division of DOS which of interest to a logistic planner is Uniformed Capability Support Division which fall under the Office of Supply Chain Management.

#### 1.3.2.1 Uniformed Capability Support Division (UCSD)

Uniformed Capabilities Support Division is responsible for:

---

<sup>14</sup> <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/office-of-military-affairs>

<sup>15</sup> <https://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community/about>

<sup>16</sup> <https://operationalsupport.un.org/en>


<sup>17</sup> <https://operationalsupport.un.org/en/organizational-structure-0>


- Processing reimbursement to T/PCCs (reimbursement for personnel, equipment, self-sustainment and for LOAs)
- Oversight of the COE Framework and other policies and procedures for equipment verification and control
- Preparation of MOUs for military and police contingents
- Liaison with contributing countries and support for policy forums
- Cost and performance analysis with regard T/PCC reimbursement

A mission or a Member State may consult with UCSD during MOU negotiations for the deployment of a new military or police unit (recalling that an MOU is signed between a T/PCC and USG DOS). The mission seeks guidance from UCSD with regard implementation of the COE Manual.

It should be noted that UCSD is not authorised to vary the COE Manual directly. Because of the financial implications, the COE Manual is decided in negotiation with Member States, and changes are authorised by the General Assembly.

### 1.3.3 DOS Organisational Chart





## 1.4 Command and Control of UN Logistics

The responsibility for direct administration and logistic support to peacekeeping missions within UNHQ is detailed below. Be aware that many concepts of authority, command, control and delegation were reviewed as recently as 2019 as part of the UN Reform. This means that personnel with experience prior to this time may discover that their next UN

deployment has a different decision-making structure. A considerable amount of decision making has been delegated to missions. A natural result of this is variation between missions as the HOM considers what is needed to best achieve that mandate. Another natural consequence is that the decision-making structure continues to evolve over time.

#### 1.4.1 Authority, Command and Control Policy (AC2)

##### 1.4.1.1 Overview

The UN DPO/DOS Authority, Command and Control (AC2) Policy<sup>18</sup> applies to all personnel involved in the planning of United Nations peacekeeping missions and in the implementation of their mandates. This policy defines and describes the AC2 arrangements at the Headquarters and mission levels; the responsibilities of the Head of Mission (HOM) and other senior mission leadership and mission integration and control arrangements. The policy also specifies the responsibilities retained by Member States over their military and police contingents and units serving in United Nations peacekeeping missions

This policy lays out the freedoms and restraints available to the Force or Police Contingent. It is worthy of detailed review by incoming commanders and departmental chiefs (such as Chief U4, Chief U5), as it contains some marked differences in authority to utilise or allocate resources.

Past deployed uniformed personnel state that specifics of the AC2 policy are one of the largest sources of friction in integrated Missions. This is because AC2 represents a substantial departure from the command structure that any national contingent, or indeed Force Commander, might anticipate. This unique structure is not simply a factual change. It fundamentally changes the way that operations must be planned and resourced. This requires a re-examination of many unconscious practices associated with military or police planning. Above any other policy, it is essential that commanders, logisticians and planners understand not only the content of AC2, but its implications.

##### 1.4.1.2 Key elements of AC2

This policy applies to all personnel involved in the planning of United Nations peacekeeping missions and in the implementation of their mandates. It defines and describes the AC2 arrangements at the Headquarters and mission levels; the responsibilities of the Head of Mission (HOM) and other senior mission leadership and mission integration and control arrangements. It also specifies the responsibilities retained by Member States over their military and police contingents and units serving in United

---

<sup>18</sup> 2019.23 UN DPO/DOS Policy on Authority Command and Control 25 Oct 2019

Nations peacekeeping missions. This is essential in understanding the freedoms and limitations of tasking.

1.4.1.2.1 AC2 at UN HQ level

Appointment	Responsibilities	Consequence
<b>USG DPO</b>	Providing political and policy guidance and strategic direction to the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), and peacekeeping operations. Guidance is based on Security Council mandates and General Assembly resolutions	Note that DPO decisions are guided by SC and GA activity – accordingly many policy decisions (including the nature of the AC2 framework) require GA or SC majority to change.
<b>USG for Operational Support (DOS)</b>	Responsible for operational support to United Nations Secretariat entities globally, including peace operations. This support includes advisory, operational and transactional support services in the areas of administration, supply chain, logistics, health care management, personnel and information and communications technology	As a result, Mission Support is often constrained by policy or guidance provided by DOS (which in turn must meet direction provided by SC or GA)
	<p>The USG DOS signs the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Troop/Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) in accordance with the Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Manual. This drives how T/PCCs are reimbursed for their troop or police contributions.</p> <p>The USG DOS sub-delegates authority to the Assistant Secretary General for Supply Chain Management for all procurement activity, including Letters of Assist (LoAs) with Member States for the provision of mission military enabling assets</p>	<p>The MOU, underpinned by the COE Manual, defines the capability requirements of contingents – and the reimbursement allocated for that purpose.</p> <p>The locus of authority of different parts of the MOU/COE framework shape who (in both UNHQ and in the mission) is able to make decisions on finance and resource consumption.</p>
<b>The USG for Safety and</b>	is accountable and responsible to the Secretary-General for the executive direction and control of the UNSMS	Accordingly, DSS takes certain responsibilities for the assessment of safety and

<b>Security (USG UNDSS)</b>	and for the safety and security of United Nations personnel and their recognized dependents both at UNHQ and in the field, in accordance with the Framework of Accountability of the UNSMS	security within mission. These may be assessments (or parts of assessments) which a Force or Police may be more used to conducting internally, such as within the Intelligence/ISR function
-----------------------------	--	---

## 1.5 General concepts to for a Commander and Planner to understand

The Secretariat does not operate like a military headquarters. It is a civilian organisation with military advisors, but which makes decisions using its own processes which must be understood independently of prior experience. The Secretariat provides essential advisory and administrative functions and facilitates the interaction between the mission and the key organs (SC and GA and related committees). In particular, Office of Military Affairs and the Police Division provides advice to key decision makers. Engaging with the Secretariat is required (and valuable), firstly to achieve short term administrative processes, and secondly to understand the factors which will affect a decision being presented to an SC/GA committee. Thirdly, the Secretariat must be engaged to ensure decisions being presented to decision-makers correctly reflect the considerations of the mission. The secretariat (DPO or DOS) will be responsible for preparing the decision briefs and documents which would influence this decision. Therefore, engaging with the right stakeholders, through the right processes will ensure the missions concerns are properly represented.

Note that many aspects of policy guiding or constraining the mission are set at the international level. Where USG DOS or DPO has established policy, it is to execute the will expressed by the General Assembly. In some cases, the specific policy or constraint was explicitly determined by the GA.

### **Commanders or planners in mission need to understand this in order to**

**>Understand when and how to engage with the Secretariat**

**>Consider if a matter can be resolved in mission within delegation of authority or must be escalated**

**>Appreciate that some of the most challenging aspects of UN missions arise from constraints applied by the Member States.**

It is incredibly common for uniformed commanders to expend considerable staff effort seeking to change the system to suit uniformed expectations. This can consume staff time an effort needed to deliver meaningful planning and support, especially if attempting to change decisions made in General Assembly or Security Council, in effect made by the

Member States of the UN, not the Mission or the Secretariat. A sage commander, planner or logistician will appreciate the value of prioritising staff effort with regard for whether such investment will achieve reasonable improvement in proportion to the effort involved.

## 2 General structure and components of a UN Peace Operations Mission – Force, Police, MSD, Civilian

### 2.1 Structure

#### 2.1.1 Head of Mission (HOM).

Depending on the mandate and make-up of a particular operation, the SG may appoint a military Force Commander (FC) or Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to exercise overall command of all components of a UN operation (electoral, civil affairs, military, police, administration, etc.). If a SRSG is appointed, he or she may also coordinate the activities of UN Agencies, Funds and Programs (UNAFPs) (such as UNHCR, WHO, UNICEF).

#### 2.1.2 Components

While every UN Mission is tailored to meet the mission, the environment and limits of funding imposed by the funding member states, the common components are military, police and civilian, which are considered substantive components that implement mandated tasks. For UN peacekeeping, “substantive” refers to essential work or the tasks set by the mission mandate that is carried out by UN military, police and civilian components. Substantive components directly assist local and national partners. By working together on mandated tasks, military, police and civilians help strengthen the foundation for sustainable peace. Components and units need to work together on different tasks to support the same mandate. This challenges all peacekeeping operations.

##### 2.1.2.1 *Civilian Component:*

Comprised of two major entities:

**Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG)** - One Deputy is often termed the Principal DSRSG, responsible for political, operational and rule of law aspects of the mission. The Principal DSRSG is the second in command and becomes Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the mission when the HOM/SRSG travels. HOM/SRSG delegates management of mission operations to this DSRSG.

**DRSG/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator** - The second DSRSG often serves as Resident Coordinator (RC). The RC leads the UN Country Team (UNCT). In that role, the RC represents and coordinates UN development work of the UN agencies, funds and programmes. The RC is the main point of contact for UNCT with heads of state and government. The second DSRSG may also be appointed UN Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC). A DSRSG serving as RC and HC is “triple-hatted”. The HC heads the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). The HCT has representatives from: UNCT, International and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement – which includes the International Committee of the Red Cross



(ICRC) and International financial institutions (IFIs) – for example, World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The HC coordinates emergency and humanitarian response and operations.

#### 2.1.2.2 *Military Component*

The Head of Military Component (HOMC) or Force Commander (FC) reports to the HOM and has 'UN Operational Control' over all military personnel and units assigned to the mission. This covers formed military units or contingents, military experts on mission and staff officers. This delegated authority lets the HOMC deploy and direct forces for specific tasks. Specific tasks involve those limited by time, function and location. The HOMC may also delegate military personnel and units under 'UN Tactical Control' of a subordinate military commander. This allows local direction of personnel, assisting tactical missions and tasks. The HOMC is the principal adviser to the HOM on military issues.


#### 2.1.2.3 *Police Component*

The Head of Police Component (HOPC or Police Commissioner (PC) reports to the HOM and has 'UN Operational Control' over all UN Police (UNPOL) in a peacekeeping operation. This covers UN Individual Police Officers (IPOs), Specialised Police Teams (SPTs), Formed Police Units (FPUs) – and when deployed to the mission, members of the Standing Police Capacity (SPC). The HOPC may assign separate tasks within the mission area to individual FPUs. The HOPC may delegate this authority to subordinate police officers for specific purposes. The HOPC is the principal adviser to the HOM on police issues.

#### 2.1.2.4 *Support Component - Mission Support Division (MSD)*

The support component is responsible for necessary mission logistics and administrative support and is headed by the Director or Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS). DMS/CMS makes sure logistical and administrative support is provided to the mission and is a civilian. The DMS/CMS is the most senior UN official in the mission authorised to spend UN funds from mission budget. Three civilian subordinate officials may support the DMS/CMS. These are

- 1) Chief Operations and Resource Management,
- 2) Chief Service Delivery Management and
- 3) Chief Supply Chain Management. This combines civilian and military services.



## 2.2 AC2 within the mission

### 2.2.1 Key terms:

The following important terms are defined in AC2 policy in Section E and have been included in the Glossary.

These terms are important to understand because they differ from the command and controls concepts of many countries. Casual users of these terms will make incorrect assumptions

The important terms are:

**United Nations Operational Authority** The authority transferred by the Member States to the United Nations to use the operational capabilities of their national military contingents, units, FPU and individual military and police personnel to undertake mandated missions and tasks. United Nations Operational Authority over such forces and personnel is vested in the Secretary-General and through him in the head of a specific mission, under the authority of the Security Council. The Secretary-General exercises that authority under the overall authority of the Security Council. United Nations Operational Authority involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits:

**United Nations Operational Command and Control** The authority delegated to a Military or Police Commander for the direction, coordination and control of uniform personnel under his or her command. Operational command and control includes the authority to assign tasks, designate objectives and give direction to individual uniformed personnel, units and sub-units necessary to accomplish the mission.

**United Nations Tactical Command and Control** The authority delegated to a Military or Police Commander to assign specific tasks to forces under his or her command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by a higher authority. Tactical control is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements and activities

necessary to accomplish the assigned tasks. It may be delegated to and exercised at the level of subordinate sector and/or unit commanders.

**Administrative Control.** The authority over subordinate or other organizations within national contingents for administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other non-operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Administrative Control is a national responsibility given to the NCC in a peacekeeping mission.

**Tasking Authority** The authority vested in specified senior mission leaders (HOMC, HOPC, or D/CMS) to assign tasks to mission enabling assets and deploy, redeploy and employ all or part of an enabling asset to achieve the mission's mandate.

**Technical Reporting.** A secondary reporting line for informational and technical purposes on matters not relating to the command and control of operations, or to national administrative control. It is an informational and technical advisory communication link that should in no case circumvent the primary reporting line and command/supervisory relationships, through which formal direction and tasking is issued. Technical reporting lines must be transparent and formalized in approved documentation (e.g. Secretary-General's Bulletins, Inter-organizational agreements, etc.).

Appointment	Description	Logistic Consequence
<b>Head of Mission (HOM)</b>	<p>Reports to the Secretary General through the USG DPO</p> <p>responsibility for implementation of the mission mandate and authority for managing the resources of the mission</p> <p>If the most senior UN official in the area, is also the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG).</p> <p>In rare occasions, the Force Commander is also the HOM, however this is unusual.</p>	<p>The Secretary-General delegates authority to manage the human, financial and physical resources of the mission to the HOM<sup>19</sup></p> <p>HOM may sub-delegate the authority to subordinate United Nations personnel on a functional basis, however delegations are advised by both DOS and overseen by DMSPC.</p> <p>If an organisation does not have capacity to exercise a delegation, it may be exercised by DOS. This means</p>

<sup>19</sup> under the framework established in ST/SGB/2019/2

		DOS may make decisions on behalf of the Mission.
<b>Mission Chief of Staff</b>	<p>Responsible to HOM for ensuring coherence across all organisational units of the mission in executing the directives of the HOM.</p> <p>Integration and control structures under the COS include the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism, Mission Planning Unit (MPU), Joint Mission Analysis Centre, (JMAC), Joint Operations Centre (JOC), Conduct and Discipline Unit and Policy and Best Practices Officer.</p>	These are functions which a military or police force may expect to be internalised within their own command.
<b>Head of Military Component (HOMC)</b>  <b>(Force Commander (FC)<sup>20</sup> or Chief Military Observer(CMO))</b>	<p>Reports to the HOM, exercises “UN operational command and control” over all United Nations military personnel and units in the mission and establishes the military operational chain of command</p> <p>Maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPO Military Adviser (MILAD) at UNHQ</p>	<p>Note that the Force Commander is therefore (with rare exception) reporting to a civilian mission leader.</p> <p>Reporting to MILAD must not circumvent the direct chain of command.</p> <p>While the HOMC has UN operational command and control over all military units, military Enabling Units are tasked by DMS.</p>
<b>Head of Police Component (HOPC)</b>  <b>(Police Commissioner – PC)</b>	<p>Reports to the HOM ; exercises “UN operational command and control” over all United Nations police personnel and units in the mission including Individual Police Officers (IPOs), Formed Police Units (FPUs), specialized police teams and United</p>	<p>Note that Police and Military Contingents each report separately to HOM, while requiring prioritisation/deconfliction of mission support.</p>

<sup>20</sup> In missions where there is a Force Commander, the HOMC is simply referred to as the Force Commander (FC). HOMC is used in this handbook to reflect terminology used in AC2 Policy, which acknowledges that some missions' military components are led by a CMO.

	Nations civilian personnel serving in the Police Component	
<b>Director/Chief of Mission Support (depending on size of mission)</b>	<p>D/CMS reports to the HOM and is responsible to the HOM for the effective provision of support to all mission organizational units in the areas of supply chain, service delivery and operational resource management, in accordance with their delegated authority.</p> <p>The D/CMS advises and represents the HOM on the management of financial, human and physical resources of the mission in support of the mission's mandate. The D/CMS exercises authority sub-delegated by the HOM.</p> <p>The DMS has UN Tasking Authority over Enabling Units.</p>	<p>Note that the D/CMS does not report to the HOMC or HOPC, but rather has equal standing with both.</p> <p>The D/CMS is responsible for both coordinating the allocation of scarce assets needed by multiple components, but also is financially responsible for the resource consumption of the mission.</p>
<b>Mission Leadership Team (MLT)</b>	<p>Supports the HOM in the execution of functions and in ensuring coordination and consultative decision making on strategic and operational issues. Will typically include: HOM, DSRSG; Humanitarian Coordinator, COS, HOMC (or Deputy), HOPC (or Deputy), D/CMS, Principle/Chief Security advisor, Senior Legal Advisor and other civilian heads</p>	<p>Prioritisation for scarce resources, especially high demand logistic support assets, such as aviation, will be first set here.</p> <p>Many uniformed planning processes assume the ability to control prioritisation of such assets within that service. Uniformed operational planning processes must adapt to reflect that priority of access to assets or support which are pivotal to the success of an operation cannot be assumed but must be negotiated through the MLT.</p>
<b>Head of Field Office</b>	Head of Field Office represents the HOM and is responsible for the coherence of the mandate	It can be unexpected for uniformed commanders to discover that they must

	<p>implementation, consistent with the strategic and policy guidance provided by HOM and MLT through COS or DSRSG.</p> <p>Heads of Field Office do not hold command or control authority over the uniformed components, however Military and Police commanders at sector level must coordinate with the Head of Field Office, and with Mission Support Staff.</p> <p>Heads of Field Office are responsible for convening regional management team meetings with uniformed commanders and civilian personnel. Amongst other purposes, these meeting are to coordinate police, military and joint operations between one another and with UN civilian personnel and to ensure joint handling of local crisis situations</p>	<p>coordinate with several civilian entities before planning. It is possible that the uniformed component may not have priority over logistic support, and commanders (and their staff) will need to negotiate for the support needed for specific operations.</p> <p>Planners/logisticians will need to ensure planning processes incorporate the regional management team meeting inputs and that support needs are communicated clearly and early to this meeting.</p>
--	---	---

### 2.2.2 Mission Integration and Control Arrangements

Mechanisms for integration and control have been established for missions to facilitate the achievement of mission objectives. These are supported administratively either by the COS, or D/CMS. These include:

- Mission Leadership Team (MLT);
- Security Management Team (SMT);
- Mission Planning Unit (MPU);
- Joint Operations Centre (JOC);
- Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC);
- Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Structure;<sup>50</sup>
- MSC, MAOC, or other integrated sections/offices in MSD, or equivalent;
- Crisis Management Team;

- COE/Memorandum of Understanding Management Review Board (CMMRB);
- Integrated Mission Training Centre; and <sup>52</sup>
- Coordination Mechanisms at Tactical Level.

More information about each of these organisations is provided in AC2 Policy in Section D. Three key organisations are described below as requiring the attention of uniformed planners and logisticians:

Organisation	Description	Logistic Consequences
<b>MPU</b>	<p>The MPU is responsible for initiating, organizing and leading mission-wide planning processes under the guidance of the HOM and COS. These may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategic and programmatic level mission planning including the development, coordination and implementation of a Mission Plan. The Mission Plan translates the strategic guidance in the Mission Concept into an operational plan spanning all priority areas of the mission's work</li> <li>• Political guidance for mandate implementation and mission-wide direction set by the HOM;</li> <li>• United Nations system-wide assessment and planning frameworks, such as the ISF (or equivalent), UNSDCF and Humanitarian Response Plan, as appropriate;</li> <li>• Coordination of mission-wide contingency plans;</li> <li>• Development and coordination of the results-based budget framework associated with mission budget development to ensure that substantive objectives are supported by resources;</li> </ul>	<p>Any plans or contingencies established by the MPU will influence resources available for component-level operational planning. This will include whether there are funds available for ad hoc requests, and the priority that would be allocated to resource requests, depending on whether they fall within or outside of the MPU 's primary guidance.</p> <p>If, for any reason, an overall Mission Plan has not been produced or updated, this can create considerable uncertainty for uniformed personnel in U4, U5 roles, and for those seconded into Mission Support Centre.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementation of CPAS within the mission; and</li> <li>• Coordination or support to the peacekeeping-intelligence planning process.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>JOC<sup>21</sup></b></p>	<p>The JOC is an integrated entity supporting mission decision-makers through the provision of integrated situational awareness through routine and special incident reporting, the facilitated planning and coordination of operations and support to crisis management JOCs and JMACs shall align their activities to avoid any gaps and overlap in the provision of situational awareness and analysis support to mission leadership.</p> <p>Mission organizational units contribute civilian and uniformed United Nations personnel to the JOC, ensuring that appropriate expertise is made available for the effective integration of mission operations.<sup>56</sup> The Chief JOC is First or Second Reporting Officer for all United Nations personnel assigned to the JOC and exercises tasking authority over all United Nations personnel assigned to the JOC.</p> <p>During crises, the JOC supports mission crisis management coordination mechanisms. Acting as the primary 24/7 link between UNHQ via the United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) and the mission during crisis activation Missions may establish permanent or temporary JOCs at the regional (or sector/team site) level. The JOC is responsible for the provision of technical advice and liaison with regional JOCs, if</p>	<p>Operational planning should seek to deliberately integrate with JOC to ensure all planning is conducted with a common operating picture.</p> <p>Planners should consider whether logistic intelligence requirements need to be communicated with the JOC</p> <p>Note the command structure – Uniformed JOC personnel report to Chief JOC, not to HOMC or HOPC.</p>

<sup>21</sup> For more information see DPO Policy and Guidelines on Joint Operations Centres (2019)



	<p>present, and for ensuring that such liaison is undertaken in consultation with the respective Head(s) of Field Office. Regional JOCs comprise of civilian and uniformed United Nations personnel and contribute to regional integrated situational awareness and reporting, support crisis response efforts and facilitate integrated operations coordination.</p>	
<p><b>JMAC</b></p>	<p>The JMAC is responsible for collecting and analysing multi-source information, including peacekeeping-intelligence related material to produce integrated analysis and predictive assessments in support of MLT decision-making, contingency planning and crisis management. Mission organizational units shall contribute civilian and uniformed United Nations personnel to the JMAC, ensuring that appropriate expertise is made available for the effective acquisition, collation, analysis, coordination and dissemination of intelligence products.</p> <p>The Chief JMAC ensures that the JMAC serves as a decision-support and planning-support tool for the HOM and MLT in implementing the mission’s mandate. The Chief JMAC, in consultation with the HOM and the MLT, shall establish mission information requirements to guide JMAC tasking, analysis and reporting. The HOM and COS are responsible for ensuring that critical information on risk and threats is passed in a timely manner to all mission organizational units. The Chief JMAC is First or Second Reporting Officer for all United Nations personnel assigned to the JMAC and exercises tasking authority over all United Nations personnel assigned to the JMAC.</p>	<p>Planners should consider whether logistic intelligence requirements need to be communicated with the JMAC</p> <p>Note the command structure – Uniformed MSC personnel report to Chief MSC, not to HOMC or HOPC</p>

<p><b>MSC</b></p>	<p>The MSC is a joint civilian/uniformed unit within the Operations &amp; Resource Management (ORM) pillar of the MSD. The MSC provides an interface for integrated and logistical support to the mission.</p> <p>The Chief MSC reports to the Chief ORM and manages the tasking and coordination of all requests for logistics and support, on behalf of the D/CMS. All logistics and support requests must be submitted to the MSC for appropriate action.</p> <p>The D/CMS, Chief ORM and Chief MSC, in consultation with the MLT, shall guide MSC tasking and regularly review the prioritization of mission support activities.</p> <p>The Chief MSC is First or Second Reporting Officer for all United Nations personnel assigned to the MSC and exercises tasking authority over all United Nations personnel assigned to the MSC.</p> <p>MSC will be outlined in greater detail later in this Chapter</p>	<p>Any operational plans need to be consulted early and often with the MSC.</p> <p>Further, the MSC is the first point of contact for any ad-hoc support or acquisition requests (unless local policy dictates differently)</p> <p>Note the command structure – Uniformed MSC personnel report to Chief MSC, not to HOMC or HOPC. They are not merely a Liaison Officer for the Force/Police Component, nor are they representatives of their individual TCC/PCC's needs.</p> <p>This can challenge some commanders who may expect logistic representatives to be focussed on the Force/Police Component; and can challenge some T/PCCs who could expect personnel to advocate for national interests.</p>
-------------------	--	--

### 2.2.3 Lines of Authority, Command and Control

Commanders and planners are strongly encouraged to review Section D of AC2 Policy in detail, as it contains specific direction on authority, structures, and chain of command of each component.

This section draws out certain key aspects which have specific impact on planning for logistic support to operations.

<p><b>AC2 Policy states:</b></p>	<p><b>Consequences for logistic planning for operational support</b></p>
<p><b>United Nations Operational Authority</b></p> <p>The HOM has authority over all United Nations personnel deployed in a mission including the authority transferred by Member States to the United Nations to use the operational capabilities of their national military contingents, FPU, and military and police personnel to undertake mandated tasks. This is “UN operational authority”<sup>22</sup> The HOM exercises authority over uniformed components through the heads of those components.</p> <p>The HOMC and HOPC are accountable to the HOM for the management of the Military/Police (respectively) Component with responsibility to ensure effective mandate implementation consistent with the Mission Plan and in compliance with United Nations policies and procedures. Decisions on major military operations, or redeployment of troops within the mission area of operations, should result from consultations between the HOM, COS, HOPC and the D/CMS and must have the HOM’s concurrence</p>	<p>Operational plans (and associated logistic support needs) must not be made in isolation of the mission.</p> <p>AC2 policy requires that major operations must have HOM concurrence.</p> <p>To have this concurrence, support requirements must have been well researched, which requires engagement with Mission Support Division early and often to confirm any risks to support.</p>
<p><b>UN Operational Command and Control</b></p> <p>The heads of the uniformed components have “UN operational command and control”<sup>23</sup> over their troops/uniformed units/personnel. Where joint military/police/civilian operations are undertaken the HOM will ensure that command and control structures are established, and regular exercises conducted to test those structures.</p>	<p>While HOMC/HOPC has UN operational command and control, this is limited to the resourcing and capability agreed in the MOUs agreed for each unit. Mission Support Division is able to provide advice on the MOU/COE framework for each unit, which provides the basis for understanding each unit’s capability.</p>

<sup>22</sup> UN Operational Authority policy definition as per AC2 policy is found in the Glossary

<sup>23</sup> UN Operational Command and Control definition as per AC2 policy is found in the Glossary

### Integrated Personnel

United Nations uniformed personnel may be selected by the respective head of component to serve within civilian, integrated or other mission organizational units, for example, the Mission Support Centre (MSC), Service Delivery/Supply Chain Management, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), JOC, JMAC, MPU or Mission Air Operations Centre (MAOC).<sup>31</sup> Likewise, United Nations civilian personnel may be selected to serve within the uniformed components, integrated or joint offices, including Field Offices.

Having police and military personnel in these mission level organisational units has been found to significantly improve the effectiveness of planning and resource management across military, police and civilian pillars.

Such personnel must be treated as representatives of their allocated unit (MSC, JMAC etc), providing police and military expertise, not merely liaison officers acting on behalf of the police or military component.

### Administrative Control

The Contributing Member State (T/PCC) retains “administrative control” over non-operational administrative issues (such as benefits and salaries) of deployed uniformed contingent personnel and units.

Administrative control over uniformed contingents and units is exercised by an NCC deployed within the mission area. This authority is limited to administrative matters and must not adversely influence the management and conduct of United Nations operations within a mission area.

Outside the operational chain of command, the HOMC and HOPC shall establish a coordination chain with the T/PCC-designated NCC. Uniformed personnel assigned to serve under “UN operational command and control” must not act on national direction or instruction. As such, they are not under national operational control. If uniformed personnel receive instructions from national authorities, they must immediately inform their United Nations chain of command. If such instructions are contrary to United Nations orders, instructions, directions or policies, the mission will report them immediately to

Units have been provided to the UN under a Memorandum of Understanding which defines the capabilities, equipment and personnel that will be provided.

A military employment issue may arise as a result of differences in the way a military unit, or personnel, is utilised by the United Nations relative to how national military doctrine (or guidance) would dictate. This may concern, for example, tasks to be performed, disposition of military unit or personnel, or conflict with rules of engagement.

<p>UNHQ who will take the issue up, as required, with the contributing Member State.<sup>24</sup></p>	
<p><b>Logistics – Common to the Mission</b></p> <p>The United Nations is required to maintain a mission support system that integrates military and police logistical enabling support assets contributed by Member States to the United Nations, as well as civilian assets, and commercially contracted assets to provide support to the mission. <b>All mission support functions, regardless of their origin, are considered common to the mission.</b> These resources must be made available on a uniform and equitable basis, depending on priorities determined by the HOM, <b>irrespective of whether the provider of the goods or service is military, United Nations civilian or contractor.</b></p> <p>The management of logistical support is integrated under the D/CMS<sup>25</sup>. The purpose of this arrangement is to provide efficient administrative and logistics support to the mission through the optimization of mission resources</p>	<p>This fact often causes dissonance to a military commander who has read the definition of UN Operational Command and Control which appears to indicate that military logistic/enabling units are under military command.</p> <p>The fact that military enabling units are controlled by the D/CMS in order to ensure equitable support across the mission requires a deliberate change to operational planning processes, and in fact, command thinking</p> <p>This is because military planning processes generally assume that enabling units are actively working with them to anticipate their needs. Many commanders are used to having experienced logistic personnel who “make support happen” even when seemingly impossible.</p> <p>Instead, the force must take responsibility for explicitly calculating and forecasting its needs, and then</p>

<sup>24</sup> See 2019.23 Policy on Authority, Command and Control section D for further information on how to resolve issues of military or police employment between Member States and the Mission

<sup>25</sup> The exception is the intimate logistic support provided by organic capacity within a unit (known as integral or first line support)

	<p>negotiating for this support with the other mission components who also need this support.</p>
<p><b>Enabling Units - Tasking Authority</b></p> <p>The D/CMS, as delegated by the HOM, is responsible and accountable for the effective utilization and tasking of all United Nations commercial/military mission enabling assets</p> <p>Enabling assets (sometimes called Enabling Units) consist of construction engineer units, Unmanned Aerial Systems, manned airborne ISR aircraft, enabling assets with composite engineer units, medical, utility and cargo military aircraft, logistics units, signal, transportation and movement units and supply. The classification of these units is agreed in the Statement of Unit Requirement (SUR), MOU/Letter of Assist (LOA) prior to deployment.</p> <p>The MSC (or equivalent section/office in MSD) is the mission integration and control mechanism responsible for ensuring the coordinated implementation of mission priority tasks, including the necessary resources.</p>	<p>This command arrangement can be challenging to commanders who are used to such units being in close support to their organisation.</p> <p>Support which ordinarily would automatically be planned and continuously provided as a normal function of the chain of command may now need to be explicitly requested, and/or may only be intermittently available, subject to the needs of other pillars.</p>
<p><b>Aviation</b></p> <p>Planning, coordination, and scheduling of all mission aviation assets is managed through the MAOC in compliance with the mission priorities, as determined by the HOM, to ensure final coordination amongst the necessary mission components and appropriate oversight and support is provided</p>	<p>In many missions, air is the only means of transport during certain seasons. Aviation is always scarce, and any need to have the capability on standby (such as for CASEVAC) may come at an unsustainable cost to the mission as a whole.</p> <p>Operational planning in which success relies on aviation transport (for troops, sustainment or casualty evacuation) must be closely coordinated.</p>
<p><b>Combat Units (including combat aviation)</b></p>	


<p>The HOMC exercises sole tasking authority over all combat units, i.e. attack helicopters and combat engineers. Tasking is done in coordination with and/or through the MSC and MAOC, as necessary</p>	<p>While HOMC retains the sole tasking authority, note the coordination requirement.</p>
<p><b>Quick reaction, including CASEVAC</b></p> <p>All missions shall establish standing approval procedures for tasking of mission enabling assets on short notice in times of operational urgency (e.g. deployment of Quick Reaction Forces, high-risk operations launched on short notice), and process for CASEVAC (in accordance with the CASEVAC Policy) to be communicated by the MLT to all mission organizational units.</p> <p>In larger missions, which may have Field Offices and/or military sector HQs at sub-national level, authority for CASEVAC operations should be decentralised and delegated to these offices and HQs, where appropriate. The Mission Health Support Plan and CASEVAC SOP must articulate where delegated launch authorities within the CASEVAC system rest in the mission.</p>	<p>Before arriving in mission, it is difficult for uniformed planners to appreciate how complex it can be to launch a Quick Reaction Force or CASEVAC at short notice. Factors may include prior tasking of the transport asset, host nation movement restrictions or permission processes, individual unit familiarity with aviation assets, civilian air regulations, interaction with civilian contracts.</p> <p>Where such support is critical, planners and logisticians must wargame and rehearse the quick release in order to understand mission-specific limitations and how that may change in different sectors.</p>

### 2.2.3.1 *Implications of AC2*

- DMS tasking of enabling units despite UN operational command control by FC
- Military and Police are supporting efforts to a civilian led mission<sup>26</sup>. Military and Police components are designed to create the conditions for civilian pillars to operate (such as DDR, Security Sector Reform, Protection of Civilians, Women, Peace and Security outcomes, Elections etc) to achieve the mission mandate, and will receive support from MSD in accordance with mission priorities.

<sup>26</sup> With rare exception.

- Financial and resource delegations remain with MSD due to the consequences of Delegations of Authority structure, and the fact that the resources must be prioritised across Military, Police, Diplomatic and Humanitarian functions. This concept routinely challenges military and police expectations, nevertheless, this has been determined at the USG DPO level, and debate with civilian staff at a mission level will not be productive.
- Many resources that a Force or Police component expect to be available on command will instead require discussion with Mission Support to address issues of prioritisation and resource consumption. Operational planning must incorporate the relevant Mission Support decision makers early and often.



### 2.3 Influence of COE on Command and Control

COE is used as a term that means more than its technical definition as “Contingent Owned Equipment”. It refers to the entire framework by which T/PCCs provide capability (through personnel, equipment and expertise in the form of a military unit or Formed Police Unit) to the United Nations



Staff Officers, Individual Police Officers, Specialized Police Teams, and Military Observers and senior Commanders fall under a different legal and financial framework.

The COE Framework explains how units are reimbursed for the provision of major equipment (ME) and self-sustainment (SS) that was agreed under the MOU. The combination of ME and SS is intended to generate an overall capability from that unit, recorded in that MOU. COE reimbursement is paid on the basis of the agreement between the UN and the T/PCC, which has been documented in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Usually, a separate MOU is negotiated for each unit from a T/PCC.

The basis of self-sustainment, as defined in the COE manual is that many aspects of unit support are provided by T/PCCs directly to their own units within the mission. This means that an individual UN mission has many different supply/support lines into the mission, each managed by individual T/PCCs. These are in addition to the supply/support lines managed by Mission Support on behalf of the entire mission. For areas of supply/support which are the responsibility of the T/PCC to provide (and indeed for equipment/capability that the T/PCC is responsible to provide), the first point of reference to understand the agreed arrangement is the MOU signed between the UN and that T/PCC. If not resolved within the mission, such matters can be raised by the HOMC/HOPC with the T/PCC but may require UN engagement at UNHQ level to resolve.

This structure is a significant departure from traditional military chain of command, whereby a Force Commander controls the means to support a unit, and is able to make decisions to increase support (for instance, to support a desired increase in tempo). A unit's capability is determined by the MOU signed by the T/PCC, and the specific support arrangements made by T/PCCs at a national level to meet that MOU. Any planner seeking a specific capability, change in tempo or other kind of adaptation from a unit must first understand the MOU (what capability and self-sustainment was agreed). While a HOMC or HOPC may ask a unit (and associated T/PCC) to support a change, it should not be expected without appropriate negotiation.

What is within control of the HOMC or HOPC (and their staff) is ensuring compliance with COE validation procedures, and understanding any inherent freedoms or limitations posed by the COE framework (and individual MOUs) which may affect unit capability, or unit support needs.

In this way, managing unit capability (and associated logistic support needs) might be considered similar to managing a series of contracts, and understanding what is needed by all parties to meet the respective promises/obligations of these contracts. As mission capability requirements change over time, it is essential that this is communicated, and negotiated with the respective T/PCCs. Planners can and should expect unit sustainment to meet that agreed in the MOU, but must understand when it becomes a UN/mission responsibility to supplement or support (such as to support an operational tempo or disposition which was not anticipated in the MOU). Logisticians should also understand what remedies are available in instances where expected support is not available.

### 2.3.1 Combined Effect of COE and AC2 on logistic planning and operational control

The Force Commander and the Police Commissioner may be familiar with having direct control over a range of decisions and resources which support setting priority of effort, changing tempo, or otherwise generate flexibility in the component. The UN structure is considerably different, and these tools or decisions may not be available, or may require detailed consultation through a range of stakeholders. This means that flexibility desired to support a particular operational plan may not be available, or may require much longer lead times to ensure all approvals are in place. This can be challenging to accept.

This singular change goes to the heart of the challenge of being a staff officer in a Force or Police Headquarters, seeking to plan on behalf of the Force Commander or Police Commissioner. So many of the tools, processes and practices that would be used to shape and support the component towards the Commanders' Intent will operate differently than expected in a UN mission.

Many unconscious assumptions are built into planning for military and police operations. A significant portion of these relate to whether the chain of command is able to control inputs, such as resourcing and logistic support. This traditionally allows a commander to identify a vision (sometimes called Command Intent), and expect intuitive, pro-active and responsive logistic support.

UN logistic support must focus first on **accountability**, **transparency** and **economy**, given incredibly constrained resourcing, and this will naturally come at the expense of flexibility and responsiveness. Further, logistic support will be spread equitably across multiple pillars of the mission.

Commanders who are used to having their plans supported by highly pro-active and responsive logistic support at little notice will discover that instead they must allow time for staff to conduct deliberate engagement among other mission pillars in order to deconflict scarce resources, or request changes to what may be arrangements constrained by contract or other external factors.

Commanders and Planners will often have to rethink their planning processes from first principles to identify these unconscious assumptions that arise from a presumption of control over logistic resources, or risk developing operational plans which cannot be supported because logistic assets have been committed elsewhere.

### 2.3.2 General issues of cooperation across contingents (units) within a component (military or police)

The combination of AC2 and COE can have a unique effect on the way in which individual units are able to cooperate or interoperate. There is an obvious issue of compatibility between the capability (both training and equipment) of different nations which is present in any multi-national group. This is not a performance issue, but a technical reality which must be faced by any planner in any coalition environment.

The COE/MOU framework must also be considered. T/PCCs sign specific MOUs for each individual unit. This will likely be based on the expected tasking of that unit, and the structure of the MOU may not have considered the additional resourcing and capability required to share resources or inter-operate with another unit, or to re-role equipment to a common (rather than unit-specific) purpose. Fundamentally, the capability committed in the MOU is the authority for units to act. The MOU defines the extent to which a unit can reasonably be tasked (or otherwise be expected to act). Commanders and planners must avoid tasking/placing expectations in a manner that has not been authorised under the MOU. Where changed (additional or reduced) capability is needed, it should be raised as a proposed change to the MOU.

The AC2 framework creates a situation where Enabling Units (other than combat units) are under the Operational Command and Control of the Force Commander but are under UN Tasking Authority by the D/CMS, under a civilian structure, with a different approach than these units (and the Force) may be familiar.

The D/CMS control of logistic support arrangements, including the combination of military, civilian and contracted support may result in logistic support will almost always be bound by strict resource constraints. These can result in less flexibility, endurance or resilience to threat than a military or police component may normally expect.

### 2.3.3 General issues of cooperation across components

While military and police contingents may be familiar with operating in a coalition or multi-national environment, it can be very new to have a requirement to cooperate across the three components of military, police and civilian, including not only mission support but other civilian efforts such as political affairs, humanitarian aid, DDR and so on.

Mission support functions are 'common' to the mission as a whole, and provided on a uniform and equitable basis, depending on assessed priorities, irrespective of whether the unit/element dispensing the function is comprised of military, UN civilian staff, civilian staff provided by governments, commercial contractor personnel, or a combination of same.

It is a central tenet of UN missions that resources and operations must be coordinated at a whole-of-mission level. This is not a mere function of financial consideration. Rather it reflects that many of the mandate outcomes, such as Protection of Civilians, require cooperation and support between all three contingents, and no single pillar will be able to fully assess priorities.

Accordingly, while the Force Commander may set priorities of effort within the Force, the support available to the Force as a whole, or in any particular sector, will be determined in accordance with whole-of-mission priorities.

## 2.4 Mission Support Division (MSD)

Note: The following information is drawn from examples from individual missions. Although many MSDs started from a standard structure, missions may change MSD structure over time. Even though this varies somewhat, uniformed personnel need some context of potential roles and responsibilities in order to identify who to engage with over what issues. Section 2.4 thus provides some examples, however staff must confirm the specific structure of their own mission's MSD as soon as possible on arrival.

Each mission may have variations in both structure and allocation of responsibilities.

It is essential for incoming uniformed commanders and planners to understand the structure of Mission Support Division of the mission in question. The material below describes Mission Support structures and responsibilities in principle to aid a uniformed planner in identifying the right points of contact in mission. While this description below is general, and based on a composite of responses from various missions, it is essential that uniformed commanders and planners seek out and confirm the correct points of contact on arrival in a specific mission. Structure, and sometimes even position names, may vary according to local conditions.

Primarily it is the responsibility of the SRSG/HOM, supported by the DSRSG/RC/HC, DSRSG (P) and the other members of the Mission Leadership Team (MLT), to define the United Nations system's strategic priorities at the country-level and to ensure that the activities of all United Nations actors contribute to the achievement of the mission's strategic objectives.

To meet the support requirements emanating from mission strategic priorities, since the early 1990s, logistic planning for peacekeeping operations has envisaged an integrated support services system which functions through a mix of United Nations owned resources, civilian contracted services procured by the United Nations and military support capabilities, provided through 'lease' arrangements (MOUs/LoA) between the United Nations and contributing Member States.

All mission support or service functions at a peacekeeping mission, regardless of their origins are considered common to the mission. These resources must be made available on a uniform and equitable basis, depending on mission assessed priorities, irrespective of whether the organisation providing the goods or service is military, UN civilian or contractor. Delivering common support goods and services is part of the administrative function in a mission and thus falls under the responsibility of the DMS, who liaises with all components and segments of the mission through MSC.

The overall range of a mission's civilian, commercial and military logistics support resources is planned by DPO and DOS to provide full coverage for all the mission's civilian, military and police support requirements. There is no redundancy, and no surplus

capacity. Therefore, centralised management of resource-to-task is essential to the correctly prioritised, cost-effective support of all components of the mission.

#### 2.4.1 Office of the Director of Mission Support (ODMS).

The Director of Mission Support (DMS) is responsible and accountable to the HOM for the effective general management of the human, financial and physical resources allocated to a mission. To this end, the ability of the DMS to engage, advise on and help shape the plans of programmatic components is critical to ensure that support components can deliver client-focused and timely end-to-end support services against (competing) priorities.

In this endeavour, the DMS is supported by the chiefs of three pillars, namely the

- Chief Operations and Resource Management (CORM),
- Chief Service Delivery Management (CSCM) and
- Chief Supply Chain Management (CSCM).

Any of these three chiefs can deputise for the DMS in her/his absence.

#### 2.4.2 Office of the Chief of Operations and Resource Management (CORM).

Operations and Resource Management coordinates mission support functions with a view to ensuring coherence in forecasting, performance monitoring, planning, and coordination related to operational and resourcing activities. Reporting directly to the DMS, the CORM oversees, manage and direct the following strategic operations and resourcing functions of mission support components:

- a. Human Resources Section (HRS)
- b. Financial Resourcing and Performance Section (FRRS)
- c. Field Technology Section (FTS) [former Geospatial, Information Technology and Telecommunications Services (GITTS)]
- d. **Mission Support Centre (MSC)**
- e. Integrated Mission Training Center (IMTC)
- f. UN Volunteers (UNV) Office
- g. Welfare Unit

h. Coordination of Sector/ Regional Offices<sup>27</sup>

The MSC is integrated and will generally have civilian, military and police staff. Additionally, the IMTC and FTS will most often be integrated.

## 2.4.3 Office of the Chief Service Delivery Management (CSDM).

Service Delivery Management (SDM) is responsible for the provision of key logistics support services to all mission components and other clients of the Mission Support organization through technical sections to include Aviation Section, Transport Section, Engineering and Facilities Maintenance Section, Medical Services Section, Life Support Section. Reporting directly to the DMS, the CSDM is responsible for overall delivery of these services through innovative and standardized procedures through following sections:

- a. Aviation
- b. Engineering and Facilities Maintenance
- c. Medical Services
- d. Transport
- e. Life Support
- f. Passenger Booking Service (this function may alternatively be performed within the MSC) <sup>28</sup>

In many missions, the Deputy Chief of SDM is a military appointment (P4 or P5) designed to improve integration between the Force and Mission Support. It is preferred that this appointment is filled by a logistic officer, however this varies from mission to mission.

The various sections within SDM are integrated and will include uniformed personnel (primarily military). It is imperative that skilled personnel be selected for these sections as technical experience is a must.

## 2.4.4 Office of Chief Supply Chain Management (CSCM).

Supply Chain Management is responsible for planning and execution, monitoring and control, guidance and coordination of all supply chain areas that are integrated on the basis of end-to-end processes, namely, Plan, Source, Deliver, Return and Enable and cover activities related to demand planning, acquisitions, procurement, warehousing, asset and inventory management, transportation and freight planning (air, land, sea),

---

<sup>27</sup> MINUSMA MSC Policy 8 July

<sup>28</sup> MINUSMA MSC Policy 8 July

expediting movement and tracking distribution, business intelligence and performance management. The Chief Supply Chain Management reports directly to the DMS. Supply Chain Management pillar will consist of the following Sections/Units:

- a. Acquisition Management Section
- b. Procurement Section
- c. Centralised Warehousing Section
- d. Movement Control Section (MOVCON).
- e. Property Management.<sup>29</sup>

In an integrated mission, MOVCON will ideally have expert military personnel integrated into the section to assist in the specialist issues of military movement (such as dangerous goods, specialised military equipment, and integration with military strategic lift). If this is not the case, Police and Force may need to take additional effort to ensure MOVCON understands any specialist considerations.

#### 2.4.4.1 *Mission Support Centre (MSC)*

Mission Support Centre normally falls within Operations and Resource Management. The intent of an MSC is to provide all Mission components with single point of coordination for all aspects of logistics support in the Mission area of responsibility.<sup>30</sup>

#### 2.4.4.2 *Purpose of Mission Support Centre (MSC)*

MSC, usually an integrated civilian-military-police section, is one of the three major joint and integrated sections at operational level, in a mission. The other two are Joint Operational Centre (JOC) and Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) which due to the nature of their tasks and functions, report to Mission Chief of Staff. However, MSC being purely meant for mission logistics support activities, reports to Director of Mission Support through Chief Operations and Resource Management

MSC delivers integration of command, control and accountability for the provision of the support. This involves centralised planning, prioritisation and coordination of all logistics functions and the centralised employment and tasking of the logistics resources of all mission components.

---

<sup>29</sup> MINUSMA MSC Policy 8 July

<sup>30</sup> MINUSMA MSC Policy 8 July

---

*MSC is commonly the primary point of contact for Police and Military planners.*

---

#### 2.4.4.2.1 Common functions of MSC<sup>31</sup>

- a. Integrated planning, prioritisation, coordination, tasking, monitoring and reporting of all logistics functions and harmonise employment and tasking of the logistics resources of all Mission components.
- c. Review and prioritises all requests for logistics support from all mission components as well external partners and international/regional/national entities, in accordance with the Mission's aims and objectives, and allocates the most suitable approved civilian, commercial or military support resource to meet the requirements in the most effective and economic manner. This does not include standard and regular life support sustainment for uniformed component and FTS and General Supply items for all mission offices/staff which are dealt in routine by concerned MSD sections.
- e. Ensure that budgetary and human resources are identified and allocated for approved operations and projects.
- f. Plan, prioritise, integrate, coordinate and task logistics resources on behalf of DMS/Chief ORM.
- g. Coordinate tasking of all Mission Level air, land and maritime transport assets for all movements by air, water or surface in consultation with Mission Air Operations Centre (MAOC) and Joint Movement Coordination Centre (JMCC).
- h. Work in close coordination with the Regional Administrative Officers (RAOs) to ensure that all logistics support issues raised by RAOs at Mission are timely and efficiently addressed by MSD Sections at Mission level.
- i. Serve as the Mission's single point of contact at all levels for the coordination of logistics issues with approved non-Mission actors and potential clients/users, such as Government and Non-Government Organizations (NGO's), UN agencies and Regional entities.
- j. MSC provides an overview of Mission Support Division priority projects and realign them to changing mission priorities.

---

<sup>31</sup> As always, commanders and planners must confirm specifics in each mission.



- k. Update DMS and Mission Support Division senior management with reference to ongoing troop/police deployments, rotations, operations and impact on Mission resources and capabilities.
- l. Provide Mission Support Division key operational priorities and inputs into mission strategic documents and prepares annual **Mission Support Division Plan**. This requires close collaboration and coordination with key mission partners such as the strategic planners, uniformed components and substantive pillars is essential to ensure integrated planning, unity of effort and adaptation to changing mission environments.
- m. Monitor and report all logistics functions for the efficient use of mission logistics resources using an information management system (such as Umoja).
- n. Manage the Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Unit. The COE Unit acts as an advisory body on UN rules and regulations with emphasis on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the Contingent Owned Equipment (COE).

#### 2.4.4.2.2 Structure, Roles and Responsibilities of MSCat Mission HQ and Regional Office Levels

**Chief MSC:** The Chief MSC is an experienced logistics officer at the P-5 level with a thorough knowledge of United Nations logistics system and United Nations administrative procedures. The Chief MSC is also the principal advisor to CORM/DMS on all logistics planning and operations matters. Chief MSC is responsible for the planning, coordination and monitoring of all logistics operations for the Mission on behalf of the DMS. Chief MSC leads an integrated team of military, civilian and UN Police Officers under the integrated support concept.

#### Deputy Chief MSC:

- **Functions.** The Deputy Chief MSC is an experienced logistics officer at the P-4 level with a thorough knowledge of United Nations logistics system and United Nations administrative procedures. The Deputy Chief MSC assists Chief MSC in the supervision of planning, coordination, monitoring and reporting of all logistics operations for the Mission. Deputy Chief MSC is also responsible to Chief MSC for the performance management, training and technical supervision of all MSC staff, especially Logistics Operations Officers/Assistants in the Field Offices. The Deputy Chief MSC performs all the functions of Chief MSC during his absence.
- **Absence.** In case of absence of Deputy Chief MSC (civilian or military), senior most MSC Unit Chief will assume the additional responsibilities of Deputy Chief MSC. In case of absence of Chief U4, Officer in Charge (OIC) will be appointed as per chain of command established by FHQ, however the OIC Chief U4 shall not assume functions of Deputy Chief MSC (in cases where Chief U4 is also Deputy Chief MSC), which shall be performed by civilian MSC Unit Chief.
- **Tasking.** Deputy Chief MSC (military/civilian) shall to the best extent possible avoid direct tasking of military/police and civilian personnel assigned to the MSC Units

and instead shall exercise tasking authority through the MSC Unit Chiefs. Exception to this can be exigencies of service. This is to ensure that integration between U4 and MSC remains seamless and parallel tasking of the MSC personnel is minimized to the best.

---

*Note: in some missions, the Military Chief U4 also performs the role of Deputy Chief MSC. This can pose significant challenges in span of responsibility and may cause conflicts of interest as a result of the dual chain of command to Force Commander and DMS. Most missions keep the Chief U4 and the integrated military Deputy Chief as separate appointments (who nevertheless work closely together).*

---


Under the Chief MSC, MSC is commonly structured as follows:

a. **At the Mission HQ Level:**

- i. Logistics Plans Unit.
- ii. Current Logistics Operations Unit.
- iii. Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Unit.
- iv. Information, Reporting and Visit Unit.

b. **At Regional Office Level:**

- i. Regional MSC Logistics Operations (MSC Log Ops).



**Logistics Plans Unit:** Within MSC, Logistics Plans Unit serves as the logistics planning element within MSC. This unit through an integrated military, UNPOL and civilian team of experienced planning officers, plays an integral role in the development of plans for all significant Mission support activities. The unit prepares medium and long-term logistics plans to ensure centralised planning, coordination and prioritisation of all logistics functions and centralised employment and tasking of the logistics resources of all Mission components in accordance with the Mission's objectives. The main functions to be performed by the MSC Plans Unit are as follows:

- a. Analyse Secretary General's Reports, Security Council Resolutions, Military Operational Directives and other policy documents to determine the extent of support required.
- b. Provide logistics inputs to strategic mission documents like Integrated Strategic Framework and Mission Concept.
- c. Works in close coordination with Force Generation Services and Movement Control Section at UNHQ, FHQ U5 Branch, Police Planners, Mission Strategic Planning Unit and ensure that all planners in the mission have a common understanding of logistics planning/support while planning their respective mandated activities.
- d. Provide advice to other Mission components in planning logistics support to their substantive, military or police operations.
- e. Draft and review the Mission Support Plan and Mission specific logistics SOPs and disseminate after approval by Chief MSC and CORM/DMS.

- f. Lead reconnaissance and logistics assessment visits to potential deployment or downsized locations.
- g. Develop plans for deployment, redeployment and repatriation of Mission elements in close coordination with relevant Mission components<sup>32</sup>.
- h. Develop logistics annex for various contingency plans, such as Mission evacuation/relocation, in consultation with the heads of relevant Mission components and UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS).
- i. Plan medium- and long-term important logistics projects/tasks as per the priorities set by the senior Mission management.
- j. Plan, coordinate and implement liquidation of the Mission upon completion of the Mission mandate.
- k. Conduct logistics briefings, training for new staff, military and police units and personnel upon deployment to the Mission area.
- l. Perform any other task assigned by Chief/ Deputy Chief MSC.

**Current Logistics Operations Unit (CLOU):** MSC Current Logistics Operations Unit (CLOU) is an integrated unit headed by a civilian logistics officer and assisted by logistics specialist civilians, military and police staff. They perform the integrating and coordinating functions of providing logistics support to all Mission components, including but not limited to military/police deployments, reconfiguration, rotations or repatriations and authorised support for UN Agencies and non-UN entities. The unit prioritises execution of Mission level logistics plans to ensure centralised coordination employment and tasking of the Mission level logistics resources and prioritisation of all centrally coordinated logistics support in accordance with the Mission's objectives. The main functions to be performed by the Current Logistics Operations Unit are as follows:

- Through Logistics Operations Officers/Assistants (military, police and civilians) assigned to Regional Desks, provide routine support to all Mission entities including civilian, military and police components. Plan, coordinate, execute, monitor and report on all logistics tasks as per the priorities directed by Chief MSC /Chief ORM/DMS at the Mission level.

---

<sup>32</sup> One of the largest logistics undertakings done within a mission that needs considerable coordination and planning

*Chapter 2 – General structure of a UN mission*

- Ensure that requests from other UN and non-UN entities are reviewed and screened properly based on existing agreements, guidelines and policies for the decision-making of Chief MSC, Chief ORM/DMS and other relevant Senior Managers.
- Forecast and prepares short term/immediate logistic support plans, coordinate and implement cross cutting logistics support across the Mission area.
- Carry out logistics support coordination with Mission Support Division (MSD) Sections to establish Mission priorities and resource allocation within the framework of the overall Mission Support Plan and guidance from mission senior management.
- In accordance with the priorities laid down by Chief MSC and MSD Services at the Mission level, coordinate and prioritise tasking of all air, land and maritime transport assets for the movement by air, water or surface of personnel and cargo in consultation with Mission Air Operations Centre (MAOC) and Joint Movement Coordination Centre (JMCC).
- Keep a track of all out bound logistics including coordination and synchronization of cargo convoys to regions. Coordinate with U35 for ensuring that a cargo convoy planning is synchronized with Force protection capabilities at the given time.
- Maintain an overview of inbound logistics through close coordination with SCM and regularly brief Chief MSC regarding schedule/ timelines of inbound logistics and its implications on mission support operations.
- Advise Chief MSC on current logistics operations and on the execution of policy guidelines/decisions pertaining to major logistics support in the Mission Area of Operations (AOO).
- Mobilise a Logistics Operations Room on a 24/7 basis in the event of emergencies or crisis management operations.
- At all times maintain a detailed situational awareness of stocking levels of critical commodities and timely advise Chief MSC, concerned managers/sections and regional mission support components to maintain the stocking level as per operational requirements and mission support plan and SOPs/policies,
- As directed by the Chief MSC and Chief ORM, work in close coordination with the Regional Administrative Officers (RAOs) to ensure that all support requirements of the regions are met in a timely and effective manner.

- Prepare the weekly MSD Report, and conduct bi-weekly MSD briefing to DMS and MSD Service Chiefs. Provide input to MSC logistics database and electronic reporting tools, such as Umoja-based tools<sup>33</sup>.
- Use project management tools to monitor all support projects. Ensure that projects are properly resourced, timelines are met, and risks are identified and mitigated.
- Maintain close liaison with FHQ U3, U4 and U8 branches and Police operations unit to have a clear picture of military and police operations and sustainment requirements.
- Ensure that gender specific needs are catered for in all phases of logistics support.
- Provide logistics briefings and presentations to senior mission managers regarding current operations and accompany them during visits if required.
- Carry out logistic briefing for newly inducted civilian staff, Military and Police officers. Arrange for in-house logistics or related training of CLOU staff to improve knowledge and skills.
- Carryout regular visits to mission locations and task CLOU Desk Officers to have regular visits to their respective areas of responsibility to have clear understanding
- Perform any other duties as and when assigned by the Chief MSC.

**COE Unit** An integrated unit within MSC, headed by a civilian COE officer and assisted by COE specialist civilians, military and police staff. The COE Unit functions include planning and supervising COE availability in the mission. The Unit performs this function by verifying through physical inspections of COE. It monitors and reports on the correct performance of agreed responsibilities as detailed in the MOU by both TCC/PCCs and the United Nations. The main functions to be performed by the COE Unit are as follows:

- Planning and supervising COE/MOU Arrival, Operational Readiness, Repatriation, and other periodic inspections of all formed military and police units deployed in the mission to verify by physical inspection that

---

<sup>33</sup> Generally, unless integrated into MSC, military and police personnel are not required to interact directly with logistics information systems. The mission is responsible for providing training on any in-mission information systems required by uniformed personnel. This is because systems vary by mission.

the TCC/PCCs and the United Nations are complying with their agreed responsibilities as detailed in the MOU.

- Processing Verification Reports (VRs) raised because of inspections and forwarding them to senior mission management for approval and subsequent submission to UN Headquarters (UNHQ) on a quarterly basis in accordance with the schedules as promulgated by UNHQ.
- Analysis of VRs to identify, in consultation with assigned unit staff, unit commanders, and other appropriate mission and UNHQ staff, formed unit major equipment and self-sustainment deficiencies and surpluses as compared to MOU requirements and recommending corrective action to meet agreed MOU or Mission operational requirements.
- Supervision of the maintenance of inventories of COE held by all military/police units deployed to the mission.
- Overseeing issuance of UNOE and services which have been provided to units which should be self-sustained and reflect as necessary in verification reports for financial reimbursement.
- Provision of COE related technical advice, briefs and training for formed military/police unit personnel and other appropriate Mission staff on all aspects of the management and implementation in the field of the COE system.
- Participating in Pre-Deployment Visits (PDV) to TCC/PCC home countries.
- Development of mission specific policies, procedures and guidelines for the implementation and management, in the Mission, of the MOUs between the United Nations and the TCC/PCCs.
- Chief COE Unit serves as a member of and secretary to the mission's COE/MOU Management Review Board (CMMRB).
- Perform other related responsibilities as assigned by Chief MSC.

**Information, Reporting and Visits Unit:** The Information, Reporting and Visits Unit serves as a focal point for the collection, analysis and dissemination of up-to-date information on the troops, police and civilian strength and deployment details and capabilities and status of all Mission logistics support assets and the status of major ongoing projects and activities. The Unit serves as the Business Intelligence Unit within MSC. It tracks key logistics support indicators to provide Mission Support Management with necessary statistics regarding trends and capabilities, for strategic planning capacities. The unit also acts as service desk to plan and coordinate logistics support for all visits/delegations to the Mission when authorised

by the senior mission leadership. The main functions to be performed by the MSC Info, Reporting and Visits Unit are as follows:

- Collect, collate, analyse, interpret and disseminate all support information in the Mission area through electronic media.
- Monitor and analyse weekly and any other reports from all MSD elements, including from Regions, for any logistics implications/requirements.
- Receive regular reports from Force, Police and Regions (including Mission HQ) regarding updated troops/police and civilian deployed strength and regular feed this information to MSC Planning and Current Logistics Operations Unit
- Prepare logistics summaries, conduct logistics briefings and presentations on as required basis.
- Provide CLOU, Planning Unit and Chief MSC with all relevant and timely information and reports on logistics matters in the Mission.
- If tasked, track key logistics performance indicators and cost capturing for support provided to non-mission entities.
- Maintain a statistical database of requested logistics information for providing senior leadership with analysis and trends to facilitate informed decision making.
- For proper archiving, store and update important documents and data in MSC shared information storage systems.
- Carry out regular liaison with the Desk Officers of Current Logistics Operations Unit, Logistics Plans Unit and MSC Regional Office Staff, to share and coordinate the inflow of information from their respective area of responsibility and fill in the gaps.
- Be a focal point for all visits and delegations coming to the Mission. Coordinate the program of visit with the Mission sponsoring entity and coordinate all logistics supports to such visits, after authorisation by Mission senior leadership.
- Be prepared to work beyond normal working hours in the Logistics Operations Room in the event of emergencies or crises as assigned by Chief MSC. Be prepared to assign Info & Reporting staff to perform the duties of the MSC Duty Officer as per the Duty Roster prepared by the Chief Current Logistic Operations Unit or work as Duty Logistics Officer in JOC in the event of crisis.



- Perform any other duties as and when assigned by the Chief MSC.
2. **Regional MSC (Support at Sector Level):** Located in Field Offices (Sectors) Regional MSC are managed by a Regional Administration Officer (RAO) Under the RAO, the Regional MSC Log Ops supervisor leads the Log Ops team to coordinate the day-to-day logistics support activities of all MSD components in the Regional Office. MSC Regional Log Ops staff are expected to coordinate and ensure delivery of a full range of approved and authorised logistics support to all Mission components and external clients in the field under the supervision of the RAO.
  3. The main functions to be performed by the MSC Log Ops staff in Regional Offices are:
    - a. Provide advice and guidance to RAO on logistics support that can be provided within the parameters of UN Financial Rules and Regulations, Staff Rules, administrative policies, procedures, instructions, technical guidance from MSC and Mission and Regional priorities.
    - b. Assist the RAO in preparing the short- and medium-term support requirements of the Field Office.
    - c. Liaise with Sector HQ, Military Contingents, FPU, UNPOL and substantive personnel at the Field Office level, review plans and operational requirements to deliver requisite resources in a timely and cost-effective manner. As much as possible, participate in the military/police/substantive planning process in the Field Office/Sector HQs to provide timely advice and technical input in terms of providing logistics support.
    - d. Coordinate the provision of adequate logistics support, under supervision of the RAO, to designated locations within the Field Office Area of Responsibility (AOR), as required.
    - e. Oversee the proper utilisation of all UN Owned Equipment (UNOE), Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) and assets, as well as premises leased or procured from Host Government by the Mission, in conformity with UN Financial Rules, Regulations and established policies, procedures and guidelines in the Field Office AOR.
    - f. Advise the RAO for the continued requirement for procurement of land for Mission camps/offices and the establishment of premises including renewals of leases, in accordance to established Mission priorities.
    - g. Keep a track of all inbound and out bound logistics including coordination for logistics convoys in and out of AOR.

- h. Maintain an overview of all the logistics stocks in AOR including critical life support commodities held at warehouse as well as with contingents and timely advise RAO and MSC regarding any shortfalls anticipated. Ensure that all critical stocks are always maintained as per UN/Mission policies, guidelines and SOPs.
- i. Convene the weekly MSD meeting, under authority of the RAO, involving all MSD Sections and Military/Police logistics staff in the Field Office to discuss the status / progress of ongoing support or projects including preparations for any future projects or support requirements.
- j. Prepare and submit the weekly Regional Office Logistics report, after review by the RAO, to MSC Current Logistics Operations Unit and Info, Reporting and Visits Unit at the Mission level, as per timelines and intervals established by MSC.
- k. Act as the focal point on behalf of the RAO to liaise with UN Agencies, non-UN entities and local authorities in the provision of approved logistics support in the field office. Provide feedback / status of support provided, to the RAO and MSC at Mission HQ.

#### 2.4.4.2.3 Example of how an MSC may relate / engage with various Mission and Non-Mission entities.

**MSC and MSD Sections:** The core functions of MSC, on behalf and under the authority of the DMS/CORM/RAOs, are planning, coordination, tasking, monitoring and reporting of logistics operations. To implement any logistics functions, resources are provided by the technical sections forming parts of SDM and SCM. After planning a logistics project or task, MSC will seek approval of the plan from DMS through CORM and in consultation with CSCM and CSDM at Mission level and MSC Log Ops Supervisors from the RAO at Regional Office level. Once approved, MSC representatives will coordinate with the MSD sections at each level for implementation of the approved support.

As MSC does not directly control any of the resources, task orders to the UN owned assets, military units and contractors will be issued by the technical sections which administer and control them (for example SDM or SCM depending on the resource).

**MSC and Mission Military and Police Components:** Military staff assigned by the FC to integrated and joint office structures shall be responsible to, and report to, the heads of offices of those structures irrespective of whether these are military personnel or otherwise.

The same principle shall apply to Police Officers integrated with MSC. Regular participation of civilian and uniformed personnel in joint planning and coordination meetings will foster the concept of integration and would enable MSD to provide effective support to uniformed components of the mission.

**MSC and Joint Movements Coordination Centre (JMCC):** The MSC will be collocated with JMCC at the Mission level for ease of planning and coordination and clarity on movements' priority. MSC through Current Logistics Operations Unit, will provide regular updates to JMCC on prioritization of cargo movements across the Mission area.

**MSC and Mission Air Operations Centre (MAOC)** The MSC will be collocated with MAOC for ease of planning and coordination and clarity on air movements' priority and planning of Special Flights (SF) at the Mission. MSC Current Logistics Operations Unit will provide MAOC regular updates on prioritization of air movement requests.

**MSC and Joint Operations Centre (JOC):** Like the MSC, the JOC is a jointly staffed establishment at Mission Headquarters. The JOC deals with day-to-day substantive operations in the Mission. The JOC provides the HOM and the senior Mission management with the situational awareness through timely and accurate monitoring and reporting. It is manned on 24/7 basis. During an emergency, the JOC will operate as the primary centre for crisis management for the Mission.


**Routine:** The MSC will keep JOC informed of the day-to-day critical operations supported by MSD. In routine operations, there is no requirement for a permanent MSC presence in JOC; however, a MSC representative should attend all routine JOC meetings/briefings when required.

**Crisis:** During a crisis, on the instructions of DMS/CORM, MSC will mobilise a Logistics Operations Room on a 24/7 basis within its Current Logistics Operations Unit to coordinate all logistics support issues during the crisis. In parallel, the MSC will deploy a logistics officer/military staff officer in JOC who will pass on all support requirements and information to JOC from and to MSC Logistics Operations Room.

**Regional MSC and Sector HQ G4:** UN policies and guidelines provide for several integration and coordination arrangements to be established for UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations, to facilitate unity of effort in the achievement of mission objectives across all components. These include the Mission Leadership Team, Security Management Team, Integrated Mission Planning, JOC, JMAC and MSC. However, UN policies/guidelines emphasise for "coordination" at the tactical level. Civilian heads of regional offices shall establish and maintain close liaison and communication with all uniformed and civilian mission components.

Regional MSC shall work in close coordination with Sector HQ G4 Branch/IPO/FPU Coordinator to plan and coordinate logistics support for military and police in the AOR. This can be better achieved by collocation of Sector G4 and Regional MSC staff, however such an arrangement must be mutually agreed between Sector HQ and RAO. Regional MSC shall only have the coordination responsibility and shall not have tasking authority over Sector G4 Branch.


EXAMPLE ORGANIZATION OF MSD AND RELATION OF MSC TO OTHER ENTITIES (MINUSMA)




EXAMPLE ORGANIZATION OF MSD (MONUSCO)



EXAMPLE OF MSC ORGANIZATION (MINUSMA)



EXAMPLE OF MSC ORGANIZATION (UNMISS)



2.4.5 Enabling Units

UN doctrine designates certain types of support units as “Enabling Units”. These are units which, in a military structure, might be found within a Brigade, or perhaps within a Division, and would be tasked with supporting more than one unit in the normal course of their employment, at the direction of the Brigade or Division Commander. Not all field missions will have all of kinds of Enabling Units, and when present, their structure and capabilities will be designed specifically for the needs of that mission. Unlike in a purely military deployment, Enabling Units are not tasked by the Force HQ, but rather are under Tasking Authority of the Director (or Chief) of Mission Support. This is done for a combination of reasons which include:

For reasons of financial delegation (because use of the unit's capabilities involves consuming UN financial resources)

Because the capability is required to support the entire mission, not merely the Force, and thus tasking and prioritisation must be centralised for the benefit of the entire mission

Because the capability interacts with Mission Support Pillar in way which makes Mission Support best placed to manage day to day tasking.

The following are the most common types of Enabling Units

- Military Logistics Units
- Military Transport units
- Military Engineer Units
- Military Signals Units
- Military Medical Units
- Military Aviation Units

#### 2.4.5.1 *Military Logistics Units*

Military Logistic Units provide services which might normally be provided by the Mission Support pillar, in missions where it has been determined that a military capability is necessary. It is generally more financially sustainable to employ a civilian capability rather than a military logistic unit. Accordingly, a military logistic unit would only be required for reasons such as:

- Presence of threat which makes it not appropriate for civilian personnel / contractors to perform the task
- Requirement for self-protection / ability to respond to threat
- Requirement to be able to integrate with tactical and operational military planning
- Provision of a capability only available from the military (an example might be the refueling and re-arming of military aviation assets)
- Requirement to interoperate closely with military units in a way which requires military training
- Inability to source a more cost effective civilian/contracted solution.

If present, Military Logistic Units vary significantly in size, structure and capability. The UN Military Unit Manual on Logistic Units (Logistic Unit UNMUM) provides detail on the potential capability, tasking and requirements of such units.

Examples of a Military Logistics Unit include: Petroleum Company (XXX); Logistic Battalion (UNDOF); Combat Convoy Company (MINUSMA).

#### 2.4.5.2 *Military Transport Units*

A form of Military Logistic Unit, a Military Transport Unit would be employed in lieu of civilian/contracted support for similar reasons provided for a Military Logistic Unit above. However, this unit type has its own UN doctrine: UN Military Unit Manual – Transport Unit.

#### 2.4.5.3 *Military Engineer Units*

Military Engineer Units may be required to deliver construction engineering support, or combat engineering support (such as mobility, counter mobility and EOD capability). For further information on such units, please review the UN Military Unit Manual – Engineer Unit



#### 2.4.5.4 *Military Signals Units*

Military Signals Units provide augmentation to a mission's Field Technology Section (FTS). It has the capability to support one force or sector HQ, comprising up to five battalions and independent unit headquarters and up to two temporary headquarters. The Military Signals Unit supports the force communications links and information technology service requirements whenever military capability would be more appropriate than that available from UN civilians or contractors. For further information on such units, please review the UN Military Unit Manual – Signals Unit.

#### 2.4.5.5 *Military Medical Units*

In a multi-dimensional PKO, medical support is usually made up of both civilian and military/police components. A clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the various medical components of such missions, and well-defined professional reporting lines for civilian and military/police medical personnel, are critical to sustaining efficient medical support operations in the field. For further information on Military Medical Units, please refer to Chapter 3 of this document and the Medical Support Manual for UN Field Missions.

#### 2.4.5.6 *Military Aviation Units.*

UN Military Aviation Units (MAU) can contribute decisively towards the successful achievement of the Mission's mandate with the provision of Rotary or Fixed Wing Units. To date, MAUs have deployed to peacekeeping operations in most of the UN missions performing numerous tasks including but not limited to reconnaissance and surveillance, passenger transportation, cargo transportation (internal and sling), air assault/quick reaction operations, casualty evacuation, search and rescue operations and VIP transportation. For further information on such units, please review the UN Military Unit Manual – Military Aviation Unit.

## 3 Chapter 3 – Logistic functions within a UN field mission

The term Logistics is used to describe the maintenance and sustainment of military forces engaged in active operations. It relates to every aspect of a force's well-being and material support and includes such functions as supply (rations, water, fuel, spare parts and materiel), transport, accommodation, maintenance (repair and recovery), medical, movement control and some functions not typically associated with logistics: engineering and communications.

### 3.1 Sources of logistics support

The UN normally draws logistics support for its missions from a combination of four main sources:

- UN owned equipment (UNOE) sourced from the UN Global Service Centre (Brindisi and Valencia), the UN Regional Service Centre (Entebbe), other UN missions and on occasion other UN agencies (UNHCR, WHO, etc);
- Enabling units provided by TCCs operating under the UN (MSD) via a MOU;
- Commercial sources arranged by the UN (local and international contracts); and
- Contributing countries via a MOU or LOA

Within a UN field mission, it is important to note that whenever practicable, logistics support will endeavour to be integrated in order to achieve mission level operations, tasks and projects. However, uniformed contingents (military and police) deployed on a UN mission will be required to provide logistics support governed by their respective MOU and SUR. Essentially, most contingents will be responsible for providing major and associated minor equipment and spare parts under a Wet or Dry Lease arrangement and also will be required to sustain and support themselves in accordance with Self-Sustainment (SS) arrangements. In military vernacular, this is often referred to as integral support – which is where the logistics support is the responsibility of a unit or contingent.

On a day-to-day basis the TCC / PCC are required to meet their agreed obligations in terms of Major Equipment (ME) and SS. There will be occasions, where support cannot be achieved by an individual unit and thus coordination is required. Within a Sector, the contingents will need to liaise with their respective logistics staff (Military - G4 and Police – Formed Police Unit or FPU Logistics Coordinator) and the various units involved in an upcoming task or operation. Should the support requirements exceed the capability of the units, then it will be necessary to coordinate support with the Regional Administrative Officer (RAO) and staff who ultimately work and report to the civilian led Mission Support Division (MSD). Support provided by MSD is akin to second and on occasion third line support.

Issues that cannot be handled internally within a Sector must be pushed to higher HQ (Force HQ - U4 or Police Component – Senior FPU Coordinator) at the earliest stage in order to allow detailed planning and coordination to occur. Should the Force / Police components lack the logistics support the MSD at mission level must be involved. The

main planning capability within the MSD is the Mission Support Centre (MSC), which is the primary section for the Force / Police to contact for coordination and planning. In essence, the MSD is the logistics “hub” within a mission and should have integrated staff including civilian, military and police thus ensuring expert logistics and support planning for the main three components (civilian, military and police).

The realities on the ground may not conform to this. Uniformed personnel may experience numerous complexities and issues. For example:

- TCCs and PCCs might have inexperienced logistics and operations officers;
- the RAO could be understaffed and difficult to work with;
- the Force might plan in isolation and not include MSD until problems arise
- MSD may not be allocated integrated police officers to advise on police needs
- MSD may be allocated military officers without a logistics background.

Regardless of the situation it imperative to foster solid working relationships as wide and far across the mission as possible. Planners should proactively seek to participate/conduct logistics planning and coordination meetings, conferences and working groups.

## 3.2 Types of Support

There are many ways of categorising the types of logistic support provided to an organisation in the field. One useful way of describing it is Mounting, General, Close and Integral. These terms are not mutually exclusive but are useful in understanding the different sources of support.

### 3.2.1 Integral Support

Integral support is provided by the assets integral to a unit, for its own use. Because the unit commander controls these capabilities, they can be very responsive to the unit's tactical plan. Examples might include the unit catering element preparing food for its own troops, the unit's stores/supply management element which holds stores for its own use, the unit's maintenance element which provides maintenance and repair for its own equipment, and the unit's Role 1 medical element. Integral support also includes unit transport capability which are intended (under the MOU) for that unit's self-transport. In a non-UN mission, Integral Support might only be limited because the unit can rely on higher level formation/force level assets. However, in the UN peace operations environment, each unit is required to be highly self-sufficient, using resources provided by each individual T/PCC from their national support base.

### 3.2.2 Close Support

Close support is support provided by other units who are under the same parent headquarters. This might include the support provided by a Combat Convoy Company to another unit, when that CCC has been allocated to that operation. Another example

might be replenishment support provided by a logistic unit to a remote FOB. This kind of support is more commonly found in non-UN missions where logistic, engineering, signals and aviation capabilities are under the command of a single Brigade commander or Force Commander. However, the AC2 arrangement is different in a UN mission. “Enabling” units almost always placed under the control of the Director of Mission Support, to reflect the fact that the units provide support across military, police and civilian dependencies, and to reflect the delegation of authority accountabilities imposed on the mission. Accordingly, “Close” support arrangements will be limited to specific arrangements negotiated between the Force /Police Contingent and Mission Support

### 3.2.3 General Support

General Support is provided to the entire mission element (military, police and civilian). In this way, all support provided by Mission Support to Police and Military contingents may be considered General Support.

### 3.2.4 Mounting Support.

Mounting Support commonly refers to the support provided by a national support base in the course of preparing a unit to deploy into theatre. In the UN context, this would include the support provided to train and send a unit into a UN field mission.

It also includes that ongoing support that is provided by the national support base of a T/PCC to its own unit, as agreed in the MOU, and as reimbursed under the COE Manual.

## 3.3 Integral Support / Unit Level Support

---

*Much will be discussed regarding integral support / first line responsibilities – however care must be taken when using such terms, which may be common in military jargon, but may cause confusion when trying to adapt to UN structures (which don't follow the same structure).*

---

Essentially, the respective MOU / SUR for a unit/contingent will dictate the applicable support arrangements between a deployed contingent and the UN. Part of this MOU will determine issues such as who is providing Main Equipment (ME), and who is responsible for maintenance of this equipment.

Regardless of who is providing the ME (UN or Contingent) the unit will be responsible for providing its own integral support in terms of transportation and supply. Integral maintenance arrangements are dependent on the wet or dry lease arrangement. Under a wet lease arrangement, the contingent will provide the maintenance and under a dry lease the UN will provide (mission, contract or other contingent).

Self-Sustainment (SS) governs how a unit will live and survive in the mission and covers a wide array of categories including catering, medical, minor engineering, communications to name but a few. The UN would prefer that contingents provide as much SS categories as possible and will reimburse the TCC/PCC in accordance with established rates within the updated COE Manual so long as the requisite performance standards are being met. The SS categories that are provided by the UN or another contingent will be negotiated prior to deployment and will also need to meet the defined performance standards.

For military units the best analogy to use is an echelon system whereby the unit is responsible for support and sustainment of its subunits through an Administrative or Headquarters Company. Support that exceeds unit capability would default to Sector or Force level assets or MSD managed assets including Enabling units (ie. engineering, logistics, etc). This is often referred to as 2<sup>nd</sup> or even 3<sup>rd</sup> line support and must be closely coordinated through the Sector HQ and higher HQ (Force and Police with the MSC) or as outlined in mission specific guidelines.

### 3.4 Common UN Logistic Support Concepts

There is a common phrase that every UN peacekeeping mission is different. Missions can range from traditional to multidimensional and thus vary in size from a small group of observers, who may be civilian, police, military or a mixture of all three, to a combined operation of land, sea and air assets involving tens of thousands of personnel. Consequently, various logistic concepts will need to be considered to fulfill a mission's logistic requirements.

Any concept will have to be tailored for a specific mission considering the operational task, space and time, environment, climate, infrastructure and resources available. It may include features that are mobile or static, civilian or military, with in-theatre warehousing or national resupply lines or in most cases, a combination of all. There are; however, a number of concepts which have proven workable in past operations.

#### 3.4.1 Self-Reliance Concept –

Smaller Missions. In some cases, reliance on the local economy may be the best method of support. There may be a requirement for a small reception team at a point of entry to maintain logistic links with contributing MS and the UN. While specialist repair of vehicles, communication or technical equipment may be achieved out-of-theatre, self-sufficiency is highly effective in many areas of the world where a relatively modern civilian infrastructure is available. Good examples where this concept is applied is UNMOGIP and MINURSO.

#### 3.4.2 The Force Logistic Support Group Concept.

Larger missions with considerable equipment and volume of transactions can be better supported by specialized logistic support groups. One MS may be tasked to assume overall responsibility for the coordination of the Logistic Support Group (LSG) and to

incorporate logistic units or National Support Elements (NSEs) from the contributing member states into the Force Logistic Base. This concept is often used on mission initiation for larger missions and is used extensively in UNDOF.

### 3.4.3 Civilian Service Support Concept.

As missions stay longer in an area, the opportunities to arrange logistic support from civilian contractors increase. Assuming that civilian support is possible and cost effective, the military LSG would then be phased out or elements incorporated into MSD as enabling units.

---

*Most current missions are quite mature and as a result tend to rely heavily on civilian contracted support and military enabling units (engineering, transportation, aviation, etc) for logistics services and support.*

---

## 3.5 Medical

The UN medical organisation within a UN peacekeeping mission is vital to the overall health and well-being of all mission personnel. It is imperative that mission personnel receive prompt and skilled medical care. There are many differences between the medical support arrangements of a UN Field Mission versus those of a national military or police deployment. This is an area where national expectations may vary greatly, and it is important to review the respective UN policy documents to understand key differences, including how medical facilities are controlled, their span of responsibility, and differences in management of essential life support functions, including CASEVAC. The scarcity of aviation support and the complexity of the command and control structure for aeromedical evacuation cannot be understated.


Medical support in a UN mission is governed by several key references including:

- The UN Medical Support Manual
- The COE Manual (which describes standards of various medical facilities, and
- The 2019 CASEVAC Policy

Each mission will have its own policy and SOPs describing how Medical Support, and, in particular, CASEVAC, are applied in that mission. The factors which affect the physical conduct and location of medical and CASEVAC resources are significantly different (although the principles of medical care and evacuation remain the same).

The diagram below depicts a typical medical organisation within a mission outlining the relationships between the DMS and FC structures.

## Medical Structure



### 3.5.1 Medical Support Principles

#### 3.5.1.1 10-1-2 Principle.

Medical support is based on a **10 – 1 – 2** timeline where skilled first aid should be received within **10 mins**, advanced life support received within **1 hour** and surgery obtained within **2 hours**. Medical support requires continual medical care and a responsive land and air evacuation.

#### 3.5.1.2 Medical Supplies.

The highly technical nature of medical stores and their extensive national and international regulations require tight controls and highly specialised management. The complexity of multinational operations generates a number of peculiar medical logistic difficulties. Principally these difficulties revolve around a lack of commonality and often compatibility of national medical materiel (particularly drugs and consumables) and disparities between national clinical treatment regimens.

The UN medical logistics system is mission dependant. However, all missions will strive to have national contingents to be self-sufficient for the majority of medical commodities from deployment and from a period of time specified by UN planning staff and detailed in the MOU/SUR. Missions will endeavour to provide a straight-forward medical supply system capable of delivering medical supplies rapidly.

### 3.5.1.3 Blood.

The supply of blood and blood products to multinational operations is a complex and sensitive issue, stemming from the wide disparity of standards between nations and the legal constraints incumbent upon some. The availability of blood and blood products is essential for the management of the seriously injured and sick. For the majority of UN operations this will require its provisioning at Level 3. The minimum capability for an in-theatre system must be to receive liquid blood and blood components of a standard acceptable to all participating national contingents and individuals, moving, storing and distributing blood and blood components in accordance with accepted international standard. Where a particular nation cannot accept UN set standards, they must organize their own system of supply, at national expense.

### 3.5.2 Levels of Medical Support

---

*While many nations have different terminology for medical support, and some nations share terminology, it is essential to understand the UN terms used within the UN COE Manual. These are different from the terminology used by many militaries.*

---

Regardless of level, any UN medical facility is expected to be capable of rendering aid to UN mission personnel. For this reason, the COE manual requires all pharmaceuticals to include an insert in the mission language, and medical personnel are expected to be fluent in the mission language to enable the provision of support beyond their own T/PCC personnel.

**BASIC** - All uniformed personnel, as well as civilians operating in remote locations away from medical care, are required to have first aid training and must carry personal and vehicular first aid kits. Due to the extreme conditions and remote locations under which peacekeepers operate, this may be the only care available during the *golden hour*<sup>34</sup> after injury or accident and is the most important factor in the survival of injured personnel. Basic level medical support is a national responsibility: personnel arriving in the mission area must be already trained and equipped to handle this level of care by the T/PCC.

**LEVEL 1** – (Primary Health Care and Emergency Care) This could be either provided by a TCC under COE arrangements or provided by the UN and serves as a primary care facility providing immediate lifesaving and resuscitation capabilities along with routine clinical

---

<sup>34</sup> The *golden hour* is the first hour after the occurrence of a traumatic injury, considered the most critical for successful emergency treatment



care. In the case of serious injury, a Level 1 facility is expected to stabilize patients and prepare them for transport to higher level facilities. A Level 1 facility is also mobile and must be deployable to remote field locations, in whole or split into two forward medical teams.

A Level 1 facility can be strengthened to a Level 1+ facility through the addition of one or more modular capabilities, including primary dental care, basic laboratory, preventive medicine, forward surgical team and Aero-Medical Evacuation Team (AMET). Level 1 facilities normally have two medical officers, six paramedics or nurses, and three support staff, including an ambulance driver. Level 1 facilities are expected to be able to treat up to 20 ambulatory patients per day, have temporary holding capacity of five patients for up to two days, and hold medical supplies and consumables for 60 days.

**LEVEL 2** - (Basic Field Hospital) This is the next level of medical care, providing surgical and life-saving capabilities, as well as common hospital services and could be TCC provided or UN provided. A Level 2 medical facility provides all Level 1 services but additionally provides: damage control surgery; post-operative services and high-dependency care; an AMET capability; intensive care-resuscitation; in-patient services; basic imaging services; laboratory, pharmaceutical, preventive medicine and dental services; as well as record maintenance and administrative support.

A Level 2 facility can be strengthened to a Level 2+ facility through the addition of one or more modules providing orthopedic surgery, gynecological capabilities, internal medicine and diagnostic imaging. Level 2 facilities normally have 57 personnel, including both medical, administrative and logistics staff or 63 personnel if deployed with an AMET. Level 2 facilities are expected to be able to perform three to four surgical operations per day and provide hospitalization for 10 to 20 casualties for up to seven days. This level facility should treat up to 40 outpatients per day, conduct 5 to 10 dental consultations per day, and hold all necessary medical supplies, fluids and consumables for 60 days.

**LEVEL 3** – (Advanced Field Hospital) This is the third and highest level of medical care deployed within a mission area. It is usually provided by a TCC but could be commercially contracted. Level 3 facilities include all the capabilities of lower level facilities. Additional capabilities include multidisciplinary surgical services, specialist services and specialist diagnostic services, increased high dependency care capacity, extended intensive care services and specialist outpatient services.

Level 3 medical facilities may average 90 personnel, depending on the capabilities provided. Level 3 facilities are expected to be able to perform: 10 surgical operations per day; provide hospitalization of 50 patients for up to 30 days; hold 60 outpatient consultations, 20 dental consultations, 20 X-rays and 40 laboratory tests per day; and hold all necessary medical supplies and consumables for 60 days.

**LEVEL 4** - Level 4 medical facilities are definitive care facilities provided outside of the mission area to provide all levels of care, including specialist services, rehabilitation and

convalescence. Level 4 facilities are often commercially contracted or contracted under a LOA with a national government. They may also be provided as part of HNS.

Medical support such as gynaecology, orthopaedic and physiotherapy may be limited depending on the mission, however specific advice on requirements and standards is provided in COE Manual, Chapter 3, Annex A, Appendices 9, 10 and 11. This Annex should also be reviewed to understand Dental facilities, Laboratory Facilities and other medical procedures.

---

*UN definitions of medical care are different to those of many militaries. Planners and commanders should take care to ensure misunderstandings do not occur due to incorrect terminology. To avoid confusion, planners and commanders are encouraged to understand the specific capabilities of relevant medical facilities, rather than relying solely on the “Level 1-4” system to describe their capability.*

---

### 3.5.3 CASEVAC

CASEVAC planning and capability must be considered in context of the 2019 CASEVAC Policy and the 2020 COE Manual, which defines many of the capabilities associated with both medical support and evacuation.

CASEVAC is defined as the evacuation of a casualty from the point of injury (POI) to the closest appropriate medical treatment facility (MTF), utilising the most effective means of transportation. It is a continuum of care that supports a resuscitative process from the POI, through evacuation, into surgery and on to intensive care where this is required. Responsibility for the Mission’s CASEVAC system rests with the Head of Mission (HoM), though normally managed by the Director or Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) and Chief Medical Officer (CMO). The CASEVAC system must be simple in structure, lean in management and easily understood by those who use it.

CASEVAC takes priority over all other Mission activities except actions to counter immediate threats to UN personnel. CASEVAC operations will be further prioritised taking into consideration the category and number of patients. Delay in treatment leads to an increased rate of death and disability.

#### 3.5.3.1 10-1-2 in CASEVAC

For operational health planning purposes, guidelines have emerged that seek to trade-off clinical need against operational risk. The metric adopted in the UN system is the “10-1-2” guideline:

<b>10</b>	Immediate life saving measures are applied by personnel trained in first aid. Bleeding and airway control for the most severely injured casualties is to be achieved <b>within 10 minutes</b> & casualty alert message transmitted.
<b>1</b>	Advanced resuscitation / treatment is commenced by emergency medical personnel <b>within 1 hour</b> of injury / illness onset.
<b>2</b>	Where required damage control surgery (DCS) is commenced as soon as practicable, <b>but no later than 2 hours</b> after injury / illness onset.

To meet this demanding timeframe a philosophy of 'ownership at the highest level and execution at the lowest level' will be adopted. While the ownership of the CASEVAC system is invested in senior mission leadership, authority to launch CASEVAC operations is devolved to the lowest practical level without the need to seek permission from the 'ownership level'.

One of the greatest challenges of CASEVAC is that the AC2 policy and the standard mission structure means that CASEVAC requires coordination across multiple components. This includes requiring DMS (or Mission Support) approval to re-task aviation or other mission-level assets. This is made more complex by constraints imposed by the Host Nation (which must be considered by Mission Support), such as restrictions of movement, and long delays in issuing Host Nation flight authorisation for aviation assets. Uniformed personnel may be significantly surprised at how complex the process for initiating and executing a CASEVAC may be. Uniformed planners must examine the CASEVAC policy of their mission, and actively seek to understand any mission-related constraints which may affect support to an operation. This is especially true where there is a high threat (whether from IEDs, terrain or threat actors)

Medical support provided from T/PCCs must meet all performance standards for ME and SS without exception given the seriousness of this function. As such T/PCCs (and the associated units in mission) providing this capability must have a robust and dependable medical supply chain.

Regardless of level, the medical facility must clearly understand where and how it is authorised to provide medical support. Challenges can arise when non-UN patients present to UN facilities. This is a complex issue which will be resolved by the Mission, having regard to the capacity of mission facilities, the obligations of the mandate, and humanitarian principles. Individual medical facilities which extend medical support beyond that negotiated in their MOU, may present unintended diplomatic and humanitarian problems to the mission as a whole. Although providing medical support to the local populace can go a long way in winning hearts and minds, contingents must be mindful of the overall mission medical support concept including host nation support, WHO, NGOs, etc and not hinder this concept in any way.

In terms of CASEVAC, the newest UN Casualty Evacuation Policy (2020)<sup>35</sup> has made a concerted push to devolve operations to the lowest level and thus dedicated airlift does not require DMS approval for tasking. This should go a long way to remove potential time lags in the process thus promoting lifesaving.

---

*CASEVAC policy varies by mission because of the unique combination of capabilities, geography, and other considerations of each mission. The specific policies, processes and capabilities of that mission must be understood, and most importantly, wargamed and rehearsed.*

---

CASEVAC considerations should be

### 3.5.3.2 *Aeromedical evacuation considerations*

Planning for aeromedical evacuation requires an understanding of UN policy and Mission-specific policies. Each mission will have very different considerations for what will affect the ability to use Aeromedical evacuation. Considerations may include:

- Host nation constraints on flying (or procedures for seeking approval)
- Overall capabilities of aircraft (including physical, contractual and regulatory)
- Competing demands for air lift
- Location of aircraft base
- Location of AME teams (which may need to be different to the aircraft location)
- Actual location of aircraft at time of casualty

Reimbursement considerations are covered in the COE Manual, Chapter 3, Annex C, Appendix 7.

## 3.6 Supply

### 3.6.1 Introduction

The objective of Supply is to provide the right materiel, in the right quantity, to the right place at the right time and in the most economical manner. Materiel is a generic term covering equipment, stores, supplies and spares.

---

<sup>35</sup> 2020.07 DPO/DOS Policy on Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)

### 3.6.2 Levels of support

The UN supply system is tailored for a specific mission; however, a general concept for supply is common to all operations. The supply structure for UN missions is based around three distinct levels of support.

- First line (integral support) - those stock holdings intrinsic to a unit and normally deployed with it, that is the stocks required to make a unit self-sufficient for a stated period;
- Second line (direct / close support) - the stocks held to replenish first line holdings as they are consumed. Contingents may bring a National Support Element (NSE) to the mission to provide 2<sup>nd</sup> line supply support required; however, the NSE is not included in the MOU. In the event a contingent does not have a NSE, they need to ensure there is a flexible and robust replenishment system; and
- Third line (general support) - those stocks generally procured outside of the mission area. They may or may not be centrally warehoused in the mission area.

### 3.6.3 Key terminology – UN Supply functions

The following terminology is used to discuss supply in mission:

- **Acquisition of Materiel.** The process of obtaining UNOE and services. Within MSD, all three pillars have responsibilities in the acquisition of new material: OR&M, Service Delivery Management (SDM) and Supply Chain Management (SCM);
- **Receiving UNOE.** Within MSD, the SCM will be responsible for receiving material and distributing to the other pillars or contingents as required;
- **Care and storage of UNOE.** This will include warehousing and will include both the SCM and SDM;
- **Issue of UNOE to contingents.** This could involve all three pillars and non-routine materiel support should be coordinated through the MSC;
- **Disposal.** Disposal includes both UNOE and COE. The removal of materiel from the supply system through sale, donation or destruction. This is a major undertaking and must be closely coordinated with the contingents to ensure alignment with COE Manual;
- **Inventory control.** The control of materiel by establishing materiel accounting and management methods and procedures. This includes maintaining stocks at the required level.

### 3.6.4 General Guidelines for Supply Planning.

Supply planning involves the requirement and determining the range and quantity of items required to support a task or operation. This includes the identification of items of supply, cataloguing, scaling and the issue of procedures as required. Supply planning will take place across the various components and will involve multiple levels (operational and tactical).

Units/FPU are expected to be self-sufficient in certain types of stores, depending on their MOU (including, for instance if that unit is on a wet lease or dry lease). For these stores, the unit is responsible for supply planning in conjunction with its National Support Element (if present) and and/or the supply arrangements made by that T/PCC.

Other supply types are the responsibility of the mission to provide under the MOU. Within MSD, the primary section responsible for planning is the MSC. The MSC will consider supplies for Force, Police and Civilian functions.

**Foresight.** Supply planning should include not only the force-in-being, but the future force. For example, SCR 2438 explicitly calls upon Member States to continue increase the numbers of women trained and subsequently deployed to peacekeeping mission. This is likely to mean that in future, a unit/contingent/force/FPU will have increased numbers of women. This requires contingents to ensure that they carry appropriate supply lines for both men and women, such as holdings of protective equipment includes appropriate sizes/models for female soldiers, and that welfare and hygiene products are appropriate for both men and women.

Initial planning must address a broad range of factors, strike an effective balance in capabilities to meet changing requirements and retain flexibility. Planners clearly understand the operational objective and concept of operations so they can develop a concept of supply support. The multinational aspect of UN missions introduces additional complexity to the planning process. Thus, the supply planner should take into account:

- Supply capabilities TCC/PCC should be identified early as well as host nation resources and sources of supply and the most effective system of supply should be identified;
- The condition, congestion, distance, and security of sea, air and ground lines of communication impact directly on supply plans and may dictate a combination of distribution methods that increase the complexity of the logistics mission as a whole;
- Mission areas may lack the infrastructure, ie. electrical power, transportation networks, port facilities, required to provide supply support. Planning must recognise these shortfalls and find ways to overcome them; and
- The types and quantities of commodities required for the mission must take account of geographical conditions and cultural diversities.

### 3.6.5 Classes of Supply

Military personnel of different nations may be familiar with the concept of dividing supplies into types or *Classes of Supply*. Some nations/coalitions use ten classes of supply. Other nations/coalitions use five classes of supply. Other organisations do not know these terms at all. In a UN mission, it can be highly problematic to use national jargon when conversing with a multinational, multidisciplinary force.

---

*Rather than using terms such as “Classes of Supply”, or “Class 3”, it is best to state clearly the nature of supply in question (for example: petrol or aviation fuel)*

---

### 3.6.6 Materiel Acquisition Procedures

All procurement activities ie. contracts for purchase, rental of services, supplies or equipment entered into by the UN are governed by the UN's Financial Regulations and Rules. The procurement policies and procedures for the purchase, receipt, management and disposal of equipment are contained in the Procurement Manual. The Mission procures either through UNNY or locally.

Procurement can be entered into on behalf of the UN only by officials duly authorized. This includes entering into contracts, the invitation of proposals or tenders and the negotiation with potential suppliers or purchasers on the basis of detailed specifications. The duly authorised individuals in the Mission are the DMS or the Chief O&RM.

TCCs/PCCs are not allowed to procure in the name of the UN unless delegated authority has been given or a "Note Verbale" is agreed upon by HQ UNNY and governments. If a contingent enters into procurement activities without prior approval from HQ UNNY, the Mission is not liable to the MS or contract source for the terms made by that contingent.

**Types of Acquisitions.** The types of acquisition activity available to the Mission are:

- Local Purchase Order (LPO) that is within financial limits against an authorised local vendor;
- Direct Provisioning or a Purchase Order on an open-ended contract, which is a requisition against an existing approved local or pre-approved contract;
- Raise a local contract for supplies or services that are within the mission financial limitations;
- Generate an Accelerated Procurement device in which local funds are used to buy an urgent requirement off-the-shelf;
- When over the Mission financial limits, a draft Requisition is raised, approved and sent to HQ UNNY to process; and
- Letter of Assist (LOA) through HQ UNNY. This is a contracting document that is entered with a Member State's government as a source of supply to satisfy the original demand.

31. The type and method of procurement chosen will depend on the mission budget, financial limitations, sources of supply and/or urgency. Specific procedures for the demand and supplies and services will be governed by specific Mission SOP's remembering that every Mission is different.

### 3.6.6.1 *National Support Element (NSE) Procurement.*

Should the contingent obtain materiel through their NSE, that nation's national rules and regulations apply. In all cases coordination is required with MSD to ensure there is fair competition for local or limited resources.

### 3.6.6.2 *Financial Limitations.*

The procurement financial limitations vary from mission to mission based on the overall mission budget. Each mission will be given its authorised financial limit and signing authority by HQ UNNY through the DMS.

---

*As discussed later in the Finance/Budget section, Mission budgets are usually tightly constrained and determined at the level of the General Assembly/Security Council. There is rarely excess funding for ad hoc procurement within a budget cycle. This can be a frustration for commanders arriving in mission and seeing an opportunity to innovate. It is a fact of UN mission finance that any procurement needs to be planned for the following (or subsequent) financial year.*

---

### 3.6.7 Request Procedures (other than Water, Rations, Ammunition, Explosives and Fuel)

---

*In a military context, the process of seeking support is often called a “demand”. In a UN mission context, the correct terminology is “request”.*

*This is more than a synonym: it illustrates the difference in culture between a uniformed and civilian organisation. Using the term “Demand” can have a negative connotation, implying an expectation of unquestioning compliance. Engagement with Mission Support should always be considered a discussion, not a direction.*

---

34. This section outlines the procedure for contingents to request general equipment, stores and services. This does not include procedures for rations, ammunition, explosives and fuel. These classes of supply have specific process and are covered below.

Each mission will have specific mission SOPs for request procedures. Contingents (and planners) must familiarise themselves with the mission-specific SOPs and procedures. In all cases requests must be properly substantiated and justified. In most missions (such as MONUSCO), requests for logistics support (other than routine day-to-day support) is submitted to the Chief MSC who will coordinate with the applicable MSD sections (SDM or



SCM). There are MSC representatives in all sectors who will be the main source of coordination for the contingents.

35. Contingents should expect that all requests will be vetted and will result in one of the following actions:

- Acceptance of the request;
- Partial acceptance, reduction of amount requested due to limited stocks;
- If no stock is available, procurement action will be initiated;
- Cancel the request, as planned automatic distribution will take place when stock is available; and
- Rejection of the request due to non-entitlement of requisitioned item or items not in stock and no procurement action being initiated due to non-availability of funds

#### 3.6.7.1 *Delivery of Non-Routine Stores.*

The delivery of stores will be done in accordance with Mission SOPs and could include forward delivery to the contingent by Mission Support or the contingent may be required to pick-up the stores from the applicable MSD section. Delivery is dependent on security, capacity, environmental and time considerations. In the event that MSD is responsible for the delivery of the stores they might use a number of delivery methods including road, air, water, rail or other means dependent on the operational situation. For example, during the rainy season in many UN missions, the road networks are largely unusable so there is a heavier use of aviation assets for delivery. This places increasing demands on the very limited aviation asset.

#### 3.6.8 *Methods of supply*

Supply in mission is achieved through a range of sources.

- **COE** – the supply support (equipment and stores), agreed in the MOU between USG DOS and the T/PCC that a nation must provide to its deployed unit. This may include supply directly from the T/PCC to the unit, supply through a National Support Element, and contracted support arranged by that T/PCC specifically for the sole use of their units.
- **UNOE** – equipment procured by Mission Support which may be used to deliver supply support, or may be provided as equipment (for example, white fleet vehicles provided to staff officers).
- **Global and Local contracts.** Global or local contracts to provide equipment and stores, arranged by Mission Support for the benefit of all or part of the mission. Contracted support comes with the constraints inherent in that contract (such as limits on flexibility of replenishment quantities or frequency).
- **LOA** – supply support (equipment and or stores) arranged and planned by agreement between United Nations and a Member State under a Letter of Assist (LOA) to provide support into the mission. Such support is coordinated by Mission Support.

- **Enabling Units** – supply support provided by an enabling unit (such as a Logistic Unit or Petroleum Company). Such support (including provisioning) is planned and coordinated through Mission Support.

### 3.6.9 UN Supply Mechanism (Pull vs Push)

Many military logistic structures operate on a combination of push and pull supply mechanisms, where certain essential supplies are “pushed” from higher to ensure that the unit never runs below minimum stockholdings, while other, less critical supplies must be ‘pulled’ by the unit by submitting a specific demand from time to time.

Decisions about push or pull structure depend on who is ultimately providing the support. In UN field missions, the UN is responsible for providing rations, water and fuel and contingents are responsible for providing ammunition. In missions, supply support is almost always operated on a “pull system”, which means that individual contingents are required to request or “pull” the specific amounts of ration, water and fuel support needed in each delivery from MSD as required. Requests such as these will be managed and limited in accordance with mission SOPs.

This may conflict with military expectations, if units are more familiar with a “Push” system where the supply organisation automatically pushes commodities based on (for example) reports of personnel numbers or reports of stock holdings.

---

*The UN use of a pull system means that units must take a greater responsibility for conduction provisioning calculations than some units may expect.*

---

### 3.6.10 Supply other than Ammunition, Fuel, Rations and Water.

The responsibility to provide materiel and services is agreed in the respective MOU signed between a TCC/PCC and the UN. In that MOU, the TCC/PCC has agreed to provide specific Major Equipment (ME) and Self-Sustainment (SS) categories for that unit. For these categories, the TCC/PCC will need to plan to supply all minor equipment and spare parts to ensure compliance in accordance with COE performance standards. For the equipment and support that the UN has agreed to provide (whether through LOAs, Contracted support, Enabling Units or UNOE), then Mission Support is responsible to plan for the supply support to meet performance standards as stipulated in the COE manual.

In order to determine exactly what supply support is available to an individual unit, the MOU for that unit must be examined. The Logistic Support Plan of a mission prepared by MSC outlines the supply support arrangements that have been planned by Mission Support. This will assist a planner in understanding what kinds of supply support may be available.

**Repair and Spare Parts.** Additional provisioning of spare parts, minor equipment and consumables will be provided by the contingent or the UN dependent on the signed MOU, as follows:

- Under a wet lease arrangement, a TCC/PCC will provide the ME and associated minor equipment, spare parts and consumables and the necessary maintenance.
- Under a dry lease arrangement, the TCC/PCC will provide the ME and minor equipment; however, the maintenance of the ME and provision of spare parts will be the responsibility of the UN or another Member State (MS).
- Where a contingent is utilising UNOE, the UN will ensure the necessary maintenance is provided. In the event a donor or sponsor or MS provides the ME, the necessary provisioning arrangements must be agreed by the receiving TCC/PCC and UN.

In all cases, a contingent must ensure that all supplies and commodities are properly stored, secured, maintained and disposed of in accordance with recognised guidelines to ensure stock availability and ready use for operational requirements.

#### 3.6.10.1 *Ammunition management*

Two primary references govern Ammunition Management. The COE Manual sets the financial reimbursement considerations which will shape a unit's decision making. The 2020 UN Manual on Ammunition Management describes UN requirements for ammunition management and safety within the mission and should be read by all uniformed logistic personnel involved with ammunition planning and management.

The supply of ammunition is a TCC/PCC responsibility and must be closely secured and managed within the Mission. T/PCCs are reimbursed for ammunition which is consumed (in tasking or training) under strict rules governed by the COE manual. Care must be taken when tasking units to ensure that direction aligns with the MOU and COE Manual. These will determine when a unit is responsible for managing and funding its own ammunition consumption, and when funding of replacement ammunition is the responsibility of the UN. A key difference is whether the ammunition is for operational or training purposes. Staff planners should expect that there will be differences in expectation, which must be resolved by reference to the COE Manual and MOU.

This can require consideration if it is assessed that ammunition being held by a contingent is no longer serviceable and requires disposal – particularly because units may not be familiar with the processes, support and obligations associated with this practice. Planners should be aware that the MOU and COE Framework will shape the way a T/PCC decides on stockholding levels of ammunition in mission, as they must balance the flexibility provided by high stockholdings against the risk of having to dispose of unconsumed ammunition.

The term for the kind of ammunition consumption which eligible for specific reimbursement under the COE Manual is “**operational ammunition**”. The COE Manual

defines operational ammunition as ammunition that the UN and TCC/PCC agree to deploy to the mission area so that it is readily available for use in the event of need.

Operational ammunition will be reimbursed upon presentation of a claim by the Government and an operational ammunition expenditure certificate from the mission. In consultation with the FC/PC and contingent commanders, the DMS verifies the use of ammunition and explosives expended for operational purposes or to meet training standards beyond accepted UN readiness standards that have been authorised and directed by the FC/PC. The DMS co-signs an operational ammunition expenditure certificate with the FC/PC and the contingent commanders and forwards the certificate to DOS in UNNY.

#### 3.6.10.2 *Ammunition used in training.*

The UN will reimburse ammunition and explosives expended on training only if beyond accepted UN readiness standards authorised and if explicitly authorised and directed by FC/PC. The UN will not reimburse for training or exercises used to ensure units are at accepted UN readiness standards. For the latter, ammunition is considered a consumable covered under either the wet lease rates or reimbursement for contingent personnel (as part of clothing, gear and personal weaponry).

#### 3.6.10.3 *Unserviceable Ammunition.*

50. Reimbursement will be made for ammunition that becomes unserviceable while in the mission area. TCC/PCCs are responsible; however, for deploying ammunition with an expected life in excess of the anticipated length of deployment. During the rotation of a unit, when the UN is providing transportation for a TCC/PCC, or transportation is being provided under a LOA by that country, where there is spare capacity it can be used to move authorised ammunition to replace expended or expired stock.

#### 3.6.10.4 *Ammunition Stock holding.*

The MOU between UN and T/PCC will specify minimum ammunition holding requirements of each unit. Units may choose to hold higher quantities than the minimum. The level of operational ammunition required in a UN field mission is dependent upon:

- Mission task and threats
- Tempo of likely operations
- Results of Mission Technical Survey
- Safety levels of supply
- Replenishment lead/order and shipping time

#### 3.6.10.5 *Ammunition Safety.*

UN rules for safe handling and management of ammunition is described in 2020 UN Manual on Ammunition Management. While this should be read in detail, key issues of Dangerous Goods handling are drawn out below.

In order to promote the safe transport and storage of dangerous goods, an internationally agreed system for classification has been devised. The system consists of 9 dangerous goods classes.

Ammunition and explosives are considered a Class 1 dangerous good. Class 1 is then divided into Hazard Divisions, which indicate the type of hazard to be expected primarily in the event of an accident involving a quantity of ammunition. Class 1 ammunition is further divided into Compatibility Groups designed to minimise the risk of storing items together that will either increase the risk of an accident. It is essential that a contingent complies with the 2020 UN Manual on Ammunition Management regarding all issues of transportation and storage. Within this, any personnel responsible for handling and transporting ammunition and must have the necessary training and expertise in handling Class 1 Dangerous Goods.

---

*Missions may have an Ammunition Technical Officer (an officer with a high level of training in handling and disposing of ammunition and explosives). However, units must be prepared with their own ammunition technical expertise, as this Ammunition Technical Officer does not have the capacity to replace the responsibilities of units to routinely manage their own ammunition.*

---

#### 3.6.10.6 *Reimbursement for cost of transport of Ammunitions/Explosives (COE).*

The UN will reimburse contributing countries for deploying ammunition to and from the mission area. Since the cost of ammunition and missiles associated with ME items, such as anti-aircraft and anti-armour weapons and howitzers, and explosives used with ME, is not included in the calculation of monthly wet lease rates, an incremental transportation factor is not included to reimburse the cost of transportation for their replenishment. Consequently, the UN will reimburse the transportation costs for the deployment, redeployment and replenishment of those specific types of ammunition, as well as for ammunition or explosives used with ME.

#### 3.6.11 *Rations and Catering*

Good management of rations are essential not only to sustain life, but because of the effect of good or poor rationing on personnel performance, and personal welfare.

51. It is the UN responsibility to provide fresh rations after an initial self-sufficiency period (which is defined in the SUR). Unless otherwise agreed in the MOU, each unit is required to provide its own catering self-sustainment. This ensures each unit meets its own dietary and culinary needs. If the contingent does not provide catering, the UN will provide a kitchen, a catering contract or request a neighbouring contingent to provide catering support.

A United Nations Rations Scale (UNRS) defines what food items (ingredients) are available, the ordering procedures and any limitations. The UNRS provides a means for arriving at a nutritionally balanced diet based on menu planning, recipes and national preferences. There are set Ceiling Man-day Rates (CMRs) or a nutritionally balanced diet with a set monetary value of food a person is entitled to daily. Rations provisioning is based on a weekly menu plan per contingent, that is based upon specific recipe cards. Ration quantities are capped at 4,500 calories per person/day (based on total calories for ingredients). The UNRS is approved by UNHQ in consultation with Member States, and thus would require significant staff work and diplomatic effort if a mission sought to change

The UN arranges contracted support for providing fresh, frozen, chilled and dry rations to all formed military and police units<sup>36</sup>. This is coordinated by Mission Support. Composite rations (often referred to as combat or hard rations) are the responsibility of a TCC/PCC to provide and will be reimbursed if use is authorised. The Life Support Section within SDM will provide composite rations to UN staff (civilian, military and police) and UN Military Observers as directed by DMS.

The Life Support section processes and places orders with the rations contractor and are responsible for quality assurance. The Life Support section is the contingent point of contact should there be any issues with rations or the performance of the contractor.

In most missions, the UN contracts a company to provide rations to mission components. Contingents are expected to deploy with or appoint a Foods or Rations Officer (or Logistics Officer) who is responsible for preparing the weekly Rations Request based on menu plans and recipe cards. The Rations Request is sent to MSD Life Support Section. The Foods Officer also verifies, receives, stores, records usage and reports all food related issues using a "Rations Discrepancy Form", which is sent to the MSD Life Support section.

Contingents providing their own catering support are required to ensure sufficient numbers of appropriately qualified catering staff for the preparing and serving meals and for the proper storage of food items. It is essential to have an accurate number of contingent troop strength by location, with understanding of potential visitors to ensure sufficient quantities of food are available. Thus, regular coordination is required within the Sector and Force/Police HQ to maintain accurate information and support requirements for feeding.

**Reserve Ration Stocks.** A situation may arise whereby units may become isolated and regular delivery of rations may not be possible due to weather conditions, the operational situation, transit difficulties or other reasons. Therefore, reserve composite rations are to be held by contingents. Contingent Commanding Officers are responsible for the proper

---

<sup>36</sup> Note that Staff Officers, Military Observers and Individual Police Officers are not provided rations, as they are provided an allowance (discussed further below).

storage, control and rotation of reserve (composite) rations. Frequent inspections are to be carried out on all holdings of composite rations. The Mission reserve of rations will be composed of a composite ration. It may be a UN issued composite ration or a national composite ration as agreed with UN.

### 3.6.12 Catering (including Catering Equipment)

#### 3.6.12.1 *Formed Units*

Catering is a self-sustainment (SS) category and responsibility for its provision is agreed in the MOU. If a contingent deploys any additional catering equipment, not covered by the MOU, this may be regarded as NSE, and therefore not subject to reimbursement.

As outlined in the COE Manual, to receive the self-sustainment reimbursement rate for catering, the unit must be able to feed its troops with cold and hot meals in a clean and healthy environment. The contingent must:

- Provide kitchen facilities and equipment, including supplies, consumables, dishes and cutlery, for the camps for which it is responsible, as detailed in the MOU;
- Provide deep freeze (14 days where required), cold (7 days) and dry food storage for kitchen facilities;
- Provide kitchen facilities with hot dishwashing capabilities; and
- Ensure that kitchen facilities have hygienic equipment that maintains a clean and healthy environment.

Where refrigerated trucks (non-static) are required, this will be reimbursed separately under ME. The unit is responsible for maintaining and servicing its kitchen facilities, including all catering equipment, repair parts and supplies, such as dishes and cutlery. When the UN provides this service to an equivalent standard, the unit does not receive reimbursement for this category. Alternatively, a contingent could be fed by another contingent and if this is the case the contingent providing the catering service would be reimbursed based on the additional amount of personnel fed. In this case, a MOU will be agreed and signed by all applicable MS and the UN.

#### 3.6.12.2 *Individual personnel (civilian, military staff officers, UNMOs, individual police officers etc)*

**Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA).** MSA is a daily allowance payable by the UN for living expenses incurred by individual staff members (civilian, military and police) in the field in connection with their temporary assignment or appointment to a special mission. In terms of uniformed personnel this would include staff officers and UNMOs (military) and individual police officers (police). MSA is designed to cover the cost of food, accommodation and other incidental expenses and constitutes the total UN contribution towards such costs. The rates of subsistence allowance for different missions, which are subject to change, are described in the Mission Specific Guidelines to the MS. Where food

and/or accommodation are provided by the UN, Government or any related institution, the MSA will be reduced accordingly.

### 3.6.13 Water

Water is essential since it affects efficiency, morale, general health and welfare. It is required for personal consumption, medical support, decontamination, sanitation and construction, as well as for vehicle operation and maintenance. Within a field mission, the UN is responsible for the supply of water to the contingents after an initial self-sufficiency period defined in the SUR.

For most missions, the MOU for a contingent will include the requirement to provide reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPU) or water treatment plants. The UN will provide sufficient quantities of bottled water to the contingent until the ROWPU / water treatment plant is operational. At this stage the UN will no longer provide bottled water as the contingent is now capable of providing its own potable water and would be reimbursed as COE ME under a MOU. The UN would prefer all TCC/PCCs be self-sufficient for water as the procurement, transport and storage of bottled water are very labour-intensive, which makes this method of water supply expensive. Treating water in location is a far more effective and efficient manner of distributing potable water.

Where water treatment plants are in use, the UN is responsible to provide a raw water source (ie. bore hole). If any contingent is unable to bring water purification equipment (for example, in a mission comprised entirely of UNMOs or IPOs), the mission will prepare and coordinate a Mission Water Plan using a combination of UNOE and COE for water purification, storage and distribution. Contingents are responsible for the transportation of raw and treated water according to their MOU.

Water plant equipment needs to include water storage equipment that is dedicated to the production of treated water. The storage equipment is not part of static water storage capacities. For specific storage capacity requirements, units and planners must refer to the COE Manual. T/PCCs need to include in their contingents, sufficiently skilled operators for water equipment. Contingents will need to deploy with all water treatment chemicals either for the duration of the deployment or until a national re-supply line is established. The UN will not provide any consumables for TCC wet lease provided water treatment plants. Upon installation of the water purification units, contingents are responsible for testing and certifying that the purified water meets the WHO standards and is fit for human consumption. As at 2020, baseline scales of water are:

Type	Quantity
Safe Drinking Water (WHO Guidelines)	Potable Water 4.5 litres/person/day



Treated Bulk Water for cleaning, shower, ablutions and other use	80.0 litres/person/day
--	------------------------

The scales of issue can vary with climatic conditions. In regions with an extreme environment, the requirement may be further increased, particularly if heavy work is to be done.

**Water transport.** Contingents will need sufficient water trucks/trailers to transport raw water from the source to contingent camps in addition to any other water transport tasks, such as internal distribution. Water trucks are not to be used as part of the TCC/PCC water storage plan.

**Water storage.** Contingents will need separate static water storage for drinking and bulk water. Storage capacities need to be sufficient for a minimum of 170 litres per person. Static storage capacities should exclude any water truck capacities and any water storage equipment that is dedicated to the production of treated water. The UN is responsible for maintaining a separate reserve of drinking water for emergency purposes.

**Wastewater collection/disposal system.** The UN is responsible to establish an acceptable wastewater collection/disposal system, and solid waste management programme at troop deployment sites. However, TCC/PCCs may submit a proposal for an environmentally acceptable system including operators and, if accepted by the UN, the equipment will be treated as a special case for reimbursement.

### 3.6.14 Fuel / POL

Within a field mission, it is the UN's responsibility to provide Petrols, Oils and Lubricants (POL) after the initial self-sufficiency period as outlined in the contingent's SUR. POL is sometimes referred to simply as Fuel, however spans a range of products. Across all missions, diesel is the fuel specified for vehicles. Aviation fuel is provided for aircraft. In addition, fuels is provided for minor equipment such as generators. POL includes gases, oils and lubricants for equipment maintenance, for refrigeration, and for heating and cooking (ie. propane).

MSD will arrange a commercial contract for the supply, storage and delivery of bulk petrols, oils and lubricants (POL) for vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment such as generators and heaters. The storage and internal distribution within the unit, however, is a national responsibility and must comply with UN regulations for usage and distribution. Odometers (vehicles) and hour reading meters must be operational in all vehicles and generators to efficiently track fuel consumption. For efficient record of fuel consumption, the UN may install a "fuel log" device on all contingent vehicles and equipment.

Similar to other UN-supplied commodities, MSD is responsible for making contractual arrangements with sources of supply for the provision of POL products. From a contingent

perspective, the Life Support section within SDM can be contacted for routine resupply of fuel. M missions now utilise an "online" system for logistics sustainment activities called the Field Services Suite (FSS). In terms of fuel, contingents must submit a Fuel Request Form on FSS in order to be supplied/resupplied. Ultimately, MSD must track fuel requirements to ensure sufficient POL products are available across the mission. It is also MSD's responsibility to coordinate transportation to move fuel if suppliers are unable to deliver; ensure adequate fuel tanks exist to accommodate bulk storage; approving bulk issues, monitor consumption, investigate and report on shortages; inspect bulk storage operations to ensure the accuracy of pumping and metering equipment, and arranging for quality surveillance inspections.

Military and Police Unit Commanders must ensure POL is stored, secured, issued, consumed and sustained in accordance with mission SOP's and directives. As mentioned, contingents will demand fuel on the FSS using the Fuel Request Form. Contingents will be responsible for ensuring the quantity and quality of fuel upon delivery and will raise any concerns with the Life Support (Fuel) section. Contingents will also report on bulk fuel holdings as directed and will ensure that all forms of COE fuel storage ME is meeting performance standards for operational and environmental effectiveness. When fuel contamination is suspected the Sector Headquarters and Life Support Section must be notified immediately to determine if contamination is from the source of supply or local handling.

Packaged POL products include grease, oils, lubricants, and special products that are issued in sealed containers of less than 200 litres. Procedures for demanding, issuing, and receiving packaged POL products are the same as for all other consumable supplies.

### 3.6.15 Distribution

The distribution of materiel within a mission can come from a number of sources. Within a contingent, distribution will normally be the responsibility of the TCC/PCC and integral transport resources will be utilised to support dispersed company locations. Depending on the MOU arrangement, a contingent will be responsible for the replenishment of materiel required to meet applicable ME and SS performance standards. Thus, the contingent could possibly need to obtain sustainment flights from their respective country if supplies cannot be readily sourced locally. That said, these contingents are receiving reimbursement that considers these costs.

In terms of commodities that are provided by MSD (UNOE or contract) to a contingent, MSD may provide onward distribution to a contingent using mission level or 2<sup>nd</sup> line resources. Some missions possess military logistics units or enabling units that are under the AC2 of the DMS and could be tasked to support distribution support to a contingent. Alternatively, if a mission does not possess a logistics unit, distribution can be contracted to a civilian agency or a contingent could pick-up its commodities depending on security, environmental, capacity and geographical considerations.

## 3.7 Equipment Maintenance

When speaking of equipment owned by units, which is thus the responsibility of units to maintain, the correct terminology is to speak of Major Equipment (ME) and Self-Sustainment (SS). These terms are defined further in the glossary.

The maintenance of ME and SS paramount to mission success and needs to be robust and flexible to meet operational requirements. A unit with non-functional (or unreliable) equipment is not able to contribute effectively to the mandate, and will also suffer consequences for COE reimbursement. Due its importance the COE Manual provides a number of options concerning maintenance, and these change the way that reimbursement is provided for that unit. These are established at the time of MOU negotiation, and henceforth are fixed for that unit. A Force HQ planner needs to understand this, as the reimbursement and maintenance arrangements will affect whether a unit is able to project the capability required at the time required, including whether it is able to, for instance, fast track maintenance to achieve a key need.

The obligations of a unit to maintain equipment comes down to the MOU. There are several standard constructs used in MOUs. These are referred to as Dry Lease or Wet Lease.

### 3.7.1.1 *What and why does a planner or commander need to know?*

This issue may seem a T/PCC matter, and not a matter for a Force or Police component headquarter planner. However, Dry and Wet Lease arrangements significantly change the degree to which any unit is in control of the readiness of their unit equipment, and therefore their operational readiness / performance. In a traditional military chain of command, the military commander would have the ability to control maintenance support, and to influence maintenance priorities, to achieve the operational outcome. This is not the case in a UN field mission, and this has consequences for operational planning and for performance management.

### 3.7.2 Dry and Wet Lease options

The options are as follows:

#### 3.7.2.1 *Option 1: Wet lease arrangement involving one TCC/PCC*

The TCC/PCC provides major equipment and maintenance.

#### *Logistics*

TCC/PCC provides:

- Major equipment;
- Related minor equipment;
- Workshop equipment, including tools;

- Spare parts and consumables; and
- Maintenance personnel.

The UN provides accommodation for the equipment and the workshop, including storage facilities and utilities.

#### *Finance*

TCC/PCC receives reimbursement under the wet lease arrangement.

#### 3.7.2.2 *Option 2: Wet lease arrangement involving two TCC/PCCs*

The TCC/PCC provides major equipment, makes bilateral arrangements with another TCC/PCC to maintain the equipment and enters into a wet lease with the UN.

#### *Logistics*

The 1<sup>st</sup> TCC/PCC provides:

- Major equipment.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> TCC/PCC provides:

- Minor equipment;
- Workshop equipment, including tools;
- Spare parts and consumables;
- Maintenance personnel.

The UN provides accommodation, including storage facilities and utilities, to both TCC/PCCs.

#### *Finance*

The 1<sup>st</sup> TCC/PCC receives reimbursement under the wet lease arrangement. The UN has no obligation with regard to the equipment or services provided by the 2<sup>nd</sup> TCC/PCC.

#### 3.7.2.3 *Option 3: Dry lease arrangement*

The TCC/PCC provides major equipment and the UN maintains the equipment.

#### *Logistics*

The TCC/PCC provides major equipment.

The UN provides:

- Minor equipment;
- Workshop facilities, equipment and tools;
- Spare parts and consumables;
- Maintenance personnel.

The UN provides accommodation, including storage facilities and utilities, to the TCC/PCC.

#### *Finance*

The TCC/PCC receives reimbursement under the dry lease arrangement.

The UN pays for:

- Minor equipment;
- Workshop facilities, equipment and tools;
- Spare parts and consumables;
- Maintenance personnel.

#### 3.7.2.4 *Option 4: Dry lease arrangement (where 2<sup>nd</sup> T/PCC provides maintenance)*

One TCC provides major equipment and The UN arranges with another TCC/PCC to provide maintenance.

#### *Logistics*

The 1<sup>st</sup> TCC/PCC provides major equipment.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> TCC/PCC provides:

- Minor equipment;
- Workshop equipment and tools;
- Spare parts and consumables;
- Maintenance personnel.

The UN provides accommodation, including storage facilities and utilities, to both TCC/PCCs.

#### *Finance*

The 1<sup>st</sup> TCC/PCC receives reimbursement under the dry lease arrangement.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> TCC/PCC is reimbursed for maintenance.

### 3.7.2.5 *Option 5: Dry lease arrangement (with contractor)*

The TCC/PCC provides major equipment under a dry lease arrangement and requests the UN to provide maintenance. The UN enters into an agreement with a contractor to maintain equipment.

#### *Logistics*

The TCC/PCC provides major equipment.

The contractor provides:

- Minor equipment;
- Workshop facilities, equipment and tools;
- Spare parts and consumables;
- Maintenance personnel.

The UN provides accommodation, including storage facilities and utilities, to the TCC/PCC.

#### *Finance*

The TCC/PCC receives reimbursement under the dry lease arrangement.

The UN pays the contractor for maintenance costs, including spare parts and consumables, as per agreement with the contractor.

### 3.7.2.6 *Option 6 (Option 6 is not named - Wet lease using bilateral support)*

A 3rd party offers major equipment to the TCC/PCC under a bilateral arrangement. The TCC/PCC or service provider will be reimbursed the maintenance rate (including the incremental transportation factor and all other relevant factors), provided that the 3<sup>rd</sup> party certifies in writing that it will not provide maintenance services. The UN arranges with the TCC/PCC or a service provider to provide maintenance.

#### *Logistics*

The 3<sup>rd</sup> party provides major equipment to the TCC/PCC.

The TCC/PCC contributor provides:

- Minor equipment;
- Workshop equipment and tools;
- Spare parts and consumables;
- Maintenance personnel.

The UN provides accommodation, including storage facilities and utilities, to the TCC/PCC.

## Finance

The equipment of the 3<sup>rd</sup> party is offered bilaterally to the TCC/PCC at no cost to the UN. The TCC/PCC receives reimbursement for maintenance under a MOU.

### 3.8 Equipment Maintenance functions.

Equipment maintenance generally considers

- 1.) All action taken to retain materiel in or restore it to a specified condition or to restore it to serviceability. It includes inspection, testing, servicing, classification as to serviceability, repair, rebuilding and reclamation.
- 2.) All supply and repair action taken to keep a force in condition to carry out its mission.

At a Force or Police Component HQ Level, there is limited capacity to affect maintenance outcomes. However, a HQ may consider certain factors to ensure that they are aware of the maintenance limitations of their respective units and how that might affect performance.

- Balance between preventative maintenance and corrective maintenance.
- Understanding overall equipment availability (equipment which is fully functional for use)
- Identifying key equipment which is pivotal to operational success (for detailed understanding of availability)
- Understanding any critical challenges a unit is facing which may affect maintenance (for example a unit being unable to source a critical spare part due to local or global shortages, or a host nation which insists on local sourcing).
- Engaging with units (and Mission Support in the case of dry lease) to ensure maintenance plans aligns with operational priorities
- Understanding limits of recovery assets (and when HQ intervention may be required to assist in recovering of assets)
- Understanding any contract or bilateral support arrangements which may limit the flexibility of a force to temporarily or permanently relocate within the mission area.


#### 3.8.1 Example Equipment Maintenance Framework

In classic military doctrine, a unit deploys with limited maintenance capability, knowing it can rely on a Brigade or Force level logistic support for heavier grades of maintenance. In UN Field Missions, however, the Memorandum of Understanding generally requires the unit to be capable of self-sufficiency even without this higher support organisation.

This often means that a unit (if under a wet lease) deploys with a larger maintenance organisation. It will likely need to include both 1<sup>st</sup> line and 2<sup>nd</sup> line maintenance support

capability. Alternatively, the T/PCC may choose to deploy additional maintenance capability in a National Support Element which it locates in or near the mission.

An outline framework for Maintenance in the UN context is shown below and illustrates the relationship between the Lines of Support and the UN Maintenance Organization. Equipment and assemblies are moved through the system in a series of repair loops which extend from unit level to facilities both in and out of mission. At each Line of Support an increasing depth of repair is carried out. The integrity of the Maintenance concept must be observed if efficient and effective support is to be provided.



**What do we mean by 'lines of repair' and what are some of the major maintenance functions that might be found in each?**

One standard military concept considers four 'lines' of repair (i.e. from first to fourth)<sup>37</sup>.

**First line** maintenance is at unit level, and in the maintenance context would involve the unit maintenance platoon found in the unit service support company. Typical 1<sup>st</sup> line maintenance tasks include: operators daily and periodic inspection and maintenance with each type of equipment having its own maintenance check list the operator will follow and the execution will mainly consist of checking and refilling lubricants and other consumables; additionally, replacing spare parts that require no technical education or special tools to do.

**Second line** maintenance traditionally refers to maintenance beyond the unit capacity that might be performed by eg a Brigade-level maintenance workshop. In a UN field mission it is conducted within the contingent although may be conducted by the unit or

<sup>37</sup> There are several other ways of categorising repair such as "Light", "Medium" and "Heavy".



may be provided by the National Support Element external to the unit. Typical 2<sup>nd</sup> line maintenance tasks include: unit level of periodic inspection and maintenance using well-trained technicians; maintaining a maintenance workshop will manage a maintenance file on all equipment; repair equipment and return to the end user.

**Third line** maintenance in a UN mission is generally referring only to UN-owned equipment (UNOE), as it is very rare that a T/PCC will provide a third line maintenance facility in the mission. 3<sup>rd</sup> line maintenance tasks will include: advanced periodic inspection and repair using specialist technicians and tools; perform minor modifications; maintaining a 3<sup>rd</sup> line workshop that will manage detailed files on technical maintenance and repair information; and equipment returned to user or to storage.

**Fourth line** refers to the extensive maintenance work carried out in technical workshops or at manufacturer level. Representative activities at this level include major repair, refit/retro-fit and/or overhaul, as well as life extension programs. For military or police equipment, this would be only be conducted back at the T/PCC home country, and would require equipment to be returned to the T/PCC, and replacement equipment to be provided in the mission.

### 3.8.2 Recovery.

Contingent recovery assets must be sufficient and capable of providing support to the heaviest equipment provided (such as armoured vehicles) deployed and capable of recovering and evacuating equipment within and between units and formations, particularly when these are deployed over extended distances. Recovery support must be integrated with the lines of repair support, within a balance of immediacy, importance, deployment and location. Recovery plans are made, and recovery operations controlled at Force/Police level.

### 3.8.3 Request for Repair.

The repair request is the means by which a request is made by a Unit or Maintenance Organisation for the repair of equipment which is beyond their own capability.

Contingents are responsible for the maintenance of all equipment assigned to them; however, under a COE wet lease arrangement a contingent must perform all maintenance and repair. Contingents under a wet lease arrangement will need to have an augmented capability and will have traditional 2<sup>nd</sup> line capacity within their organisation. The MSD Maintenance Organization is responsible for the provision and coordination of 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> line support for UNOE. The MSD Maintenance Organization is responsible for the provision and coordination of 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> line support for COE only if under a dry lease arrangement. The repair request is normally submitted to the next line of support within the Maintenance Organisation. This will vary by mission and must be determined by reviewing mission SOPs. Depending on capability, equipment requiring 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> line repairs will be moved to the applicable maintenance facility by MSD.

### 3.8.4 Recovery Request.

Recovery is primarily a unit responsibility. That means a unit (police or military) must be capable of towing, lifting or hauling its damaged/non-functional vehicles and equipment back to the workshop or other safe repair location. If the recovery is beyond unit capacity the Sector or the Force will be asked to provide recovery assets. The Sector or Force (or Police HQ) may need to request support from MSD resources (for example requesting a heavy transport function). Normally the recovery is performed to the contingent's workshop location, where the vehicle can be repaired. If recovery has to be carried out to a temporary location, the owner unit is responsible for arranging further recovery or evacuation to unit location or workshop as applicable.

**Recovery priorities.** If recovery is being requested beyond unit capabilities, recovery priorities will be set by the Mission, Force or Police as applicable. When setting such priorities, the following are principles to consider:

- Recovery necessary to prevent injuries or death to personnel
- Recovery involving need for medical assistance and/or firefighting equipment
- Accident or breakdown of vehicles carrying perishable or explosive freight.
- Recovery needed to clear blocked roads

## 3.9 Equipment Acquisition, Disposal

---

*The following section is a summary of provisions of the COE Manual, however for full understanding, the reader must refer to the current COE Manual and consult with the COE Unit in the MSC.*

---

As indicated earlier, UN-funded materiel acquisition within a field mission can come in many forms including a local purchase, requisition against an existing local or pre-approved contract, raise a local contract for supplies or services or through a Letter of Assist (LOA) through HQ UNNY. In all cases financial regulations will be adhered to and will follow the procurement cycle of the mission. As a result, it can take considerable time to acquire new equipment as most must be budgeted and planned for within the next fiscal year. There are exceptions to this, however are limited to extreme operational necessity.

The **procurement** of equipment will rest with the DMS and the 3 x pillar chiefs. Should a contingent desire new equipment based on their assessment of operational requirements, high level negotiations must take place with the applicable sector and the Force or Police HQ. If the equipment in question is supported by the component HQ, lateral discussions can occur with MSD (and UNHQ) for acquisition. If the equipment is able to be provided by a MS, a LOA could be utilised between the UN and the MS. In this situation the MS would receive reimbursement for the LOA from the UN.

**Disposal** is often overlooked and managed poorly within a Mission particularly within the contingents. Ultimately, a contingent will be responsible for the proper disposal of obsolete equipment or equipment that cannot be effectively repaired (beyond economical repair). Some contingents may be reluctant to petition MSD for disposal assistance of such equipment due to strict national regulations surrounding security. As costs to transport equipment back to the applicable MS can be expensive many contingents will leave the equipment in the field mission. This is not ideal and can result in an equipment “graveyard” that is unkept, environmentally compromising and potentially unsafe and attracts security issues. Contingents must take all measures necessary to properly dispose of equipment and utilise the resources available within the mission for assistance.

COE remains the property of the TCC/PCC. Therefore, the disposal of such equipment is a responsibility of the TCC/PCC, unless ownership and/or responsibility for the equipment has been legally transferred to another entity. COE may be disposed of by repatriation or in the mission area by sale, donation or disposal action by the mission on behalf of the TCC/PCC. In-mission disposal of COE, by any method, must be in compliance with the mission SOFA or SOMA; host country customs and tax rules, regulations and procedures; and other relevant host country and international laws in addition to UN rules.

TCC/PCCs may request the assistance of the mission to dispose of COE through arrangements established for the disposal of equipment owned by the UN. In these cases, a formal agreement between the TCC/PCC and the mission will need to be prepared to formalise the handover of such equipment for subsequent disposal action. The agreement should specify that the TCC/PCC will make no claims for financial compensation for any potential revenue generated from the disposal action associated with the COE.

TCC/PCCs may dispose of COE by selling/donating it directly to other TCC/PCCs; the mission; UN agencies, funds and programmes; NGOs; or local governmental entities, as well as through commercial sale. TCC/PCCs should inform missions of their intention to sell such equipment by providing details of the items to be sold. The following documents shall be submitted to the mission: a formal statement from the TCC/PCC indicating that the UN will have no further liability for the equipment sold/donated, a copy of the sale document identifying the buyer, and tax payment and supporting documents.

TCC/PCCs shall complete all procedures required by their respective national regulations for the authorisation of write-off and disposal of equipment. National contingent commanders shall certify that the appropriate national administrative procedures for write-offs have been followed authorising the in-mission disposal of COE.

The in-mission disposal of COE should be an ongoing process, rather than an action undertaken shortly before contingent repatriation. As part of the quarterly COE verification process, contingents may consider conducting a regular in-mission disposal analysis of such equipment. This analysis should include a list of COE that has become

unserviceable, is beyond economical repair or is obsolete, with a recommendation for disposal actions.

---

*COE that is found to be non-functional for four consecutive quarters (12 months) must be repaired by the contingent or otherwise disposed of either through repatriation by the TCC/PCC or through an in-mission disposal method within the following six months.<sup>38</sup>*

---

### 3.10 Engineering.

---

*The term Engineering is used broadly in the UN in situations where military personnel may have been expecting more specific terms such as construction, infrastructure management, building maintenance, and combat engineer functions such as operational/tactical mobility/counter mobility activities.*

*The UN considers engineering a logistic function, and in one term encompasses all aspects of infrastructure construction and day to day maintenance through to combat engineer tasks.*

---

The objectives of general engineer support services are to plan, design, construct and maintain buildings, and physical infrastructure, operate utility plants and provide fire protection, together with other related services, in support of the operational commitments of UN field missions. A key challenge is managing two distinct asset types: Infrastructure controlled by the UN (such as UN bases), versus infrastructure owned by the Host Nation (such as roads, bridges, ports), which the UN may nevertheless need to maintain or improve for UN use. General engineer support services are provided in addition to field engineering services such as mine clearance, which may be required in certain missions.

UN field missions have a unique, complex and critical engineer logistics environment. This involves identifying and preparing bases of operation; identifying and improving utility supply lines; projecting and preparing forward logistics bases; identifying potential sources of supply for engineering works; negotiating takeover of facilities from Host Nation (HN) and forecasting and building operational stock assets forward in the theatre. Many of these actions, if not engineer unique, are engineer intensive.

---

<sup>38</sup> COE Manual 2017 Chapter 4 pages 119-120 paras 36-42

In general, engineer support concepts should be guided by the following principles:

- Maximum use of existing structures (controlled by the UN or by HN);
- Modification of existing structures rather than constructing new ones;
- Austere design and construction techniques;
- Minimum engineer effort (maximum use of HN labour and contracting);
- Standard designs and specifications.
- Establishment of office and care facilities (kitchen/dining and ablutions) takes precedent over living accommodations.

### 3.10.1 Tailoring Engineering Support.

The engineer resources are tailored to execute identified tasks considering the capabilities of the available engineering support elements (military and civilian) and capabilities. Engineer capabilities of the Force vary depending on the type of unit and country of origin. Many member states separate combat and construction engineer skills, others do not. Thus, planners must consider the specific capability and availability of the national units when building the engineering support component of the mission. Interoperability must be considered to ensure that assets are complementary, if not compatible. Engineer planners also consider assets available through the UN, contracts, the HN, and private agencies.

---

*A uniformed planner seeking engineer support from a unit (in negotiation with Mission Support) will need to understand the individual unit's capabilities by reference to the SUR for that unit type, the MOU of that unit, and discussion with that unit's command/planning team to understand any unique capabilities or processes.*

---

### 3.10.2 Obtaining Construction Material.

Engineer operations normally require large amounts of construction materials. Engineers identify, prioritise, and requisition, the required construction materials through supply channels and Engineers must be involved in the specification and acceptance process. Construction materials not available in country should be requisitioned and delivered in small quantities as forces arrive in theatre. Follow-on transportation should include limited and frequent loads of construction materials allowing a steady flow into the theatre and precluding storage problems.

107. Protection, accommodation and other construction all require large quantities of construction materials. This commodity is critical to mission success and is often needed very early in the mission. MSD must estimate requirements for theatre development and for a sustainment flow and what materials are available from local sources such as local

manufacturers, commercial stockpiles, or HN government assets. These requirements are then passed through the mission's supply/procurement organisation to integrate the requisition and transportation requirements.

Supply/procurement organisations process the requisition, receive, store, and transport construction materials. Engineers track the status of required construction materials in order to keep pace with the operation. Procurement time of several months may not be acceptable to mission needs, therefore construction materials procurement may take on extraordinary procedures such as local purchase or contracting in proximity to the theatre.

### 3.10.3 Field Mission Engineering Support Organisation

Engineering Support in field missions is provided through an Integrated Military and Civilian Support Structure located within the Service Delivery Management (SDM) Pillar of the MSD. Mission Engineering personnel coordinate, design, construct, install and maintain infrastructure, maintain and operate support systems, utility services and provide fire prevention and fire protection services, in support of the operational commitments, and towards the sustainment of the mission.

The primary task, especially at the outset of any mission, will be determine the infrastructure requirements and implementing the mission's infrastructure projects at minimum cost. The engineering support services will be the result of an integrated process where the military (enabling unit) and civilian engineering components develop the infrastructure plans and then implement the projects staffed through and approved by the SDM.

Normally a field mission will have a Military Engineer Unit (considered an enabling unit and thus tasked by MSD and responsive to the SDM). This unit is a military unit that is provided by a TCC under a MOU and primarily tasked to conduct combat engineering tasks to include but not limited to counter-mine/counter-IED, Explosive Ordnance and IED Disposal, obstacle crossing, emplace field defences and repairs to roads, airfields and LZ. The taskings, areas of responsibilities, technical policies and the engineering operating procedure will be established by the SDM, in line with the mission's tasks, objectives, logistic directives and mandate.

### 3.10.4 Major and Minor Engineering responsibilities

---

*Understanding the UN concepts of Major and Minor Engineering is essential when deconflicting between unit responsibilities and whether support is available from Mission Support.*

---

Within the missions, there is often considerable misunderstanding regarding tasks and responsibilities that fall under minor engineering and major engineering. The COE Manual

attempts to delineate between minor and major as follows: Military and formed police units deployed to UN peacekeeping field missions are generally self-sustained with regard to **minor engineering**. TCC/PCCs are reimbursed if services provided are satisfactory according to the standards set out in the COE manual. This arrangement is reflected in the MOU between the UN and the Government contributing resources to the field mission. While minor engineering work is the responsibility of each formed unit, **major engineering** work is the responsibility of the field mission. For this purpose, field missions manage all UN assets, formed military engineering units and/or contractors.

In most instances, contingents will agree to provide a minor engineering capability within their unit structure (regardless of whether the TCC would include this in that unit type), and this will be reflected in a signed MOU with the UN. The COE Manual is very specific concerning the parameters and requirements of reimbursement for this SS category. Essentially, in order to receive the SS reimbursement rate for minor engineering the unit must be able within its accommodation areas to:

- Undertake non-field defensive minor construction;
- Handle minor electrical repairs and replacement;
- Undertake repairs to plumbing and water systems;
- Conduct minor maintenance and other light repair work; and
- Provide all related workshop equipment, construction tools and supplies.

**Garbage collection** The UN considers garbage and sewage collection under engineering. The reimbursement rate to a unit for minor engineering does not include garbage and sewage collection. This is because garbage collection from a centralised location for each unit is a UN responsibility.

**Typical engineering tasks.** To enhance consistency across field missions and formed units in the execution of minor engineering tasks, the present guidance provides examples of typical engineering tasks and clarifies who is generally responsible for performing them.

- The Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR) and subsequent MOU normally requires units deploy trained craftsmen, workshops and tools, spare parts and consumables to carry out minor engineering tasks. Occasionally, formed units will recruit national workers or contractors to conduct minor engineering tasks or augment their capabilities with regard to minor engineering under their own arrangements, and at their own liability and expense. Such arrangements are not in conflict with the guidance provided in the COE Manual.
- Formed units whose MOU states that they are responsible for self-sustainment with regard to minor engineering are responsible for minor construction, repairs and replacement, as well as maintenance and supplies, in accordance with the generic performance standard above, and must be proactive in the area of minor engineering. A request for minor engineering work through the field mission will therefore be rejected as a general rule.

There are ongoing issues within field missions where units who are being reimbursed for minor engineering under Self-Sustainment are asking MSD to perform these tasks. This is not acceptable unless a unit commanding officer declares that the unit is no longer self-sustained with regard to minor engineering. The implication is that the TCC/PCC will not be reimbursed for minor engineering until its capacity to conduct minor engineering work has been restored.

This section also applies to formed units occupying temporary camps.

In the ensuing tables, UN vs TCC/PCC responsibilities are defined in relation to several minor engineering tasks. These tables have been drawn directly from 2020 COE Manual as guidance.<sup>39</sup>

3.10.4.1 *Responsibilities related to minor engineering regarding field defence stores*

Field defence stores	Field mission	Minor engineering by formed unit
<b>Construction</b>	<p>Erect adequate perimeter walls and/or barbed wire fences with access (boom gates, metal gates or other gates), perimeter lighting and other early warning systems as per security assessment</p> <p>Provide lights inside the camp</p> <p>Construct observation platforms and self-defence fortification works, ie. small shelters and trenches and bastions</p> <p>Painting and UN markings on external surfaces</p> <p>Construct dams, ditches, canals, drainage or similar permanent structures if</p>	<p>Provide a self-fortification plan</p> <p>Connect perimeter lights and other early warning systems and lights with main COE generators</p>

<sup>39</sup> COE Manual 2017, Chapter 3 Annex A, Appendix 3, pages 60-64



	required as per security assessment  Removal of vegetation	
<b>Maintenance and repair</b>	Conduct structural and major repairs, ie. major repairs to fences, walls and platforms, and replacement of perimeter lights in the event of damage  Major paintwork	Conduct inspection and daily repairs of perimeter wall/fence, lights, observation platforms and fortification works, ie. patching of small holes in fence, necessary electrical and carpentry work and minor paintwork as per building maintenance standard
<b>Consumables/supplies</b>	Provide all related minor equipment and consumables for construction, maintenance and repair, ie. concertina wire, barbed wire, corrugated galvanized iron sheets, pickets, nails, ground locking pegs, light bulbs, paint and sandbags	None. Consumables are a UN responsibility
<b>Tools and personnel</b>	Provide all tools and personnel for construction, major repairs and maintenance work	Provide guidance with respect to fortification plan  Provide all personnel and tools for daily inspection

3.10.4.2 *Responsibilities related to minor engineering during development and maintenance of the camp area*

Camp area	Field mission	Minor engineering by formed unit
<b>Construction</b>	Removal of major vegetation, ground levelling, ground	Construct concrete platforms, slabs and sheds for generators (COE and UNOE),

	<p>stabilisation (gravel, hardstand, compacting)</p> <p>Ground work for tentage</p> <p>Drainage (installation or construction of collection pools, soak pits or outlets; installation of underground drains)</p> <p>Grading of surface</p> <p>Provision of water source (well, river, lake, external supply) and storage if no COE storage is available as per MOU</p> <p>Installation of UNOE, ie. generators, water and waste treatment plants, fuel storage, computers, and telephone and communication lines</p> <p>Provision of technical guidance for installation of UNOE</p>	<p>vehicle wash areas, gymnasium, etc.</p> <p>Installation of COE generators and power connection/distribution to accommodation area, office and workshops, kitchens, perimeter lights, water treatment plants, medical facility, etc.</p> <p>Installation of COE water treatment plants with storage and internal distribution to end users (ablution facilities, kitchen, laundry facility, hospital and work areas, dining and accommodation, etc.)</p> <p>Connect COE field ablution facilities to UN-provided sewage facility</p> <p>Installation of COE fuel storage;</p> <p>Construction of guard posts, ammunition storage, shades, garbage collection points and centralised safe storage;</p> <p>Removal of minor vegetation, landscaping within own camp area (lawn, flowers, lamps) and dust stabilisation</p> <p>Construction of signs and minor paintwork</p> <p>Other minor construction work such as outdoor sports facilities, weights for gymnasium, car ramps, flag poles with platforms, vehicle</p>
--	--	--

		wash points and barbeque area
<b>Maintenance and repair</b>	<p>Conduct structural and major repairs to groundwork, drainage and water supply</p> <p>Collection of garbage and hazardous waste from centralised formed unit location</p> <p>UN-owned generators, water and waste treatment plants</p>	<p>Removal of minor vegetation (small bushes, grass, etc.)</p> <p>Daily inspection and maintenance of all drainage, water supply and groundwork</p>
<b>Consumables/supplies</b>	<p>Gravel and sand for ground repairs following erosion and other repair requirements</p> <p>Minor equipment and consumables for structural and major repairs to drainage installations</p> <p>UNOE that is used to support formed unit</p>	<p>Provide all related minor equipment and consumables for minor construction work, maintenance and repairs (cement, gravel, sand, nails, screws, fittings, fertilizers, liquids, electrical wires, fuses, light bulbs, pipes and hoses, filters, etc.)</p> <p>Consumables for the formed unit's minor engineering work may under exceptional circumstances be issued (as the situation allows) by the field mission against cost recovery</p>
<b>Tools and personnel</b>	<p>Provide all personnel and tools for major construction work and structural and major repairs</p>	<p>Trained personnel (carpenters, plumbers, electricians) and all relevant tools</p>

3.10.4.3 *III. Responsibilities related to minor engineering when the UN provides accommodation*

Accommodation	Field mission	Minor engineering by formed unit
<p><b>Construction</b></p>	<p>Foundation work and erection and assembly of accommodation units, office and workspace, and ablution facilities</p> <p>Construction/reconstruction/refurbishment to UN standard of living space and office/workspace, including kitchen and laundry facilities</p> <p>Installation of floor/wall/roof panels, doors, windows, footings, netting, heating/cooling</p> <p>Installation of building utilities (electrical wiring and fixtures, water supply and wastewater removal)</p> <p>Internal and external painting of UN-provided accommodation and workspace, as well as UN markings, as necessary</p>	<p>Provide an accommodation plan which allows for effective use of UN-provided accommodation while ensuring satisfactory living conditions of formed unit personnel</p>
<p><b>Maintenance and repair</b></p>	<p>Repair and replacement of building elements (floor, walls, roof panels, doors, windows, footings)</p> <p>Major repair work to building utilities (installation of electrical wiring and fixtures, water supply and wastewater removal)</p> <p>Major paintwork</p> <p>Preventive maintenance: periodic inspection and testing of all elements and fixtures, fastening of loose fixtures (door handles, window brackets, hinges, electrical wiring and fixtures), repair or replacement of broken/damaged items (window panes, electrical wiring and fixtures, door handles, hinges) and repairs to toilets and showers</p>	<p>Cleaning: Daily sweeping and washing of floors, wash basins, showers, water closets and urinals; washing of walls, window cleaning, and removal of limestone in toilets, showers, faucets and shower heads, etc.</p> <p>Cleaning: daily cleaning of drains, plumbing installations and fixtures, and electrical installations and</p>

	Minor paintwork and repairs to painted surfaces	fixtures, including surface wiring
<b>Consumables/supplies</b>	Provide all spare parts and consumables related to maintenance and repairs, except cleaning materials	Provide cleaning materials
<b>Tools and personnel</b>	Provide all personnel and tools for construction and assembly work, installation and major repairs  Provide all personnel and tools for daily maintenance work	
<b>Other</b>	Provide furniture for eating facilities, where necessary	Maintain furniture

### 3.10.5 Environmental Compliance and Waste Management

TCC/PCCs are to ensure that all members of the national contingent conduct themselves in an environmentally conscious manner. They shall observe established UN rules and regulations applicable to the functioning of peacekeeping operations, endeavouring to achieve full compliance with UN environmental and waste management policies and procedures for field missions, as set out in annex K (TCC) and annex N (PCC) to the MOU.<sup>40</sup>

Units are required to appoint officials to serve as environmental focal points. These appointed officials are responsible for liaising with the mission Environmental Officer including the monitoring, assessment and reporting of contingents' compliance and environmental briefings are provided during induction training. COE Units should request the participation of mission environmental and waste management staff during appropriate verification inspection activities. When practical, COE Units should assist the environmental and waste management staff to conduct their technical inspections, briefings and training of contingent personnel in environmental and waste management matters

National contingents undertake that they will “do no harm” to the local environment (including wild plants and animals) and, upon departure, will leave the premises and

<sup>40</sup> COE Manual 2017, Chapter 9, Article 7, page 182

physical environment in the condition in which it was provided to them. The only exceptions to this requirement to remediate will be in exceptional cases of operational imperative where the mission has been informed. They will observe a policy of no littering around the bases or on patrols. They will take concrete steps to conserve water and energy, reduce and segregate waste and properly manage hazardous waste and wastewater for which they are responsible. Where possible, the use of renewable energy will be prioritised.

The UN will provide assistance to national contingents to enable them to comply with UN environmental and waste management policies and procedures. Such assistance shall include providing national contingents with the agreed infrastructure and services that enable them to operate in an environmentally conscious manner. The UN will provide mission-specific briefings, induction and continuing training on field mission policies and procedures regarding environmental and waste management, comprising practical actions that can be taken by uniformed personnel to ensure a responsible presence. Mission support point of contact is the MSC (usually in the COE Unit).

#### 3.10.5.1 *Environmental issues.*

As UN missions take place in nations that have been undergoing considerable turmoil and strife, environmental protection will have assumed a low priority compared to other issues of national concern. This does not give the UN mission a license to ignore environmental protection.

The UN has a special obligation to act responsibly towards the environment of the Host Nation and to set a good example. Environmental regulations will differ in every UN mission area, even to the point of there being potentially conflicting legislation between various jurisdictions in the mission area.

Every UN mission member, civilian or military, must conduct his or her affairs with the following themes always in mind:

- Protection of the environment is every individual's responsibility;
- Sound planning is essential to minimise damage to the environment, economise on local resources, and make best use of UN funds; and
- The environment must be considered in the planning and undertaking of every activity.

#### 3.10.5.2 *Environmental Policy.*

Planners and commanders at all levels from Force/Police HQ down to units should seek out the mission-specific environmental policy to guide the actions of its units and individuals. This policy must be taught to mission members to ensure they are aware of the commitment of the mission to sound environmental practices.

### 3.10.5.3 *Environmental Action Plan.*

Each UN mission is expected by the COE Manual to create an Environmental Action Plan in which specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timely (SMART) targets for environmental protection measures to be undertaken are detailed. Responsibilities for achieving each specific target must be clearly stated and known by everyone.

### 3.10.5.4 *Hazardous Materiel.*

A major element of the Environmental Action Plan should be an examination of the mission's hazardous materials procedures. Every mission should have a Hazardous Materiel Management Plan (HAZMAT Plan). It must, as a minimum, agree with HAZMAT handling regulations of the Host Nation.

### 3.10.5.5 *Personnel Awareness.*

In a typical UN mission, the number of nations represented by troops and civilian staff will create a wide divergence in the degree of environmental awareness amongst mission personnel. Any successful personnel awareness campaign will need to be proactive. All personnel must share both a basic environmental awareness and a knowledge of their individual role in environmental protection. All commanders should ensure that relevant environmental concerns are addressed in all activities in the mission. In all tasks, personnel should be made aware of practices that will preserve the environment.

### 3.10.5.6 *Community Relations.*

An Environmental Action Plan is not complete without an effective community relations program, which creates a positive public image of the mission's commitment to environmental protection. Cooperation with the HN on environmental issues makes the public aware that the UN is a good corporate environmental citizen. A secondary benefit is that UN operations are likely to gain increased acceptance once the public sees the UN commitment to protecting the local environment.

## 3.11 *Guidelines for Accommodation and other Facilities/Utilities*

---

*Depending on national background, uniformed personnel may or may not think of Accommodation and Facilities/Infrastructure (such as Base management) as a logistic issue.*

*Nevertheless, military and police staff in logistic or mission support roles have reported that this topic consumes a considerable amount of their time and effort to manage.*

*The UN considers the construction of Buildings and Infrastructure (including accommodation, office areas and other facilities) to be part of the Mission Support function (unless otherwise negotiated in an MOU)*

---

Commanders and planners must consider Accommodation and Facilities in many circumstances including:

- When planning to establish a new Forward Operating Base or Temporary Operating Base
- When new rotations of a unit/contingent have concerns with the standard of their facilities
- When changes to the mission/environment necessitate amendments. This could be changes in security requirements, change in the size or nature of the element located in that base (a mechanised infantry unit will have different accommodation needs from an aviation unit), or, for example as units increase the proportion of women deployed, changes may be required to ensure women are afforded safe, secure accommodation and separated ablutions.

### 3.11.1 Standards of Accommodation.

*Enquiries and negotiation about standards of accommodation consume a significant amount of management attention in some missions.*

---

The Standards of Accommodation for Military and Police Units are laid out in the COE Manual, Chapter 3, Annex A.

The provision of accommodation by a unit is decided during the initial deployment discussions and planning for each individual unit and recorded in the MOU. On a mission start up, most units will be expected to deploy with tentage to accommodate their troops for at least six months. Units are paid a reimbursement rate if they are providing tented accommodation (living, ablution and workspace) for themselves.

Requirements for accommodation may vary extensively from mission to mission depending on geography, climate, Host Nation Support, civil contractor support, in-mission infrastructure and contributing countries (national contingents) facilities, material and services available.

To be clear, the UN is responsible for the provision of long-term accommodations unless otherwise negotiated with a TCC/PCC. The T/PCC may negotiate to provide/construct their own facilities, in exchange for a reimbursement rate. Whether provided by the contributing country or the UN, the long-term accommodation must meet the minimum standards listed in COE Manual. If the UN is unable to provide standard accommodation, and the T/PCC's unit remains in tentage. T/PCC is entitled to receive ongoing



reimbursement until all personnel are housed at the required standard. As all of the current missions are quite mature, accommodations are well-developed; however, contingents should be prepared to deploy sub-units to Forward Operating Bases (FOB) that may require expedient or temporary accommodations such as tentage.

---

*In any event, it should be noted that there are very few circumstances in UN policy entitles a deployed person to a single room, or even a two-person room, regardless of rank.*

*However, there are many missions where T/PCCs have elected to construct accommodation which exceeds the minimum standard.*

---

Where a unit or contingent takes issue with the standard of accommodation; the analysis must consider:

- The MOU of that unit (which determines whether the UN or the unit's T/PCC is responsible for that accommodation)
- The minimum standards established by the COE Manual<sup>41</sup>

If the accommodation meets the minimum standards established by the COE Manual, any expectation of change in standard must be pursued by that unit, through their T/PCC. If the accommodation does not meet the minimum standards, and is a UN responsibility for that unit, engagement with Mission Support would be appropriate to seek rectification. Nevertheless, the unit would need to also pursue the matter through their T/PCC, as it will affect reimbursement.

In all cases, the Force or Police HQ may choose to represent factors associated with the accommodation up through the chain of command to DPO, but has limited, if any, capacity to direct construction. As always, it should be expected that the UN Mission is not funded to conduct additional construction beyond that which was negotiated with T/PCCs and thus planned prior to the funding cycle. For this reason, any negotiated changes may take a year or longer to effect.

While the COE Manual considers issues such as reimbursement for accommodation, the construction of a base (temporary or permanent) involves many other factors, including ensuring the base can be correctly supported (changes to replenishment contracts; development or establishing roads; building helipads or airfields; boring water wells). These are the responsibility of Mission Support and can require significant time to achieve.

---

<sup>41</sup> The practice of some T/PCCs of exceeding the minimum accommodation standard, can sometimes lead to an incoming unit rotation from a different nation to incorrectly conclude that their own accommodation is 'below standard'

It is for this reason that Mission Support must be involved as early as physically possible in any consideration for relocating / expanding operating bases.

### 3.11.2 Ensuring appropriate planning in accommodation

Security Council Resolution 2438 calls on Member States and the UN Secretariat to ensure safe, enabling and gender-sensitive working environments for women in peacekeeping operations.

Specifically, this includes both the UN and T/PCCs providing adequate and appropriate infrastructure and facilities for women in missions, such as (but not limited to) accommodation, sanitation, health care, protective equipment, specific needs and demands for security and privacy.

This means that not only new base locations, but existing locations must consider:

- How to ensure accommodation planning considers issues of privacy / security for sleeping and ablutions while maintaining team cohesion. This may involve improving lighting to ablution buildings; ensuring doors are lockable; installing cubicles/privacy screens in ablutions. Planners should balance the need for a unit to be able to operate together with privacy/dignity concerns, and should consider that, for example, placing all women (regardless of section/office/unit) in one building far away from their colleagues can be highly damaging to morale and unit management.
- Ensuring ablutions and accommodations on all bases (including forward and temporary operating bases) are appropriate for women.
- How to adapt to that different nations will have different norms with regard what constitutes privacy, security, and dignity, and negotiating these sensitively.

Accommodation changes such as these have significant lead times. For this reason, it is not sufficient to wait until a T/PCC has additional female peacekeepers in-bound. By the time this occurs, there will be insufficient time to arrange the building/supplying of appropriate amenities.

---

*Pro-active planning must occur as early as possible, in order to ensure that, as proportions of female peacekeepers increase, facilities are appropriate.*

---

### 3.11.3 Considerations for planning a new site/infrastructure

When considering the planning of a new FOB or TOB, headquarters planners must first consider both the obligations of the Unit and the UN (under COE Manual/MOU), and the capacity of the affected units to live under tentage versus expect constructed accommodation, depending on the timeframe. They should also consider any mission

factors (such as environment or security) which may affect the decision. Any plans which might require construction support must be discussed with MSD as early as practical.

Regardless of 'entitlement' under policy, or expectations by a unit, the mission will be constrained by practical limitations such as timeframes to obtain construction material, availability of scarce construction resources, time required to secure contracts, and the (usually long) timelines required to secure mission funding to achieve the above.

---

*The construction of a new Forward Operating Base (FOB) to achieve facilities beyond tentage may need to be considered a year or more in advance.*

---

#### 3.11.4 Infrastructure Maintenance.

Many UN missions face difficulties in their early stages in deployment/sustainment due to destroyed or non-existing Lines of Communication (LOC), Main Supply Routes (MSR), non-existing or destroyed seaports, airfields, heliports, and logistic facilities and utilities. The minimum requirements for mobility, survivability, and sustainability of all mission contingents and units may vary depending on tasks, deployment areas and national support (self-sufficiency). Nevertheless, mission engineering capabilities must focus on the basic needs of the all UN personnel deployed in the mission area.

Refer to Engineering (above) for more on infrastructure maintenance and how responsibilities are allocated between contingents and the UN.

#### 3.11.5 Non-base Infrastructure.

The UN negotiates with the Host Nation as part of the Host Nation consent for UN presence. Nevertheless, overall HN consent does not mean that key national infrastructure is available or even functional for UN needs. Accordingly there are many circumstances where the mission will need to separately negotiate for access.

The mission (through Mission Support) will often need to build, maintain or refurbish infrastructure to permit mission operations and logistic support. This is a Mission Support responsibility, and is one of many reasons why enabling units are tasked by Mission Support, and are not considered solely for the use of the Force. Mission Support will balance the effectiveness and cost of contracted support against the availability (and cost) of military engineering support.

##### 3.11.5.1 *Airfields and Heliports.*

In many missions, air transport is essential (especially during the wet season) due to poor road infrastructure, and other terrain and climate impacts.

Regular and consistent maintenance and rapid supply/resupply of all airfields/heliports are essential. Wherever possible, the mission will use existing airfields in the HN/mission area.

The identification of existing airfields and heliports, including the requirement for new airfields, the extension or repair of existing facilities, and maintenance requirements is a very high priority in the early planning stages of a mission. Military engineer support generally will not have the specialised or heavy engineering equipment, construction material, skilled troops, and funding required for the construction of more than helipads

#### 3.11.5.2 *Seaports.*

Whereas the initial elements of a mission are most often deployed by air, the efficient and economic flow of troops and material into the theatre may depend on adequate port facilities as close as possible to the mission area. HN agreements granting mission use rights would then be essential. Wherever possible, existing ports are used, rehabilitated or upgraded. The construction of new ports is normally beyond capabilities of national contingents participating in UN operations.

The Mission Support engineer element's responsibilities may include to support construction, repair and maintenance of different facilities, both above and below the waterline. The units, skills and equipment for this kind of capability is hard to source from TCCs. Therefore, the planning and mounting of a new mission will involve the use of existing and functioning port facilities, which require as little as possible repair, upgrading or maintenance and will focus primarily on the Main Supply Routes (MSR) and Lines of Communication (LOCs) from the ports to the area of deployment.

#### 3.11.5.3 *Roads.*

An adequate road network is needed to transport personnel, equipment, and supplies for any UN mission. Wherever possible, the mission will rely on existing roads as the Main Supply Route (MSR) and Lines of Communication (LOC)s. It can be expected that the same circumstances which resulted in the establishment of a UN mission may have made road infrastructure a low priority for that host nation, or simply beyond Host Nation resources to address.

Accordingly, road maintenance (in order to secure essential routes) can consume a significant proportion of Mission Supports engineering effort. In missions with a dry and wet season, it is not uncommon that the entire dry season main effort is to refurbish roads made impassable by the wet season.

Though it is unlikely that one single engineer unit at force or national contingent level will be designated solely for road construction, many engineering elements will be engaged in this task during the deployment and sustainment phases of a mission.

Properly maintained and secure MSR's will permit mission forces to have quicker access to critical areas and will allow humanitarian agencies to perform their assigned tasks. MSR's or LOCs should be two way and all-weather surface. It should be acknowledged that all-weather surfaces for all MSR's and LOCs may be beyond the capability of Force and Mission engineers.

### 3.11.6 Bridges.

An efficient MSR network must be able to carry all expected traffic loads. Often, bridging is the weak link in the load-carrying capacity of a route. A force or police planner relying on a particular route must ensure that they understand the load-carrying capacity of any bridges, which may require the tasking of ISR assets or other forms of surveying.

Because of the scarce nature of engineer assets, planners must have considered detours and bypasses (both from a practicality and security perspective). Not only is it likely that scarce assets will not be available to reinforce or repair a bridge, a bridge is a natural target for a threat actor seeking to limit mobility (whether that actor is targeting the UN element, another security actor, or simply seeking to control the local population).

## 3.12 Aviation

---

*Aviation is often a critical limiting factor in logistics planning – because in many missions, the climate, terrain and distances involved make aviation the primary line of communication (means of support).*

---

Aviation support is always in limited supply, and accordingly is controlled by the Director of Mission Support. A successful planner will understand the capabilities and constraints of requesting this much-demanded capability in order to ensure the correct support has been requested. Further, the planner must be able to clearly substantiate the task in the context of both Force and Mission priorities, so that Mission Support can correctly prioritise the task.

Aviation and Air Services are an important and often essential part of UN field missions. The purpose of these services is to support the achievement of UN operations. To do this it may utilise either helicopters or fixed wing aircraft, which are made available by a TCC or UN Contractors.

The following aviation tasks might need to be conducted as part of the logistic support:

- Aerial deployments of quick reaction forces;
- Intra-theatre passenger flights and logistics airlift;
- Theatre support to troop rotations;
- Helicopter slinging and hoisting;
- Search and Rescue (SAR);

- Emergency Medical Evacuation; and
- Aerial observation and surveillance

The type of aircraft involved depends largely on the duties to be performed, the area of operation and the topography, the availability of suitable airports and helipads, etc. Depending on these aspects the aircraft involved may be either fixed wing or rotary and short, medium or long-range type aircraft with a capability of passenger and/or cargo transport. Air services will vary in size and may range from one flight by one aircraft to a complex airbridge including different types of aircraft with different capabilities from different nations and/or contractors. The required planning and coordination measures will largely depend on the size of the operation.

The capabilities of rotary and fixed wing aircraft can support logistic tasking such as:

- Sustainment planning requirements;
- The completion of daily tasks that involve the transportation of materiel and personnel; and
- Contingent planning associated with medical evacuation, evacuation of personnel from areas, etc.

### 3.12.1 Aviation Tasking

Mission level aviation resources are tasked and managed through the Mission Air Operations Centre (MAOC) which might be located in the Aviation section of Service Delivery Management (SDM) or co-located in the MSC

Each TCC and contractor contributing air assets and personnel will be expected to deploy with sufficient air maintenance capabilities as well as the necessary air to ground and air-to-air communications. One of the air units might be expected to deploy with a meteorological element. Traffic control, flight safety, airfield management as well as mobile air movements sub-units and elements may be called in to assist in the task of providing efficient air support services to missions. Size, final structure and strength will be dependent upon the mission assigned to each unit.

In support missions such as MINUSMA, Air Field Support Unit are deployed to provide cargo handling, Flight Following, Air Traffic Control Services, Emergencies Crash and Rescue Services.

For military aviation assistance provided under an LOA, the document will detail the TCC's duties and obligations of the parties involved and will specify the term:

- Short-term use. The use of military aircraft supplied by a government on a short-term basis is usually for a specific task of limited duration (moving military personnel to a mission area at the outset of a peacekeeping operation and returning them to their home country after completion of the operation, rotating troops, evacuating UN military personnel and internationally recruited civilian staff members and their

authorised dependants from a mission area when the situation so warrants and assisting in the movement of a mission headquarters and its personnel from one location to another within the mission area); or

- Long-term use. When aircraft are provided on a long-term basis, they are usually accompanied by a national contingent for their operation, maintenance and upkeep. The contingent and its personnel, vehicles and equipment shall form part of the mission under the existing rules and regulations of the COE Manual.

Field mission aviation assets may be provided by civilian UN contracts or by a TCC. Unlike other military units, if military aviation capability is provided by a TCC, it is negotiated through a LOA not a MOU. Regardless of the source, Mission Support manages all aviation tasking, including the management of any host nation restrictions on use.

The source of the aviation asset may significantly change the information needs and the capability limitations of an aviation capability. For example: civilian contracted aircraft may refuse to carry weapons and/or ammunition unless packaged and stowed in a particular manner, which may make the aircraft unsuitable for supporting (for example) a Quick Reaction Force. Aside from the fact that different aircraft have different capabilities (ie. carrying capacity), different nations may have different training or rules on night flying, air crew rest (and thus availability), loading and so on.

Logisticians may be tasked to support or use this capability in theatre. Problems arise when logistics planners and staff are unfamiliar with using aircraft for support. This can result in planners not having essential data (such as load dimensions, and dangerous goods information) to hand and/or not understanding why such information is essential. Planners may also make incorrect assumptions about the capabilities and limitations of an aviation asset based on experience of their own nation's capability. Unfamiliarity with air lift can result in trepidation and reluctance to use this resource.

---

*Regardless of prior aviation experience, when conducting aviation planning, ALL uniformed planners should engage the Mission Air Operations Centre (or equivalent) in the mission, to understand the specific capabilities, limitations and planning considerations of the aviation support of that mission.*

---

**Mission Air Operations Centre (MAOC) and the Mission Support Centre (MSC):** In MINUSMA, the MAOC is collocated with MSC for ease of planning and coordination and clarity on air movements' priority and planning of Special Flights (SF) at the Mission. In other missions, it may be found in other parts of MSD, such as under Service Delivery. MSC Current Logistics Operations Unit will provide MAOC regular updates on prioritization of air movement requests. As stated, it is essential that contingents and Component HQ staff meet regularly and often with the MSC for coordination and planning.

### 3.12.2 Aviation Tasking Priorities.

Originating from the HoM, the priorities of using air assets (including both fixed wing and rotary wing) will be determined depending on the situation in the theatre or mission area. Normal priorities are:

- Deployment and operational movement or direct operational support<sup>42</sup>;
- Food and medical supplies;
- Other essential supplies;
- Communications;
- Duty travel and non-essential supplies and
- Leave and welfare goods

137. In the mission area, UN flights operating on transport or movement missions are divided into scheduled flights and special flights (unscheduled flights), the latter which are flights programmed for a specific mission. Requests for special flights are scheduled through the same channels as scheduled flights; however, total available flight hours will be limited and only the most urgent requests will normally be met.

#### 3.12.2.1 Air Cargo

138. The cargo transported by air is defined as follows:

Regular Cargo. Cargo to be moved within a required time frame either on Scheduled or Special Flights;

Free Flow Cargo. Cargo with a relatively low priority, which will be transported on a space available basis. Cargo requiring special treatment and special care may not move as Free Flow Cargo; and

Dangerous Goods. For the commitment of an aircraft to the transport of dangerous goods, Mission Support must ensure commercial aircraft have been approved for this kind of transport and the operator is certified by the responsible Civil Aviation Authority. This may cause delays.

139.

---

<sup>42</sup> Aeromedical evacuation / CASEVAC is tasked and controlled differently in each mission for reasons of resourcing, environment and external restrictions. Planners and commanders must familiarise themselves with the specifics of aviation prioritisation for CASEVAC in their mission. Missions may differentiate between prioritising the task of redirecting an aircraft for CASEVAC, versus dedicating aviation assets to CASEVAC.



### 3.12.2.2 *Special Flights*

Occasionally, there is a requirement to move personnel and/or cargo outside the normal schedule of flights and to accommodate this requirement, an Air Mission Request (AMR) must be raised to request that aircraft are tasked specifically for that purpose.

140. Special flights are required in the following circumstances:

- Movement of personnel or cargo which is critical to the mission;
- Peacekeeping Force (PKF) operational requirements where failure to move the personnel or cargo will jeopardize the mission;
- Movement of the SRSG, Deputy SRSG, FC/PC and others conducting official mission business; and
- Movement of VIPs and Official visitors whose travel is in the interests and success of the Mission.

### 3.12.2.3 *National support flights.*

A number of national governments provide their contingents with regular support flights carrying passengers, mail and cargo from the home countries to the missions and vice-versa, or even in the mission area. Such flights may be weekly, monthly or otherwise as required and they are at the expense of and at the full responsibility of the representative home governments. However, on some occasions, with the approval of the governments concerned, it is in the interest of the UN to use such flights for the transport of UN cargo or passengers. Such use of airlift capacity may be either whole or partial and a reimbursement of the cost is normally prorated according to the capacity actually used. Planners seeking to make use of such flights must first identify the correct decision making authority. While this might involve the UN mission, it may also require negotiation directly with the national government involved. It should not be assumed that a UN arrangement to use such a flight can be extended to any Force, Police, TCC or PCC purpose.

**Airfield Management.** All Air Operations require support infrastructure. These requirements will largely depend on the location of the mission, the geography, the size of the operation and the type of aircraft used, such as helicopters, short take-off and landing fixed wing aircraft or long-range type aircraft. One important service is Air Traffic Control (ATC). Air Traffic Control is managed by the MAOC. ATC is one of the most essential elements of airfield management and must be capable of performing their basic duties such as

- Controlling aircraft based on the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Rules and Recommendations;
- Confirming the required permissions, such as landing permits of incoming aircraft in service at the UN, with the national authority prior to the aircraft's arrival;
- Controlling aircraft on the Movement Area in consultation with ground service units; and

- Broadcasting field weather conditions to incoming aircraft and weather forecast to outgoing aircraft.

Besides ATC services, aviation support requires ground services performing emergency services for a crash fire rescue response for incoming and outgoing flights and using aircraft handling equipment like start carts, auxiliary power units, hydraulic test stands, mules.

**Customs and immigration.** As a part of their duties, MCD operating at an airport will:

- Maintain contact and liaison with police, customs, and other local authorities;
- Contact the airport authorities to obtain permission to handle UN owned or chartered aircraft at a reserved area and to obtain access to the apron for UN vehicles; and
- Contact the custom and immigration authorities to arrange for special clearing of passengers and cargo.

### 3.13 Transport

Within the mission area there is a constant requirement for the movement of equipment, materiel and personnel. Primarily, this is concerned with the transportation of goods from rear operating areas to forward operating areas. These movements are usually covered by regular, scheduled transport detail runs. Depending on the nature of the run, it may be coordinated by U4 staff or through normal transportation procedures through the MCU.

---

*Individual units are responsible for bringing transport assets (and associated drivers/operators) in accordance with their MOU. However, an operational planner at Force or Police HQ is likely to be requesting movement support from MSD to meet a need beyond the capability of an individual unit, or when coordinating a movement support function between two or more units.*

---

Decisions to move a unit to a forward or temporary operating base generate additional transport support requirements, depending on a unit's self-lift capability, and depending on how this changes sustainment support.

Within the mission, a planner (such as U4 staff) may find themselves engaging with several different organisations when considering transport support:

#### 3.13.1 Transport Section

The Chief Transportation Officer (CTO) within the SDM Pillar is responsible for the coordination, allocation, distribution, accounting and maintenance of UN owned vehicles. The CTO may also run a motor pool of UN-owned and rental vehicles. The CTO

is a UN contracted civilian and will cooperate closely with the MSC for tasks. The Transport Section is responsible for managing the UN's civilian transport fleet.

### 3.13.2 Joint Movements Coordination Cell (JMCC)

The JMCC is an organisation which falls under the DMS in different locations of MSD in different missions. The function of the JMCC is to:

- Provides an “inbound” coordination and functions as the focal point for the collection and exchange of goods delivery information
- Updates system information so interested parties will have necessary details to take appropriate action (planning onward transportation, Virtual Receipt and physical Receipt & Inspection (R&I); and
- Coordinates customs clearance and updates to end users (ie. Contingents)

In some missions, such as MINUSMA JMCC is collocated in the MSC for ease of planning and coordination and clarity on movements' priority. MSC, through Current Logistics Operations Unit, will provide regular updates to JMCC on prioritisation of cargo movements across the Mission area.

### 3.13.3 Movement Control (MOVCON)

The function of MOVCON is to:

- Provide multi-modal (road, air, sea, rail) transportation operations for delivery and distribution of goods
- Administration and control of all MOVCON activity in the mission
- Develop systems/infrastructure to facilitate the movement of UNOE/COE and all personnel
- Maintain a structure capable of multi-modal transportation means for cost effectiveness and efficient utilisation of transport resources

151. MOVCON will normally be situated with the Chief Supply Chain Management to enable effective coordination. MOVCON is normally integrated, thus ensuring is effective movement of military and police forces and equipment. MOVCON normally has a number of detachments operating at airports, seaports, and railheads.

### 3.13.4 Military Transport Units –

Military Transport units may be part of a larger national or multinational logistic organisation and will usually deploy with a variety of general-purpose vehicles. This unit could be in the form of an enabling unit under the tasking authority of the DMS.

### 3.13.5 Lines of Support: Transport Terminology

In military terminology, transport is sometimes categorised as follows:

- 1<sup>st</sup> line / Integral – All transport within a contingent area and executed by transport assets organic or attached to a contingent or unit controlled by the contingent or unit commander. Integral/unit transport assets may conduct scheduled transport such as resupply runs, or local shuttle runs as well as ad-hoc transport requirements.
- 2<sup>nd</sup> line – Transportation for carrying troops as well as transportation requirements for contingents and units that do not have integral transport assets. This also includes support when a task requires more transport support than the unit can achieve. 2<sup>nd</sup> line transportation is controlled by the DMS through the Chief SDM. 2<sup>nd</sup> line supply deliveries within the rear area and forwarded to contingent line transport assets can be supplemented with commercial transport assets or through using local transportation services such as rail, road, barge or air.

Within a complex, multidimensional mission with integrated support there could be a wide array of transport tasks. In some cases, military transportation assets could be utilised for NGO's or other Mission partners upon request.

### 3.13.6 Modes of Transport

#### 3.13.6.1 Land (road or rail).

Principal activities related to land transport include identifying the load capacity of bridges in the mission area (in combination with mission engineering staff) and route planning. Other activities include traffic regulation depending on steady-state volume as well as changes in traffic volume due to such factors as accidents, operational situation (ie. use of land mines and/or 'road-side improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and the movement of internally displaced people (IDPs) or refugees). Land is the primary mode of transport in field missions.

**Considerations** – When considering road movements, planners need to have a current situational awareness of the main supply routes (MSR) noting status of routes (bridges, checkpoints, etc) based on a number of factors such as security, safety and condition. In many missions during the “rainy” season roads become impassable and other modes of transport must be utilised. The use of road movement is largely efficient and normally not limited to capacity. Road movement in most UN missions depends heavily on weather and road condition. Accordingly, where road movement is critical, engineer support will be in high demand to maintain the lines of communication.

In terms of rail movement, security, safety and condition must also be considered; rail can be a cost-effective solution for heavy equipment, large quantities of stores, large numbers of troops and when moving over long distances. Rail movement is limited to the infrastructure of the host nation, including the location of rail heads (loading areas). This can vary extensively from mission to mission, however there are some missions where rail movement is used to good effect. Rail movement generally therefore requires road movement to move the cargo to the rail location, and to move it from the rail head to the final destination. This requires appropriate load handling equipment (such as forklifts)

at both ends. This can be cumbersome and time consuming and so tends to be most suitable for long distances / known routes used regularly, rather than for short, urgent or ad hoc movements.

#### 3.13.6.2 [Air.](#)

Transport may be by rotary wing or fixed wing aircraft. In MONUSCO, mission authorities use air transport extensively to deliver rations, fuel, water, etc., due to the shortage and condition of roads, particularly in the rainy season. Air transport involves the coordination of air traffic with and through the Joint Movement Coordination Centre (JMCC).

**Considerations** – When considering air movements, planners need to consider factors such as weather, air superiority and capacity. Air movement can be highly effective given the speed involved in comparison to other modes; however, planners need to recognise that many contingents will lack the necessary expertise in this area and might be reluctant to utilise.

Regular training should be afforded for contingents in air movements outlining roles and responsibilities such as the provision of timely and accurate load lists, load configurations (including dimensions of equipment) and the transport of dangerous or hazardous goods.

When planning for air movement to a new location, it will be critical to understand the requirements for landing (whether a landing zone, air strip etc). These requirements will vary not only by aircraft type/model, but also by the organisation/contingent operating the aircraft. Such issues must be positively confirmed in appropriate detail (to the flying organisation/contingent's satisfaction) and should be considered in reconnaissance/intelligence RFIs. While most planners do not need to understand the fine detail of the landing requirements of a fixed wing aircraft, commanders at every level should understand the Landing Zone requirements of their rotary wing asset available to the mission, in case of CASEVAC or emergency (risk to life) replenishment.

Air movement is extremely fast; however, is costly, and missions have very limited capacity. Civilian air transport will often have significantly more restrictive rules on the transport of weapons and ammunition.

As many nations have variations in air management, while some principles are common, different contingents may over or underestimate what is possible in the mission. In-mission air movement may be limited by daylight hours, overall flying hours in a month or contract period, host-nation restrictions on movement/permissions (which can sometimes have unwieldy procurement processes).

#### 3.13.6.3 [Water.](#)

While Mission Support or T/PCCs often use sea shipping to send stores and equipment to mission areas, sea transport is not commonly used within the mission. However, some

missions do use navigable rivers and lakes as a means of transportation are used in some missions.

**Considerations:** Water movement is relatively efficient and inexpensive.

Water movement is often underutilised within missions. However, if the means is available water transport is an effective method of movement. Planners need to consider the relative security and safety of personnel and cargo.

Vessels used must be seaworthy and cargoworthy, meaning that they are suitable for the intended waters, and suitable for the load/purpose/use to which they will be put. Planners seeking to use water transport must take and obey any guidance relating to load limits, cargo dimensions, load placement provided by the licenced operators of those vessels.

When planning for water transport, planners must also be aware of the dock or landing point capacity and limitations. Heavy rainfall may affect both the navigability of bodies of water and/or the feasibility of using certain landing points.

#### 3.13.6.4 *Other means*

There are circumstances where, although it would be desirable to use transport equipment, that equipment is not available, or the terrain makes it prohibitive (for example movement in mountainous terrain, or movement of fuel from an airstrip that is needed to operate the engineer equipment needed to rebuild the road to allow access to the airstrip by vehicle). In such circumstances, missions have used options which include:

- Personnel moving loads on foot (carrying, rolling, dragging)
- Beasts of burden such as mules and camels
- Snowmobile

These means have limited scope. They are not suitable for long distances or heavy cargos – consider that any movement by beast or personnel that takes more than a few hours becomes limited by the additional cargo (in water and rations) required for the pack-carriers. Similarly, equipment such as snowmobiles have limited fuel range and can only operate over snow. Accordingly, such means should be reasonably limited to the circumstances or terrain requiring that solution.

#### 3.13.7 *Movement types*

It is essential that movements are planned and coordinated in fine detail, having regard for the specific personnel and equipment (types, quantities and dimensions) to be moved, and considering the complexities that can arise when dealing with support provided by UN or other nations, or requiring multi-modal transport (eg combining water, land and air travel for parts of a journey). Even greater complexity arises when seeking to move equipment into or out of a land-locked country, requiring negotiation with

neighbouring states, especially when dangerous goods or weapons are involved. This is discussed further in Chapter 4.

The UN has different policies for supporting different categories of movement, based on what is or is not a T/PCC responsibility:

#### 3.13.7.1 *Intramission Movement*

**Intramission** refers to any and all requests to move cargo or personnel between two points within the mission. Some tasks are considered a T/PCC responsibility, and some are considered a mission responsibility. This will vary according to whether the cargo falls into certain categories, what was agreed in that T/PCC unit's MOU, and whether the movement is to meet a mission priority versus a unit preference. Regardless, there are some kinds of movement requests which may be considered by the mission even if it is normally a unit/T/PCC responsibility. It is essential that the planner understand what capabilities are available to the Force/Police Component, and what may be requested of MSD. To understand T/PCC obligations, a planner should refer to COE Manual Chapter 4, compare this to the MOU of the units in question, and, as always, consult with MSC.

Mission Support Division can provide some forms of movement. This varies by mission given that each mission may require very different concepts of land (road or rail), water and air transport support. Mission Support Division movement support may be provided through either contracts or local staff and UNOE. It must be expected that this may result in limits on support arising from issues such as civilian working hours, asset/driver availability or potential threat.

The costs associated with intramission transportation will be absorbed by the mission if there is a requirement to transport spare parts and consumables from authorised points of entry to a mission to other destinations within the mission area. UN field missions will entertain all reasonable requests for movement within the mission area using any available transportation resources, including UN assets, commercial assets and/or assets of the TCC/PCC.

Intramission movements are normally concerned with the internal sustainment or movement of supplies and equipment within the UN's Area of Operations (AOR). Primarily this is concerned with the transportation movement from rear (headquarters) operating areas to forward (unit) operating areas. These movements are usually satisfied by regular scheduled runs by MSD through the JMCC.

#### 3.13.7.2 *Movement in/out of mission (troops and resources)*

Although this handbook considers the operational logistics issues within a mission, the process of rotating contingents in and out of missions has a direct impact on in-mission planning. This section is provided as an a guide to the movement of units and individual personnel in and out of mission.

### 3.13.7.2.1 Pre-deployment and Deployment.

The UN is responsible for the deployment and repatriation (including regular rotations) of contingent personnel authorised in the MOU. The UN will normally make the necessary arrangements with the TCC/PCC and appropriate carriers. When a TCC/PCC offers to provide transportation to and from the mission area, or when the UN is unable to provide the required transportation, the UN may request the TCC/PCC via a LOC to provide such transportation. In such cases, the UN will reimburse the TCC/PCC the associated cost, up to the estimated amount that would have been incurred had the UN provided those services (normally the lowest bid meeting the transportation requirement) or provide reimbursement at a rate agreed to between the UN and the TCC/PCC.

The UN is responsible for the deployment and repatriation of COE, including spare parts and consumables, as noted in the MOU or as outlined in the SUR. The port of embarkation/disembarkation shall be agreed upon and noted in the MOU. For landlocked countries (ie. CAR) or countries where equipment is moved by road or rail to the mission area, the port of embarkation/disembarkation will be an agreed border crossing. The UN will normally make the necessary transportation arrangements with the TCC/PCC and appropriate carriers. When a TCC/PCC offers to provide transportation to and from the mission area, or when the UN is unable to provide the required transportation, the UN may request the TCC/PCC via a LOA to provide such transportation.<sup>43</sup>

### 3.13.7.2.2 Inland Transportation.

Inland transportation refers to any transportation in the T/PCC home country to get equipment to the port of departure.

The UN is responsible on initial deployment and repatriation for the cost of inland transportation of authorised ME and initial provisioning of associated spare parts between its agreed originating location and an agreed port of embarkation/disembarkation as noted in the MOU. The authorised equipment will be redeployed to the agreed originating location.

Inland Transportation is covered in more detail in the COE Manual. **It applies only to transportation that occurs within the home country of the TCC/PCC and not within the Mission area.** Essentially, the UN will look to reimburse the movement of ME from Point A to Point B on deployment and redeployment recognising there are costs associated in moving this equipment to a APOE / SPOE. For instance, a TCC/PCC may have to move ME 5,000 km from the primary location to the applicable seaport or airport going to and returning from a mission and will need to be reimbursed for these costs.

---

<sup>43</sup> COE Manual 2017 Chapter 4 pages 113-114, paras 4-7



Logisticians or planners may be involved in the planning efforts associated with their own nation's deployment to theatre. DOS may charter the commercial aircraft for the deployment, or the TCC/PCC may deploy with its own aircraft under a LOA. The Logistics Division within DOS will co-ordinate transportation for each deployment, rotation and repatriation and the normal mode of transport will be air for personnel and sea for equipment.

For each flight, Logistics Division will require the following information (in electronic and hard copies) in order for airlift arrangements to be made on a timely basis:

- Place of embarkation, name and location of the airport of embarkation (APOE);
- Number of troops to be moved and dates the troops will be ready for airlift; and
- Points of Contact in the TCC/PCC to coordinate the movement (name, telephone/mobile number and email address).

During the deployment, all planned airlift scheduling must be coordinated through the Logistics Division within DOS in order to avoid overloading destination airfields by simultaneous arrival of aircraft from more than one TCC/PCC. The following information is required by the MCS during deployments and rotations:

- Type(s) and numbers of aircraft to be used;
- Flight schedules in detail with timings;
- Number of troops to be moved;
- Requested level of reimbursement for the movement; and
- Load details for each flight including aircraft configuration (ie. palletised, containerised or bulk load).

### 3.13.7.3 *Inter Area Movements.*

This is a strategic movement that comprises all movements of personnel, vehicles, equipment and material from participating countries to and from the UN mission area by means of transportation by air and sealift or, on the ground, through transit countries by means of road, railway, and inland-waterway transportation.

On initial deployment and repatriation, there will be considerable coordination from the respective Permanent Missions (PM) and national governments with the UN. Regarding movements this will be closely coordinated with the Logistics Division within DOS. Additionally, the JMCC within the field mission will be the principle agency for managing the movement of contingent personnel and equipment into and out of the mission area and the necessary internal movement within the mission itself. This applies to deployment, rotations and repatriations.

The UN is responsible for funding the initial deployment, rotation and repatriation of contingent personnel. This holds true for contingent equipment for deployment and repatriation; however, depending on the COE MOU arrangement, contingents are responsible for the costs associated with the rotation of major equipment, minor

equipment, spare parts and consumables. Contingents are encouraged to maximise personnel rotation flights to return non-serviceable equipment and bring in replacement equipment.

#### 3.13.7.4 *Deployment/rotation issues (from in-mission perspective).*

In terms of deployment and rotations it imperative that contingents provide as much detail in advance to the JMCC ensuring the Force and Police component HQ in consultation with the MSC are involved with ongoing planning. In short, deployments and rotations cannot be done in isolation and they need to be a truly integrated and all informed enterprise. Deployments and rotations are major undertakings, and it is incumbent on the contingents to provide significant detail to include passenger lists, equipment manifests including serial numbers, quantities and dimensions to the Mission planners involved with the planning activity.

In all cases, operational effectiveness must be maintained, so deployments need to be sequenced and closely coordinated with a departing contingent (if applicable) and with the contingent itself for rotations. All movement plans need to consider the necessary administrative support (accommodations, feeding, transport, etc.) and closely synchronised to ensure operational efficiencies and security are maintained. From current mission feedback, many contingents are ill-prepared for deployments and rotations and often fail to provide the necessary detail required for planning and implementation.

### 3.14 Field Technology/Communications

#### 3.14.1 Why is Field Technology/Communications in a document on logistics?

---

*It surprises many uniformed personnel to discover that the UN considers Field Technology and Communications (also called Signals) to be part of logistics. Accordingly, Mission Support is responsible for delivering communication support.*

*Even where a planner is not considering communications or signals "effects", the U4 and other planners must be aware of the logistic support construct underpinning unit and mission communications, which follows the COE/MOU/SUR framework.*

---

#### 3.14.2 Field Technology Services (FTS).

FTS is located in the O&RM Pillar within MSD is currently mandated to deliver quality, robust and reliable solutions and services in support of mission mandate implementation, providing and maintaining the infrastructure and service management frameworks on which these solutions and services are delivered.

The aim is to build and maintain supporting networks and to deliver a broad range of technologies and enabled mission capacities: from Command and Control radio-based systems in support of safety and security and uniformed personnel; to regular voice, video and business applications, and new tools and automated processes that facilitate and inform key decision-making. Managing and delivering these operations is resource intensive.

#### 3.14.2.1 *Unit Communications Requirements*

Communications composition and size are Mission-tailored and depend on the size and requirements of the UN Mission it supports. These requirements are specified in the SUR. Based on requirements, the UN and contingents will provide a combination of UNOE and COE. The UN has specific capabilities; however, mission capabilities will be prioritised and directed by the DMS based on Mission requirements.

MOUs will document agreements between the UN and contingents as well as bilateral arrangements among contingents. The UN will lease COE communications equipment through wet/dry leases arrangements. The provision of communications equipment for dry/wet lease reimbursement will be applied to contingents providing communication services on a force level, that is, above the battalion or contingent level. The service must be available to all units as designated by the Mission HQ and will be included in the MOU.<sup>44</sup> The MOU will specify the technical specifications to be used. The equipment must be sufficient to provide the basic communications network desired by the mission. A backup capability must be retained in theatre to ensure uninterrupted service. The backup equipment will deploy and redeploy with the contingent.

#### 3.14.2.2 *Global Satellite Communication*

World-wide coverage is utilised by the complete range of UN Missions. The UN Global Support Centre (UNGSC) at Brindisi, Italy hosts the major satellite ground station for UN Global Satellite Communication.

#### 3.14.2.3 *Intranet*

DPO\DOS Peace Operations Intranet is the central repository of information for DPO/DOS staff at UNHQ and in field missions. Through the site, staff members can access official policy and guidance, reference materials, lessons learned and best practices material, administrative forms and templates as well as the link to the UNHQ Intranet (iSeek) and links to other field mission Intranets.

---

<sup>44</sup> COE Manual 2017 Chapter 3 Annex A, p. 29, paras 6-7

#### 3.14.2.4 UMOJA

UMOJA is the IT platform that automates inventory/asset and fleet management in field missions. It is made up of a transactional system, a reporting system and an information portal. It fully automates activities, such as strategic deployment stock (SDS) management, warehouse management, material release order management, spare parts and expendable management, inter- and intra-mission transfer, receipt and inspection, issue/handover/return to stock, description codification, maintenance, damage discrepancy report management, fleet management, and write-off and disposal. This web-enabled system is based on a fully relational database and is centrally hosted and administered at the UNGSC. UMOJA also automates procurement workflows in field missions. It fully automates such activities as vendor management, requisitioning, sourcing and solicitation.

#### 3.14.2.5 Radio

Field missions need a number of core communications and information technology based on radio (microwave, VHF, UHF, HF, AM/FM), telephone, imaging and satellite technologies, as a layered means of communications. Such services are, in turn, interfaced with DPO/DOS global networks. The provision of data services is enhanced through the use of standardised software applications and systems.

#### 3.14.2.6 Communication tasks

181. Communication tasks within a field mission are vast and normally include the following:

- Communications interoperability between UNNY, UN Mission HQ and Mission forces down to Sector level. This may include down to Unit HQ depending on the MOUs and LOA;
- Supporting the installation, operation and maintenance of satellite systems, microwave links, HF radio networks, commercial fibre optic links, telephone systems, switched UHF radio systems, and commercial services such as the Internet;
- Providing secure and reliable information exchange via email, video, files and voice communication;
- Providing support to offices of the Mission's civilian component and assisting governmental or non-governmental agencies in their communications and information technology-related requirements;
- Installing, operating and maintaining antenna masts and towers; auxiliary equipment such as generators, containers, and uninterrupted power supplies;
- Assisting in installing, configuring and maintaining electronic countermeasure systems in close cooperation with the C-IED cell and other experts;
- Hosting specialised command and control applications and situational awareness software, granting access to open information sources such as the Internet and operating information exchange systems and technologies for presentation and meeting support in close collaboration with UN FTS experts.

- Installing, operating and maintaining encrypted microwave-based communications network links; VHF and TETRA radio networks; ground-to-air radio systems in coordination with Air Traffic Control; antenna masts and towers;
- Using short and mid-range radio systems and repeaters, such as VHF, UHF and TETRA, mobile telephone systems, and systems for camp security, such as video surveillance, fire alarm systems and public announcements systems; and
- Installing, configuring, operating and maintaining information technology systems, software and applications within the premises of the camp.

The contingents are responsible for rear link communications to their respective home countries, welfare equipment (computers with internet) and all equipment and support not in the MOU (national owned equipment, which is not reimbursable).

#### 3.14.2.7 Telephone

Telephone is the preferred means of communication for the unit; it will be utilised as much as possible for internal communications within the HQ and for communications with non-mobile sub-elements and sub-units of the unit located in the main base camp. The requirement for very high frequency (VHF) / ultra-high frequency (UHF) FM and high frequency (HF) communications within the AOR will be determined during the site survey and is subject to negotiation with the TCC/PCC. The standards for each of the communications subcategories are defined below, in order of usage preference. To receive the SS reimbursement rate for communications, a unit must meet the following criteria specified in the COE Manual.<sup>45</sup>

### 3.15 Welfare

---

*Welfare is considered an important aspect of UN logistics, not merely to be 'kind' or 'generous' to personnel.*

*Welfare support reduces boredom and increases morale, and as such is proven to be directly related to unit performance, while an absence of welfare support has a direct relationship to breaches of conduct.*

*Such effects directly impact the mission's reputation, trustworthiness, and ability to achieve the mandate.*

*Accordingly, while Welfare might be considered a TCC/PCC responsibility, a Force Planner must be aware of the Welfare provisions and logistic*

---

<sup>45</sup> COE Manual 2017 Chapter 3 Annex B, Paragraph 14, pages 45-46

*expectations, in order to take the correct action if TCC/PCC welfare is not being delivered.*

---

Welfare is a subcategory within the Miscellaneous and General Stores SS category. Appropriate levels of equipment and amenities across the welfare spectrum, to include entertainment, fitness, sports, games and communications, must be provided in quantities appropriate to the number of personnel at their respective locations in the mission area. Verification as to whether appropriate standards have been provided will be based on the welfare arrangements agreed between the TCC/PCCs and the UN, detailed in Annex C, Appendix 2 of the MOU.

**Internet.** Internet access is also a subcategory within the Miscellaneous and General Stores SS category and a contingent providing this service must ensure there are appropriate levels of equipment and bandwidth in the peacekeeping mission. In terms of reimbursement, a TCC/PCC will meet the following conditions:

- Provide appropriate quantities of equipment and based on internet requirements agreed between the TCC/PCC and the UN, and as detailed in the MOU;
- Access to the internet is to be established by the TCC/PCC and not linked to existing UN communications systems; and
- Specific standards concerning internet can be found in the COE Manual, Chapter 3 Annex B, Appendix 2.

**Allowances.** As part of ensuring appropriate welfare, the UN pays an allowance to each contingent which is intended to be passed on directly to the individual personnel of the contingent (and not retained by the T/PCC). This includes a daily allowance plus a recreational leave allowance for up to 15 days of leave taken during each six-month period. This allowance is intended to ensure individual soldiers and police of a contingent are able to pay for minor welfare items.

Force and Police HQ staff should be aware that, on occasion, the payment may not be reaching the individual soldier/police officer. It is important that welfare and recreation allowance be spent as designed. Contingents who have neglected their welfare obligations have traditionally experienced more administrative and disciplinary issues. Time and resources must be afforded for all personnel to unwind from the stress and grind of the Mission when practicable.

## 3.16 Finance / Budget

### 3.16.1 Mission Budgets

As discussed above, UN Peacekeeping Mission budgets are negotiated through the Fifth Committee and agreed at the General Assembly. Mission budgets are approved separately from the UN's Regular Budget. A key factor in a Security Council decision to

issue a mandate is ensuring that there is sufficient support from member states to both fund the mission, and to provide the necessary troop and police support.

Mission budgets are, of course, heavily reviewed and discussed, having regard for the mandate issued by the Security Council, the capability required to achieve the mandate and, above all, the limits to which Member States are willing to pay. These budgets face constant detailed scrutiny at highest levels of international diplomacy, and individual Member States (or blocs of Member States) will debate the fine detail of individual requirements.

While responsibility for managing this budget is delegated into the mission, the mission is constrained by the overall funding allocated by the General Assembly. Further, the mission is not empowered to change reimbursement rates or rules for COE or personnel and must work within that framework. For this reason, operational tempo may be constrained by budget.

### 3.16.2 Responsibilities

#### 3.16.2.1 DMS/CMS

When the DMS/CMS is appointed, they will be issued with instruments of "Delegation of Authority" as may be required for the proper functioning of the mission. The financial limits of such authority, including those for the purchase of non-expendable property, shall be specified for each mission and will include the authority to enter into support contracts.

190. The DMS/CMS is responsible for the following financial matters:

- Supervising financial management systems and budgetary control;
- Preparing and submitting budget estimates for the mission as and when required; and
- Reconciling the financial and related requirements of the mission.

#### 3.16.2.2 Chief Financial Resourcing and Performance

Under the supervision of the Chief OR&M Pillar within MSD, the Chief Financial Resourcing and Performance is responsible for:

- Approving mission payments and maintaining the mission accounts;
- Coordinating the preparation and production of budget estimates and programme budgets for the mission; and
- Ensuring full implementation of and compliance with all existing UN financial rules, regulations, instructions and procedures laid down in the United Nations Finance and Budget Manual Version 1. October 2012.

### 3.16.3 Reimbursement

When considering mission budgets, commanders and planners should understand that the Military and Police Components represent a significant cost in the mission budget.

T/PCCs are reimbursed for providing individuals and units.

- **Individuals:** Reimbursement for individuals (IPOs, UNMOs and Staff Officers) is managed by individual contract with T/PCCs.
- **Units/FPUs:** TCC/PCCs are reimbursed for their personnel at rates approved by the General Assembly and negotiated in the MOU. It is important to note that personnel costs for reimbursement are reviewed within the UN every years from an appointed Senior Advisory Group (SAG) led survey, with the next one scheduled for 2022. TCC/PCCs are also reimbursed for COE utilised in the mission. The COE rules and procedures including the reimbursement for ME and SS categories will be covered in Chapter 7.

## 3.17 Procurement cycle

### 3.17.1 Why should a Commander or Planner be concerned with Procurement?

Ad hoc procurement regularly consumes the attention and time of both commanders and planners. It is not uncommon for new commanders and/or officers to identify innovative ideas they would like to implement for the benefit of the mission which depend on procurement of equipment by the UN. Recent examples include identifying opportunities to use drones to enhance security.

Incoming commanders and planners may be surprised to learn that missions are not funded for ad hoc procurement within the funding cycle, and that a procurement process must be handled with a deliberate, long term approach.

Unless in an emergency, a successful procurement process will likely yield results several rotations after the initiator has left. This is not a function of in-mission resistance, but a necessary result of a funding cycle which requires GA approval through the Fifth Committee. Mission funding is determined by the Member States, and additional funding is not readily available.

### 3.17.2 Acquisition Planning

Acquisition planning is an essential phase in the overall acquisition process and a necessary prerequisite to the procurement process. It seeks to effectively and systemically forecast the UN's requirements, based on demand plans generated by the end-user/requisitioner. Acquisition planning supports the timely and efficient fulfillment of mandates. Acquisition planning necessarily includes procurement forecasting geared towards the timely delivery of goods and services. It requires that consideration be given to logistics, finance and resource management. Requisitioners are responsible for



developing acquisition plans in cooperation with Procurement Officials in a timely manner. Ideally, acquisition plans should be developed in advance of each budgetary cycle to allow the concerned procurement office the necessary lead time to develop its procurement strategies, including the consolidation of requirements to leverage economies of scale. <sup>46</sup>

Procurement policy is covered in the UN Procurement Manual<sup>47</sup>

### 3.17.3 Emergency Procurement

In the case of emergencies, such as natural disasters or other situations where there is a risk of injury or loss of life, the timing and sequencing of procurement activities may be modified in order to deal with the emergency; however, as the current COVID-19 pandemic has shown, the timely and effective acquisition of personal protective equipment has been challenging across many field missions. In other words, expectations must be tempered as procurement within field missions is often a relatively long process.

---

*Even where such an emergency exists, the suspension of due process can only be supported for the shortest possible time required until the crisis has somewhat stabilised. The processes then must be fulfilled for the crisis period – and will be subject to significant scrutiny. Thus, emergency procurement will overall take more time and effort overall from the mission than planned acquisition.*

---

Conflict may arise where a Commander considers a procurement to be vital or urgent to the mission, but Mission Support advises that the matter does not meet the criteria for emergency/crisis procurement. This is because specific policy defines Emergency Delegation of Procurement Policy. The definition of an Emergency Situation for the purposes of procurement is:

“Urgent situations in which there is clear evidence that an event or a series of events has occurred which imminently threatens human life/lives or livelihoods, and where the event or a series of events produces disruption in the life of a community on an exceptional scale.” The event or a series of events can comprise any of the following:

---

<sup>46</sup> UN Procurement Manual 30 June 2020, Chapter 4, p.31, para 4.1 (REFERENCE FROM 2019 MANUAL – CHECK IF PARA STILL CORRECT)

<sup>47</sup> DOS/2020.9 UN Procurement Manual, 30 June 2020

Chapter 3 – Logistic functions within a UN field mission

- a. Sudden calamities such as earthquakes, floods, locust infestations, and similar unforeseen disasters;
- b. Human-made emergencies resulting in an influx of refugees or the internal displacement of populations, or in the suffering of otherwise affected populations;
- c. Drought, crop failures, pests, and diseases that result in an erosion of communities and vulnerable populations' capacity to meet their basic needs;
- d. Sudden economic shocks, market failures, or economic collapse resulting in an erosion of communities' and vulnerable populations' capacity to meet their basic needs;
- e. A complex emergency for which the government of the affected country or the Head of Agency of a UN organization has requested the support of the UN;
- f. Other event(s) that, in the opinion of the ASG, OSCM or USG, DOS, would fall under the definition of a genuine emergency situation<sup>48</sup>

---

*Note the level at which a decision is made for 'other events'. Note also that the definition of Emergency Situations does not include pre-emptive situations: it is limited to events which have occurred.*

---

#### 3.17.4 Field Mission specific

Field missions will have their own procurement planning processes and procedures, and therefore this reference cannot detail the specific processes. In general terms applicable MSD staff shall meet regularly to review acquisition plans for the forthcoming budgetary period(s) and typically update the acquisition plans on a as required. Both the Force and Police Components will be solicited throughout the procurement cycle for input on future acquisitions.

---

*The procurement cycle is very deliberate and is limited by the mission funding cycle. Acquisitions must normally be considered 1-2 years out. Thus, component and contingent commanders must be cognisant that desired equipment or projects most likely will not be realised during their tenure in a field mission.*

---

---

<sup>48</sup> UN Procurement Manual 30 September 2019, Chapter 15, section 15.4

CONFIDENTIAL

*Chapter 3 – Logistic functions within a UN field mission*

## ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 3

### COE/MOU/SUR: UNDERSTANDING THE CAPABILITY FREEDOMS AND CONSTRAINTS

#### 3A - 1. Key Documents

There are three key documents that commanders and planners must be familiar with under the COE framework. These are:

- Memorandum of Understanding
- Statement of Unit Requirement
- Letter of Assist

#### 3A - 1.1 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

A Memorandum of Understanding<sup>49</sup> is a legally binding document agreed between the UN and a T/PCC on the personnel, equipment, capability and self-sustainment of troops or police deployed to a peacekeeping mission.

While based on the Statement of Unit Requirement (described further below) for that unit type for that mission, the UN and T/PCC will negotiate on issue such as maintenance and support arrangements, requests by one party to substitute equipment, where the T/PCC is not able to provide the full capability proposed in the SUR, or where the T/PCC may have an additional capability that would be beneficial to the mission. Negotiations will consider whether the alternatives proposed by the T/PCC are desirable and/or able to be accommodated, and/or whether some other arrangement must be made to make up any shortfalls. Depending on the impact on the mission, shortfalls or additional capability may result in a change in the nature of reimbursement to the T/PCC. The final agreement is recorded in the MOU. Because of this, units which are notionally 'like' may have different overall reimbursement.

It is the intent of the COE system is to have a MOU signed by the TCC/PCC and the UN prior to deployment, stipulating the obligations of each party related to personnel, major equipment, and self-sustainment. It can happen on occasion that a contingent is deployed without a finalised MOU. This can cause challenges for all parties.

---

<sup>49</sup> An MOU has a variety of different legal definitions depending on context and legal jurisdiction. The definition provided here is not an all-purpose definition and is limited to the scope of Member State support to UN Peacekeeping Missions.

*ANNEX A to Chapter 3 – COE/MOU/SUR freedoms and constraints*

The final form of the MOU can vary as long as the substantive elements of the model MOU remain consistent for all Member States. The legal aspects of the MOU are to be in accordance with the financial rules and regulations of the UN. It is understood that no change/amendment, addition to, or deletion from the model MOU is to affect or diminish the legally binding nature of the MOU on the parties.

A model MOU is contained in the COE Manual and is used as a basis of negotiation between the UN and a MS. The signed MOU is a binding arrangement and is the primary document to determine MS and UN responsibilities and obligations on deployment within a field mission. The Mission COE Unit will verify through a series of inspections to determine if MS and UN are meeting the performance standards and specified quantities of the MOU, which could affect reimbursement.

### 3A - 1.1.(1) Why does the commander/planner need to understand the MOU?

MOUs form the ultimate source document for the agreement of what a unit has agreed to self-sustain, and thus what support that unit may expect from the UN. This agreement will vary from unit to unit. Accordingly, commanders and senior logistic planners may need to understand the nature of the MOU. Because of the variations in reimbursement, the document may be considered too sensitive to release. IN this instance, it is appropriate for the commander/staff planner to request that MSD provide a copy or summary that provides the necessary understanding of capabilities and support agreements without the specific reimbursement values.

### 3A - 1.2 Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR)

The Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR) is a document that describes the capabilities that are required by a mission to achieve mandated operations. While it is the statement of requirement, the final agreement is recorded in an MOU or LOA.

The associated MOU and/or Letter of Assistance (LOA) will be negotiated based on the capabilities outlined in the SUR. TCC/PCCs are expected to comply with the CONOPS, SUR, Rules of Engagement (ROE)/Directives on the Use of Force (DUF) and DPO/DOS Policy on Authority, Command and Control in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The provisions in such MOUs shall neither supersede the capabilities sought in the SUR nor affect the planned employment of this capability once deployed. If any discrepancy or disagreement on interpretation of the document arises among concerned parties, the interpretation solely by the Military Planning Service (MPS) / Office of Military Affairs (OMA) is deemed valid and any other interpretation is preempted.

The SUR augmented (largely replaced) the UN 2008 Generic TCC Guidelines. The SUR is designed to assist respective MS in their preparations for deployment on a mission and outlines tasks, logistics and administrative concepts. The SUR is the basis for generating

and deploying UN military unit by capability and is mission specific (ie. medium utility helicopter unit to MINUSMA; level 2 hospital to UNMISS; etc).

### 3A - 1.2.(1) Why should the commander or planner be concerned with SURs

The SUR is the primary way in which the mission / the UN describes its capability need. The Force or Police Component may, from time to time, engage with the Office of Military Affairs in order to advise changes in that capability requirement. Such changes must be well justified, as they have a corresponding cost, which must be both agreed with DOS, and the associating funding must be sought through the Fifth Committee.

Changing the SUR for a given unit type will not change existing MOUs. However, new MOUs will be negotiated based on the revised SUR, and by changing the SUR, an avenue is opened to renegotiate with T/PCCs for existing unit MOUs. Much of this activity occurs at the Secretariat, however it the senior Police or Force HQ which is likely to have campaigned for the change in order to achieve the mandate.

Problems arise for the mission when the requirements of the SUR are not achieved (for instance, if, in the MOU it was agreed that a unit would vary from the SUR). Regardless of the agreement documented in the MOU, the SUR as written details the capability that was required in the mission. Where there are shortfalls there will be an associated operational impact and an adverse effect on mission success.

Where this occurs, the Force/Police HQ will seek to engage both Mission Support and the Secretariat (through OMA) to have this shortfall rectified in another fashion (such as through support from a different Member State, or contracted support). Any such shortfall rectification has budgetary impacts which may require funding through the Fifth Committee, and thus will take time to resolve.

### 3A - 1.3 Letter of assistance (LOA).

While commanders and planners will normally need to review MOU (discussed further below) to understand support capabilities and requirements, some kinds of support are captured in a different kind of legal document called a letter of assistance (LOA).

A letter of assistance is a method utilised by the UN to procure equipment and/or services from a MS and will be negotiated by UNHQ and the MS. The majority of LOAs pertain to transportation: particularly the movement of personnel and equipment on initial deployment and final redeployment or for aircraft and vessels used on UN operations.

A letter of assistance is a legally binding contractual document between the UN and a Government. It provides the appropriate authority for procurement of services on behalf of the UN. It also specifies how reimbursement will be made. Detailed information about letters of assist can be found in chapter 13 of the United Nations Procurement Manual.

### 3A - 1.3.(1) Common uses for LOAs

ANNEX A to Chapter 3 – COE/MOU/SUR freedoms and constraints

- Aviation Units
- Rotation of Units (when not carried out by UN)
- Provision of support without troops

### 3A - 1.3.(2) LOA Contents.

A letter of assistance consists of a cover letter and the general terms and conditions: Covering letter to include: LOA number; Country/United Nations mission/year/LOA number for the specific mission; purpose, requirements; type of service or equipment; and reimbursement.

The general terms and conditions may include: services; itemized reimbursement for services provided; detailed regulations regarding the time frame for payment, invoices, receipts and the relevant division/department at UN HQ; aircraft call signs (in the case of air transportation); facilities provided by the UN; reporting accidents or incidents; safety; claims and insurance; tax exemption; circumstances for changes by the Government or by the UN; termination; future commitments; modifications; settlement of disputes; privileges and immunities; and force majeure.

### 3A - 1.3.(3) Rotation of units.

An LOA for rotation of units is the most common form of LOA that a HQ officer will encounter. This is done in the circumstance where a T/PCC wishes to take responsibility for conducting a unit rotation, when it would have been a UN responsibility – and thus covers the reimbursement associated with taking on that function<sup>50</sup>. A unit rotation refers to the rotation of unit personnel only. Equipment is expected to remain in mission (unless a T/PCC rotates it at its own expense).

When rotating units (personnel only), the UN will ask the TCC/PCC whether the rotation shall be carried out by the UN or by the country under a LOA. If it is decided that the country will carry out the rotation, the country will forward a request for a LOA, including the expected costs for the rotation, the means to be used and a detailed movement plan. The UN will then evaluate the costs and send a reply to the country in which the UN either: accepts the cost or states the costs are too high and sets the ceiling at a particular amount. When the rotation is carried out, the TCC/PCC will forward a claim and invoices to the UN.

### 3A - 2. Wet Lease vs Dry Lease

Wet and Dry Lease arrangements were mentioned in detail in Chapter 3. Under the COE system these arrangements are documented in the MOU agreed to by a TCC/PCC and

---

<sup>50</sup> Generally, the UN agrees to fund one-unit rotation every 12 months. If a T/PCC has negotiated to rotate its units more frequently, this is generally at T/PCC expense (and such additional rotations would not require an LOA). This explains why there may be an LOA for some rotations but not others.

## ANNEX A to Chapter 3 – COE/MOU/SUR freedoms and constraints

the UN concerning Major Equipment (ME). Under a Wet Lease, a TCC/PCC will provide the ME and associated minor equipment and consumables and provide the maintenance and spare parts for the ME. Under a Dry Lease, the TCC/PCC will also provide the ME, minor equipment and consumables; however, the maintenance will be provided by the UN or another contingent.

The COE Manual defines the reimbursement rates for ME under both wet and dry lease with a higher amount affixed to a Wet Lease due to the provision of maintenance. The COE Unit in a mission will perform a series of inspections to determine if the performance standards are being met under either arrangement.

---

*It is imperative that all parties to the MOU perform their respective obligations of the MOU regarding ME in order to maintain operational effectiveness. If either party does not have a suitable reason for non-compliance there could be reimbursement implications, loss of credibility and an erosion of operational effectiveness.*

---

### 3A - 2.1 Wet/Dry Lease Performance Management.

There are verifiable standards by which both dry and wet leases are applied and subsequently reimbursed. The standards stated in terms of operational requirements are designed to be generic in nature to fit the widest range of equipment.

#### 3A - 2.1.(1) Principles.

The following principles are applicable to all equipment:

- Equipment arriving in theatre must be in a serviceable condition for use in its primary role and must already be painted with United Nations markings;
- All associated minor equipment, checklists or load list items required for use with the equipment in the performance of its role will accompany the equipment;
- Under the wet lease arrangement, the contributor is responsible for the provision of replacement equipment, spare parts, maintenance and contracted repair;
- To meet serviceability standards, units have the option to maintain an additional 10% of the quantities of ME authorised under the MOU to be deployed and redeployed with the unit. The UN will be responsible for the associated deployment and redeployment as well as painting and repainting costs. A TCC/PCC will not receive wet lease or dry lease reimbursement for overstocks;



## ANNEX A to Chapter 3 – COE/MOU/SUR freedoms and constraints

- A “reasonability<sup>51</sup>” view is to be employed when assessing whether a performance standard has been met. The exception is that the capabilities, staff and medical equipment and the capability to perform emergency medical procedures according to the standards for medical self-sustainment must be present at all times.
- A TCC/PCC and the UN should not be penalized when non-performance results from the operational situation in the mission area; and
- Any equipment damaged in transit will be the responsibility of the party responsible for making the transportation arrangements.

The COE unit will use the MOU in verifying the type and quantity of ME provided by the TCC/PCC. A third-party maintaining equipment of another TCC/PCC is to meet the same performance standards as a troop/police contributor providing maintenance of its own equipment.

### 3A - 2.1.(2) Standards.

The COE Manual (Chapter 3 Annex A) specifies performance standards for all categories of ME (vehicles, armaments, communications, engineering, etc) that must be met in order to be qualify for reimbursement. Failure to meet these standards can severely hamper operational and mission effectiveness.

### 3A - 3. COE / MOU Management Review Board (CMMRB)

---

*As the CMMRB is an integrated body within the mission it is the best avenue to address major issues and concerns as they pertain to COE/MOU compliance and regulations. The three major components (MSD, Force and Police) are represented at this board and are afforded the opportunity to voice or articulate specific concerns.*

*The recommendations from the CMMRB can have a far-reaching impact on a contingent in terms of reimbursement especially if mission factors are recommended to be changed. Normally COE/MOU related issues are resolved within the mission, which speaks to the effectiveness of this Board.*

---

In consultation with the FC/PC and contingent commanders (CC), the DMS/CMS establishes appropriate mechanisms and procedures to ensure the efficient and effective administration and management of the MOU/LOA and to implement it in the mission on

---

<sup>51</sup> A reasonability view considers whether the T/PCC and the UN has taken all reasonable measures and have met the spirit of the MOU, even if the full substance of the MOU has not. For further information, see the COE Manual, Chapter 3, Section III.

behalf of the Secretariat. The DMS/CMS will also consult with the FC, PC and CC(s) to establish a Mission Contingent-Owned Equipment and Memorandum of Understanding Management Review Board (CMMRB).

This Board will review the capabilities of contingents, their major and minor equipment holdings and their SS capabilities needed to meet the operational requirements of the mission. The CMMRB will review mission factors, as required and makes recommendations to the Secretariat in regard to corrective actions that may be required. The DMS in concert with the components will attempt to have disputes resolved at the lowest possible level locally.

### 3A - 4. COE Inspections

---

*For commanders and staff officers / planners the inspections that occur within a mission are vital.*

*From a command perspective, if a unit's equipment and services are deemed compliant then necessary operational readiness and capability is being maintained.*

*From a planning perspective, unit compliance will permit flexibility and options available in considering future tasks and operations.*

*Conversely, non-compliance can have significant impact on operational effectiveness and mission success and will handicap a planner. Additionally, non-compliance could result in a reduction or loss of reimbursement for a TCC/PCC.*

---

Ultimately, verification and control procedures are intended to ensure that the terms of the MOU between the UN and the TCC/PCC are met by both parties and to take corrective action when required. ME and SS standards are defined to ensure operational capability.

Verification and control will be carried out on the basis of a number of types of inspections:

**Arrival inspection:** The arrival inspection is to take place immediately upon arrival and to be completed within one month. If equipment and personnel are already in the mission area when the MOU is concluded, the first inspection will be carried out on a date to be jointly determined by the mission and contingent authorities and is to be completed within one month of that date;

**Operational readiness inspection:** An operational readiness inspection must be carried out at least once in every six-month period of a unit's deployment in the mission area and any time the mission believes the equipment or services do not meet the specified standards. The condition of the ME and SS will be inspected with a view to assessing whether the capability is sufficient and satisfactory;

**Repatriation inspection:** The repatriation inspection shall account for all ME of the TCC/PCC to be repatriated and verify the condition of the ME provided under the dry lease arrangement. The inspection shall also ensure that no UNOE is part of the equipment being repatriated;

**Other verifications or inspections:** Other verifications or inspections deemed necessary by the HOM or UNHQ shall be carried out.

At every stage of peacekeeping operations, time and human resources are short, and excessive time cannot be spent beyond that required to determine that the minimum requirements have been met by the TCC/PCC or the UN in each area.<sup>52</sup>

From a contingent perspective it is essential to meet as early and often with the COE unit to foster healthy working relationships and permit close coordination of verifications. The COE unit should be advised if there are issues or concerns with COE and can assist a contingent with alternative support arrangements.

### 3A - 5. Self-Sustainment (SS) versus Main Equipment (ME)

The COE Manual defines SS as a logistics support concept for a unit in a peacekeeping mission whereby the contributing MS provides some specific, or all, logistics support to the contingent on a reimbursable basis. SS is the closest UN term for the military concept of integral logistic support that a unit provides for itself. In a UN peacekeeping mission, SS may involve more robust support than traditional integral/1<sup>st</sup> line support – and might be considered 1<sup>st</sup> line “plus”.

Discussions between the UN and the TCC/PCC will result in an agreement on the capabilities to be provided by the UN and the contingent being deployed. As a starting point for negotiation, the UN will identify and request from the TCC/PCC those SS capabilities it cannot provide. The right of the TCC/PCC to provide any or some categories of SS will be taken into consideration during the negotiation of the MOU. However, the UN has a responsibility to ensure that any SS services provided by a TCC/PCC meet the minimum operational capabilities, are compatible with the other TCC/PCC where interface is required, and that the costs to the UN are similar to what it would have cost the UN to arrange centrally for the provision of these SS services.

---

<sup>52</sup> COE Manual 2017 Chapter 2, Page 10 paras 23-25

### 3A - 5.1 Categories of self-sustainment

The COE manual considers self-sustainment under the following categories:



Commanders and planners seeking further guidance on SS categories and definitions should engage with the MSC in mission.

### 3A - 5.2 Overview of Reimbursement for SS vs ME

Monthly SS services reimbursement is based on the actual troop strength as agreed within the MOU. For example if a contingent is being reimbursed for Catering under SS and providing this service to 800 personnel (as stipulated in the MOU), the contingent will receive 800 x the catering reimbursement rate as outlined in the COE Manual on a monthly basis (if standards are being met).

Some kinds of equipment might be reimbursed under ME or under SS. Common examples are generators and containers. A unit must distinguish between equipment meeting the ME requirements from equipment allocated for SS. One piece of equipment cannot be both, and thus equipment which is intended to be used for SS (resulting in SS reimbursement) cannot also be reimbursed as ME. For example, if a contingent is being reimbursed for Catering under SS it will need to provide a refrigeration capability such as refrigeration container. Even though a refrigeration container can be also found in the ME category in the COE Manual, this particular container but will not be reimbursed under ME as it is a requirement of the Catering under SS.

When an enabling unit is using a piece of equipment to deliver support to the mission (not to itself), such equipment would be considered ME, and would be entitled to reimbursement as ME. An enabling unit must still provide its own self sustainment and must

## ANNEX A to Chapter 3 – COE/MOU/SUR freedoms and constraints

differentiate equipment used for SS from equipment used as ME. These instances will be negotiated and indicated in Annexes B and C of the MOU where applicable.

**Reimbursement rates for ME and SS.** The reimbursement rates for ME are listed in Chapter 8, Annex A of the COE Manual and are updated every three years within the COE Working Group. Similarly, the reimbursement rates are updated every three from the COE Working Group and are listed in Chapter 8, Annex B.

### 3A - 5.3 Reimbursement for relocation.

When it is mutually agreed that a contingent is required to change location of any base camp (unit or sub-unit level) due to an operational or logistics/administrative requirement, the TCC/PCC may submit a claim to the UN for reimbursement of the extra and reasonable costs to reinstall the self-sustainment services under its responsibility (ie, accommodation, tentage, field defence stores, internet, catering, etc.).

### 3A - 5.4 Self-sustainment planning considerations

Commanders and planners must understand SS when considering unit performance, in order to understand whether the drivers of performance are within the unit's responsibility and/or control.

Commanders should anticipate that units will need to take considerable care if presented with orders inconsistent with it's MOU and obligations to meet COE Framework verification. For example, an order to use ME in support of SS (or vice versa) would represent a variation from the agreed MOU. Operational requirements which vary from an MOU may need to be taken up with the T/PCC government, not merely the unit commander.

### 3A - 6. Reimbursements for personnel

The COE framework also includes a reimbursement for personnel of a unit/contingent provided in accordance with the MOU. A T/PCC may elect to deploy additional personnel, such as in a National Support Element, however these personnel would not attract reimbursement. Equally, deductions may be made to reimbursement for contingent personnel in respect of absence listed in the MOU, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 67/261, paragraph 11. This may affect the strength of some contingent's self-sustainment capability (and other capabilities), if that T/PCC is sensitive to reimbursement.

The Secretary-General established a Senior Advisory Group (SAG) to consider rates of reimbursement to TCC/PCCs in 2011. The SAG recommended a new methodology that was adopted by the General Assembly that will consider personnel costs every 4 years. The Government (TCC/PCC) will be reimbursed for contingent personnel at the rate of US\$1,428 per person per month as at 1 July 2018, regardless of rank. This rate will be

subject to change from time to time which will be decided by General Assembly resolution.

---

*While the reimbursement rate is intended to compensate the T/PCC for the opportunity cost associated with providing personnel to UN peacekeeping, the actual salary and allowance provided to contingent personnel remains at T/PCC discretion and may vary considerably from contingent to contingent.*

---

### 3A - 7. Disposal of COE

As discussed in Chapter 3, disposal of equipment is a function which consumes logistic management effort in missions. If not managed effectively, accumulated non-effective equipment becomes a security and environmental issue, and consumes significant base-real-estate issue. T/PCCs may be reluctant to process equipment disposal if procedures are not well understood, particularly if operational tempo is high.

According to the general conditions for ME and SS provided by TCC/PCC under a MOU, COE remains the property of the TCC/PCC. Therefore, the disposal of such equipment is a responsibility of the TCC/PCC, unless ownership and/or responsibility for the equipment has been legally transferred to another entity. COE may be disposed of by repatriation or in the mission area by sale, donation or disposal action by the mission on behalf of the TCC/PCC. In-mission disposal of COE, by any method, must be in compliance with the mission SOFA or SOMA; host country customs and tax rules, regulations and procedures; and other relevant host country and international laws.

TCC/PCC may request the assistance of the mission to dispose of COE through arrangements established for the disposal of equipment owned by the UN. In these cases, a formal agreement between the TCC/PCC and the mission will need to be prepared to formalize the handover of such equipment for subsequent disposal action. The agreement should specify that the TCC/PCC will make no claims for financial compensation for any potential revenue generated from the disposal action associated with the COE.

TCC/PCCs may dispose of COE by selling/donating it directly to other TCC/PCCs; the mission; UN agencies, funds and programmes; NGOs; or local governmental entities, as well as through commercial sale. TCC/PCCs should inform missions of their intention to sell/donate such equipment by providing details of the items to be sold. TCC/PCCs shall complete all procedures required by their respective national regulations for the authorisation of write-off and disposal of equipment.

---

*The in-mission disposal of COE should be an **ongoing process**, rather than an action undertaken shortly before contingent repatriation.*

---

As part of the quarterly contingent-owned equipment verification process, contingents may consider conducting a regular in-mission disposal analysis of such equipment. This analysis should include a list of contingent-owned equipment that has become unserviceable, is beyond economical repair or is obsolete, with a recommendation for disposal actions. Contingent-owned equipment that is found to be non-functional for four consecutive quarters (12 months) must be repaired by the contingent or otherwise disposed of either through repatriation by the TCC/PCC or through an in-mission disposal method within the following six months.<sup>53</sup>

### 3A - 8. Preparation and responsibilities in COE inspections

Commanders and planners must be aware of the importance of COE inspections and verification as a tool for managing capability and ensuring unit performance. Time and management effort must be allocated to these functions. T/PCCs sensitive to reimbursement may focus heavily on such inspections and may expend significant staff and command effort ensuring that reimbursement is maximised. Noting sensitivity to reimbursement, contingents may be motivated to protect equipment (at the expense of operational capability) so that it will be found fully functional during COE inspections. At the Force and Police component level, attention should be paid to ensuring the equipment arriving in mission correctly aligns to the equipment/capability agreed in the MOU.

As indicated above there are several verifications that will occur concerning COE (ME/SS).

#### 3A - 8.1 Arrival Inspection

- Conducted within one month of arrival in the mission area, ideally at the Seaport of Disembarkation (SPOD) or Airport of Disembarkation (APOD) - subject to planning, coordination and pre-scheduling assuming staff are available in the COE Section;
- Vehicles will receive UN license plates with chassis numbers recorded and the corresponding UN license number added to the UN database;
- Some vehicles will need to be serviced (mirrors, weapons systems readied, fire extinguishers recharged) at or near the harbour, which may require specialist tools, equipment and personnel;
- The advantage to conducting the inspection immediately upon arrival is that the vehicles can be declared operational; and

---

<sup>53</sup> COE Manual 2017, Chapter 4 pages 119-120, paras 36-42

ANNEX A to Chapter 3 – COE/MOU/SUR freedoms and constraints

- If SS stock is not on site on arrival, the contingent will need to explain to the inspectors what their plans are, and what they intend to do and how. The inspector at this point can also offer advice and assistance.

### 3A - 8.2 Monthly Inspection

- Verify ME is operational
- Assess categories of Self-Sustainment (SS)
- Inspection worksheets completed and signed by COE and TCC/PCC
- Monthly inspection + Monthly Equipment Status Report = Periodic (Quarterly) Verification Report (VR)

The contingent Logistics Officer will staff the Monthly Equipment Status Report (MESR), which is a list of all ME to the COE Section. They include any periods of unserviceability and form the basis for the Quarterly Verification Report (VR). Reimbursement to the TCC/PCC by UNHQ is based on this VR.

### 3A - 8.3 Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI).

ORIs will be conducted once every six months, per mandate, or as ordered by the DMS/FC/PC with an inspection team of military, police and civilian inspectors from the COE section.

Who and how many should participate in the inspection depends on the type of unit, size, complexity of equipment, geographical dispersion and previous problems encountered. If it is an engineering unit, the team should include an engineer. If there is a Level 3 hospital, a doctor should be included to inspect the hospital and verify the hygiene of the clinic and kitchen. If there has been a problem with the unit meeting operational commitments, then a representative from the Force HQ Operations should be on the team.

An additional ORI could be required by the FC, PC or DMS under a number of circumstances. For instance, if the FC is concerned that a unit is not meeting operational standards, they can request an ORI to determine if there are shortfalls, which can be addressed through the COE system.

In terms of ME shortfalls if a TCC agreed to provide a certain number of patrol vehicles, and this category is always below the 90-percent rate, this poses a problem. It is of concern for the FC, as this unit is not meeting the operational standards. The Sector Commander or Chief Operations Officer may become involved, to potentially amend tasks to this unit or to change the number of patrols that will be done within the area. What other options are available? Can a neighbouring TCC increase its Area of Responsibility (AOR) and send more patrol vehicles? Can another TCC provide patrol vehicles under a dry lease? Could the UN assume responsibility to service the vehicles, using its resources, local contracts, another TCC or a combination thereof? What other options are possible? If equipment is no longer required, it should be repatriated where



*ANNEX A to Chapter 3 – COE/MOU/SUR freedoms and constraints*

the UN is responsible for the deployment and repatriation of equipment. If this equipment was on the original MOU and was requested by the UN, the UN is now responsible to bear the costs of returning it to the TCC. In the above-noted situations, the mission would have to review the required action and make recommendations for MOU amendments.

Regarding SS, the categories are inspected to confirm if UN standards are being met, identify new operational requirement and review/confirm services provided by the contingent/UN. If there are new operational requirements, there may be a necessity for new SS categories to be provided by the TCC/PCC. For instance, perhaps night observation would be added as a requirement, which was not previously considered necessary. The TCC would then have to be requested to provide the requisite number of night vision goggles or have the UN assume responsibility to provide the items. The ORI will also confirm which SS categories are being provided by the TCC and which by the UN. If either is not meeting the standard, an assessment should be done as to whether the category can be re-allocated.

### 3A - 8.4 Repatriation Inspection.

This is not an inspection that is done every time the contingent rotates. It is done only when the TCC/PCC withdraws that contingent from the mission, and it will not be replaced. It is important to verify all ME that must be repatriated. Perhaps some will be scrapped or donated to the host country. MOVCON personnel require an accurate description of all equipment to be repatriated, to make the requisite shipping arrangements. If there is a discrepancy in the UNOE it may require an investigation. The date that the unit becomes non-operational is important, as it impacts on the reimbursement to the TCC/PCC.

For all inspections it is imperative that the contingent has leadership buy-in as this responsibility does not fall solely on the logistics staff. To properly prepare and perform well on these inspections considerable coordination is required with unit operational staff and personnel and there should be clear direction and guidance from the leadership that the inspections are a unit priority that must have appropriate expertise and personnel. Success on these inspections are paramount for unit operational effectiveness and reimbursement.

For all inspections the COE section will use verification reports for ME and SS and will comment on issues of concern and provide recommendations for addressing these concerns. The reports will also highlight the areas where the contingent is compliant, thus allowing applicable reimbursement. The contingents are provided a copy of all verification reports and must advise the chain of command and the COE section as issues are rectified.

### 3A - 9. Consequences of committing fraud during COE inspections.

COE inspections are designed to be open and transparent and are based on the principle of reasonability. Thus, if a contingent can reasonably explain as to why a certain

piece of ME or a SS category is not meeting performance standards, they might not be subject to reimbursement deductions. For example, in UNAMID there is a host nation requirement to procure spare parts locally where possible. If there are shortages of spare parts in the mission this could have an adverse impact on the proper maintenance of ME and SS. The only exception to this would be ME and SS for Medical as a contingent must meet all performance standards without fail.

There have been cases where a contingent who is non-compliant seeks to convince the inspection team that they are meeting performance standards. For example, displaying the same minor equipment for several different vehicles or verifications of vehicle odometers indicate little movement; however, associated fuel recordings indicate otherwise. In such cases, it erodes the operational effectiveness of the mission and the credibility of a contingent or country can be significantly tarnished. Depending on the severity of the fraud, a contingent could be forced to repatriate.

---

*The Mission COE Unit (through the MSC) will provide guidance on any instance of inspection irregularity, including the conduct of investigation into potential fraud.*

---

### 3A - 10. Rotation of ME at UN Expense

COE brought in to a peacekeeping mission area is expected to remain for the duration that the TCC/PCC participates in that mission and will not be rotated with contingent personnel. Therefore, costs related to the transportation of equipment to meet national operational or maintenance requirements, including third-or fourth-line maintenance, are a national responsibility and not eligible for reimbursement by the UN. The UN is responsible only for reimbursing a TCC/PCC for transportation costs of extra equipment brought into a mission area when mutually agreed. In such cases, UNHQ will issue an amendment to the MOU.

Certain categories of ME under prolonged deployment to peacekeeping missions may be considered for rotation at UN expense. This applies to ME which are non-operable, or for which continued maintenance is not economical in the mission area. Such a decision is at the discretion of a mission CMMRB in consultation with the applicable contingent commander, on the basis of operational requirements within the mission. These categories are as follows: aircraft/airfield support equipment, armoured personnel carriers (tracked), armoured personnel carriers (wheeled), engineering equipment, engineering vehicles, support vehicles (commercial pattern) and support vehicles (military pattern).

For specific guidance on this matter, commanders and planners should both review COE Manual Chapter 4, Section VII and consult with the COE Unit in mission.

### 3A - 11. Options for providing alternative support if a contingent is unable to provide SS or ME.

ANNEX A to Chapter 3 – COE/MOU/SUR freedoms and constraints

It is possible to arrange within the mission that either the UN or another contingent provides ME and/or SS to a contingent on a temporary basis due to operational necessity.

If this is conducted, it may have reimbursement implications for the supporting and supported contingents. The reimbursement must be reviewed on a case by case basis and any such issue should be consulted with the COE Unit.

---

*A commander or planner should understand that it is not a simple matter for Mission Support to obtain funds to support this kind of rectification.*

*While the contingent in need of support may have their reimbursement reduced accordingly, these funds are not available to the mission to reallocate elsewhere, such as to pay for additional contracted support.*

*Missions rarely have surplus funding for such contingencies. Additional funding required would need to be sought in subsequent funding years. In the short term, arranging alternative support for an SS/ME shortfall would need to be resolved using resources already in mission.*

---

Examples include:

- In the event where a contingent has been advised to rectify a number of issues concerning catering but have failed to do so in prescribed timelines and without sufficient reasons, the UN or another TCC might provide this service. Where the UN is providing the catering, the contingent will not be reimbursed for this SS category or if another contingent is providing the service, they would be compensated based on the additional personnel they are required to feed.
- Regarding ME, should a contingent lose vehicles as a result of hostile action, temporary loan of applicable UNOE equipment could be made to maintain operational effectiveness and the contingent would not face a loss of reimbursement.

### 3A - 12. Loss of or Damage to COE

While commanders and planners will be focussed on allocating and supporting capabilities to achieve the operational effect, they must be aware that contingents will be sensitive to the implications of loss or damage to COE. The consequences to the contingent vary according to the reason for loss or damage, and the value of the item(s).

The HOMC/HOPC determines if an incident meets the definition of hostile action/forced abandonment.

#### 3A - 12.1 Definitions

*ANNEX A to Chapter 3 – COE/MOU/SUR freedoms and constraints*

Hostile action is defined as an incident of short or sustained duration resulting from the action(s) of one or more belligerents that has a direct and significant hostile impact on the personnel and/or equipment of a TCC/PCC. A hostile action may be characterized as a single action when different activities can be related to each other by means of time, place or tactical/strategic considerations, as acknowledged by the FC/PC.

Forced abandonment is defined as action(s) resulting from a decision approved by the FC/PC or a provision in the rules of engagement that results in the loss of custody and control of equipment and supplies.

### 3A - 12.2 T/PCC responsible for loss/damage below set thresholds

TCC/PCCs are responsible for loss of or damage to ME resulting from a single hostile action or forced abandonment for each item of ME whose individual generic fair market value is below the threshold value of \$100,000 or when the collective generic fair market value (GFMV) for loss or damage is less than the threshold value of \$250,000 for actions within one UN budget year.

For ME lost or damaged, the United Nations will assume liability for each item of ME where individual GFMV equals or exceeds \$100,000 in a single action or for ME lost or damaged when the collective GFMV of such equipment equals or exceeds \$250,000 for a series of hostile actions within one UN budget year. No upper limit shall be placed on justified claims.

### 3A - 12.3 Rotation to replace lost/damaged equipment

Equipment lost or damaged as a result of hostile action or forced abandonment can be considered for rotation at UN expense. The method of calculation for the reimbursement of the cost of such equipment is made at the GFMV rate less the equipment use charge, ie. the cumulative payments to date under a dry lease and any other payments associated with the environmental or intensified operational conditions mission factors made by the UN for that equipment.

Reimbursement will be processed only after the TCC/PCC undertakes to replace or repair the equipment. When equipment is provided under a wet lease arrangement, the method of calculation for damage shall be the reasonable cost of repair. Equipment that has suffered damage will be considered a total loss when the cost of repair exceeds 75% of the GFMV.

### 3A - 12.4 No-fault incidents.

When deciding reimbursement for loss and damage, a distinction between no-fault incidents and hostile action or forced abandonment must be made:

The wet lease/dry lease rates include a no-fault factor to cover loss of or damage to equipment in a no-fault incident. There is no additional reimbursement and no other claims are receivable in the event of equipment loss or damage in such incidents.

### 3A - 13. Mission Factors

Reimbursement provided to T/PCCs is adjusted to reflect Mission Factors. Mission Factors may vary across a mission (for example, a particularly high risk Sector). Commanders at all levels will be expected to engage and provide advice to the CMMRB on changes to Mission Factors. Mission Factors are discussed in detail in COE Manual Chapter 7

Mission factors are intended to compensate the TCC/PCC for extreme operating conditions in the mission area. When conditions impose significant and additional hardships, they are to be applied to the lease rates as follows:

- An Extreme Environmental Condition Factor not to exceed 5% of the reimbursement rates for ME and for SS;
- An Intensified Operational Conditions Factor not to exceed 5% of the reimbursement rates for ME and SS; and
- A Hostile Action/Forced Abandonment Factor not to exceed 6% (new in COE Manual 2017 as the old figure was 5%) of the reimbursement rates for SS and the spare parts element (or ½ of the maintenance rate) included in the wet lease rate.

These factors will be determined by the Technical Survey Team at the initiation of the mission and will be reviewed by the CMMRB. Mission factors are specific to each peacekeeping mission and are subject to change depending on the prevailing conditions in the mission area. The UN or TCC/PCC can request a review of the mission factors whenever the conditions in the mission have changed sufficiently to warrant a review.

#### 3A - 13.1 Natural disasters – impact on Mission Factors

If a natural disaster occurs in a mission area, it is the responsibility of the UN to determine the extent of the natural disaster and the impact on Mission factors. As circumstances permit, the United Nations shall make an assessment of the situation and review the factors and sub-factors to be re-evaluated in accordance with the conditions, within the limits of the existing mission factor ceilings. The possible changes in the mission factors will be temporary and will be maintained during the period that the UN recognizes the significantly changed circumstances. Reimbursement due to the re-evaluation of the mission factors will be paid for the period for which the UN determines the changed circumstances exist.

#### 3A - 13.2 Transportation Factor

An incremental transportation factor is applied in certain circumstances to provide reimbursement for spare parts associated with the maintenance of ME under the wet lease arrangement. There are many factors which affect the Transportation Factor adjustment. Planners involved in this calculation should refer to COE Manual Chapter 7.

3A - 14. Sources for additional information in mission on COE and equipment management

Making early and regular contact with the COE section is important for contingents and HQ staff.

The COE section maintains a COE database that includes mission wide serviceability rates. This information is vital for mission and component HQ planning staff when planning for future operations or tasks. Even with this database, contingents must continue to provide mandated reports and returns through their respective chains of command to higher HQ on equipment serviceability rates.

## 4 Principles of UN Logistics

### 4.1 Traditional UN Principles of Logistics

While the delivery of logistical support to a force has modernised due to advancements in technology, underlying principles of logistics have given logistics planners the ability to support the operational plan by measuring advantages and disadvantages of a potential course of action against these principles.

Many nations have Principles of Logistics doctrine. These are principles which must be considered during planning in order to assess the strengths and weaknesses of logistic support options. They are often used during Course of Action Analysis as one means of evaluating a support option

The UN has its own set of Principles of Logistics. While similar to those of many nations, they vary because of the unique nature of the United Nations, including the required flexibility, mobility and multinational construct of UN Logistics, and, importantly, that the UN is, at all times, acting at the behest of the Member States, and must demonstrate to the Member States that funding and direction is being correctly followed. The UN Principles of Logistics are:

- Responsibility
- Foresight
- Flexibility
- Economy
- Simplicity
- Cooperation
- Sufficiency
- Accountability
- Visibility

**Responsibility:** As previously stated, the support to a field mission is task-tailored with each mission; therefore, articulating responsibility is crucial. The contributing MS and the UN have a collective responsibility to ensure that forces deployed on any UN field mission are fully equipped and supported. This may be achieved either through national or cooperative arrangements, but they must be clearly agreed upon prior to deployment. MS and the UN have a collective responsibility for the care, custody, and safeguarding of UN assets;

There are many policies, manuals and guidance which outline the respective responsibilities of the UN, T/PCCs and individual organisations within the mission. A UN logistics planner will need to understand exactly how this translates within the mission to the specific task at hand. The overarching policy guidance comes from 2019 Authority Command and Control Policy (AC2) and the COE Manual. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on assisting a planner in identifying the respective responsibilities for providing different kinds of support.

**Foresight:** The administrative and logistical planning for any mission begins well before the commencement of any peace operation. This includes first identifying resources within or close to the deployment area and obtaining information regarding the infrastructure of the site. Consideration should be given to any special on-site requirements such as clothing, munitions, accommodation and mobility. Contingency planning for strategic movement should begin at the earliest opportunity. During the mission implementation phase, foresight is required to anticipate changes in the mission area that will affect logistics delivery. Planners must prepare for mission closeout and understand what will be required to transition out of a mission area;

Foresight is a principle common to many nations, however it requires additional thought in a UN mission, because often, the key advisors that a commander would rely on to instinctively anticipate Force/Police activity are not located within the Force/Police component, and are in fact in Mission Support. Within a UN mission, foresight requires close cooperation between the uniformed component (Military or Police) and Mission Support Division. Aside from the technical expertise that Mission Support Division provides in managing logistic support; the civilian staff in that division have extensive experience, often in multiple UN missions, and (with good engagement) will be able to advise uniformed planners about support requirements (or potential problems), and the appropriate timelines needed to prepare (or resolve).

**Flexibility:** Flexibility in the field of logistics means the ability to conform to operational plans that will almost inevitably be subject to frequent change, particularly in the early stages of any peace operation. In conditions where lines of communication are liable to be disrupted, it may be necessary to deviate from pre-set procedures and to modify standard methods of operation to meet unexpected events;

Flexibility requires foresight. It involves ensuring that contingency planning has been considered, and, if possible, rehearsed. Flexibility also involves



having clear lines of command and control, so that changes can be rapidly executed. Flexibility is aided by understanding not only the commander's direct orders, but his or her underlying intent.

**Economy:** On any mission, resources are rarely plentiful and must be used effectively, efficiently, and economically. Early integration of all available assets provided by the contributing MS should be the main goal. When possible, this integration should be planned prior to deployment to avoid duplication of resources at the mission site. Notwithstanding a desire to rationalise logistics assets at the earliest opportunity, there is likely to be a surge of operational requirements to assist with the initial deployment of any UN force, and this may, in the short term, create duplication of some resources;

Economy is not simply the cheapest/lowest resource option. Rather, economy achieved when *effective support* is provided using the least amount of resources necessary at the least cost, *within an acceptable level of risk*.

**Simplicity:** Complicated procedures can slow down or completely fail the mission. The simpler the logistics plan, the easier it is to understand. The greater the understanding of the plan, the more effective the cooperation between contributing countries and the speed an original plan can be adapted to meet changing circumstances will be;

Simplicity therefore aids flexibility and cooperation. Standardised procedures are a valuable tool in creating simplicity – and ensures that staff effort is focused on the most important part of the problem. For this reason, Force and Police HQ are strongly encouraged to (in consultation with Mission Support) develop robust Standard Operating Procedures which are used and kept up to date. Similarly, templates for standard messages, requests etc are valuable if they improve understanding and reduce the time taken to perform routine (or urgent) tasks. An example of this is the “Alert” format used to advise of a casualty.

**Cooperation:** Cooperation will always be the key to producing a workable logistics structure for a UN mission. Levels and standards of support differ by country. There are often a variety of nationalities with different languages, cultural requirements and capabilities. In order to achieve a workable logistics product, cooperation is necessary. A high level of mission headquarters cooperation with the UN force/police headquarters is required;

For many national contingents, cooperation is taken for granted, as contingents are used to working with their own forces (or with allies that they work with regularly). The friction that arises from working in a multinational UN mission should not be underestimated. It takes a effort and leadership to overcome the natural desire to expect that “tasks should be performed the way my nation prefers” and focus on a solution which meets the ultimate goal of achieving the mission’s mandate.

**Sufficiency:** The levels and distribution of logistics resources must be enough to meet the sustainability and mobility needs of the operational plan. Stock levels should consider the expected nature and duration of the mission and consumption pattern. Peacetime stock levels tend to be inappropriate for most UN peace operations;

Sufficiency requires that contingents and HQ planners pay close attention to not only stock provisioning (that is, ensuring that stock holdings are well planned, having regard for both normal and high tempo rates of usage, and allow for potential disruptions in supply), but also for equipment maintenance planning, to ensure that vital equipment will be available for support at the right times. While the UN does not direct specific internal practices of a unit, it does expect that the ultimate capability/performance is met, and it is not only reasonable but desirable if HQ logistic staff engage to ensure that unit planning in these matters aligns with Force/Police HQ planning, and is appropriate having regard for the ability of Mission Support capabilities.

**Accountability:** The importance of accounting for assets cannot be understated. The UN and contingents in the mission area must know what they have available and what is and is not serviceable. Accountability also means who is accountable to initiate, carry out, and audit logistical functions. Accurate accounts must be kept for all assets that are purchased and issued to contingents for the support of a mission. This includes any equipment classified as COE;

Accountability comes from a recognition that UN funding is always constrained, and that even small shortfalls or losses can have a disproportionate effect. There are many case studies of UN missions which are unable to achieve the expected operational effect because equipment could not be correctly identified and thus used; or had been consumed for incorrect purposes and thus was not available for the mission.

Member States expect their funds and assets to be used wisely, and actively seek regular assurance that missions genuinely need the funds and equipment provided, and will withdraw support if not assured. Delegation of

Authority and AC2 Policy are designed around the unique challenges that the UN face in being required to account for funding and resources consumed. This principle underpins why the DMS controls and prioritises scarce resource assets.

*Visibility:* Logistics assets are vital to an operation and represent large amounts of money. It is important that a full audit trail is available for all assets dispatched to, in, and from the mission site. This can be achieved using several methods ranging from barcodes, satellite tracking or basic card systems. The respective HQ must always have access to inventoried information. This includes information regarding the numbers of personnel, quantities and types of materials and supplies held, usage rates, pipeline times for resupply and future requirements of any portion of the mission. Prior to deployment, the logistics staffs of MS must have a clear plan regarding how they will keep and supply such information on-demand or by timed return. The FC/PC should develop onsite SOPs outlining required information maintenance.

When considering visibility, a planner should also consider the visibility of the mission and its practices to the wider world. Visibility can encompass how Member States perceive a mission, how T/PCCs perceive the mission (and the value of their contributions), how the host nation perceives the UN, and how the community perceives the mission.

#### 4.1.1 Impact of UN Principles of Logistics

The UN Logistic Principles have existed in their current form for over twenty years. Accountability and Visibility are two principles which fundamentally change the nature of logistic support in UN missions versus the principles of national uniformed (particularly a military) doctrine. The need to account to the Member States for resource usage drives many practices and procedures in a way which may constrain flexibility and simplicity.

Military logistic principles often include concepts such as Responsiveness, Survivability, and similar. Not merely words, they reflect that uniformed commanders expect their logistic system to be robust, and capable of supporting a wide range of operational concepts, and to be able to rapidly adapt to changing circumstances. These principles give rise to a common joke/compliment: “Logistics Just Happens”. This refers to the seemingly supernatural way in which uniformed logistics personnel take the commander’s intent and use all the resources at their disposal to make sure that the mission is achieved.

The absence of such principles in the UN Principles of Logistics is not simply semantic oversight. They require uniformed commanders and planners to understand, *and accept*, the realities of the UN logistic / mission support system. Constrained resources mean that UN logistic systems are considerably less responsive, require considerably more lead time, and often rely on civilian support systems to deliver support further forward into the operational space. Civilian labour or contracts are more economical but are not trained or equipped for high risk environments, nor can they be expected to be responsive after hours, or in patterns not in the employment agreement/contract. A threat which may not have stopped military logistic support may prevent civilian support arrangements from continuing. Accordingly, contingents must be more self-sufficient, and consider reserve stockholding carefully.

#### 4.2 Unique factors affecting logistic support in UN missions

The table below summarises some of the key differences between a traditional military deployment under national command versus deployment to a UN mission. These factors have significant effects on the way Force and Police components will operate.

These factors can invalidate assumptions that planners unconsciously rely on in operational planning and support management.

Factors	Examples of effects
Funding limitations and inflexibility inherent in UN missions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• General Assembly decision making process</li> <li>• Budget process and timeline</li> <li>• Member State funding limitations</li> <li>• Member State attention/oversight</li> <li>• Requirement for accountability and transparency beyond traditional military procedures</li> </ul>
A unique command and control structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The United Nations Authority, Command and Control Policy (AC2) places certain assets and resources under an unexpected command structure to many military organisations</li> <li>• The impact of the national self-sustainment structure (governed by the Contingent Owned Equipment Manual, the Statement of Unit Requirement, and the Memorandum of</li> </ul>

	<p>Understanding) significantly removes the ability of the Force to assist units with support to achieve effects</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Individual Units may have different Memoranda of Understanding, even if they were intended to have the same capabilities.</li> <li>• Military/Police units and individual are subject to a dual command framework, being at once subject to the UN Command and Control structure, but also subject to Troop/Police Contributing Country strategic objectives, which may not always align.</li> </ul>
<p>Multi-national force with unique support constraints</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The legal framework underpinning the way T/PCCs provide units into the field has several implications:</li> <li>• Staff officers used to working with a single-nation formation will be surprised by the limitations to interoperability and cooperation between units from different T/PCCs. This will not simply be due to procedural/capability differences. In many cases, the COE framework and the specific MOU constrains them (for example, whether consumables will be reimbursed, implications if another nation uses that unit's equipment, or even the consequence if equipment is damaged)</li> <li>• Similar units may have different support needs (which affect flexibility and capability) as a result of different MOUs negotiated between the UN and those T/PCCs.</li> <li>• Certain aspects of unit support are at the discretion of T/PCCs. Differences in national approach can yield different outcomes at the performance level.</li> <li>• Different forces will have different expectations of support, regardless of the UN support arrangements. This can render challenges from everything from allocation of accommodation space, to perceptions of what limits endurance for a long range patrol.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Different forces will have different expectations of what is required to support mixed-gender units. Although COE Manual provides minimum limits, this must still be negotiated with sensitivity and dignity.</li> <li>• Unit commanders may be under an explicit (or implied) expectation by their T/PCC to meet T/PCC strategic goals. For example, a commander may not be empowered to make decisions which would reduce the reimbursement received by that T/PCC.</li> </ul>
<p>The unique nature of UN support structures</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Logistic Support is provided by a variety of different sources (detailed in Chapter 3). Many of these support mechanisms are beyond the Force Commander's control</li> <li>• Some Logistic Support depends on the Troop Contributing Countries providing support to their own units, which does not always occur</li> <li>• The reimbursement framework for units often create unexpected drivers for unit behaviour</li> </ul>
<p>Complex and dynamic political scene;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Host Nation restrictions on movement</li> <li>• Funding impacts associated with which countries support/do not support the mission</li> <li>• Changes in freedom of action depending on what can be negotiated diplomatically between the mission and the host nation</li> <li>• Changes in political support for the mission within the country by the community (which can change region by region)</li> <li>• Different community and security considerations in different regions depending on the political stability in that location</li> <li>• Demands for mission resources associated with political, humanitarian, protection of civilians or other efforts (beyond military and police support requirements). This can change how priorities for support are set, and can result in rapid changes in response to emergencies.</li> </ul>

<p>Variations in threat</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In some locations, military forces may be provided with civilian support quite far 'forward' due to the low threat level. This can involve needing to negotiate support that is constrained by civilian working hours or economical contracts.</li> <li>• In other locations of high threat, the military effort may involve assisting with the provision of logistic support to non-military efforts, including disarmament, humanitarian aid, policing efforts etc.</li> </ul>
<p>Geographic, topographic and climatic variations of theaters of operations</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Wet seasons in which road movement becomes impassable, placing aviation lift assets in high demand, and requiring remediation from engineering assets.</li> <li>• Units may be deployed in climates in which they are unfamiliar and may not know how to forecast for the change in support requirements. This could range from water needs to accommodation needs.</li> <li>• The Force may face considerable distances between support sources and unit locations. Some units are not experienced in managing support over extended distances</li> <li>• The Force may be geographically spread over a large area, requiring disproportionate effort towards movement and replenishment</li> </ul>
<p>Numbers of individual nations involved in each operation;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Force may be larger, or alternatively may be less well supported than Staff Officers or units may be familiar with.</li> <li>• Issues of large (and small) scale can challenge a planner who has not been provided with adequate tools.</li> </ul>
<p>Variations in national standards in training, equipment, operational procedures and operational support;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Troop Contributing Countries have very different concepts of logistic doctrine, which will often depend on that nation's history of contribution to other warlike or peace operations, the size of their nation, and the size and budget of their defence force</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Police Units and individuals will have very different expectations of support concepts (and procedures) than military units/staff officers</li> <li>• Troop and Police Contributing will each have evolved their own procedures, based on their different equipment and training concepts.</li> </ul>
<p>Language and communications differences.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• T/PCCs will have different language proficiencies, and will have different training regimes for personnel learning the mission language</li> <li>• T/PCCs may also have different cultures about communication, command direction, making enquiries or admitting a lack of knowledge</li> <li>• T/PCCs with common language and culture may even then use the same terminology to mean different concepts and vice versa.</li> <li>• Civilian organisations often have a very different expectation of communication style versus Military and Police organisations. Confusion can occur in areas of terminology, or even expectations of cooperation / ability to direct.</li> </ul>

### 4.3 UN Mission Culture – effects on Planning

#### 4.3.1 Differences in professional culture

A military or police officer in a UN mission will experience a range of professional differences in their working environment which can at best cause friction, and at worst prove an obstacle to planning for logistic support in an already complex mission. These can include:

##### 4.3.1.1 *National / cultural differences across contingents.*

This may include differences in national culture, and even sub-cultures within various organisations. A professional staff officer in any multi-national headquarters will brace themselves for two certainties



Colleagues from other nations will seek to communicate and problem solve using fundamentally different heuristics, which go beyond which “procedure” is being used

Every human being has ‘bias’. It is a natural tendency to believe that one’s personal “way of thinking” is correct, and that others should adapt. However, the most successful staff officers are able to see how their own behaviours impact others, and adapt accordingly <sup>54</sup>, rather than insisting that their own national methods must take primacy.

#### 4.3.1.2 *Police and Military cultures*

UN doctrine often considers Police and Military contingents together as “uniformed”, especially if they seem to use similar rank structures, it must be recalled that in most nations the organisations share very little similarities. It follows that they may not share common terminology, will often have very different professional cultures, and most importantly, their training, experience and professional development is markedly different (as is appropriate given their very different roles and capabilities).

Concepts such as operational-level planning may not be known to some organisations. Care must be taken to ensure that military planners do not assume that police personnel will (or should) follow the military planning process or terminology.

**Uniformed vs Civilian.** There are several factors which uniformed personnel must consider when understanding the point of view of civilian colleagues and experts:

- The complexity of UN missions, and the inflexibility of its funding structure, which means that change requires a long-term perspective.
- The duration of a uniformed individual/unit’s deployment/rotation.
- The limited likelihood that uniformed personnel can perceive all of the factors associated with an issue

---

<sup>54</sup> There are many resources available to a professional officer or civilian who wishes to consider these issues further. Two useful resources which are reasonably concise and accessible are:

Book: “When Cultures Collide” by Richard D Lewis

Online: “Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions” (and related tools), found at <https://hi.hofstede-insights.com/national-culture>

- That Civilian personnel are professionals in their own field and are far more experienced in the unique methods and processes of UN missions.
- That however much the uniformed person may be frustrated with a particular situation, it is likely your civilian Mission Support counterpart has been equally frustrated but for a longer period of time.
- What may appear as civilian inflexibility is often a function of a decision well beyond the mission's control, such as a General Assembly resolution
- That Civilian personnel must manage the long-term consequences of well-meant but destructive short-term change.
- That while, military and police (to differing degrees) operate within a hierarchical structure where orders are to be obeyed, UN civilian culture is very different. When seeking support of the civilian component, a wise uniformed member poses a request, not a demand. This distinction is essential for a respectful relationship.
- That a uniformed expectation of a 24/7 work tempo is not realistic in the context of a long-term civilian workforce. Civilian staff can and will surge in an emergency, but while uniformed personnel are deployed for a limited period at high tempo, civilian personnel must sustain capability over the life of the mission.

#### 4.3.1.3 *What does this mean for the commander or planner?*

*Mission structures are highly complex, and organisations seeking resources will not have the full control and authority over the assets and resources they need to perform their responsibilities.*

*Further, it is not reasonable to expect that personnel deployed for 6-12 months into a mission can possibly absorb and comprehend the myriad of policies and practices of a complex UN mission.*

*Accordingly, the most fundamental responsibility of a Military or Police Officer appointed in a planning / logistics role is to*

- *identify the key Mission Support personnel who can advise them on the various functions*
- *develop a close working relationship with those personnel at each level. Do not be rank sensitive – identify the expert and/or the decision-maker, regardless of rank.*
- *engage them early and often when planning (or even considering contingencies)*

- *introduce timeframes / expectations early, as often UN processes require a longer lead time. Mission Support contacts may need to adjust your expectations, and*
- *recall that the mission mandate trumps individual pillar objectives*

#### 4.4 Planning Words of Wisdom from the Missions

The following advice was compiled in a working group comprising military, police and civilian personnel working across a wide variety of UN peacekeeping missions.

These notes are offered without editing, in the interests of frank sharing of lessons learned, while recognising the differences in individual experience.

##### 4.4.1 How best to describe the differences between UN mission support versus home-nation logistic support?

- Reliant on Mission Support Division for logistical support as opposed to Higher Logistical Command echelon
- Priorities may not align all the time between military, police and civilian components therefore requires more simplified approach to planning is required
- Contractor Officer Representatives can monitor contracts/scope of work & performance rating
- Logistic support in UN missions requires more coordination and redundancy in logistics planning and execution
- There can be greater variety of assets/units to choose from in order to execute mission

##### 4.4.2 What factors must be considered to make the best use of TCC/PCC and UN logistic support/ resources collectively to achieve the mandate?

- A clear understanding of the units' MOU/SURs (which describe its capability)
- Understanding units' overall capabilities and limitations
- Mission Factors i.e. security, terrain, in a non-permissive environment
- At the Headquarters Level we must find way to mitigate their shortfalls and provide solutions
- Overall UN policies which is vague at times, not straight forward

calls for interpretation

4.4.3 How will the UN logistics support concept (including changes in command and control) change how operations are planned and resourced compared to TCC/PCC commanders' previous expectations?

- Requires a shift in mindset
- Individuals must be educated on UN Logistics Support Concept
- Time factors associated with assembly of personnel, equipment, contractual agreements, and logistics itself
- Planning cycle is 6-9 months out, while outside of UN construct 2 years or greater out for Force Generation
- Limited by assets in theatre for maintenance parts and other problematic equipment failures

4.4.4 What considerations are required to ensure good integration between Military/Police and Mission Support pillars to ensure Military/Police elements have the best advice at the right time?

- Combined Planning Meetings between the Force and Mission
- Forming relationships with your counterparts
- Long range planning and consideration for other variables i.e. Rainy Season & Holiday Observance
- Provide an in-brief to newly assigned personnel within the theatre
- Ensure everyone has a shared understanding & can see the desired Endstate both Force & Mission
- Making sure we have the right personnel in the right meetings
- Battle Handover/overlap of key log personnel is vital

4.4.5 How, where, and when might planning practices change to incorporate consultation with Mission Support at the appropriate phases of planning?

- From the onset include all parties (including MSD) at the earliest stage concerning planning
- When one's mindset changes perception versus reality
- Form relationships and work together more congruently
- Schedule combined planning briefs to ensure consultation is rendered from the Mission

- “Relationships”
- Understanding capabilities & limitations of MSD is a key and collaborating during all phases

#### 4.4.6 Describe logistic planning considerations

*(in terms of information required, timelines, and any freedoms/limitations), which must be considered when planning a military, or police operation in a UN mission (having regard for AC2, COE/MOU requirements, mission support constraints, etc).*

- Consideration for units' MOU/SUR to validate capabilities
- National caveats, governmental policies, & units willingness to perform assigned missions
- Resupply demands for that unit
- The ability to articulate gaps and shortfalls to Headquarters/MSR/Regions
- Deliberate Planning from the onset, not a hasty plan

#### 4.4.7 Name important concepts in conducting the Logistic aspects of / inputs to military or police planning.

- Shared concept of support by the Force to the Mission
- Backbriefs from the Sector Commanders (Tactical) to FC (Operational) to UNHQs (Strategic) to resonate effects
- Long-range planning handed to mid-range planning and then in turn tracked in a current operations manner
- Understanding the requirements/capabilities/shortfalls from the initial set

#### 4.4.8 Recommended Tools/templates,

Consider which tools or templates would be useful if a mission does not already have robust logistic planning practices. For example, during Mission Analysis (duration, distance, destiny, demand, and risk or 4DR) and Logistics Estimate.

- Have a standard format for proceeding through a logistic estimate
- Keep a table of which units have 'non-standard' arrangements for self-sufficiency in their MOU
- Develop SOPs of the most common procedures. SOPs are only useful if they are followed and if they are kept up to date.

- Use a Tabletop Exercise which forces all key stakeholders to expand on their tasks & purposes and shortfalls
- Develop logistics checklist for all logistics operations
- After developing any plan, have a standard backbrief format and require Sectors to backbrief their understanding of the plan to Force HQ. This helps ensure all understand.

#### 4.4.9 What Constraints / Restraints have you observed.

- Contractual solutions within theatre not the best efficient means
- MOU shortfalls have a major impact on the execution of tasks / ops
- National caveats i.e. restriction of night movement, emplacement of key personnel within unit formations
- Procurement timeline/processes
- Commanders/National leadership sometimes imposes sanctions on their troops to perform their assigned mission
- Cross-talks with the leadership place a void on mission execution, approval process
- Operations must be aligned with seasonal weather
- Budget management lacks flexibility at operational & tactical level especially due to hefty bureaucratic procedures of UN

## 5 Logistic Planning in support of UN Operations

### 5.1 Logistic Planning support to Operational Planning.

Many T/PCCs have excellent planning methodologies for anticipating and planning logistic support. The differences between planning methods can cause confusion. Chapter 5 provides one method of planning for logistic support which may be used when military and police planners do not have a common planning process. It incorporates tools which are common to many countries.

Regardless of the planning approach used, what is most important is that the planning team has a common understanding of the planning approach to be used, and is using common terminology which is understood by all.

Planning prompts, checklists and templates are valuable tools to develop in mission to aid new staff as they learn the nuances of the mission.

#### 5.1.1 Planning process

Although there are many variations on staff planning processes, they tend to have common components (even if they are named differently, or grouped in different ways). A generic process flow is shown below:



*Annex A to Chapter 5 – Logistic Planning Terminology*

Whichever process is being used by the commander and operational planners, and whatever name is being given to this process, there are several key considerations for the logistic support to this plan:

- Logistic planning must happen alongside (and in many cases in anticipation of) the operational plan. While operational planning is underway (using the steps above), supporting organisations (including logistics planners) will be conducting a parallel process in which they consider the logistic-specific considerations of the operational plan / planning options.
- Logistic support may well be a constraint on the viability of the operational plan.
- Logistic support is considered a mission resource (apart from SS), and so will be subject to the overall needs of the mission /sector.
- The subject matter experts for much of this support is not an integral part of the Force or Police HQ, and so must be explicitly invited.
- Logistic planners must be engaged at the earliest stages of planning possible. This is because
  - They will have requests for information (RFI) which must be considered in the intelligence preparation process
  - They will need to start preparing contingency plans designed to give the commander maximum freedom of action (within resource constraints)
  - Many forms of UN support need some lead time to coordinate (particularly if a scarce resource, or reliant on a change to contracted support).

In a UN mission, this means not only involving the uniformed logistic personnel from that component (eg U4 staff for the Force); it also means involving the relevant Mission Support personnel early and often in the planning process.

This also reinforces the value of having regular, habitual meetings/working groups between the component and working group, and the value of having regular informal engagement between planners and mission support personnel at each level.



---

*It has been a regular, unfortunate, occurrence that Uniformed HQ have passed their operational plan to Mission Support Division at such late notice that Mission Support, despite their best endeavours, could not arrange the support that the plan assumed would be available, while the operational plan was too far developed to be modified.*

*Both uniformed and civilian personnel reflected that these plans would have been supportable, if only Mission Support had been engaged at the time the plan was being developed, rather than being provided at the last moment.*

---

## 5.2 Logistic Intelligence / Common Operating Picture

Peacekeeping-intelligence (as distinct from other Intelligence definitions outside the UN) is the non-clandestine acquisition and processing of information by a mission within a directed mission intelligence cycle to meet requirements for decision-making and to inform operations related to the safe and effective implementation of the Security Council mandate<sup>55</sup>. Its purpose is to support a common operating picture to support planning and operations. There are strict rules regarding the acquisition and management of peacekeeping-intelligence in UN missions which will, almost certainly, be more restrictive than the expectations of uniformed personnel (whether military or police). Further, intelligence acquisition and management responsibilities are spread across several organisations across the mission, including the JMAC, and Force and Police Intelligence elements.

### 5.2.1 Policy and Guidance

Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence (MPKI) functions are covered in detail in the 2019 Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook (MPKI HB) and the 2020 Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Staff Handbook (PKISR HB). Personnel seeking a detailed understanding of how to

---

<sup>55</sup> 2017.07 DPKO/DFS Policy on Peacekeeping Intelligence

engage with the Intelligence function to obtain essential Logistic Intelligence should first engage with this material.

Beyond the intelligence requirements of the main effort of an operation, the logistic planner will have specific intelligence requirements which must be met to achieve effective logistic support. Such intelligence requirements will be valuable not only at Force and Sector HQ, but also to the logistic planners in units, considering how to manage self-sustainment.

### 5.2.2 Key Definitions<sup>56</sup>:

**Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIR).** A CCIR can be anything that the Force leadership determines as information that is required to allow them to make timely and effective decisions and are not necessarily limited to PKI related issues. For the purpose of the PKISR Handbook the U2 should focus on those CCIRs that relate to PKI. It should be noted that in many cases the U2 will need to define the CCIRs on behalf of the leadership and gain endorsement of them before progressing.

**Priority Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirement (PIR).** The PIRs should be drawn primarily from the CCIRs but can also be derived from strategic guidance from Force leadership. Again, the U2 will need to define the PIRs on behalf of the leadership and they should be regularly reviewed to ensure that they are still relevant. The PIRs form the basis of acquisition and therefore time should be spent on ensuring they are well thought out and truly represent the needs of the Force. The successful management of PKISR relies heavily on the ability to prioritise acquisition and therefore the PIRs must reflect the Force's priorities to ensure appropriate coordination.

**Specific Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirement (SIR).** Each PIR in turn is broken down into several SIRs which relate back to the PIR. The point of breaking them down is to allow the U2 to get to the point where the acquisition units can start to answer the PIRs. The SIRs are best structured thematically to support this process. The theme of prioritisation of the SIRs is also essential at this stage to support the effective management of the acquisition assets.

**Essential Elements of Information (EEI).** The EEI is the final step in the PIR relationship and are effectively the individual questions that will be assigned against the acquisition assets. The EEIs relate to the SIR, which in turn relate to

---

<sup>56</sup> From the PKISR HB

the PIR. Once again, clarity is important, as is prioritisation to support effective PKISR management. There are no set rules on how many EEs relate to an SIR or in turn how many SIRs relate to the PIR. Each Mission will have different issues affecting the ability to deliver against the mandate and therefore there is no right or wrong answer.

**Request For Information (RFI).** The RFI process allows for any individual or entity in the Mission to ask a question that needs to be answered by the PKISR capabilities under the Mission's command and control. This should not be limited to the military side of the Mission; a well-established process should allow for all Mission civilian and uniformed components to submit an RFI, which can be prioritised against the EEs to allow for the effective tasking of PKISR.

### 5.2.3 Planning including Logistics Intelligence.

Logistics intelligence or the Logistics Preparation of the Mission Area (LPMA) - conducted at the same time as the HQ is conducting its "Intelligence Preparation" phase, is a key conceptual tool available to logistics planners in building a flexible, responsive mission support plan. LPMA consists of the action taken by logistics personnel at all levels to optimize the means (mission structure, resources, strategic lift) of supporting the mission. These actions include:

- Identifying and preparing logistics depots and forward operating bases
- Selecting and improving Lines of Communications (LOCs)
- Forecasting and positioning mission stocks forward
- Identifying resources currently available in the mission area for use by contingents
- Ensuring access to resources in a timely manner

The LPMA refines the Logistics Estimate to allow logistics personnel to advise commanders on the most effective method of providing adequate and responsive support. The LPMA is achieved through reconnaissance of the mission area from a logistics support perspective.

### 5.2.4 Logistics Intelligence

Logistics intelligence is specific intelligence information that assists logistics organisations in making their plans. Information gathering will take place at all levels as well as between levels. Certain questions, such as "What is the state of the area's infrastructure?" can be partially answered even prior to a visit to the mission area. Weather and environmental assessments can occur. Other questions may include: What is the terrain like in the mission area and

will it affect plans positively or negatively? What is the utility grid (water and sewer systems) like? Will the mission be in a population centre or rural area? What are the predominant health issues? Potential distribution sights can be identified and martialling areas for equipment and vehicles and existing medical facilities in the area can also be identified.

### 5.2.5 Process

Logistic planners must identify any Requests for Information (RFI) that they need resolved through the use of Intelligence capabilities. Any such request will take time to action, and so care should be taken to provide any critical due dates, clear geographic boundaries; and to provide sufficient context to allow assets to gather the correct information needed.

Logistic RFIs might include:

- Condition of critical routes (MSR, SSRs, alternate routes)
- Condition of critical bridges or other crossing assets
- Hostile threat on route. This may include
  - threat of damage to roads or infrastructure such as bridges or ports
  - IED threat on routes
  - nature of threat to the convoy/vehicles being used to deliver sustainment, which may require force protection
- Restricted areas (whether restricted by host nation, or by local armed groups)
- Population density and makeup in region
- Size and weapons capability of local armed groups
- Threats assessed in the area to be supported (which may affect force protection, and/or whether a civilian support contract will be viable.
- Local population activities in the area (which may include that certain routes or regions are used by the population).
- Perceptions/behaviours of local population (noting that sustainment activities often represent wealth, and that
- Other UN activities occurring in the area to be sustained (the civilian population does not readily distinguish a humanitarian aid supply vehicle from a military supply vehicle when both are painted white with a large UN on the side).
- Other population using a shared resource (such as a water source), and impacts on use
- Drainage/ flooding risk of a particular location (route, temporary camp, equipment park)

## Annex A to Chapter 5 – Logistic Planning Terminology

- Possible points and methods for in-loading of personnel, stores and equipment (for example, for establishing a Temporary Operating Base)
- Any existing infrastructure which might be used (given Host Nation permission) in a new location, including local sources for provision of supplies, health facilities, etc.
- Sources of potable and non-potable water
- Transportation means and systems
- Bridges, roads and tunnel restrictions
- Inland and coastal waterway capabilities
- Medical risks
- Real-estate available for placing support infrastructure (such as for temporary workshops, storage of supplies etc).

Note that many Logistic RFIs may not be limited to logistic application – nevertheless the wise planner ensures that any Logistic RFIs have been requested, regardless of an assumption that they may also be, for instance, CCIRs. There are several reasons for this, but a critical one is that while the commander may also have this information requirement, the logistician may need it at a different time, in a different level of detail, or for a different purpose.

---

*Always ensure that Logistic RFIs are specifically requested within the Force or Police intelligence acquisition process with the specific context, location and timeframe needed for logistic support – do not assume that the operational planner has understood the logistic implications.*

---

### 5.3 The Logistic Estimate

Within a field mission the logistics estimate is a process conducted by logistics staff at the operational level. The desired outcome is to produce logistics courses of action (also called a logistic support concept) to support each operational course of action (COA).

The logistics estimate is the process of:

- Gathering data against pertinent mission support concepts: Area of Operations (AOR) size, Lines of Communication (LOC), Main Supply Route (MSR), Airport of Disembarkation (APOD) / Seaport of Disembarkation (SPOD), etc;

*Annex A to Chapter 5 – Logistic Planning Terminology*

- Analysing their impact on sustainment; and
- Integrating data into operational logistics planning.

The logistics estimate will ultimately lead to a logistics plan or support concept of operations. The estimate will need to be a detailed analysis of the potential operation or tasks and will look to incorporate the following concepts: Principles of Logistics, Key Considerations, Factors (4DR - Distance, Demand, Duration, Destination and Risk or the 5DR (4DR + Dependency) and Deductions.

Properly planned sustainment gives the commander freedom of action. In order to plan for sustainment operations, the logistics planner needs to consider the following (not exhaustive) list:

- Must properly identify the sustainment tasks by function (maintenance, engineering, supply, medical, communications and transport) including assigned and implied tasks;
- Identify the Lines of Communication (routes connecting the operating unit to its main support base) and the Main Supply Route (including alternate routes);
- Must determine the Force Protection required – ie. armed escorts for convoys;
- Must determine what follow-up operations being considered; and
- Must determine the sustainment priorities and to which units.

A MA is conducted for each of the selected COAs and defines the operational tasks to be performed and the resulting logistics requirements. Some tasks are specified by the mandate, while others are implied. For example, a specified task might be to disarm opposing factions; which is a clear task. The implied tasks; however, may include storage of and accountability for the weapons, destruction procedures and re-issue procedures. If the MA only notes the specified task, then the resources necessary to perform the implied tasks will be understated. Once the specified and implied tasks are identified, the logistics planner considers the tasks estimated in relation to the environment in which they are to be executed.

**Logistics Planning Factors.** A listing of relationships between two or more variables, ie. KG's/person/day, which can be used to plan resource needs in detail. If they are not readily available, they should be developed and applied when planning a specific mission (4DR).

**Determination of Logistics Requirements.** This is accomplished by applying the logistics planning factors against the tasks outlined in the MA. The gross logistics requirements can then be used by the planner to determine the most efficient and cost-effective method of supply and distribution.

### 5.3.1 Planning considerations – 5DR

---

*Many nations have doctrine for understanding the logistic considerations of a problem. Some nations refer to the 4 Ds, the 5 Ds, 4 DR or have other names entirely. This section provides a simple set of non-nation-specific considerations suitable for planning in UN Missions.*

*This model is called 5DR.*

---

For the requirements identified in the MA, the logistics planner needs to determine a measure of predictability for the mission. This can be accomplished by applying the **5DR** factors against the requirements. The 5DR is explained as follows:

#### 5.3.1.1 *Destination.*

**Destination determines nature of the requirement in relation to the location of the mission.** Destination defines the overall environment in which the operation will take place, which affects factors such as the pattern of wear and tear on equipment, the variety of supplies and the physiological demands on troops.

Considering this factor helps to define the strategic LOC. Destination influences: transportation means (air, ground, sea or joint), supply alternatives and stock size: for six months or less, strategic communication limits. Destination influences logistic support to military operations, that is, language, climate, austerity of infrastructure and attitudes of the operation area is essential for logistic supply, reliable knowledge of the environment and infrastructure are essential for logistic support, level of threat in a war zone and its environs is crucial in logistic supply and strategic lines of communications are essential for logistic support operations.

Destination significantly influences logistic support as it sets the pre-conditions and patterns of wear and tear. Thus, the AOR (area of operation) will directly influence the forecasting of demand and logistic estimates required to

maintain and sustain the forces in the operational theatre for the duration of the operation. Hence the need to plan and store large buffer stocks to cater for unforeseen contingencies and provide for safety, flexibility, expedience, and flexibility in switching operational priorities.

#### 5.3.1.2 *Demand.*

##### **Demand determines the magnitude of the requirement in terms of forecast of consumption.**

This factor helps in shaping the replenishment plan and setting the self-sustainment levels required by contingent.

Demand for supplies and services are not simply the gross mathematical consumption, but also its pattern, its rate of change and its variability. Demand stems directly from the commander's intent and the tempo of operations. It is the sum of the steady state, cyclical and surge demands. Many units may be used to a 'push' style of replenishment. Demand considerations include understanding how and when and what quantities to request support.

Buffer stocks are essential for unforeseen eventualities, big number of troops require big volume of materiel support, the intensity of operational engagement drives the level of materiel requirements and operational environment and distance directly impact on demand levels.

#### 5.3.1.3 *Distance.*

**Determines the shape of the LOC.** This factor applies distance and accessibility to the calculation for deployment and how the LOC can be established. The movement of troops and supply of materiel require suitable transport and logistics equipment and facilities, reliable transport and communication infrastructure are essential for logistic support, accessibility, speed and flexibility are essential for logistic facilities and strategic lines of communications are essential for logistic support operations were key elements of distance in logistic support to military operations.

When considering distance, the logistic planner must consider distances between nodes within the theatre (such as Field Office/Sector support areas). The length, capacity and topography of the lines of communication will determine the size, shape, structure and balance of the distribution resources committed to it. Distance factors will also determine the volume of resources committed for operating stocks and the time in transit and the requirement for forward bases or intermediary staging posts.



#### 5.3.1.4 *Duration.*

**Dictates the necessary robustness and need for investment in logistics support requirements in relation to the time (How long is support required?).** This factor impacts how complete the logistics support needs to be and the overall volume of equipment and material to be planned. Longer operations consume more logistic support, deployment and support of military operations consumes heavy funding, development of local infrastructure is essential for operational support and strategic investments are essential in longer operational undertakings.

When considering duration, planners may need to reassess operational viability periods (the period during which forces must be self-sufficient), or be able to advise units on ways in which external support may be offered to extend their units endurance.

#### 5.3.1.5 *Dependency.*

**Dependency means understanding the type and quantity of units requiring logistic support.** In a national framework, planners may instinctively understand the support requirements of their force from prior training and experience. In a UN mission, the dependencies are often significantly different to that which a planner may expect from their prior experience. This may be due to UN SUR design, caveats expressed in the MOU, the nature of the COE framework, which requires units to provide additional self-sustainment, or simply that each T/PCC brings its own equipment which has different support needs and planning considerations. As such, Dependency factors become substantially more important in a UN mission than may be in a national deployment.

Logistic planners will need to understand the dependencies equipment fleets, personnel numbers and likely operating characteristics.

#### 5.3.1.6 *Risk.*

All of the above factors must always be assessed against a relative risk factor, which will determine the level of force protection required. For example, perhaps scheduled convoys must traverse through a stretch of territory where there are considerable parties to the conflict activity. In this example, the appropriate solution may be force protection for the convoys (armed escorts).

Risk and Threat Analysis is an essential part of the Operational Planning process as taught on the UN Staff Officers Course and Protection of Civilians

Course. Risk Analysis consider more than just overt threat actors (in military terms 'the enemy') but must consider all stakeholders in the mission, including host government representatives, local law enforcement, local community and so on. Risks are not limited to military threat, but may include theft, corruption, restrictions of movement, damage to the community and more.

Risks to logistic support must be included in the overall Sector, Component, and Mission and Component Risk Analysis, as the means of treating these risks will require discussion at these levels of command.

### 5.3.2 Deductions

This is done by analysing the factors from the 5DR framework and making deductions.

Deductions must be made in relation to the following logistics functions: General, Supply, Medical, Maintenance, Engineering, Transportation and Communications or the GSMMETC construct. Logistics estimates (sometimes called administrative estimates) are used to follow a process to solve a support problem using the known or assumed facts regarding the operation. They are used at all planning levels. The main purpose of an estimate is to produce a logistics plan that can be translated into action.

Logistics planning hinges on three key elements: factors, considerations, and deductions. All levels of planning need to gather facts, consider them, and draw the right conclusion in order to provide the best possible mission support.

A **factor** is a circumstance, fact, or influence contributing to a result. In an estimate, a factor will affect the execution in the peace operation (ie. budget or weather). A **deduction** is a crucial part of the planning process as it uses intuition, training, and experience to assess the factor. A deduction looks at such things as the requirement and availability of logistics support in relation to the factor. Examinations of all the factors and **consideration** of those factors lead to one or more deductions.

A crucial element in all logistics planning at all three planning levels is properly identifying constraints and restrains early and often. A **constraint** is something that you **must do**. It can be imposed by the head of mission or the host nation. An example would be a host nation limiting the use of roads or railways to a specific time or location. A **restraint** is something that you **must not do**. In logistical terms, this may mean such things as a Force not buying food locally for fear of driving up the price or not travelling by night by order of a HoM / FC.

**Deductions.** A deduction is a conclusion reached by logical reasoning. For example, police make deductions and then decisions based on evidence as related to a suspect that may have been at the scene of the crime. Where appropriate, deductions are drawn from factors and consolidated into the overall plan. In some cases, the issue under examination may be significant enough to warrant the development of separate COAs and a plan. Although far from exhaustive, the following provides a suggested list of some issues that might warrant consideration or the GSMMETC construct:

### 5.3.2.1 *Deduction examples*

General - Operational planners make deductions on support capabilities based on the availability or unavailability of services between a TCC/PCC, Host Nation Support and UN contracted assistance. Support arrangements will need to be clearly identified by task, yet flexible and be ready to be amended if one capability becomes compromised or priorities change.

What can you deduce?

- Weather – clothing, fuel, infrastructure;
- Joint – opportunities to lean on other elements (air, land and sea) if required

Supply – What can you deduce?

- Availability by class of supply – warehoused, serviceable and visible
- Reserve – 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> line, advise chain of command on shortages
- Distribution methods – air, land, delivery points, pickups
- Mission configured loads – where, when (shelters ready to go)
- Emergency resupply procedures – have a plan
- Reporting – SA over holdings, establish relationships with higher HQ and units/sections
- Rations – fresh or hard
- Fuel: current status; bulk storage; requirements; bulk refuelling capability; distribution plan; allocations, risk
- Ammunition: requirements versus availability; ammunition storage sites; restrictions; risk
- What will be the most critical or vital supplies that will limit the mission?
- What is the operational tempo, and how will that affect supply consumption?
- What climatic or environmental conditions will affect supply consumption
- What climatic, environmental or threat conditions will affect supplies in storage?

- What dangerous goods regulations apply (for both storage and movement).

Medical - What can you deduce?

- Numbers of troops = number and types of medical issues
- Medical priorities – Ebola, IED, traffic accidents,
- PKO vs peace enforcement = different casualty estimates and troop replacement plans
- Concept of ops = Medical priorities and number of facilities – establishment, training efforts, in field support to civilians, gender based
- Facilities – location, distance between units and role 3 hospital (mov ops)
- Evacuation procedures and capabilities – dedication of air resources
- Mortuary affairs – storage, ramp procedures,
- Refugees / Internally Displaced Persons - pressure to provide tentage, rations, sanitary services, female and children support networks
- Finance services – know how the system works to expedite procurement and reimbursement
- What are the most likely causes of illness or injury?
- What are the climatic or environmental conditions which may affect personnel health

Maintenance - What can you deduce?

- Vehicle type – spare parts requirements, expected failure rates, sources of supply
- 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> line holdings
- Vehicle Off Road (VOR) rate – UN reimbursement values, inspection rates
- Damage repair – recovery capability, 2<sup>nd</sup> line maintenance facilities (tools, repair equipment, infrastructure)
- Repair limits by time and level – need to know expected time to repair to advise Ops (has impact on operational capability)
- Cannibalisation policy – are you authorized to cannibalise from VOR vehicles?
- Mobile Recovery Team (MRT) allocation centralized or dispersed
- Repair parts availability – maintainers identifying requirements? Push / pull system of reimbursement?
- Recovery procedures - Lead nation, subordinate nation? Co-operation?
- What will be the most essential equipment to the operational plan.
- How reliable is this equipment, and what is the equipment availability (what proportion is fully serviceable)
- What is the operational tempo prior to the operation, and how will this affect equipment readiness?

*Annex A to Chapter 5 – Logistic Planning Terminology*

- What is the duration of the operation, and how does equipment normally operate over this period?
- Are there any critical repair parts which may limit the operation?
- Is there anything in the climate or environmental conditions which will impact equipment operation (for example, proximity to salt water; fine dust clogging intakes)

Transportation - What can you deduce?

- Heavy and light requirements - Types of armored vehicles – types of heavy lift (vehicle, rail)
- Movement control – day or night ops? 24/7? Number of forward operating bases = increased need for mov con
- Route use/priority traffic – coordination with host nation and UN, security of convoys?
- Traffic control - military police or civilian police or HN coordinated trailer transfer points – security
- Alternate modes - air, land, sea and rail = more/less capacity = more/less effective = more/less expensive
- Security of lines of communication (LOC) – convoys, MOB, FOB, APOE/APOD, SPOD/SPOE, organized crime
- Are routes (including bridges, culverts, tunnels) able to take the weight of all vehicles?
- What climatic or environmental conditions will affect routes?
- How does the threat environment affect choice of movement (including force protection, use of civilian transport, mode used).
- Is there sufficient transport assets to achieve the required tempo over the duration of the operation for the distances involved?
- How will maintenance policies/requirements affect the availability of transport assets at the required time?

Engineering

Engineering is not traditionally considered a function of logistics; however, within a field mission engineering support at the mission level is provided by MSD (Engineering section within Service Delivery Management). Engineering support can come from a number of sources including minor engineering from the contingent, another contingent and the UN and major engineering provided by the UN (Enabling unit or contract). In planning engineer requirements for an upcoming operation or task what can you deduce?

- Status of the MSR
- Route mines clearance

*Annex A to Chapter 5 – Logistic Planning Terminology*

- Availability of IED detection vs Explosive Ordnance Disposal (clearance).
- Security escort
- Availability of engineering supplies
- Availability of ammo for personnel on security escort
- Materiel for repairs and building construction
- Defensive stores
- Availability ablutions / showers area
- Water purification capability
- Construction of sewage system
- Power
- Climate and environmental conditions which will draw the priority of effort.

Communications – Similar to Engineering, Communications are not traditionally considered a function of logistics; however, within a field mission communications support at a mission level is provided by MSD (Field Technology Section within Operations and Resource Management). As stated in Chapter 3 communications support is well defined in the respective MOU and SUR and contingents most often will provide communications (telephone and radio) at the subunit level where communications from the contingent to higher headquarters will be the responsibility of the UN (mission). In considering communications for an upcoming operation, what can you deduce?

- Radio requirements (HF, VHF, UHF)
- Landline / telecommunications availability
- Bandwidth
- Radio Rebroadcast requirements
- Internet availability
- Command Post location
- Availability of communications spare parts

### 5.3.3 Coordination –

When conducting a logistics estimate to determine the overall support concept or plan for a potential operation or task, proper and consistent coordination is vital. Regardless of the level who will be performing the task (contingent, sector, force/police, mission) coordination will need to take place as soon as possible and must be carried out until task completion. For example, a sector task might include multiple contingents so inter-contingent logistics planning and discussions should take place and will involve the Sector HQ. Issues and concerns that cannot be resolved within the Sector including the MSD RAO as applicable will be elevated to the Force/Police Component HQ and potentially to the MSD as well. Logistics issues involving

MSD must be pushed to the Mission Support Centre for both planning and implementation. Thus, coordination must occur at all levels with a constant flow of information up and down and laterally through the respective chains of command.

#### 5.3.4 Interoperability –

As indicated every UN mission is different but the more successful ones will have a high degree of interoperability. Similar to coordination, contingents must be prepared to work and perform alongside contingents from different MS, different components (civilian, military and police). Interoperability will be challenged by national caveats and SOPs, communication and language barriers; however, these challenges must be overcome for mission success.

The most common barrier to interoperability is that planning officers, who are familiar with their own nation's capabilities, equipment and requirements, are of course not aware of the differences presented by other contingents. This is made more complex by the UN SURs and the UN self-sustainment / COE framework, which sees units potentially deploying with quite different capability than they may otherwise deploy. This could range from having increased maintenance capacity, to having an IED detection capability to assist with road movement. For this reason, commanders and planners must engage to understand the specific capabilities of the contingents on the ground, by both reviewing MOUs (or summaries of the same), and engaging with units.

A second barrier to interoperability is that the COE framework can create a situation which inhibits cooperation between contingents. This is because of the way that reimbursement is calculated, including reimbursement for loss or damage. Two units from the same T/PCC may be able to cooperate and share resources or equipment to achieve economy of effort. However, a commander from one T/PCC offering support to another T/PCC risks a situation where equipment for which she/he is personally responsible becomes damaged or lost, or consuming resources without reimbursement, and being answerable to their T/PCC. Beyond the COE framework, a T/PCC's internal accounting or control mechanisms may be the impediment.

In addition to interoperability between contingents, interoperability requires integration at the HQ level. The UN has adopted integration as a tool to improve interoperability and the proper and effective placement of military and police staff officers within the Mission HQ and MSD must be the norm. Major issues can arise when the uniformed personnel embedded into the

Mission HQ or MSD or underutilised or ignored. Similarly, employing a uniformed staff officer who is not a technical expert (aviation, medical, engineering, etc.) or lacks planning experience will have an adverse impact on interoperability.

### 5.3.5 Gender considerations

Gender mainstreaming within the UN means integrating a gender equality perspective at all stages and levels of policies, programmes and projects. So, in terms of logistics planning for an operation, task or project, gender considerations must always be considered. For example, a contingent planning to send a company of male and female personnel to a Forward Operating Base for an extended period must consider accommodations, absolutions, toilets, lighting, medical supplies, etc. The UN desires more uniformed female personnel so including gender considerations in all planning activities is best practice and encouraged.

Security Council Resolution 2438 on Women and Peacekeeping calls upon Member States and the UN Secretariat to conduct a range of concrete actions in order to increase the participation of women in peacekeeping operations. Amongst many other important actions, SCR 2438 explicitly calls upon Member States to continue increase the numbers of women trained and subsequently deployed to peacekeeping mission. SC2438 calls on Member States and the UN Secretariat to ensure safe, enabling and gender-sensitive working environments for women in peacekeeping operations. Specifically, this includes both the UN and T/PCCs providing adequate and appropriate infrastructure and facilities for women in missions, such as (but not limited to) accommodation, sanitation, health care, protective equipment, specific needs and demands for security and privacy.

The actions arising from SCR 2438 will have many implications for commanders, planners and logisticians. Firstly, a nation has not previously deployed women to a mission, there may be aspects of logistic support that may not be intuitive, and planners should seek advice (whether from bilateral partners, or other planners within the mission, who have experience in deploying with women). Considerations might include (but are certainly not limited to):

- Ensuring that stockholding of protective equipment includes appropriate sizes/models for female soldiers. For example, poorly fitting body armour and helmets are not merely inconvenient but may impede a qualified soldier or police officer from moving, climbing in



and out of vehicles promptly, firing their weapon accurately, and can result in (avoidable) injury.

- Ensuring that medical support is capable of supporting women's health requirements, including medications, supplies, and experience in female health concerns. This includes ensuring that female peacekeepers are able to raise sensitive matters with appropriate privacy with a medical professional.
- Ensuring that welfare, health and personal supplies held are suitable and reasonably available for both women and men. Examples include personal hygiene supplies (such as toiletries), morale items (such as treats, personal care items, magazines, sporting equipment etc).
- Ensuring that accommodation considers issues of privacy / security for sleeping and ablutions while maintaining team cohesion. This may involve improving lighting to ablution buildings; ensuring doors are lockable; installing cubicles/privacy screens in ablutions. Planners should balance the need for a unit to be able to operate together with privacy/dignity concerns, and should consider that, for example, placing all women (regardless of section/office/unit) in one building far away from their colleagues can be highly damaging to morale and unit management.
- Pro-actively ensuring that ablutions and accommodations on all bases including forward and temporary operating bases are appropriate for women.
- Respecting that different nations will have different norms with regard what constitutes privacy, security, and dignity, and negotiating these sensitively.
- Actively seeking to understand in mission if there are other logistic practices or considerations which may be degrading the security, dignity and/or effectiveness of women peacekeepers (however unintended) or conversely would encourage and enable women peacekeepers and continue to amend practices where found.
- Negotiating ambiguity with care in instances where UN Policies have not yet been amended to reflect SCR 2438 (for example, accommodation standards are currently under consideration).

It is not difficult to plan for an inclusive, safe working environment, but it can take time to change infrastructure once built. For this reason, where possible, plans should anticipate the increased participation of women, even if women are not currently deployed in that location.

---

*Military and Police peacekeepers deployed to UN missions deliver an essential capability under threat. They have*

*accepted the risks that come with this responsibility.  
Peacekeepers of all genders deserve the respect, dignity and  
safety afforded by having appropriate logistic support.*

---

## 5.4 Reconnaissance within a Field Mission

It is an axiom that all military operations must be prepared to the last detail. This of course implies that the authority responsible for launching the operation has information well in time, regarding the aim, scope and the approximate date of launching of such an operation. This applies to UN military operations and in all cases the requisite logistics support needs to be well planned and analysed and where a possible a reconnaissance needed to be conducted as part of the logistics estimate process (logistics preparation of the mission area).

An all-encompassing Logistics Reconnaissance Checklist for UN operations, which could be applied to any situation in any part of the world would be the ultimate tool; however, one checklist cannot possibly serve to determine the entire logistical requirements for every task or mission. Therefore, this checklist is designed as a guide for staff officers tasked with undertaking a reconnaissance for deployment to a new area of operations within the mission. Personnel selected must use their initiative, common sense and experience to include any areas that this checklist does not cover.

Prior to the actual reconnaissance a significant amount of information must be determined, such as the concept of support, ie. who is providing what resources (UN, Host Nation, Contingent)? These next few pages will help the members of the reconnaissance to better understand their responsibilities and to be better prepared to complete their tasks.

A UN PSO can range in size from a relatively small mission in terms of civilian, military and police (Cyprus - UNFICYP) to a large mission with thousands of personnel (DRC - MONUSCO). Logistics support arrangements therefore have to be tailored to the particular requirements of each mission. In all cases, logistics organisations must be flexible enough to support the whole range of peacekeeping operations.

### 5.4.1 Prompts and checklists for logistics reconnaissance

The following are some handy checklists items that should be examined when performing a logistics reconnaissance for a new site, such as when a unit is being relocated to a new base.

The relevance of some checklist items may vary depending on the level of permanence of the intended location.

#### 5.4.1.1 *Supply*

##### General

- How many trucks can be stored / parked?
- Carrying capacity of trucks
- Surface stability (hardstand, grassy field, etc)
- Availability of office areas
- Status of road and impact on movement of materiel and supplies
- Canteen services

##### Disposal / Hazardous Waste

- Are there national / local regulations regarding the disposal of material?

##### Local Procurement

- What is the method of contracting and procuring from the local economy?
- Are there any limitations, controls on access to the market?
- Does this vary for different types of supply, or different parts of the mission?
- What currency is being used?

##### Fuel

- Availability of petrol, propane and miscellaneous fuel (transmission fluid, brake fluid, etc)
- Method of storage and dispensing

##### Rations / Water

- Fresh rations availability (meats, vegetables, fruit, fish, bread), hard rations
- Storage including refrigeration and cooling
- Purification capability (Reverse Osmosis Purification Unit) and spare water
- Packaged or bulk water?
- Location of nearest bore? Does this pose a security problem
- Timeframes required if new bore is needed?

- Feeding facilities

#### Repair Parts

- Storage capacity and national resupply procedures under a Wet Lease MOU.
- Are there local sources for replenishment?
- Are rates of usage known?
- Has Mission Essential Equipment been identified?
- Are high usage / mission essential parts held in sufficient stock?

#### Sewage

- Disposal procedures for garbage, grey (cooking and cleaning) and black (human waste) water

#### Defensive Stores requirements

- Concertina / razor / barbed wire, 6' pickets, 2' pickets, sand bags corrugated steel

#### Tentage Requirements

- Amount, type (4-man, 10-man, etc), source, special heaters storage

#### Contract Labour

- Cleaners, food services, laundry
- Contingency if threat level changes and contract labour cannot support?
- Wages

#### Storage / Material Handling Equipment (MHE)

- Type (covered warehouse, open storage, shed, etc)
- Are storage facilities heated, dry and waterproof?
- Is power and lighting available within storage facilities?
- Is security storage available for classified property?
- What is the availability of MHE (ie. trucks, forklifts, pallet jacks, etc)?
- Is MHE appropriate for the weight and dimensions of the load

#### 5.4.1.2 *Transport*

Equipment/support available:

- Modes of transport available (air, road, rail, water, other)
- Container movers
- Material Handling Equipment (MHE)
- Types and cargo capacity of the transport available. This may be
  - Host Nation support
  - Cross contingent support
  - UN support (Civilian or Enabling units (transport or logistic units)
  - Spare parts requirements
- Transportation resources
  - Driver license requirements
  - Road maps, tactical maps
- Availability of personnel (labour)

Routes

- Location of nodes of support
- Route clearance – does this have host nation considerations? Parking areas
- Possible dumping and loading sites
- Seasonal concerns (rainy season, ice in mountains)
- Security measures required
- Existing Main Service Routes (MSRs) conditions, carrying capacity and classification
- Existing Bridges / chokepoints
- Possible location for check points / roadblocks and harbours areas
- Distance to be covered
- Alternative routes

#### 5.4.1.3 *Movements to / from entry point into mission*

Airport of Disembarkation (AOD)

- Name of airfield(s) and location
- Length and capacity of runway

Civilian / military representative(s)

Emergency telephone numbers (fire station, ambulance, control tower, etc)

Aircraft loading/off-loading ramp:

- Sufficient space for aircraft parking areas
- Loading / off-loading restrictions in effect
- Vehicle access
- Proximity to vehicle / cargo marshalling area
- Adequate lighting facilities
- Anti-skid mats for slippery ramp area

Vehicle/cargo marshalling area

- Adequate space
- Access from highway
- Access to aircraft parking ramp
- Lighting facilities for load acceptance checks

Weigh scales

- Rental charges and method of payment
- Calibration certificate
- Location

Vehicle washing facility available

Repair facilities

Vehicle refuelling and defuelling facilities

- Fuel
- Civilian / military sources
- Location(s)

Working accommodations

- Office with adequate communications
- Crew room (with communications as required)
- Passenger rest area
- Customs, Health, Immigration room
- Coffee facilities
- Washroom

Staging areas

- Accommodations available
- Rations, water and fuel available

Ground Support Equipment:

- Civilian / military sources
- Rental charges and method of payment
- Forklifts
- Cargo Loader or equivalent
- Mobile crane
- Passenger stairs (minimum 10')
- Airfield crew vehicle

Labour

Warehouse or storage areas including type and capacity

Electricity

- Type of AC power available, voltage, cycles
- Generators available or needed
- Type and capacity of generator required

Inland transportation available from the airport

- Customs, Health, Immigration and Agriculture
- Location and proximity to field office
- Documentation requirements
- Arrangements for meeting aircraft arrivals and departures

Hours of work

Security requirements

Staging areas

- Accommodations available
- Rations, water and fuel available

UN assistance available

#### 5.4.1.4 *Seaport of Disembarkation (SPOD)*

Name, type and location of seaport(s)

- Depth of channels and berths (lengths)
- Cargo handling equipment available and capacity
- Types of vessels handled (RORO, containers, break bulk)

Civilian / military representative(s)

Emergency telephone numbers (fire station, ambulance, etc)

Inland transportation available from the port

Capacity and type of roads and rail

Office space available at seaport for MOVCON and support elements

Storage and marshalling areas

Customs

- Passport / visas requirements
- Cargo documentation requirements

Port reception capacity

Ship unloading areas (berths) and restrictions

Labour

Warehouse or storage areas including type and capacity

Repair facilities

Vehicle and container parks

Bulk storage areas

Electricity

- Type of AC power available, voltage, cycles
- Type and capacity of generator required

Hours of work

Security requirements

Staging areas

- Accommodations available
- Rations, water and fuel available

UN assistance available



#### 5.4.1.5 Maintenance

##### General

- Number and types of operational tasks
- Number of Maintenance personnel required
- Establish what level of mobile activity can be expected
- What repair and recovery capability does the UN and supporting forces have?
- Will the TCC have to provide maintenance to other foreign contingents in this mission (will be part of MOU)?
- What is the Cannibalization policy?
- What environmental factors will affect equipment maintenance?

##### Security

- Degree of security provided to detachments, Mobile Repair Teams (MRTs) and recovery elements?

##### Command And Control

- What is the command and control relationship?
- What is the method of communications for detachments?
- Who controls the maintenance priorities?
- What level of maintenance liaison is proposed?

##### Facility capabilities

- Repair of electronic modules from electronic equipment
- Overhauls of electrical, mechanical equipment assemblies
- General engineering fabrication
- Modifications
- Inspections
- Refrigeration
- Medical equipment maintenance
- Calibration

##### Equipment and Tools

- Availability of tools, test equipment and technical manuals

##### Maintenance Workshops

*Annex A to Chapter 5 – Logistic Planning Terminology*

- Where is the workshop(s) located? Are there alternatives?
- Are there any suitable civilian workshops?
- Water availability
- Sufficient power / electricity (capacity of supply)
- Waste disposal procedures
- Hard standing
- Adequate entry, exist and circuit routes
- Adequate area to hold repairable equipment
- Adequate living and working accommodations
- Where are equipment repair pools to be set up? Who controls and maintains?
- What is the system for authorizing release from the pools?
- What is the back loading policy?
- What preservation methods are required?
- Welding - Argon Arc, Acetylene and adequate storage of all industrial gases
- Refuelling
- Lighting

Spare Parts

- What is the system of supply of repair parts for contingent owned and UN owned equipment and other foreign contingents?
- Where are the spare parts sourced?
- Where are the spare parts stored?

Equipment

- Repair and Recovery Vehicles
- Tow Bar
- Crane (6,000 -10,000 lbs)
- Forklift (6,000 lbs);

Local Supply

- Steel
- Wood
- Nuts and bolts
- Welding rods
- Fuel products
- What is the method of contracting, procuring from the local market?
- Are there any limitations, controls on access to the market?

#### 5.4.1.6 *Engineers*

Status of MSR and mine clearance requirements

Security / escort

Electricity

- Type of AC power available, voltage, cycles
- Reliability
- Generators available or needed
- Type and capacity of generators required

Accommodations

- Availability
- Sleeping, feeding and work

Water Supply

- Quality of water and availability
- Requirement for purification
- Requirement for water transportation and storage

Sewage / Garbage

- Is there a Treatment plant?
- Disposal procedures for garbage, gray and black water, waste oil
- Availability of dumpsters
- Availability of contractors
- Latrines and abolition areas

Defensive Stores

Vehicles and Equipment

- Specialized (bridge laying, demining)
- Tractors, graders, bull dozers
- Materiel Handling Equipment
- Spare parts

#### 5.4.1.7 *Medical*

Medical Facilities

*Annex A to Chapter 5 – Logistic Planning Terminology*

- Location
- Lighting and power supply
- Heat and air conditioning
- Bed capacity
- Ventilation
- Water supply (hot and cold)
- Toilet facilities
- Refrigeration
- Fly screens
- Storage

Local Medical Personnel

- Military
- Civilian

Local Hospital(s)

- Name(s)
- Name of and phone number of manager;
- Bed capacity
- Staff specialists (general surgery; internal medicine; orthopaedics; neurosurgery; anaesthesia; radiology; pathology; dermatology; tropical medicine)
- Laboratory
- X-Ray
- Dental facilities

Ambulance

- Contingent resources
- Mission resources
- Private company

Supplies

- Storage (space, dry, cool, secure)
- Method of resupply (national, international, local)
- Labelling

Local diseases and Venomous animals

Aero MEDEVAC

- What aviation resources are available?
- Are stretchers compatible with these aircraft?
- Refrigeration of medical supplies in transit
- What are the requirements to site a Helicopter Landing Zones

#### 5.4.1.8 *Communications*

##### Telephones

- Local provider
- External provider
- Satellite
- Secure

##### Internet

- Provider
- Secure
- Speed
- Bandwidth

##### Radio

- HF, VHF, UHF
- Frequencies
- Voice procedure
- Radio Rebroadcast (RRB) capabilities
- Mounted / Dismounted
- Air-Ground-Air (include frequency of operation)
- Interoperability
- Secure

##### General

- What facilities exist for safeguarding classified matter?
- Storage of spare equipment
- Electrical power (voltage, frequency)

**ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 5 – TRANSLATING MILITARY LOGISTIC TERMINOLOGY****5A - 1. Continental staff system**

Most UN missions use the continental military staff system to describe the structure of the military force. Although well known to the military, the use of this kind of specialised terminology can cause confusion, particularly as police or civilian structures are not necessarily organised/distinguished by the same categories.

**5A - 1.1 Branch type/function**

The standard staff system uses number to indicate the function type, not a tier/level of authority. Therefore 1 is not higher or lower than 2.

Staff branch 1-6 are used fairly consistently across many countries, however different nations may have different expectations of the meaning of 7, 8 and 9 branch. This would need to be checked in the mission, and would likely be determined by either legacy or the direction of the Head of Military Component.

Staff Number	Branch
1	manpower or personnel
2	intelligence and security
3	Operations (or current operations)
4	Logistics (including supply, distribution, equipment repair and recovery, medical and health support and other related support functions). Construction and maintenance of facilities may fall here (unless given their own branch under 7, see below)
5	Plans (or future operations)
6	for signals, sometimes called communications, information technology
7	Can vary – engineering OR military education and training
8	for finance and contracts. Also known as resource management.

### 5A - 1.2 Headquarters level

Typically a letter is used to indicate which level or kind of Headquarters. “U” is used to designate the branch at Force HQ. “G” may be used to designate the equivalent branch at Sector HQ. “A” (Air Force) or “N” (Navy/Maritime) might be used to designate a specific HQ which deals only with that function.

*Examples:*

*U4 The Logistic Branch at Force HQ*

*G3 The Operations Branch at a Sector HQ.*

Sometimes a HQ will choose to combine branches for efficiency. When this occurs, the most common combinations are:

*G1/4 A branch responsible for all aspects of personnel and logistics*

*G3/5 A branch responsible for both current operations and future planning.*

### 5A - 1.3 Branch or the individual?

While it depends on context, if the speaker refers to “The U4”, or the speaker is likely referring to the Chief of the U4 Branch

Otherwise, the speaker is likely referring to the Branch as a whole.

## References

These references can be found by navigating to the Peacekeeping Resource Hub <https://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community> , and clicking on the “Policy and Guidance” link, then “Policy”, and searching the Dag Hammarskjold Library Repository. Users may need to register on first entry.

2008 Generic Guidelines for Troop Contributing Countries Deploying Military Units to the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions

2009.09 DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Roles and Training Standards for UN Military Staff Officers

2010.20 DPKO/DFS Policy on Training for all UN Peacekeeping Personnel

2012.06 DPKO/DFS Policy on Contract Management

2013.06 DPKO/DFS Manual on Surface Transport Management in the Field

2014.10 Policy on Joint Operations

2014.21 DPKO/DFS Movement Control Manual

2015.09 Guidelines for Field Verification and COE (currently under revision)

2015.17 DPKO/DFS Policy on National Support Element

2015 United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Logistics Unit Manual (currently under revision).

2015.12 Medical Support Manual for United Nations Field Missions

2015.16 DPO Policy on Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement

2016 United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military/Combat Transport Unit Manual

2016.09 Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Operations

2016.10 DPKO/DFS Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

2017.07 DPKO/DFS Policy on Peacekeeping Intelligence



2018.01 DPKO/DFS Policy on Gender Responsive United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

2018.21 DPO/DOS Aviation Manual

2019.03 Weapons and Ammunition Management Policy

2019 Supplementary Guidance on Supply Chain Management Source Process

2019.23 DPO/DOS Policy on Authority, Command and Control

2019 DPO/DOS/DPPA/DSS Policy on Weapons and Ammunition Management

2020.7 DOS/DPO/DPPA/DSS Policy on Casualty Evacuation in the Field

2020.03 DPO United Nations Military Engineer Unit & CET Search and Detect Manual

2020.9 DOS United Nations Procurement Manual

2020 UN Manual on Ammunition Management

2020 Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Staff Handbook (PKISR HB)

2020 United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual (UNIBAM)

[2020 COE Manual](#)

## Glossary

Term	Meaning
Accountability	the obligation of staff members to be answerable for all decisions made and actions taken by them, and to be responsible for honouring their commitments, without qualification or exception. Accountability includes achieving objectives and high-quality results in a timely and cost-effective manner, in fully implementing and delivering on all mandates to the Secretariat approved by the United Nations intergovernmental bodies and other subsidiary organs established by them in compliance with all resolutions, regulations, rules and ethical standards; truthful, objective, accurate and timely reporting on performance results; responsible stewardship of funds and resources; all aspects of performance, including a clearly defined system of rewards and sanctions; and with due recognition to the important role of the oversight bodies and in full compliance with accepted recommendations.
Administrative Control	The authority over subordinate or other organizations within national contingents for administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other non-operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Administrative Control is a national responsibility given to the NCC in a peacekeeping mission.
Arrival Inspection	- the inspection of major equipment will take place immediately upon arrival in the mission area and must be completed within one month. The United Nations, in consultation with the troop contributor, will decide the time and place. Where equipment and personnel are already in the mission area when the memorandum of understanding is concluded, the first inspection will be carried out on a date to be jointly determined by the mission and contingent authorities and is to be completed within one month of that date
Asset Management	safeguarding, maintaining and accounting for property and equipment, used and controlled by UN
Caveats	Formal or informal non-compliance with the Statement of Unit Requirement. A formal caveat is recorded in the MOU. An informal caveat is not recorded in the MOU, but is enforced by a T/PCC regardless.
CIMIC	coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the military force and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies
CMS	Chief of Mission Support (see also Director of Mission Support)

COE	see: Contingent Owned Equipment
COE	Contingent Owned Equipment: Major equipment, minor equipment and consumables deployed and operated by a contingent in the performance of peacekeeping operations
Constraints	in contrast to: Restraints. Something which you must do.
Consumables	Supplies of a general nature consumed on a routine basis. Consumables include combat supplies, general and technical stores, defence stores, ammunition and explosives, and other basic commodities that are used to support major equipment, as well as to support minor equipment and personnel
Contingent	All formed units, personnel and equipment of a troop/police contributor deployed to the mission area
COS	Mission Chief of Staff
CPAS	Comprehensive Performance Assessment System - a system which combines inputs from all pillars of the mission in order to assess if actions are contributing to successful achievement of the mandate, and identify corrective actions.
DFS	See DOS
DMS	Director Mission Support .selected by UNHQ and is responsible to Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and acts as its representative at mission HQ. Principal advisor to SRSG on administrative and logistics matters
DMS	Director Mission Support
DMSPC	UN Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance. A department of the United Nations within the Secretariat
Donated Equipment	Third-party contingent-owned equipment offered to a troop/police contributor for exclusive use by that country in a particular United Nations mission, which will revert to the original owner upon mission termination or earlier departure by the troop/police contributor.
DOS	Department of Operational Support (formerly Department of Field Support or DFS)
DPKO	See DPO

DPO	Department of Peace Operations (formerly Department of Peace Keeping Operations or DPKO)
Dry Lease	reimbursement system whereby the troop/ police contributor provides equipment to the mission and the United Nations assumes responsibility for maintaining the equipment
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
DSRSG/HC	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General/Humanitarian Coordinator
DSS	UN Department of Safety and Security
DUF	Directions for the Use of Force. Used by Police
Enabling Assets / Enabling Units	Enabling assets consist of construction engineer units, Unmanned Aerial Systems, manned airborne ISR aircraft, enabling assets with composite engineer units, medical, utility and cargo military aircraft, logistics units, signal, transportation and movement units and supply. The classification of these units is agreed in the Statement of Unit Requirement (SUR), MOU/Letter of Assist (LOA) prior to deployment.
Extreme environmental conditions factor	Mission factor applicable to the reimbursement rates for major equipment and for self-sustainment to take into account the increased costs borne by the troop/police contributor for extreme climatic and terrain conditions. This factor is applicable only under conditions of significant anticipated additional costs to the troop/police contributor. The factor is not to exceed 5 per cent of the reimbursement rates
FC	Force Commander. See also HOMC
Field Mission	
Force asset	a unit that provides services such as communications, medical or engineering services, which normally would be reimbursed only under self-sustainment on a force level. Such units may be entitled to reimbursement for major equipment used to provide such services
Force Commander (see HOMC)	senior military officer, appointed under the authority of the Secretary-General, responsible for all military operations within the mission

Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG)	– a member state assumes overall responsibility for the co-ordination of logistics support, but draws on the resources of national support elements and their logistic units to provide support from respective troop contributing member states
Forced abandonment	Actions resulting from a decision approved by the Force Commander, Police Commissioner or his or her authorized representative or from a provision in the rules of engagement which results in the loss of custody and control of equipment and supplies
FPU	Formed Police Unit
GA	General Assembly
Generic fair market value (GFMV)	- Equipment valuation for reimbursement purposes, computed as the average initial purchase price plus any major capital improvements, adjusted for inflation and discounted for any prior usage, or the replacement value, whichever is less. The generic fair market value includes all items associated with the equipment in the performance of its operational role
HNS	Host Nation Support - support provided by the Host Nation to the mission as part of the agreement between the UN and the Host Nation
HOM	Head of Mission. Usually (but not always) civilian
HOM	Head of Mission (HOM / Senior Representative of the Secretary- General (SRSRG) - official appointed by the Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, who is responsible for all United Nations activities within the mission
HOMC	Head of Military Contingent. Generally this is the Force Commander (FC) if there is a military force, however it may alternatively be the Chief Military Observer (CMO)
HOPC	Head of Police Contingent. Usually called the Police Commissioner (PC)
Host Nation	The country in which the peacekeeping mission is located, and which has provided consent for the peacekeeping mission to exist
Hostile action	- an incident from the action(s) of one or more belligerents that has a direct and significant negative impact on the personnel and / or equipment of a troop/police contributor
Hostile action or forced abandonment factor	the mission factor applied to each category of self-sustainment rates and to the spares element (or half of the estimated maintenance rate) of the wet lease rate to compensate the troop/police contributor for loss and damage. The factor is not to exceed 6 per cent of the rates

Incremental transportation factor:	the factor, calculated separately for each contingent in each mission, to cover the incremental costs of transportation of spare parts and consumables under a wet lease system or a lease for maintenance in increments of 0.25 per cent of the leasing rate for each complete 800 kilometres (500 miles) of distance, beyond the first 800 kilometres (500 miles), along the consignment route between the port of embarkation in the home country and the port of entry in the mission area. For landlocked countries or countries where equipment is moved by road or rail to and from the mission area, the port of entry in the mission area will be an agreed border crossing point
Intensified operational conditions factor	- the mission factor applicable to the reimbursement rates for major equipment and for self-sustainment rates to compensate the troop/police contributor for increased costs resulting from the scope of the task assigned, the length of logistics chains, the non-availability of commercial repair and support facilities, and other operational hazards and conditions. The factor is not to exceed 5 per cent of the rates
ITS	Integrated Training Service, part of Directorate of Policy, Evaluation and Training, within DPO
Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC)	developed to create a common operational picture from which the SRSO conducts his Mission management. JMAC gets information from all Mission Components and co-operative agencies for analysis
Joint Mission Support Centre (JMSC)	situated within the Operations and Resource Management pillar within the Director Mission Support organization. Provides progress of logistics operations, maintains a detailed database of available resources and equipment and provides logistics advice to the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) on future and ongoing ops. Staffed with Civilian, Military and Police personnel
Joint Operations Centre (JOC)	- acts as the integrated Operations Centre, monitoring all current operations and activities, receiving and staffing reports from subunits and forwarding comprehensive reports to higher levels. Additionally, the JOC develops contingency plans as required and staffed with Civilian, Military and Police personnel
LD	Logistics Division, DOS
Letter of Assist	a contractual document that the United Nations signs with Member States, authorising the latter to provide specific goods and/or services to the United Nations.
Level 1 Medical Support	Primary Health Care and Emergency Care

Level 2 Medical Support	Basic Field Hospital
Level 3 Medical Support	Advanced Field Hospital
LOA	see: Letter of Assist
Loss or damage	- total or partial destruction of equipment and/or supplies resulting from a no-fault incident, the actions of one or more belligerents or a decision approved by the Force Commander/Police Commissioner
<b>Maintenance</b>	
Maintenance rate	- the reimbursement rate to compensate the Government for maintenance costs, comprising spare parts, contracted repair and third-and fourth-line maintenance, required to keep major equipment items operational to the specified standards and to return the item to operational condition upon return from the mission area. The cost of labour for first-and second-line maintenance is not included, as these are part of the normal tasks of military and police personnel responsible for maintaining equipment. The rate includes an incremental transportation rate to cover the general costs of transportation of spare parts. This rate forms part of the “wet lease” rate
Major equipment	: major items directly related to the unit mission as mutually determined by the United Nations and the troop/police contributor. Major equipment is accounted for either by category or individually. Separate reimbursement rates apply for each category of major equipment. These rates include reimbursement for minor equipment and consumables that are used to support the item of major equipment
ME	Major Equipment
Member State	The countries / nations / independent states which form the membership of the United Nations. At time of writing, there are 193 Member States, and two "Observers".
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)	- an agreement between the UN and each Troop Contributing Country (TCC) and is a key document that defines: what capacity / effect the TCC should bring to the Mission and how the sustainment of this force will be conducted and defines responsibilities of support by the UN or TCC and the method or reimbursement

Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence	Intelligence functions conducted by Military components in a peacekeeping missions. Functions and implementation will be different from national military intelligence functions.
Minor equipment	: Equipment that is used to support a unit, such as catering, accommodation, non-specialist communication and engineering and other mission-related activities. Specific accounting of minor equipment is not required. Minor equipment is divided into two categories: items designed to support major equipment; and items that directly or indirectly support personnel. Personnel-related minor equipment is covered by the rates of reimbursement for self-sustainment
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSCA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
Mission Support Logistics Plan	Prepared by MSC, this records the tasking and prioritisation of logistic assets and resources for a given period or operation.
Mobility	A capability of military forces - that which permits them to move from place to place. In this way, mobility includes, for example, that a road or bridge is usable
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
Movement(s)	The activity involved in the change of location of equipment, personnel and stocks, as part of a military operation.
MPKI	See: Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence.
MS	see: Member States
MSC	Mission Support Centre. Part of Mission Support pillar in a mission, responsible for coordinating all



MSD	Mission Support Division.
MSR	Main Supply Route
NCC	National Contingent Commander. An appointment, independent of any UN role/responsibility, to be the command representative for all military (or all police) personnel of a particular T/PCC. This person represents the T/PCC, as distinct from representing an individual unit.
No-fault incident	- An incident resulting from an accidental occurrence or negligent conduct, such incidents do not include acts attributable to wilful misconduct or gross negligence on the part of an operator or custodian of equipment
OMA	Office of Military Affairs, an element of DPO under the MILAD
Operational inspection	- carried out by duly designated representatives of the United Nations, must be conducted at least once every six months. Major equipment will be inspected to ensure that categories and groups, as well as the number delivered, still correspond with those in this memorandum of understanding and the equipment is used appropriately
PC	Police Commissioner. See also HOPC
PCC	Police Contributing Country.
Peacekeeping Mission	A United Nations Field Mission established by mandate of the Security Council under Chapter 6 or Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, for the purpose of creating the conditions for peace
Peacekeeping-Intelligence	Intelligence functions conducted by a Peacekeeping Missions. Its functions and implementation is constrained by specific rules covered in the Policy on Peacekeeping-Intelligence. This is a specific term which is hyphenated to distinguish it from Member State national intelligence functions.
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation. Also called a Peacekeeping Mission or Field Mission
Police Commissioner (PC)	- senior police officer, appointed under the authority of the Secretary-General, responsible for all police operations within the mission
Police Contributing Country.	A country which is contributing police personnel whether as individuals (such as individual police officers) or formed police units (FPU).

Pre-deployment Visit (PDV)	– Visits by Department of Peace Operations, Department of Operational Support and field mission teams comprising representatives from appropriate functional areas to Member States. They are undertaken to assist Member States in preparing their contingents for deployment and to ensure that Member State contributions meet the operational requirements of the mission and the timing of deployments.
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
Rations	
Recovery	In logistic terms, Recovery means the function of bringing damaged equipment from the location of damage back to a location where it can be safely repaired
Repair	In logistic terms, Repair means performing maintenance in response to equipment being damaged (regardless of cause).
Repatriation inspection	carried out by duly designated representatives of the United Nations when the contingent or a component thereof leaves the mission to ensure that all major equipment provided by the Government, and only such equipment, is repatriated, and to verify the condition of equipment provided under the dry lease concept
Restraints	see also: Constraint (opposite). A restraint is something you must not do (by order).
Restrictions	see also: Restraints. Something which prevents freedom of action and which is which is imposed by an authority . This may include policy, legislation, regulation, or orders. Understanding which authority has imposed the restriction/restraint allows one to understand the process which must be undertaken in order to have that restriction/restraint changed or released.
ROE	Rules of Engagement. Used by Military.
RSOI	Reception, Staging and Onward Integration. See RSOM
RSOM	Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) – systematic planning for receiving and preparing personnel and equipment for onward operations
SC	Security Council

SCM	Supply Chain Management (SCM) - a pillar under the Director Mission Support responsible for Supply Chain Performance, Acquisition Management, Procurement, Centralized Warehousing and Movement Control (MOVCON)
SDM	Service Delivery Management (SDM) - a pillar under the Director Mission Support responsible for Transport, Aviation, Medical, Engineering and Facility Maintenance and Life Support (rations and fuel)
Self sustainment	A logistics support concept for a unit in a peacekeeping mission whereby the contributing State provides some specific, or all, logistics support to the contingent on a reimbursable basis
SG	Secretary General
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) - an agreement negotiated between the UN and the Host Nations, which details the rights privileges, immunities and nature of services to be provided to the force (military) and its personnel, as well as their responsibilities and obligations
Special case equipment	Major equipment for which, because of the uniqueness of the item, its high value or the lack of a generic group, a standard rate of reimbursement has not been defined in the tables of reimbursement
SRSG	Senior Representative of the Secretary General. The most senior UN official in a designated region/mission. May be the HOM, but not always.
SS	See Self Sustainment
SSR	Secondary Supply Route
Statement of Unit Requirement	a document that enumerates the capabilities that are required by a mission for optimising a unit's effectiveness in the conduct of mandated operations. While it is the statement of requirement, the final agreement is recorded in an MOU or LOA
SUR	See Statement of Unit Requirement
TCC	see Troop Contributing Country.
Transport/Transportation	The means (modes) to move forces, equipment and personnel and includes the appropriate mechanical equipment eg boats, ships, trucks, trains, aircraft

Troop Contributing Country.	A country which is contributing military personnel whether as individuals (such as staff officers and military observers) or units. "TCC" is sometimes used informally within mission to refer to the units within the mission, however care should be taken to distinguish the difference between the unit on the ground, and the TCC which contributed it
UN	United Nations
UN Operational Authority	<p>The authority transferred by the Member States to the United Nations to use the operational capabilities of their national military contingents, units, FPU and individual military and police personnel to undertake mandated missions and tasks. United Nations Operational Authority over such forces and personnel is vested in the Secretary-General and through him in the head of a specific mission, under the authority of the Security Council. The Secretary-General exercises that authority under the overall authority of the Security Council. United Nations Operational Authority involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• of a specific mandate of the Security Council;</li> <li>• an agreed period, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal of a contingent would require the contributing country to provide adequate prior notification; and</li> <li>• a specific geographic area (the mission area as a whole).</li> </ul>
UN Operational Command and Control	<p>The authority delegated to a Military or Police Commander for the direction, coordination and control of uniform personnel under his or her command. Operational command and control includes the authority to assign tasks, designate objectives and give direction to individual uniformed personnel, units and sub-units necessary to accomplish the mission. tasks to individually deployed military experts, units and sub-units within the military component, in consultation with the National Contingent Commander (NCC), as appropriate</p>
UN Tactical Command and Control	<p>The authority delegated to a Military or Police Commander to assign specific tasks to forces under his or her command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by a higher authority. Tactical control is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements and activities necessary to accomplish the assigned tasks. It may be delegated to and exercised at the level of subordinate sector and/or unit commanders.</p>
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNHQ	Colloquial reference to the United Nations Secretariat

UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan (precedes UNMISS)
UNMISS	UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOE	United Nations Owned Equipment (UNOE) – Major equipment, minor equipment and consumables deployed and operated by permanent staff, Military Experts on Mission and select contingents in the performance of peacekeeping operations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) - a UN resolution adopted by the fifteen members of the Security Council
UNSOM	UN Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization
USG	Under Secretary General. The head of a Department, such as DPO or DOS.
Wet Lease	reimbursement system whereby the troop/ police contributor provides and assumes responsibility for maintaining and supporting deployed major items of equipment, together with the associated minor equipment. The troop/police contributor is entitled to reimbursement for providing this support