



In Memoriam



Thomas van der Meijden

Royal Netherlands Army

***In dedication, for his contribution
towards the UN Military
Peacekeeping Intelligence
Doctrine and Training Package***

***Deceased-22 June 2019
People's Republic of China, Performing his UN
duties***



Module1

Military Peacekeeping- Intelligence Conceptual Framework

Module 1 Content

- PKI and MPKI introduction and principles
- MPKI cycle and processes
- MPKI management tools
- MPKI structures, roles and responsibilities



Lesson 1.1

UN PKI and MPKI Overview

Lesson Contents

- Importance of UN PKI
- UN PKI Principles
- MPKI Principles

Learning Outcomes

- Explain why UN PKI is important to UN missions
- Explain the UN PKI principles
- Explain the MPKI principles



Why the UN Department of Peace Operations Embraces Intelligence

**UN Military Peacekeeping-
Intelligence Handbook (MPKIHB)
supporting document for military
components**

United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations /
Department of Field Support
Ref. 2017.07



Policy

Peacekeeping Intelligence

Approved by: USG DPKO
USG DFS
Effective date: 2 May 2017
Contact: DPKO-DFS/DPET/PBPS Policy Planning Team
Review date: 2 May 2019

Why UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence

- Support Common Operational Picture (COP)
- Early warning of imminent threats
- Identify risks and opportunities

Principles

UN PKI Overarching

- Under rules
- Non-Clandestine
- Areas of application
- Respect of State
Sovereignty
- Independence
- Accountability,
capability, authority
- Security & Confidentially

UN MPKI Practical

- Command led
- Centralized Control-
Decentralized execution
- Objectivity
- Accessibility & timeliness
- Invest in ISP and MPKI
battle-rhythm

Under Rules

- Security Council mandates
- Compliance with UN Charter
- Consistent with overall legal framework
- Human rights obligations

Non-clandestine

Clandestine activities:

- Conducted in such a way as to assure secrecy and concealment of activities
- Inconsistent with the legal framework
- Illicit and outside the boundaries of peacekeeping-intelligence

Areas of Application

- Enhance situational awareness
- Ensure safety and security of personnel
- Inform operations and activities related to the POC tasks

Respect to State Sovereignty

- Respect the sovereignty of Host states
- Respect the sovereignty of neighbouring states

Independence

- Autonomous / independent of national systems or other operations
- Maintain exclusive international character
- Share intelligence with non-mission entities when UN conditions met

Accountability, Capability, Authority

- Authority to make decisions
- Proper capabilities to execute functions
- Accountable for effective execution of responsibilities

Security and Confidentiality

- Secure information management and communications
- Shared / disseminated on “need to know” and “need to share” concepts
- Disclosed to trusted individuals for official duties

MPKI Command-led

- Centrally coordinated process
- Leadership is continuous
- Commander sets priorities and directs effort
- Intelligence staffs organize, collect and produce intelligence

Centralized Control, Decentralized Execution

- Peacekeeping-intelligence systems thrive under centralized control and decentralized execution
- Centralized planning and direction essential for unity of effort
- Disparate elements should be trusted to execute tasks without unnecessary interference

Objectivity

- Unbiased Intelligence
- Never distorted to fit a preconceived idea or to conform with senior leadership views
- Moral courage is required

Accessibility and Timeliness

- Readily available to the user
- Suitable for immediate comprehension
- Reach those who need to know in time
- Appropriate security classification

Invest in ISP & Battle-rhythm

- Clear responsibilities
- SOPs, timings, reports and returns
- Battle-rhythm sets conditions for success
- Provides cogs that make MPKI machine work

Take Away

- PKI supports UN missions to better understand their environment, anticipate strengths, weaknesses of spoilers that impact the execution of the mandate
- UN PKI / MPKI principles help guide the management of intelligence activities in UN peacekeeping operations
- UN PKI overarching principles support the UN PKI Policy and the mission as a whole
- MPKI practical principles support the military component and their interaction with other interlocutors

Questions



Lesson 1.2 MPKI Cycle and Management


Lesson Contents

- MPKI cycle
- MPKI management tools

Learning Outcomes

- Identify the stages of the MPKI cycle
- Describe the MPKI management tools

MPKI Cycle



Direction

- Based on commander's mission / intent
- Staff identifies intelligence gaps
- Formalize IRs

Acquisition

- Data feed- analytical step of cycle
- The process involves identification, coordination, and tasking of assets
- Data and information from the broadest sources

Analysis

- Process where data and information is converted into intelligence
- Collation and integration- grouping and recording of information for retrieval, comparison and evaluation
- Evaluation- review of information to assess reliability and credibility

Analysis

- Analysis: the methodical breaking down of information into its component parts, examination of each to find interrelationships and the application of reasoning
- Interpretation: the interpretation of the new peacekeeping-intelligence against existing knowledge and assessment in order to refine predictive assessments

Dissemination


- Process of distributing formatted intelligence products
- For users in decision-making and planning
- Follows “need to know/need to share” concepts
- Human rights and humanitarian law violations must be reported

MPKI Management Systems and Tools

Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism (MICM)

- Missions shall establish an MICM to direct and oversee the peacekeeping-intelligence cycle
- Include JMAC, JOC, relevant components and UNDSS, etc.
- Done by standalone body or JMAC
- Coordinated by Mission Chief of Staff

Coordination Mechanism



Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Support Plan (MISP)

- A peacekeeping-intelligence concept of operations
- Acceptable and unacceptable methods for use
- Specific considerations to be observed
- Information management tools
- Arrangement for information sharing

Mission Information Acquisition Plan (MIAP)

- Most important direction tool
- Catalyst for MPKI cycle
- Living document
- Changes per developing situations
- Communicated to acquisition assets
- Basis for execution orders

Take Away

- MPKI principles inform all activities of UN peacekeeping operations of the management of intelligence
- The MPKI cycle is the process by which MPKI is acquired, analyzed and disseminated based on clearly identified requirements
- MPKI management tools ensure effective intelligence support to military decision making and mandate implementation

Questions



Lesson 1.3

MPKI Structure & Roles

Content

- UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence (PKI) structures
- MPKI roles and responsibilities

Learning Outcomes

- Explain UN PKI structures, roles and responsibilities
- Explain UN MPKI structures, roles and responsibilities

UN PKI Structure

- Strategic Peacekeeping-Intelligence (SPKI)
- Operational Peacekeeping-Intelligence (OPKI)
- Tactical Peacekeeping-Intelligence (TPKI)

- Department of Peace Operations (DPO)
 - Current Military Operations Service (CMOS)
 - Assessment Team (AT)
 - Department of Safety and Security (DSS)
 - Threat and Risk Assessment Service (TRAS)
 - DPO and DPPA
 - Single Regional Structures (SRS)
 - Office of USG for Peace Operations
 - Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Team (PICT)
 - United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC)
-


OPKI Structure

- Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC)
- Joint Operations Centre (JOC)
- FHQ MPKI Cell (U2)
- Crime Peacekeeping-Intelligence Unit (CPKIU).
- Chief Security Advisor (CSA)
- Other Entities

OPKI Management Mechanisms

- Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism (MICM)
- Additional networks
- Key persons

MICM Organization



UN PKI Management Mechanisms

- Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism (MICM): JMAC, JOC, UNDSS, U2, UNPOL and other entities
- Additional networks: IOs, NGOs, Host State's intelligence structures
- Key persons: SRSG, DSRSG, HoMC (FC), HoPC (PC)

TPKI Structure

- Supports UN tactical-level commanders
- Feeds local PKI up the chain to inform operational & strategic PKI picture
- For MPKI, relates to G2 Sector and S2 Battalion levels
- Likely to be similar representation from police and other mission components


UN MPKI Structures, Roles And Responsibilities

- Establishes MPKI architecture
- Additional MPKI elements


Establishing MPKI Architecture

- Force HQ PKI Branch (U2)
- Sector HQ PKI Branch (G2)
- Battalion HQ PKI Section (S2)
- Company HQ PKI Support Team (COIST)

U2 Branch Structure



G2 Branch Structure



U2/G2 Branch Roles/Responsibilities

- Manages MPKI Cycle - direction, acquisition, analysis, dissemination
- Information acquisition activities are conducted to support mission / force IRs
- Appropriate acquisition assets are tasked to acquire relevant information
- Incoming information is collated on a central database, and available to relevant personnel

U2/G2 Branch Roles/Responsibilities

- Maintains source registry
- Produces timely, relevant, concise, predictive intelligence
- Identifies trends
- Ensure Peacekeeping-intelligence Estimate (PIE) are complete / current
- Supports operations with Short Peacekeeping-Intelligence Estimates (SPIE)

U2/G2 Branch Roles/Responsibilities

- Conducts AOE and actor analysis
- Ensure a gender and protection perspective in peacekeeping-intelligence products
- Timely Intelligence provided to higher / subordinate HQs
- Represents the military component at difference levels

Additional MPKI Elements

- Peacekeeping-Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (PKISR) Unit
- Military All-Source Information Cell (MASIC)

MPKI Support to Non-Mission Partners

- A SRSG decision to share MPKI with non-Mission partners
- Bound by UN information and peacekeeping-intelligence protocols

Take Away

- UN peacekeeping-intelligence structures, roles and responsibilities
- UN MPKI structures, roles and responsibilities

Questions

LEARNING ACTIVITY


Type: Small Group Discussion

Approx. Time: 30 minutes

Exercise:

Construct a S2 section and explain its roles and responsibilities.

Suggested S2 Structure





Lesson 1.4

Information Security

Content

- UN Security Policy
- Threats to information
- Classification and handling

Learning Objectives

- Explain the UN security procedures for information security
- Describe the aspects of UN information that threat actors seek to acquire
- Describe the sources exploited by threat actors to acquire information
- Explain key elements of UN policy on information sensitivity, classification and handling

Definitions

Security: Protection against intentional threats

Threat: A potential cause of harm initiated by deliberate actions.

Hazard: A potential cause of harm resulting from non-deliberate actions.




Security foundation

- Pre-requisite for successful UN operations
- Any security breach of official or protectively marked material or information
 - Undermines operational effectiveness
 - Potential risk to life
- All UN personnel responsible

Question: *What entity has primary responsibility for security of UN personnel and property?*

UN Security Policy

- MPKI staff must
 - Be aware of and conform with UN security policy
 - Understand security policies and SOPs
- If doubts, consult your local security officer



Information Security

Question: *At what stage of the intelligence cycle are information security threats likely to manifest?*



Threats to Information Security

Threat actors look to acquire information on aspects of UN activity:

- Future intentions
- Operational plans and activities
- Command, control, and communications
- Strengths and dispositions
- Locations
- Equipment and capabilities

Threats to Information Security

Threat actors exploit UN information:

- Surveillance and reconnaissance
- Radio and line communications
- Loose talk
- Civilians
- Insider threat



Classification & Handling

Information sensitivity, classification, handling

Classification Levels	
UNCLASSIFIED	Unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected not to cause damage to the work of the UN
CONFIDENTIAL	Unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the work of the UN
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL	Unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the work of the UN

Classification & Handling

Considerations when classifying:

- Received or sent to third parties
- Endanger safety or security of individual, or violate his or her rights
- Endanger security of Member States
- Prejudice conduct of operation or activity of UN
- Legal privilege / internal investigations
- Internal / draft documents

Classification and Handling

Information handling:

- Accounting and control
- Loss or compromise
- Downgrading of sensitive information
- Storage of sensitive documents and material
- Destruction of sensitive information or material
- Carriage and dispatch of sensitive information

Take Away

- Understand the threat
- Understand your role
- Security policies and manuals provide additional information

Questions



Lesson 2-1

Legal Framework for Peace Operations: General International Law (UNPKI)

Learning Objectives

- Apply key rules of international law relevant for peacekeeping intelligence
- Explain what are the host state authorities in line with international humanitarian and human rights law

Hierarchy of norms

UN Charter

Human Rights, IHL, Refugee Law

Security Council Mandate


Status of Forces/Mission
Agreement (SOFA/SOMA)

Memorandum of Understanding with
Troop & Police Contributors (MOU)

UN Peacekeeping Policies

Rules of Engagement (ROE) &
other mission specific rules

Peacekeeping under the UN Charter



- Prohibits force by states, except in self-defense or Security Council approval
- Basis for Chapter VI and VII missions
- UN supports international law / human rights

International Human Rights Law (IHRL)



- Protects dignity, freedom and equality
- Establishes obligations of states.
- Continues to apply during war & national emergencies
- UN must respect & protect human rights (regardless of mandate)

PKI "must be conducted with full respect for human rights, including in particular the rights to privacy, freedom of expression , peaceful assembly and association"
(UN PKI Policy)

Case Study 1 – Wiretap:

The host state police wants to wiretap a political dissident but fails to obtain the necessary judicial warrant. Instead, they ask the UN Mission's military intelligence branch (U2) to carry out the electronic monitoring and pass on relevant information (in exchange for information to keep the mission secure).



What are relevant legal obligations?

Human Rights Due Diligence Policy

UN Support to non-UN Security Forces

UN support to non-UN Forces cannot be provided:

- *Risk of entities committing **grave violations** of Int. humanitarian, human rights or refugee law*
- *relevant authorities fail to take necessary **corrective or mitigating measures***



Prevents legal liability for aiding violations,
promotes human rights & protects U.N.
credibility



- ✓ Applies to **all types of support** to states and regional organizations, including intelligence sharing (exceptions for human rights & mediation work)
- ✓ Supporting entity must initiate risk assessment & **monitor** compliance
- ✓ **Risk mitigation & engagement**, not blunt conditionality
- ✓ Suspension or withdrawal of support is **last resort**



Application of

HRDDP

Case Study 2 – Information Request:

The U2 requests the host state's national military intelligence agency to obtain certain information from armed group fighters detained by the agency. It is well known that the national military intelligence agency systematically uses violence to "break" its detainees and make them speak.

What are the relevant legal obligations?

International Humanitarian law (IHL)

- Applies to parties to armed conflict
- Military peacekeepers engaged in hostilities
- Regulates conduct of hostilities
- Restricts means of warfare
- Protects those who do not or no longer engaged in hostilities



Protected Persons under IHL



- Civilians not directly participating in hostilities
- Medical and religious personnel of armed forces
- Wounded, sick and others *hors combat*
- Prisoners of war & interned armed group fighters
- Peacekeepers (unless engaged in military hostilities)

Case Study 3 – Injured Fighter:

UN forces capture a badly injured armed group fighter. UN interrogators tell him that he will receive medical care once he discloses where his group placed improvised explosive devises (IEDs) that may harm the mission.



***What are the
legal
obligations?***

International Humanitarian Law: Conduct of Hostilities

- **Distinction** between civilians & combatants
- **Precaution** to minimize risks for civilians
- **Proportionality** to limit incidental harm to civilians



Case Study 4 – Allies:

The mission's joint intelligence cell shares aerial images of enemy positions in densely populated areas with a regional peace enforcement mission.

As was foreseeable, the regional force shells entire neighbourhoods without taking any measures to protect the civilian population.

**What are the
legal
Obligations?**

International Criminal Law

- **War crimes**

Grave breaches -Geneva Conventions / serious IHL violations

- **Crimes against humanity**

key feature: systematic or widespread inhumane acts

- **Genocide:**

Intent to destroy national, ethnic, racial, religious groups

- **State duty to prosecute**

- **International tribunals**
(e.g. International Criminal Court)



Sources of International Law

International Human Rights Law

- UN Charter
- Human rights treaties
- Universal Declaration of HRL

International Criminal Law

- Int. criminal court
- Customary Int. law

International Humanitarian Law

International armed conflict:

Geneva Conventions
Protocol I

Non-international armed conflict:

Art. 3 Geneva Conventions
Protocol II

International Refugee Law



- 1951 Refugee Convention:
 - Fear of **persecution** due to race, religion, political opinion
 - International protected status
 - Protected under UNHCR mandate
 - Refugee rights
- 1969 African Refugee Convention-
Refugees also persons fleeing **armed conflict**
- 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees-
Persons fleeing internal conflicts & generalized violence



Case Study 5 – Refugees:

JMAC obtains intelligence that the host government plans to force refugees to return to their home country where political oppression and armed conflict continues to persist. The JMAC chief wonders how that information is relevant.

Are there concerns here and appropriate cause for action?

Rights of Refugees

- Prohibition of expulsion or return if real risk (“*Refoulement*”)
- Prohibition of discrimination for race, religion or country
- Freedom to practice religion
- Right to acquire property
- Access to courts
- Public education
- Freedom of Movement



Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

- **Forced to flee** (due to war or natural disaster)
- Have **not crossed an international border**
- No special international status; Home state must protect
- Keep human rights & rights as citizens
- Protection reinforced by:
 - UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
 - AU Convention on Internal Displacement in Africa

Lesson 2.1 Take Aways

- PKI personnel must assess how their work impacts on human rights and IHL. Compliance with the HRDDP ensures that they do not become complicit to violations of international law
- Like other civilians, refugees and internally displaced persons are of concern to the mission and hence its PKI priorities

Questions?



Lesson 2-2

Legal Framework for Peace Operations- Mission Specific (UNPKI)

Learning Objectives

- Describe the legal framework and UN policies for UN Missions
- Explain essential privileges and immunities and the legal framework to ensure their accountability, good conduct and discipline
- Explain the importance of protecting sources

Security Council Mandate

- Security Council Resolution:
highest legal basis for the mission
- Outlines tasks
and responsibilities
- What the Security
Council expects
Mission to accomplish



Observer mandates requiring PKI

- Observe and verify violations of ceasefires, armistices, withdrawal agreements
- Monitor security and humanitarian situation
- Monitor disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes




Protection-orientated Mandates

Human Rights

Protection of Civilians

Child Protection

Conflict-related Sexual Violence



Protection mandates are a PKI priority

Host State Agreements (SOMA/SOFA)

- Legal doc signed by UN and host state
- Privileges and immunities for UN mission / personnel
- Example: freedom of movement, customs exemptions, visa requirements
- Supplemented by special agreements (example-handover of persons detained by mission)



Important Privileges & Immunities under SOMA/SOFA

- Functional immunity from arrest, detention, seizure
- Immunity from legal process for official actions & words
- Inviolability of papers and documents
- Correspondence by code, courier & sealed bags
- Wear military uniform & fly UN flag
- Unhindered entry & departure (international staff)
- Freedom of movement within the mission area

For United Nations interest; not personal benefit.
Can be waived by United Nations without prejudice

Case Study 6 – Leaked Documents:

The mission obtained secret government plans to violently cleanse an area of a minority ethnic group. To contain the leak, the host government:

- Prosecutes the JMAC national officer who obtained the plans from a government official
- Prohibits UN officials from leaving the country unless they agree to have their bags searched
- Jams the mission's code cable correspondence
- Declares the JMAC chief persona non grata

Is the mission legally protected against these steps?

United Nations Functional Immunity

- Troop contingents under jurisdiction of their state, they may not be arrested, prosecuted etc. by the host state
- UN civilians, UNMOs and all UNPOL have it for official acts:
 - Status of Forces Agreement/Status of Mission Agreement
 - 1946 Convention on the Privileges & Immunity of the United Nations
- Protects UN staff from intimidation and reprisals. Can be waived by Secretary-General in interest of UN
- Actual misconduct (e.g. sexual exploitation and abuse) is always subject to disciplinary & criminal action relevant personnel

Immunity never means impunity for U.N. peacekeepers

DPO-DOS PKI Policies and Guidelines

- Human Rights Due Diligence Policy
- Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy Guidelines on Acquisition of Intelligence
- Guidelines on the Exchange of Intelligence/Peacekeeping-Intelligence with Non-UN and Non-Mission UN Entities
- PKI, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Staff Handbook
- Military Peacekeeping Intelligence Handbook

Compliance with U.N. policy is mandatory for all peacekeepers

PKI legal limits, as established or reaffirmed by DPO Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy

- Full respect for human rights & international law
- No clandestine activities
- No exposure of sources to harm
- Independence of UN's peacekeeping intelligence
- Cooperation with states subject to conditions

Case Study 7 – armed group :

To obtain information on an armed group, the mission considers to:

- *Pool its PKI resources with host authorities in a joint intelligence cell*
- *Infiltrate UN language assistant as a recruit into the armed group*
- *Pay an armed group fighter for copies of the group's battle plans*
- *Recruit as informants children who the armed group employs as cooks*

What are relevant legal obligations?

Source protection- Intelligence Acquisition Plan

1. Who faces protection risks?

- Sources and persons suspected to be sources
- Family members; others close to sources
- Mission staff, national staff

2. What protection risks must be considered?

- Reprisals and intimidation
- Prosecution of sources
- Community stigmatization

3. How can protection risks be mitigated?

- Individual risk assessment before source contact
- No recruitment if risks too high
- Confidentiality of all contact with source
- If exposed: advocacy, relocation, physical protection, coping mechanisms

**A mission that
does not protect its
sources, will not
have sources**

Lesson 2.2 Take Aways

- Protection mandates rely on good PKI and must be made a PKI priority, as per UN policy
- PKI personnel enjoy privileges and immunities protecting them from any host state reprisals related to their official duties
- Protecting PKI sources from harm is a priority from a legal, policy, ethical & operational perspective. Protection must be ensured before sources are approached

Questions?



Module3

Military Peacekeeping- Intelligence Operational Framework

Module 3 Content

- MPKI Overview
- MPKI Direction
- MPKI Acquisition
- MPKI Analysis
- MPKI Dissemination
- Analysis of the Operating Area (AOE)
- Information Security



Lesson 3.0

MPKI Cycle & Intelligence Functions


Content

- Introduction
- The MPKI Cycle - Overview
- Direction
- Acquisition
- Analysis
- Dissemination

Learning Outcomes

- Explain the MPKI Cycle as a continuous process
- Explain which sub processes falls under each of the Intelligence Functions

The MPKI Cycle



- is the mechanism for producing MPKI
- is a continuous & perpetual process
- consists of four Intelligence Functions
- *owned by the peacekeeping intelligence staff*


Direction



- **DIRECTION**
- AQUISITION
- ANALYSIS
- DISSEMINATION

Direction

- Commander's guidance to Intelligence community
- Given formally in the form as CCIRs and PIRs
- Assures MPKI supports the mission objectives
- Helps focus acquisition efforts



Intelligence and Information Requirements are
NOT static, require you to *take*
ascertain direction, and to *give* direction

Acquisition




- DIRECTION
- **ACQUISITION**
- ANALYSIS
- DISSEMINATION

Acquisition

- Operationalized through the IAP
- Limited by capacity to collect (scarcity of acquisition assets)
- Requires an understanding of given Direction

Analysis




- DIRECTION
- AQUISITION
- **ANALYSIS**
- DISSEMINATION

Analysis

Analysis is the structured examination of all relevant information to develop knowledge, which helps to give meaning to events within an operational environment



Dissemination



- DIRECTION
- AQUISITION
- ANALYSIS
- **DISSEMINATION**

Dissemination

- Output from analysis is disseminated
- Timeliness vs. completeness
- Need to know/need to share
- Degrees of processing

Take Away

- The MPKI Cycle is the UN-recognized process
- Consists of the four Intelligence Functions
- Structured, systematic, cyclical and recognizable
- Predictable output (for dissemination)
- Need to know/need to share
- Supports and integrates with the MDMP

Questions



Lesson 3.1

Direction

Content

- Introduction
- Key Terms
- Getting direction
- Intelligence Acquisition Plan (IAP)
- Named Areas of Interest (NAI)
- Indicators
- Request for Information (RFI)

Learning Outcomes

- Demonstrate your understanding of Direction as a part of the UN MPKI Cycle
- Demonstrate your understanding of key terms within Direction
- Demonstrate ability to create an Information Acquisition Plan (IAP)
- Demonstrate ability to develop Named Areas of Interest
- Explain and develop Indicators

Key Terms

- Intelligence Dialogue (ID)
- Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)
- Specific Information Requirements (SIR)
- Essential Elements of Information (EEI)
- Information Acquisition Plan (IAP)
- Named Areas of Interest (NAI)
- Request for information (RFI)

Information Acquisition Plan(IAP)

Status	Priority	PIR	SIR	EEIs	INDICATORS	COLLECTING UNIT				NAI	NLT	LTIOV
						A Coy	B Coy	C Coy	Recon	UN Os		
		1. What is the main threat to the civilian population in the AOR?	IR 1.1: How are the tribes and clans in the AOR composed? MR IR 1.2: Who are the village head and village leaders in the region? MR		Leaders, offices, meeting places, places of worship, Building structures, dress code, greeting traditions, Police records, prisons, "shady activities", taxing/bribes	X	X	X	X	NAIs 11, 13, 15, 22, 24, 33, 35	12NOV 2017, 2400	14NOV 2017, 2400
					Guns, weapons caches, weapons smuggling, money flow, IDPs, smuggling	X	X	X	X	NAIs 22, 31, 33		
					Public statements, election campaigns, media, brochures, graffiti, meetings and rallies	X	X	X	X	NAIs 11, 22, 30		
			weapons are present? ME IR 1.5: How are neighboring regions affecting the situation in the region? MD IR 1.6: What is the political ambition of the political leaders in the AOR? MC									

Has it been fulfilled?

What information needs to be acquired

Priority

Where to acquire it

When is the information required

Who will acquire the information

PIR: Priority intelligence requirement
NLT: Not later than
NAI: Named area of Interest


IR: Information requirement
RFI: Request for information.
LTIOV: Latest time information of value

Priority: Mission Critical (MC)
Mission Essential (ME)
Mission Desirable (MD)

PIR: Priority PK-Intel Requirement
SIR: Specific PK-Intel Requirement
EEI: Essential Element of Information
NAI: Named Area of Interest
NLT: No Later Than
LTIOV: Last Time Information is Of Value

Direction

- Clear direction is the starting point
- Outlines requirements
- Ensure focus
- Enables prioritization



Direction: Overview

**What does
Leadership
want/need to know?**

**How can the MPKI cell
break down leadership's
broad information and
intelligence requirements**

**How do I manage
acquisition assets to
find the answers?**

**Direction from
Leadership**

**Direction translated
to PIRs, SIR, and EEs**

**Acquisition assets
tasked**


**Requirements are NOT static, require you to
take/ascertain direction, and to give
direction**

Step One: Defining the APIR/APII

Defining the APIR/APII

- **Area of Peacekeeping Intelligence Responsibility (APIR)**- area allocated to a commander, **responsible** for intelligence production
- **Area of Peacekeeping Intelligence Interest (APII)**- area in which a commander requires intelligence on those factors and developments **likely** to affect the **outcome** of his current or future operations

Defining the APIR/APII




Direction – Learning Activity 1


- Time 15 min.
- Individual task
- Define your Sector APIR
- Define your APII and justify
- Is information Acquisition mandated outside Force AOR? If not, how do you acquire Info
- Brief this, justifying your inclusions

Step Two: Ascertaining Direction

Direction: When?




What does
Leadership
want/need
to know?



Direction: PIRs - from who/what?



Mission or Task



Dialogue with Commander and Commander's Intent




Mandate



Your knowledge of the Operating Environment

Intelligence Dialogue


- U2/G2/S2 representative and Commander and any other necessary staff
- **Why is it important:**
 - To fully understand Commander's intent
 - To understand how your cell can be most useful
 - To generate 'buy in' to the intelligence process
 - To manage expectations
- **Questions to ask:**
 - What do you want or need to know
 - What are your information/intelligence priorities
 - When, where, and how do you need the reporting



Mission

UN Force deploys in three conflict affected areas (sectors **west**, **east**, and **north**) of Country A, for the duration of its mandate to ensure: **a safe and secure environment for all civilians** in its area of operations; to facilitate **the freedom of movement of humanitarian aid convoys**; to **monitor and report on violations of ceasefires**, and of **human rights violations**; where possible, to assist the government in the **re-establishment of state-authority**; and to ensure its own **Force Protection**.


Three column format: Process



Factor	Deduction	Output
Input factor or question	Analyses process (So What)	Output for staff
Example		
High temperatures and no rain-season	Drought, Famine and increasing flow of refugee	Focused questions (PIR's – RFI's) Effects on OE, population and UN Potential actions by UN Tasks for UN / UNCT Constraints for UN Risks for population and UN mission

Characteristics of PIRs

- PIRs are requirements raised by commanders to support a specific mission
- A series (maximum 8) in an IAP
- Always posed in a question
- Broad Intel Requirements are that directly relate to your mission or mandate:
 - Non-specific
 - Relates Force Protection, POC
 - Not subject to frequent change
 - Too general to be useful to sensors
 - Require further reduction



Framing a Good Question

- Types of questions

- Closed


- Leading

- Compounded

- Open



= Normal Question



= Leading Question

Direction Learning Activity 2

Approx. 45 minutes (Syndicate work)

Task:

- Use mission, mandate, tasks, and commander's intent, identify relevant factors for consideration
- Transfer two factors to three column format
- Make necessary deductions
- Create a list of IRs, group them thematically, and create two PIRs
- Transfer PIRs to your IAP

Step Three: Prioritize your PIRs

Prioritizing Intelligence Requirements

- Mission Critical (MC). A PIR critical to success of mission; will not succeed unless PIR is answered
- Mission Essential (ME). A PIR deemed essential to assist in mission success
- Mission Desirable (MD). A PIR / IR is important to know but not essential to the success of the mission

Learning Activity 3— Prioritize PIRs

Time: 15 minutes.

Task:

- Using the 7 PIRs given to you, decide which are Mission Critical, Essential and Desirable
- Be prepared to justify your responses in your back brief to the Instructor

Step Four: Specific Information Requirements / Essential Elements of Information


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SIRs and EEIs – Why?

- A PIR or IR is an **Intelligence** Requirement
- Intelligence is comprised of multiple sources of Information:
 - Specific **Information** Requirements
 - Essential Elements of **Information**
- PIRs are too broad
- Often your sensors will NOT understand:
 - What to look for
 - What kind of questions to ask
 - What to report
- Information Acquisition Plan to **ALL** units

Characteristics of SIRs/EEIs

- Always connected to a PIR
- Always posed in question form
- Increasingly specific questions:
 - Granular detail
 - Can relate to specific actors' geographical areas
 - Clear guidance to sensors



PIR 1: What threats to Civilians exist in the AOR?

SIR 1.1: What armed Groups operate in the AOR?

SIR 1.2: Does tension exist between civilian population groups in the AOR?

SIR 1.3: What diseases are prevalent in the AOR?


SIR 1.4: What other hazards occur in the AOR?

SIR 1.5: What is the capacity of the State to respond?

EEI 1.1.1 Which Armed Groups does the civilian population fear?

EE 1.1.2 What arms do these Armed Groups use?

EEI 1.1.3 Where and when do these Armed Groups operate?



Learning Activity 4 Establish Initial IAP

Time: 45 minutes

Task: Issue an IAP. Use the two PIRs, break them down to SIRs and EEIs

- Use the Three Column format
- Complete your syndicate IAP, and BPT brief on it

Take Away

- PIRs should never be given straight to units without being broken down to SIRs and EEIs
- Once a good IAP is constructed it is a living document and should change
- With each new mission there will be new intelligence and information gaps:
 - If time allows: SIRs, EEIs collected prior to the new mission
 - If not, add to the IAP or create a mission-specific IAP
 - Issue as IAP or as RFIs to Acquisition Assets
 - Monitor progress: Brief outgoing patrols, Debrief returning patrols, maintain pressure on acquisition assets/superior HQs etc

Questions



Lesson 3.2

MPKI Acquisition

Lesson Content

- Introduction
- The MPKI Cycle - Overview
- Direction
- Acquisition
- Analysis
- Dissemination

Learning Outcomes Lesson 1.3

- Explain the MPKI Cycle as a continuous process
- Explain which sub processes falls under each of the Intelligence Functions

Acquisition




- DIRECTION
- **AQUISITION**
- ANALYSIS
- DISSEMINATION

Acquisition – Basic skills

- *Clear objectives (Mission Leadership) can not be overstated.*
- *More and more technical Acquisition Assets, but*
- **Every soldier is a sensor**



What is Acquisition?



Acquisition



The roles

Acquisition Roles

- Acquisition
- Acquisition Management. (AM)
- Information Management. (IM)
- Areas of Intelligence
(Responsibility and Interest)



Acquisition



Exploit, coordinate task of IR

What is Acquisition Management?

Updated DTG:					Signed by			LEGEND	
U2 DIRECTION					Date:				
PIR	SIR	EEI	INDICATORS	LTIOV	AQUIRING UNITS	RFI	NAI	REMARKS	FORMAT
1. What are the threats to the local population?	1.1 What armed groups operate in the area?	1.1.1 Sign of armed group x presence?	Transmissions on frequency utilized by armed group x. Presence of signature equipment.						
	1.2 What is the attitude armed groups towards the population?	1.2.1 Has an armed group demonstrated intent?	Local population display fear/no fear for armed group x Statements (leaf letters) in area from group x						
WHAT I NEED TO KNOW?			OBSERVATION	PRIO	TASKING	WHERE TO ACQUIRE		HOW TO REPORT	

Example of an Information Acquisition plan

What is Acquisition Management?

MILITARY INFORMATION ACQUISITION PLAN				A Coy	B Coy	C Coy	Recce Coy	UNMO	ISR TF
PIR	SIR	EEI	PIR = Priority Information Requirements / SIR = Specific Information Requirements / EEI = Essential Elements of Information						
PIR 1	What are the threats to the local population?								
	1.1		What is the attitude of LP towards International forces (MINUSMA, BARKHANE, EUTM, JF G5Sahel)?						
	1.2		What is the attitude of LP towards GoM (MDSF + authorities)?						
	1.3		What is the impact of change to the social dynamics of the LP?						
	1.4		What is the impact of the ethnic/tribal dynamics on the security situation in MALI?						
	1.5		What is the status of Gov facilities/infrastructure and provided services to the LP?						
	1.6		What is the impact of IDP/refugees on the security situation?						
	1.7		In what way does the LP get information?						
PIR 2	Are the CAG compliant to the peace agreement?								
	2.1		Is there a significant change in CAG attitude/compliance towards Peace Agreement implementation?						
	2.2		What are the changes to CAG activity?						
	2.3		What are the internal dynamics of CAG's?						
	2.4		What is the attitude of CAG's towards LP?						
	2.5		What is the security threat to the MOC?						
PIR 3	In what way do TAG's pose a threat to MINUSMA, BARKHANE, EUTM, G5SAHEL, NGO's, IO & MDSF?								
	3.1		What activities and operations do TAG's conduct in our AO?						
	3.2		In what way do TAG's threaten the freedom of Movement of MINUSMA, GoM, NGO and IO in our AO?						
	3.3		What are the IDF capabilities of TAG's in our AO?						
	3.4		What are the IED capabilities of TAG's in our AO?						
	3.5		What are the SAF capabilities of TAG's in our AO?						
	3.6		What are the TAG capabilities to conduct complex attacks?						
	3.7		What is the air threat posed by TAG?						
	3.8		What is the attitude of the TAG towards LP?						
	3.9		What are the internal dynamics of TAG's?						
PIR 4	Which actors/factors can hamper the Freedom of Movement (FoM)?								
	4.1		Which significant incidents happened during patrolling?						
	4.2		What is the security situation in areas where force density is low (nonexistent)?						
	4.3		What is the ability of the population to move unharmed on main axis around and between key population centers?						
	4.4		What is the ability of NGO/UN civilian staff to perform their activities unharmed?						
	4.5		What is the security threat on airports?						
	4.6		What is the security situation on the main supply routes (MSR)?						
PIR 5	What is the impact of the NSAG on the peace process?								
	5.1		What are the changes to NSAG activity?						
	5.2		What are the internal dynamics of NSAG's?						
PIR 6	What are the links between population groups, AG, criminals, MDSF and government officials?								
	6.1		What are the links between AG and criminals?						
	6.2		What is the relationship between the local population and AG's?						
	6.3		What are the links between CAG and government officials?						
	6.4		What are the links between NSAG and other AG?						
	6.5		What are the links between NSAG and government officials?						
	6.6		What are the links between TAG and GoM officials?						
	6.7		What are the foreign linkages to TAG's?						

A full Intelligence Acquisition plan. Too BIG!

What is Acquisition Management?

DTG: XXXXXX MICM														Tasked
Acting Chief IRM/AM, ISR									Signatur: A.KARLSON					Planned
FHQ U2									DTG: 18 OCT 2019					Cancelled
														Dynamic re-tasking
AQUIRING UNITS														
PIR/IR	EEI	Indicator	NAI	Priority	Coy A	Coy B	Coy C	Recce	TASK START	LTIOV	Format	REMARKS		
1.1	What armed groups operate in the area?			ROUTINE					271330					
1.2	What is the attitude armed groups towards the population			ROUTINE					271330					
1.2.1	Has an armed group demonstrated intent?			PRIORITY					251330					
1.1.1	Sign of armed group x presence?			PRIORITY					231900					

Extract from an IAP. Prioritisation.

What is Acquisition Management

		FHQ U2 IAL to Forces				LEGEND		is no longer	IS ALREADY TASKED		
		REF: IAP 007	This IAL is dated: 14/05/2019		Pending		VALID / NEW TASK				
		REF: U2 MICM 13/05/2019	Annex to TaskO OP FLINT		FHQ U2 C IRMCM						
SERIAL	IAP REF	IR	INDICATORS & WARNINGS	Named Area of Interest	LTIOV	Tasked asset	Task starts DTG	Task ends DTG	Period of report for asset	COMMENTS	
1	PIR 1, IR 1.1, 1,2	How are the different ethnicities supporting / taking part in different organizations (TAGs and other AGs) in the AoO?	LPs have knowledge that there are foreigners or people from another geographical area now in neighbourhood area, who have been here since a few days/weeks/months.	NAI 028,029,030	DTG: xxxx	ISR COY	DTG: xxxx	DTG: xxxx	Daily		
2	PIR 1, IR 1.1, 1,2	Key leaders in AOO /villages, who are they: How susceptible are they to adhere to reconciliation processes?	Religious, wealthy individuals.	NAI 028,029,030	DTG: xxxx	CIMIC	DTG: xxxx	DTG: xxxx	Daily		
3	IR 1.4, SECT IR	What non-military threats affect the local population?	Weather impact, disease present. Signs of hunger or significant needs. Crop failure.	NAI 028,029,030	DTG: xxxx	ISR COY, UNIT BN	DTG: xxxx	DTG: xxxx	As obtained		
4	IR 1.5	Are the LP under the influence of AGs (optional of coercive), are LP forced to hamper International Forces by any means?	Population displays fear/ no fear in Area X. Dwells and Mosques are demolished in villages, destroyed cultivation. Closed clinics and medical centers, Government and regional administration centers closed, absence of justice providers. Level of availability of electricity, water, sabotaged network providers' facilities.	NAI 028,029,030	DTG: xxxx	MALE UAS, ISR COY	DTG: xxxx	DTG: xxxx	As obtained		
5	IR U2 Prod SIR 3.8	Where are schools affected with security issues?	No teaching, Schools closed teachers not present or not attending schools.	NAI 028,029,030	DTG: xxxx	MALE UAS	DTG: xxxx	DTG: xxxx	As obtained		

Best practise: Example of IAL (extracted from IAP)

What is Information Management?

	Daily INTSUM	Weekly INTSUM	Monthly INTSUM	CIMICREP	MRAT (FHT)	SUPINTREP/ INTREP	FLASREP/T HREAT WARNING	MISREP/ IMINTREP
A Coy	X	X	X	X	0	X	X	0
B Coy	X	0	0	0	0	X	X	0
C Coy	X	0	0	0	0	X	X	0
Recce Coy	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
UNMO	0	X	X	0	0	0	X	0
ISR TF xx	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
MALE UAS	0	0	0	0	0	0	X	X

What is Information Management?

Classification: UN CONFIDENTIAL		Priority: Immediate
Serial	UN MISSION TITLE RFI 001/00	
1	SUBJECT OF RFI	A general statement of the subject of the RFI
2	Date/Time Group Requested	The Date Time Group (DTG) of the request
3	DTG Required	The latest DTG after which the information will be of little value
4	STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENT	In as much detail as possible, clearly state the nature of the requirement
5	REMARKS	Any amplifying remarks that will assist in clarifying the request
6	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	Indicate the desired security classification
7	POINT OF CONTACT	Identify (by name and contact number) who is the originator / responsible for handling the RFI
METHOD OF TRANSMISSION: The format in which you want the RFI to be produced.		


FHQ U2 IAL to Forces							LEGEND		is no longer	IS ALREADY TASKED
REF: IAP 007			This IAL is dated: 14/05/2019			Pending				
REF: U2 MCM 13/05/2019			Annex to TaskIO OP FLINT			FHQ U2 C IRMCM	VALID / NEW TASK			
SERIAL	IAP REF	IR	INDICATORS & WARNINGS	Named Area of Interest	LTIOV	Tasked asset	Task starts DTG	Task ends DTG	Period of report for asset	COMMENTS
1	PIR 1, IR 1.1, 1.2	How are the different ethnicities supporting / taking part in different organizations (TAGs and other AGs) in the AoO?	LPs have knowledge that there are foreigners or people from another geographical area now in neighbourhood area, who have been here since a few days/weeks/months.	NAI 028,029,030	DTG: xxxx	ISR COY	DTG: xxxx	DTG: xxxx	Daily	
2	PIR 1, IR 1.1, 1.2	Key leaders in AOO/villages, who are they: How susceptible are they to adhere to reconciliation processes?	Religious, wealthy individuals.	NAI 028,029,030	DTG: xxxx	CMC	DTG: xxxx	DTG: xxxx	Daily	
3	IR 1.4, SECT IR	What non-military threats affect the local population?	Weather impact, disease present. Signs of hunger or significant needs. Crop failure.	NAI 028,029,030	DTG: xxxx	ISR COY, UNIT BN	DTG: xxxx	DTG: xxxx	As obtained	
4	IR 1.5	Are the LP under the influence of AGs (optional of coercive), are LP forced to hamper International Forces by any means?	Population displays fear/ no fear in Area X. Dwells and Mosques are demolished in villages, destroyed cultivation. Closed clinics and medical centers, Government and regional administration centers closed, absence of justice providers. Level of availability of electricity, water, sabotaged network providers' facilities.	NAI 028,029,030	DTG: xxxx	MALE UAS, ISR COY	DTG: xxxx	DTG: xxxx	As obtained	
5	IR U2 Prod SIR 3.8	Where are schools affected with security issues?	No teaching. Schools closed teachers not present or not attending schools.	NAI 028,029,030	DTG: xxxx	MALE UAS	DTG: xxxx	DTG: xxxx	As obtained	

What is Information Management?

MILITARY INFORMATION ACQUISITION PLAN						A Coy	B Coy	C Coy	Recce Coy	UNMO	ISR TF
PIR	SIR	EEI	PIR = Priority Information Requirements / SIR = Specific Information Requirements / EEI = Essential Elements of Information								
PIR 1			What are the threats to the local population?			46	0			139	
			1.1What armed groups operate in the area?			1	0		42	30	18
			1.2What is the attitude armed groups towards the population			12	2		0	8	29
			1.3What is the impact of change to the social dynamics of the LP?			11	3		4	11	30
			1.4What is the impact of the ethnic/tribal dynamics on the security situation in MALI?			25	28		6	9	55
			1.5What is the status of Gov facilities/infrastructure and provided services to the LP?			9	0		2	54	91
			1.6What is the impact of IDP/refugees on the security situation?			2	2		2	5	22
			1.7In what way does the LP get information?			0	2		2	13	28
PIR 2			Are the Compliant AG compliant to the peace agreement?			38	0			42	
			2.1Is there a significant change in CAG attitude/compliance towards Peace Agreement implementation?			1	9		1	3	21
			2.2What are the changes to CAG activity?			2	1		0	6	27
			2.3What are the internal dynamics of CAG's?			28	2		0	3	28
			2.4What is the attitude of CAG's towards LP?			4	3		0	3	16
PIR 3			In what way do TAG's pose a threat to th Mission, NGO's, IO?			79	0			58	
			3.1What activities and operations do TAG's conduct in our AO?			30	31		16	20	36
			3.2In what way do TAG's threaten the freedom of Movement of the Mission, GoM, NGO and IO in our AO?			40	2		16	7	6
			3.3What are the IED capabilities of TAG's in our AO?			8	1		0	0	0
			3.4What are the IED capabilities of TAG's in our AO?			19	7		7	14	0
			3.5What are the SAF capabilities of TAG's in our AO?			11	0		3	0	0
			3.6What are the TAG capabilities to conduct complex attacks?			14	5		0	0	3
			3.7What is the air threat posed by TAG?			5	0		0	0	0
			3.8What is the attitude of the TAG towards LP?			13	11		4	10	34
			3.9What are the internal dynamics of TAG's?			2	2		0	3	7
PIR 4			Which actors/factors can hamper the Freedom of Movement (FoM)?			32	0			43	
			4.1Which significant incidents happened during patrolling?			1	0		0	15	0
			4.2What is the security situation in areas where force density is low (nonexistent)?			2	5		0	8	13
			4.3What is the ability of the population to move unharmed on main axis around and between key population centers?			10	4		18	7	15
			4.4What is the ability of NGO/UN civilian staff to perform their activities unharmed?			1	4		3	6	5
			4.5What is the security threat on airports?			1	1		0	0	0
			4.6What is the security situation on the main supply routes (MSR)?			17	0		18	6	26
PIR 5			What is the impact of the NSAG on the peace process?			8	0			5	
			5.1What are the changes to NSAG activity?			4	8		0	1	3
			5.2What are the internal dynamics of NSAG's?			0	5		0	3	6
PIR 6			What are the links between population groups, AG, criminals, MOSF and government officials?			1	0			12	
			6.1What are the links between AG and criminals?			1	19		0	2	9
			6.2What is the relationship between the local population and AG's?			0	1		0	3	24
			6.3What are the links between CAG and government officials?			1	0		0	2	5
			6.4What are the links between NSAG and other AG?			2	0		0	0	2
			6.5What are the links between NSAG and government officials?			0	0		0	1	0
			6.6What are the links between TAG and GoM officials?			0	0		0	1	0
			6.7What are the foreign linkages to TAG's?			0	0		0	1	7

Monitor and deliver to requester

What is Areas of Intelligence?



IR (tasking) and/or RFI (asking)

Acquisition – Basic skills

- Clear objectives (Mission Leadership) can not be overstated.
- More and more technical Acquisition Assets, but
- **Every soldier is a sensor**






I don't know what I don't know
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I don't know what I know
I know what I know


Acquisition

Sources of information



Sources of information




Sources of information



Sources of information



Sources of information





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I know what I know

Acquisition Cycle

The way of an IR

Acquisition Cycle- Step One

What PIR is being addressed:


- **PIR 1: What are the threats to the local population**

REPORTING: (Datamining)

- **04 MAY 19** IDF ATK on Object A (NFDK). Highly likely by AG A;
- **10 APR 19** IDF ATK on National Sec.Force Camp, one (1) CIV WND. Highly likely by AG A;
- **02 MAR 19** ATK on LoC, one (1) AG KLD;
- **29 JAN 19** CPX ATK on LoC by AG, two (2) National Security Forces KIA, 10 WIA and one (1) AG KLD.


(NEW) INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS: (ana

- Current situation IVO Hills north of Object A
- Detailed information about Armed groups (AG) presence and strength.
- Presence and strength of AG along LoC.
- AG support by Local Population (enforced and voluntarily),
- Political affiliations of Local population,
- IED situation on roads (LoC)
- FoM on LoC
- Possible bypass roads (possible enemy assembly areas)



ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION (Based upon conducted AOE and Actor Analysis)

Acquisition Cycle- Step two



A Coy is to:


- Overwatch ...
- Monitor...
- Patrol ...

B Coy is to:

- Overwatch...
- Monitor....


Recce plt is to:

- Conduct
Surveillance
XX...



Acquisition Cycle; step three

Updated DTG:					Signed by		LEGEND		
U2 DIRECTION					Date:				
PIR	SIR	EEI	INDICATORS	LTIOV	ACQUIRING UNITS	RFI	NAI	REMARKS	FORMAT
1. What are the threats to the local population?	1.1 What armed groups operate in the area?	1.1.1 Sign of armed group x presence?	Transmissions on frequency utilized by armed group x. Presence of signature equipment.						
	1.2 What is the attitude armed groups towards the population?	1.2.1 Has an armed group demonstrated intent?	Local population display fear/no fear for armed group x Statements (leaf letters) in area from group x						



Acquisition Cycle

PIR	SIR	EEI	Acquiring Unit				NAI	NLT	LTIOV
			A Coy	B Coy	UAS	UN Ob			

+

A Coy is to:

- **Overwatch** ...
- **Monitor**...
- **Patrol** ...

B Coy is to:

- **Overwatch**...
- **Monitor**....

Recce plt is to:

- **Conduct**
Surveillance
xx...

Ops Off tasks with support with IAP from PKMI
branch

Acquisition Cycle

FRAGO REFERENCE

1. SITUATION

a. General

Acquired information suggests AK 74 weapons are being stored and sold in the vicinity of NAI 01.

b. Threat Assessment

The threat level in NAI 01 is assessed to be **LOW**.

2. MISSION

a. Own mission

To conduct patrolling and overt surveillance in NAI 01 to establish the presence of armed actors and weapon systems.

3. EXECUTION

a. Tasks

1. A Rifle Company, 1 Rifle Battalion

Conduct patrolling in NAI 01 with focus on the village of YYY (MGRS XXXX).
Patrolling is to be conducted from DTG XXXX to DTG XXXX.

2. 3 Recce Platoon

Conduct static overt surveillance against road Alfa and Bravo (MGRS XXXX)
Surveillance is to be conducted from DTG XXXX to DTG XXXX.

Information requirement: Collect and report according to Intelligence Acquisition LIST, Appendix ZZ

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

All units are to bring one (1) Day of supply (DOS).

5. COMMAND/SIGNAL

a. Command and Control

A Rifle Company is to co-ordinate all patrol and surveillance activity in NAI 11.

b. Report and returns

Written patrol reports are to be submitted to Bn/S2 NLT DTG XXXX
Patrol debrief will be conducted DTG XXXX.

Ops Off task, PKMI ask




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	I know what I don't know
	I don't know what I know
	I know what I know

Acquisition

Best practise; example from a mission

Acquisition Management

FHQ U2 IAL to Forces						
		REF: IAP XXX	This IAL is dated: 14/05/2019			Per
		REF: U2 MCM 13/05/2019	Annex to TaskO OP FLINT			FHQ U2
SERIAL	IAP REF	IR	INDICATORS & WARNINGS	Named Area of Interest	LTIOV	
1	PIR 1, IR 1.1, 1.2, EEI 1.1.1	Sign of armed group x presence?	Transmissions on frequency utilized by armed group x Presence of signature equipment LPs have knowledge that there are foreigners or people from another geographical area now in neighbourhood area, who have been here since a few days/weeks/months.	NAI 028,029,030		
2	G2 RFI xxx	Key leaders in AOO/Villages, who are they? How susceptible are they to adhere to reconciliation processes?	Religious, wealthy individuals.	NAI 028,029,030		
3	SIR 1.2	What is the attitude of armed group towards the population	Population displays fear/ no fear in Area X. Dwells and Mosques are demolished in villages, destroyed cultivation. Closed clinics and medical centers, Government and regional administration centers closed, absence of justice providers. Level of availability of electricity, water, sabotaged network providers' facilities.	NAI 030		
4	SIR 1.4, G2 RFI xxx	What non-military threats affect the local population?	Weather impact, disease present. Signs of hunger or significant needs. Crop failure.	NAI 028,029,030		



Best practice: Example from a mission

Management of IAP

Aquisition Management Plan		14-maj				15-maj				16-maj				17-maj				18-maj				19-maj				20-maj							
UNIT	ASSETS	0-6	6-12	6-18	18-24	0-6	6-12	6-18	18-24	0-6	6-12	6-18	18-24	0-6	6-12	6-18	18-24	0-6	6-12	6-18	18-24	0-6	6-12	6-18	18-24	0-6	6-12	6-18	18-24				
Civilian Contractor	HERMES 057P	CREW REST					OP FLINT				OP FLINT				Retask to Route Recce MCD xxx				OP FLINT				OP FLINT				CREW REST						
	HERMES 058P					UNSERVICEABLE				UNSERVICEABLE				RFI nr xxxx				RFI nr xxxx				RFI nr xxxx				RFI nr xxxx							
	HERMES 059P					RFI nr xxxx				IAL POL NAI 029				ENGINE CX				ENGINE CX				Retask RFI nr xxxx				Retask RFI nr xxxx							
LOA	HERON 613P					RFI nr xxxx				Retask RFI nr xxxx				NO FLY - But Alert				Pending						Retask to City A			Pending						
	HERON 614P			Force Protection OP TECKEL V NAI 028						CREW REST						Static overwatch TASSIGA NAI 028					OP FOLON 2 - AA POL				NO FLY - But Alert								
01 ISR TF	Recce Patrol		HOTO - FRAMEWORK OPS, IAL OP xxxx																														
01 ISR TF	FHT		HOTO - FRAMEWORK OPS, IAL OP xxxx																														
02 ISR TF	LRRP	COLLECTING IAL, Appendix to Annex D, FragO 001 FOLON 2																															
Sector A, xxBat	xx Coy					COLLECTING NAI xx, IAL still pending																											

Resource availability



Lesson 3.3a

Analysis Introduction, Collation and Evaluation

Lesson Content

**Analysis
Overview**


Collation

Evaluation

Learning Outcomes

- Explain the importance of Analysis
- Explain the importance of Collation and Evaluation
- Explain that collation systems are adaptable
- Explain how to evaluate information, include :
Reliability and Credibility

Analysis



Turn information into a finished product through process

Step One: Collation – Why?

- Information recorded in a common format
- No information lost
- Information sorted
- Information easy to retrieve
- Information accessible to all relevant personnel
- Information is secure



Collation - How

- Identify and register each piece of information
- Sort according to :
 - Date of information
 - Date received
 - Source (credibility and reliability)
 - Type of information
 - Subject of information
 - Link to PIRs, IRs if appropriate



- Standardization – develop and enforce a naming convention
- Translation

Microsoft Excel (fichier de l'activation du produit)

File Home Insertion Mise en page Formules Données Références Affichage

Celles Réviser à la ligne automatiquement Standard Mise en forme conditionnelle Mettre en forme des tableaux Styles de cellules Insérer Supprimer Formules Remplissage Tracer et Rechercher et filtrer

Police Alignement Nombre Styles Cellules Édition

E27

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
1	Date Received	Date of Information	Source	Evaluation	Subject	Type of Information	Classification	PR	Document						
2	01-jun-19	30-mai-19	A2	NAI 3	Armed Group	HUMINT	Confidential	PR1	AG_Mouvement.doc						
3	05-jun-19	02-jun-19	C2	Village X	Economic	HUMINT	Confidential	PR3	Local Economy.doc						
4	10-jun-19	09-jun-19	C3	Town Y	Social	HUMINT	Unclassified	Not Applicable	Social Change.doc						
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Monthly, Weekly, or daily worksheets

Acquisition agency worksheets

Specialized worksheets

Jun 2019

100%

Collaboration - Excel

File Home Insert Page Layout Formulas Data Review View Layout Connections Update Data Tell me what you want to do

Get Data From Files From Tables From Web From Other Sources Refresh All Queries & Connections Sort Filter Advanced Filter Test to Columns Flash Fill Remove Duplicates Data Validation

UPDATES AVAILABLE Updates for Office are ready to be installed, but first we need to close some apps. Update now

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
1	Date Received	Date of Information	Source	Evaluation	Location	Subject	Type of Information	Classification	PIR	Document	
2	01-Jun-18	30-May-18	ISR Coy	A3	NAI 3	Armed Groups	HUMINT	Confidential	PIR 1	AG_Movement.doc	
3	05-Jun-18	02-Jun-18	Jaskal	C2	Village X	Economic	HUMINT	Confidential	PIR 3	Local Economy.doc	
4	10-Jun-18	09-Jun-18	NGO Y	C5	Town Y	Social	HUMINT	Unclassified	Not Applicable	Social Change.doc	
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Monthly, weekly, or daily sheets

Agency Worksheets

Jun 2018 1st Br 2nd Br 3rd Br 4th Br

Collation Exercise

- In Class Exercise:
 - Time 10 Minutes
 - Decide what **headings** your syndicate would use for the collation of data
 - Be prepared to present your results



"PENTON, IS YOUR PLUMB SYSTEM BASED
ON THE CHAOS THEORY AND ENTROPY?"

Considerations

Information Technology:

- Continuous electrical supply
- Enough communication availability
- Available software
- Security classification and access control
- Memory usage
- Skilled operator/human resources
- Back Up/Recovery



Be pragmatic:

- Prioritize information
- Constantly reshape database and filter relevant information

Use recording and visual aids:

- Annotated Maps, ORBATs, XL or Word documents with hyperlinks to data files timelines, diagrams and matrices

Evaluation

WHY

- Assigns a value to incoming data
- Enhances accuracy of an assessment
- Gives confidence to the analyst
- Acts as a caveat

Evaluation - How

- Information is examined
- Regard to reliability of source
- Regard to credibility of content
- Acquisition normally evaluates
- Caveat – sources registered, higher HQs may assign different reliability
- Source registration limits circular reporting / better assessments
- Credibility – often not apparent to collector, usually a HQ role

Evaluation - rating

SOURCE RELIABILITY		
RATING	EVALUATION	OBSERVATION
A	Reliable	No doubt of authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency; has a history of complete reliability
B	Usually Reliable	Minor doubt about authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency; has a history of valid information most of the time
C	Fairly Reliable	Doubt of authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency but has provided valid information in the past
D	Not Usually Reliable	Significant doubt about authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency but has provided valid information in the past
E	Unreliable	Lacking in authenticity, trustworthiness, and competency; history of invalid information
F	Cannot Be Judged	No basis exists for evaluating the reliability of the source

The acquisition agency *usually* evaluates the reliability of the source:

- Caveat: Sources must be registered, and higher HQs may assign a different level of reliability.

Evaluation - rating

CREDIBILITY OF INFORMATION		
RATING	EVALUATION	OBSERVATION
1	Confirmed	Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; Consistent with other information on the subject
2	Probably True	Not confirmed; logical in itself; consistent with other information on the subject
3	Possibly True	Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; agrees with some other information on the subject
4	Doubtfully True	Not confirmed; possible but not logical; no other information on the subject
5	Improbable	Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicted by other information on the subject
6	Cannot Be Judged	No basis exists for evaluating the validity of the information

Evaluation - rating

SOURCE RELIABILITY

RATING	EVALUATION	OBSERVATION
A	Reliable	No doubt of authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency; has a history of complete reliability
B	Usually Reliable	Minor doubt about authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency; has a history of valid information most of the time
C	Fairly Reliable	Doubt of authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency but has provided valid information in the past
D	Not Usually Reliable	Significant doubt about authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency but has provided valid information in the past
E	Unreliable	Lacking in authenticity, trustworthiness, and competency; history of invalid information
F	Cannot Be Judged	No basis exists for evaluating the reliability of the source

A5

B2

CREDIBILITY OF INFORMATION

RATING	EVALUATION	OBSERVATION
1	Confirmed	Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; Consistent with other information on the subject
2	Probably True	Not confirmed; logical in itself; consistent with other information on the subject
3	Possibly True	Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; agrees with some other information on the subject
4	Doubtfully True	Not confirmed; possible but not logical; no other information on the subject
5	Improbable	Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicted by other information on the subject
6	Cannot Be Judged	No basis exists for evaluating the validity of the information

Take Away

- The primary objective of collation is to make sure that no information is lost, and all information is easy to retrieve
- All information needs to be recorded and sorted in a common format
- Always consider issues around IT, pragmatism and the use of recording and visual aids
- Evaluation is achieved through: Verification, Comparison and Rating
- To rate a piece of information, its credibility and source reliability is assessed

Questions

Learning activity

▪ Read the Collation and Evaluation Exercise sheet

- 07 Jul 18: A Garland Armed Forces (GAF) officer reports that the GAF, who UNMMIG has been reliable in the past, unit controlling the border crossing to the west of Gulu states that it has received reports of some 4x4 vehicles entering, 06 Jul 18 Garland along UN approved roads .
- 08 Jul 18: A source (**Grant**) about which there has been some doubt about authenticity reported to a Sector East Long-Range Reconnaissance HUMINT team that 'the price of weapons in the local markets at Otwal, Monla and Apala has doubled in the 07th Jul 18. The price of ammunition has also doubled'. Other local sources, and some International NGOs appear to confirm this report.

- Collate the reported information according to the table
- Use the evaluation tables for rating

Date of information	Date of acquisition	Source	Rating	Subject	Location

Learning activity possible answers

Serial number	Date of information	Date of acquisition	Source	Rating	Subject
1.1	06 Jul 18	07 Jul 18	A Garland Armed Forces (GAF) officer	A/2, A/3,A/4 Or B/2, B/3,B/4	4x4 vehicles entering Garland along un approved roads
1.2	07 Jul 18	08 Jul 18	Grant,	A/1, A/2 Or B/1, B/2 Or C/1, C/2,	the price of weapons and ammunition in the local markets has doubled



Lesson 3.3b

Introduction to Analysis and Integration


Content

- Introduction to Analysis and Integration
- Analysis Fundamentals
- Analysis Standards

Learning Outcomes

- Explain the definition of analysis and integration
- Explain analysis fundamentals
- Explain analysis standards

Analysis & Integration in the MPKI Cycle



- COLLATION
- EVALUATION
- **ANALYSIS & INTEGRATION**
- INTERPRETATION

Analysis Definition

- *Analysis is the structured examination of all relevant information to develop knowledge, which helps to give meaning to events within an operational environment.*

Reference: MPKI HB, p. 53

Analysis and Integration

- *Analysis and Integration is the methodical breaking down of information into its component parts; examination of each to find interrelationships; and application of reasoning to determine the meaning of the parts and the whole. The result should be a predictive peacekeeping-intelligence assessment that will enhance understanding.*

Analysis Fundamentals

- Aligned with commander's requirements and PKI processes
- Must accept a degree of ambiguity
- Timeliness is more important than perfection
- Must be auditable/replicable
- Deals with quantitative and qualitative information
- Multiple sources of data (avoid single sources)
- Objectivity

Analysis Standards

- Objective
- Timely
- Accurate
- Relevant
- Maximum sources
- Appropriate analytical tools
- Evaluated
- Clear
- Identify changes
- Gender perspectives

Take Away

- The ultimate purpose of analysis is to support the UN MDMP
- Support is achieved by analysing and integrating information in order to create an overall picture of what is likely to happen in the future
- Analysts need to be fully committed to providing the best possible analysis (given time and available information) to decision makers in a timely manner

Questions

Exercise

Tasks:

Explain the importance of:

- Timeliness

- Multiple sources (including different genders)

Answer the following question:

If an analyst discovers information that they previously missed, how do they demonstrate professional courage

Approx. Time: Discuss 10



Lesson 3.3c

3 Column Format

Content

- Introduction
- Factors
- Deductions
- Outcomes
- Learning Activity

Learning Outcomes

- Explain the 3 Column Format
- Describe factors
- Derive deductions
- Identify outcomes

3 Column Format Overview

What is Known

So What?

Next Steps?

Factor	Deduction	Output
Weather	The operation will be conducted during the wet season and river levels are likely to be higher than normal.	TASK (T) – Engineer Recce are to conduct reconnaissance of current crossing points to see if they are still usable.
Actor Equipment	The Threat Actor has no night vision capability	PLANNING GUIDANCE (PG) – Night operations are likely to provide UN forces an advantage.
Religious Affiliations	On current intelligence, it is uncertain as to what religious affiliation the village of WINFORNIA has.	INFORMATION REQUIREMENT (IR): What is the religious affiliation of WINFORNIA and how will it affect the UN forces there?
Bordering Forces	Host Nation security forces are operating to the East of our AIR. They operations are not understood.	REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI): What operations are being conducted by HNSF to the East of the AIR?
IDP camps	IDPs remain in the AO and are being used as cover by threat actors	CONSTRAINT (C): Operations against threat actors will have movement and increased ROE constraints due to likelihood of collateral damage.
Local Tribal Leaders	The local tribal leaders are known to be trustworthy and are supportive of UN presence.	FREEDOM (F): UN forces can engage with local tribal leaders during the mission and can seek advice without compromise.

Identifying Factors

Definition of Factor:

A circumstance, fact or influence that contributes to a result.

- Oxford English Dictionary

Identifying Factors Exercise

Tasks:

Identify a factor we should consider if our mission is to secure a refugee camp, and why:

- The rainfall in the region this year conforms to the average over the last 10 years
- Historically, rain falls in the area of the Refugee Camp in intense downpours during the late afternoon lasting up to 30 minutes, reducing visibility

Approx. Time: Consider 3 minutes, answer 2 minutes

Making Deductions

- Product of analysing a factor by asking “So what?” until a relevant output is reached
- A string of deductions link factors to outputs
- Analysts can be tempted to stop asking “So what?” too early, resulting in irrelevant or no outputs

Making Deductions

- Deductions may follow multiple lines, e.g.:

Factor: Rain falls heavily for up to 30 minutes in the afternoon, reducing visibility.

SO WHAT?



Deduction: UN static guards cannot observe boundary.



SO WHAT?

Deduction: Criminals may exploit rain to move in/out of camp.



SO WHAT?

Output: Task - Boundary patrols required when raining.

SO WHAT?



Deduction: Vehicle mounted aid workers may not see refugees during rain.

SO WHAT?



Deduction: High risk of refugees, especially children being run over during periods of rain.

SO WHAT?



Output: Task – Introduce driving ban inside camp during rain.

Making Deductions

- Deductions may follow multiple lines, e.g.:

Factor	Deduction	Output
Rain falls heavily for up to 30 minutes in the afternoon, reducing visibility	1.1 - UN static guards cannot observe boundary. 1.2 - Criminals may exploit rain to move in/out of camp.	TASK (T) – Task - Boundary patrols required when raining.
	2.1 - Vehicle mounted aid workers may not see refugees during rain. 2.2 - High risk of refugees, especially children being run over during periods of rain.	TASK (T) – Introduce driving ban inside camp during rain.

Making Deductions Exercise

Tasks:

If we consider the potential for heavy rainfall to also cause some flooding due to blocked drainage routes, what deductions might you make along that line of reasoning?

Time: Consider 3 minutes, answer 2 minutes

Producing Outputs

- You made all the deductions you can when you arrive at something you must do
- Outputs are tangible results of making deductions from factors
- More than one output may be produced from a factor
- Outputs come in multiple forms

Types of Outputs

- **Task.** Action needs to be taken
- **Planning Guidance.** Advice on to consider during planning
- **Information Requirement.** A requirement for internal answer
- **Request for Information.** A request to an external audience for an answer
- **Constraint.** A factor preventing freedom of action during a mission
- **Freedom.** A factor providing physical or conceptual room for action during a mission

Take Away

- The 3 Column Format is the cornerstone of PKI analysis, understand how to use it
- The keys to the 3 Column Format are:
 - Identify factors that are relevant to the mission and/or protection of civilians
 - Produce deductions by asking “So what?” repeatedly until you reach an output
 - Produce outputs that result in something that needs to be done

Questions



Lesson 3.3d

Other Analytical Tools and Interpretation

Content

- Introduction
- Analytical Tools
 - Timeline
 - Time Event Chart
 - Event Map
 - Association Matrix
 - Link Diagram
- Practice timeline tool

Learning Outcomes


- Explain a range of analytical tools
- Make deductions from analytical tools

Introduction

- Analytical tools assist us to see information from different perspectives
- There are different tools other than 3-column format
- Graphical tools help us absorb information quickly and give us briefing tools
- Two key categories of graphical tools:
 - Pattern analysis-Timeline, Time Event Chart, Event Mapping
 - Link analysis- Association Matrix, Link Diagram


Timeline

Timelines shows information in a sequential to reveal patterns by time



Timeline Exercise


Task: What assessments can you make from the timeline?



Approx. Time: 15-20min


Time Event Chart

Time Event Charts expands on a timeline and orders events to reveal more complex patterns





Time Event Chart

Pattern Analysis Plot Sheet displays events over time



UNIT and AREA: UN 1/AO PATTERN

MONTH and YEAR: JAN 1998



LEGEND

A: AMBUSH

B: BOMBING


M: MURDER

K: KIDNAP




Time Event Chart Exercise

Task: What quick assessments can you make from this Time Event Chart?



Event Map


Event Maps show patterns in event types and locations



Event Map Exercise

Task:


What quick assessments can you make from this Event Map?



Time: Consider 3 minutes, answer 2 minutes



Association Matrix

A simple Link Analysis tool that shows relationships between entities, equipment, places and/or events



Link Diagram


Displays linkages between entities, individuals, organizations, events



Additional Analytical Tools

- You have been exposed to a small number of possible tools
- Explore additional analytical tools:
 - mind-mapping
 - brainstorming
 - ACH, SWOT analysis
 - COG analysis
 - gender analysis

Analysis & Integration in the MPKI Cycle



- Collation
- Evaluation
- Analysis & integration
- **Interpretation**

Interpretation

COLLATE INFORMATION
(so we can find it)

EVALUATE INFORMATION
(so we know how reliable it is)

ANALYSE INFORMATION
(so we know what it means)

INTEGRATE ANALYSIS
(so we see the wider picture)


INTERPRET NEW ANALYSIS
(so we can give it the right weight)

Interpreting the new peacekeeping-intelligence in the context of what is already understood or assessed to refine predictive assessments

Take Away

- In addition to the 3 Column Analysis tool, Pattern Analysis and Link Analysis include analytical tools:
 - Timeline
 - Time Event Chart
 - Event Map
 - Association Matrix
 - Link Diagram
- Analysts should become conversant with a range of analytical tools in order to provide the best possible analysis to decision makers
- The final step in the Analysis Phase is to interpret new intelligence, relating it to previous assessments

Questions





Lesson 3.4a

Introduction to Dissemination

Lesson Content

Dissemination

Principles

Dissemination formats

Clarity


UN reporting format

Learning Objectives

- Explain why relevance and timeliness are crucial in the dissemination phase
- Explain how the MPKI products can be delivered in verbal, written or graphical means
- Explain how UN report formats are used to facilitate multinational interoperability

Dissemination

- Dissemination is the process of conveying peacekeeping-intelligence to mission decision-makers and other relevant mission personnel.
- Final phase of the PKI cycle
- To the right people, to enable decision-making and initiate further direction
- Timely and secure manner



How to Disseminate

- Follow UN and Mission rules and regulations
 - Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Support Plan
 - Guidelines, SOP
 - Intelligence Dialogue
- Production Plan
 - Regular and Ad hoc products, timings, formats and who has responsibility;
 - Release authority for different products
 - Preferred dissemination (when, how and to whom)

How to Disseminate


- Compliance with the "need to know/need to share" concepts
- Mandatory reporting requirements
 - human rights and humanitarian law violations including trafficking, combat-related sexual violence (CRSV) and crimes against children

How to Disseminate


- Information Management
- Responsibilities
 - Lead on dissemination of reporting
 - Ensure intelligence reporting are received and sent on time and in the correct format
 - Ensure that IT, documents and electronic media security protocols are complied with

Dissemination Principles

Placing of the results of the Analysis and Integration into the context of a prediction.




Dissemination Principles



Dissemination Principles

Need to know

Need to share



Dissemination Formats

Verbal

- Language
- Security Clearance
- Knowledge of the subject
- Time allocated
- Visual aids, IT

Written

- INTREP
- INTSUM

Graphical

- PICINTSUM
- Sketch maps
- Overlays

Clarity

- Separate facts from assessments
- Standard format
- Visual aids and graphics
- The fewest possible words

UN Reporting Formats

- Peacekeeping-Intelligence Reports (INTREP)
- Peacekeeping-Intelligence Summary (INTSUM)
- Thematic reports

Important contents

- **Executive Summary**

- Paragraph highlighting the main events
- Include assessments
- Continuous narrative or bullets points

- **Main Body Heading**

- DTG, location
- Classification
- Distribution
- Title

Important contents

- **Situation**

- Report briefly what happened
- Provide only relevant information
- Consider recipient background – provide additional information (footnotes, annex) if required
- Follow logic sequence of facts (time, location, actor)
- Relevant information - unevaluated / unconfirmed sources

- **Comment**

- Factual and provide context
- Relation to something happening or TTPs or can support
- Comment Ends

Important contents

- **Assessment**

- An evaluation of what has happened to explain why and whether it will occur again based on your analysis of the information you have.
- Deductive - What just happened and Why?
- Predictive - What will happen in the future?
- Include assessment of likelihood (uncertainty yardstick).
- Missing information
- **Assessment Ends**

Qualitative Statement	Associated Probability Range
Remote or highly unlikely	Less than 10%
Improbable or Unlikely	15 -20%
Realistic Possibility	25-50%
Probable or Likely	55-70%
Highly Probable or Highly Likely	75-85%
Almost Certain	More than 90%

Important contents

Outlook

- Predictive, including second and third order effects
- Can be broken down into three time periods
 - Short term
 - Medium term
 - Long term
- Vary depending if at the tactical, operational or strategic level

Example

WINFORNIA PoC pro-LEMON rallies.

Situation On 18 Apr 19, IDPs conducted a peaceful demonstration in the **WINFORNIA** POC site (**GR12345678**) to celebrate the release of John **LEMON** from house arrest.

S2 Comment. Considering the ethnic breakdown of the **WINFORNIA** PoC site (80% **RONDA** and 20% **TUTU**), the support for **LEMON** is unsurprising. These types of demonstrations are **consistent with the current trend** having been observed previously in both **JUBAR (GR14567890)** and **DUKA (GR16456457)** PoC sites. **Comment Ends.**

S2 Assessment. **LEMON** is **likely** to gain confidence from the demonstrations and will take advantage of his increased freedom of movement, both physically and politically, increasing his relevance amongst the IDPs. It is **highly likely** that such demonstrations will continue to occur over the **next 72-96 hours**, despite being discouraged by UNIGAR. It is **unlikely** that these demonstrations will become violent as the IDPs seek continued assistance from UNIGAR. **Assessment Ends.**

Learning Activity – Criticize INTREP

Classification: UN CONFIDENTIAL		Precedence: IMMEDIATE.
SUBJ:	UN INTSUM 001/01 FROM 23 1200A NOV 19 TO 24 1700A NOV 19	
1	HIGHLIGHTS	<p>On 22 Nov 2019 the UN CSO reports that there was overt surveillance of a UN base and some patrols in NICADIA;</p> <p>Reasonably ok source reported on 22 Nov 19 that the ENLF pays money for control of the BXP NE of DAFARI.</p> <p>On 23 Nov 2019 very reliable open sources report that three civilians, recently arrived to WALESI from NORTHLAND were very sick.</p> <p>On 24 Nov 2019, the EIMF is supposed to have launched an anti-UNMMIG media campaign.</p>
2	THREAT ACTORS	NSTR
3	FORCE PROTECTION	NSTR
4	OPPOSITION TO COHA	NSTR
5	MISCELLANEOUS	NSTR
6	POLITICAL	NSTR
7	UPCOMING EVENTS	Election campaing.
8	ASSESSMENT	<p>Overall, nothing has really changed in the AO. Sector East G2 considers that the reports about surveillance are alarmist as several recent patrols have reported that they are being photographed as they are a novelty in the area.</p> <p>SE G2 thinks that the ENLF probably does control the border, but we are not 100% certain. That said, it would seem to make sense as the ENLF does need money. Sector East G2 would therefore suggest that the report is probably at A1 level, possibly A2.</p> <p>The newspaper has excellent sources in WALESI and so we probably have three sick civilians from NORTHLAND. This might mean that there is an outbreak of sickness in NORTHLAND. Hospitals in WALESI are pretty good. Perhaps it would be timely to undertake a Quick Impact Project (QIP) to help.</p> <p>Sector East G2 cell has corroborated the anti-UNMIG campaign. Lots of twitter accounts 'liked' the story, some of which we geo-located to North and South Eri. Sector G2 therefore thinks that this is true. Realistically, we think this means that the Force needs to be very cognizant of potential threats while on patrols, possibly form armed elements.</p>
ORIGINATOR: U2/UN Mission XX. Releasing officer: RU Joking.		

Take Away

- Peacekeeping intelligence that is not disseminated to those that have a need to know has no value
- Peacekeeping intelligence indicating an assessed threat to life must be conveyed immediately
- Dissemination must ensure that Peacekeeping intelligence is delivered at the right time, in the relevant quantity and quality, to the right people

Questions



Lesson 3.4b

Dissemination-INTREP

Lesson Content


Overview

Learning activity

Learning Objectives

- Explain why the INTREP is sent without regard to a time schedule
- Describe the INTREP format
- Describe the INTREP content and how it helps portray information

INTREP Overview



INTREP Format

Classification: UN CONFIDENTIAL		Precedence: IMMEDIATE.
SUBJ:	INTREP 001/00 241200 C DEC 17	
1	DETAILS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Who• What• Where• When• Why/How• Own CoA or response
2	COMMENT	The Intelligence staff's deduction of the implications of the incident or event.
ORIGINATOR: U2/UN Mission XX. Releasing officer:		

Take Away

- The INTREP is a *non routine* report sent as required
- The INTREP is made to provide clarity on current incidents/events where the information can not wait for the INTSUM (next lesson)
- The INTREP should include the issuing intelligence staff's evaluation of significance and relevance of the information

Questions

- Learning activity -

- You have each been issued with an inject
- Take the information, run the intelligence cycle and write the comments and assessment of an INTREP.
- Time: 40 min at syndicate room
- Discussion: 15 min at plenary room



Lesson 3.4c

Dissemination-INTSUM

Lesson Content


Overview

Learning activity

Learning Objectives

- Explain that INTSUM is a periodic document driven by commander's PIRs
- Describe the INTSUM format
- Describe the content of an INTSUM

INTSUM – Overview -




INTSUM Format

Classification: UN CONFIDENTIAL		Precedence: IMMEDIATE.
SUB J	UN INTSUM 001/00 FROM 241200A DEC 17 TO 281200A DEC 17	
1	HIGHLIGHTS	
2	THREAT ACTORS	
3	FORCE PROTECTION	
4	OPPOSITION TO COHA	
5	MISCELLANEOUS	
6	POLITICAL	
7	UPCOMING EVENTS	
8	ASSESSMENT	
ORIGINATOR: U2/UN Mission XX. Releasing officer:		

INTSUM Example

1. Classification / Distribution
2. Reporting period
3. PICINTSUM/BLUF
4. Information
5. Assessment
6. Drafting /releasing authority



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The security situation throughout the UNMISS AOR is fragile. Active hotspots are Ben Leer/Mayendit, Northern Jonglei, Mundri/Maridi, Yei River State and Western Lakes State with armed clashes, target killings, criminal incidents and tension.

Dhorbor: On 18 Jan, UNMISS received the report that on 15 Jan, a team of SSLA soldiers were moving from Mayom to Bentiu for logistic and training activity were ambushed near Dhorbor. Two soldiers were allegedly killed. However, SPLA-iO(RM) denied their involvement in an ambush. FHQ U2 Comment: It is fifth ambush which was reported in last two months on Rubkona May road and the perpetrators of the ambushes could not be verified.

Duk Padiet: On 18 Jan, UNMISS received a report that on 17 Jan (evening), Taban Deng Gai First Vice President departed from Duk Padiet by an airplane and headed to Juba.

FHQ U2 Comment: It is likely that the main reasons for the change in the planned schedule are the poor road conditions, and security concerns.

Kapoeta East: On 18 Jan, UNMISS met with the State Minister of Finance who informed that

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presence of armed opposition groups near Lotimor payam, Kapoeta East County, close to the Ethiopian border. The armed groups are allegedly part of Cirillo's group, and some members of the SPLA-iO(RM) are still present in the area as well.

FHQ U2 Comment: There have been several reports about the presence in Kapoeta East of armed groups that are part of – or aligned with – Thomas Cirillo's "National Salvation Front". Those groups are "South Sudan Movement for Change" and "South Sudan Democratic Movement".

Wadelelo: On 17 Jan, UNMISS conducted an integrated patrol to Wadelelo, a village in Kwajena county, about 36 kilometers Southeast of Wau town in order to follow up on a report about the alleged SPLA-iO(RM) recruitment of child soldiers. The team met with about 80-armed soldiers and later briefly met with about 2,000 civilians whose chief and commissioner requested food and medicine for their people. HRD observed 5 children in military attire holding guns. According to the deputy commander of SPLA-iO(RM) in the area, they have about 1,500 children recruited, and he described them as the best fighters for their mission.

FHQ U2 Comment: This was first patrol in the village since January 2017. Recruitment of underage fighters have been increasingly reported over the last six months. The recruitment has reportedly been conducted by SPLA-iO(RM) and SPLA-iO(TD) in several locations around the country.

1. ASSESSMENT FOR THE NEXT WEEK

North: In Upper Nile, the security situation is tense and fragile in the areas of Kaka, Nasser, Maiwut and Pagak. It is likely that the SPLA-iO(RM) has the intent to take the areas of Kaka, however it is not likely that SPLA-iO(RM) has the capacity to hold the area if SPLA decides to re-take it. It is assessed as likely that SPLA or/and SPLA-iO(TD) will launch offensive operations against SPLA-iO(RM) to gain control of Maiwut and Pagak area in the short- to medium term, whereas SPLA-iO(RM) will likely continue to attempt to dislodge SPLA from their positions. SPLA-iO(RM) will continue to maintain their stronghold of Tonga in order to protect its vital logistic supply route between Tonga - Wunkur - Tungar -

- Kadugli to sustain its forces in Northern Jonglei, New Fangak, Mayendit and county. It is likely that SPLA or/and SPLA-iO(TD) will launch offensive operations against SPLA in short to medium term. Indicators will be presence of commanders, troops, re-supply, re-inforcement and artillery in the area of Kaldak, Adar and Ow

In Unity, the security situation has grown more tense and fragile in the northern part due to the attacks by SPLA-iO(RM) troops on SPLA positions over the last 10 days. It is highly likely that the small scale clashes will continue in this area in the short-term. In southern Unity State, it is assessed as possible that SPLA has the intent to take Adok port and Panyijar, which are two of the few remaining SPLA-iO(RM) strongholds. The security situation in Kochi, Bieh, Leer and Mayendit remains fragile due to the presence of SPLA and affiliated Militias. Security situation in POC sites is deteriorating, especially in Bentiu where an increasing number of security related incidents are reported.

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4. INFORMATION GRADING

Probability	Probability range	Synonyms
Highly likely	> 90%	Highly probable. We are convinced. Virtually certain. Almost certain. High confidence. High likelihood.
Likely	60-90%	Probable. We estimate. Chances are good. High-moderate confidence. Greater than 60% likelihood.
Possible	40-60%	Even chance. Chances are slightly greater (or less) than even. Moderate confidence.
Unlikely	10-40%	Probably not. Not likely. Improbable. Low confidence. Possible but not likely.
Highly unlikely	< 10%	Highly improbable. Nearly impossible. Only a slight chance. Highly doubtful.

Drafted by:
Major Otgonbayar TSOLMON
Analyst U2
UNMISS FHQ

Reviewed by:
Major Lars THORESEN
Deputy Chief U2
UNMISS FHQ

Released by:
LtCol Volker THOMAS
Chief U2
UNMISS FHQ

6

Take Away

- INTSUM is a periodic summary of peace keeping intelligence on the current situation within a commander's APIR
- In addition to the updated situation, peace keeping INTSUMs shall contain updated assessments

Questions

INTSUM- Learning Activity

- Assume the role of a U2-section at Sector HQ
- Using the four INTREPs from the previous lesson and template
- Each syndicate is to produce an INTSUM
- Focus on assuring all paragraphs in the format is covered in the product
- Approx. Time: 40 minutes



Lesson 3.4d

Dissemination-

PICINTSUM

Lesson Content


Overview

Learning activity

Learning Objectives

- Explain why PICINTSUM is a graphic document driven by commander's PIRs
- Describe the PICINTSUM format
- Describe the content of a PICINTSUM and how it conveys information

INTREP – Overview



PICINTSUM- Format

The PICINTSUM should include :

- Map
- Reported intelligence related to the map
- Assessment

Increased tension in the AOR last 48 hours



Reported incidents – activities:

1. Organisation Y able to mobilize up to 5000 fighters
2. Training camp for Terrorist Armed Group Y
3. MANPADS observed
4. Displaced Persons moving North East

Assessment:

- Armed groups **HIGHLY LIKELY** able to conduct sustained guerrilla warfare and effective information operations in the region for the next three weeks.
- Use of MANPADS against friendly air assets is **HIGHLY LIKELY**

Take Away

- PICINTSUM is a graphic summary of peace keeping intelligence on the current situation within a commander's APIR
- Peace keeping PICINTSUM contains a map, reported incidents and activities and assessments

Questions

Learning activity

- Using the same INTREPS used to create the INTSUM in the previous lecture, create a PICINTSUM
- Produce a Power Point slide containing the elements to be found in the format



Lesson 3.5a

Introduction to Analysis of the Operating Environment (AOE)

Series of AOE Lessons

- Lesson 3.5a Introduction
- Lesson 3.5b Analysis of Physical Terrain (PT)
- Combining PT factors
- Lesson 3.5d Analysis of Human Terrain
- Lesson 3.5e Analysis of Information Terrain
- Lesson 3.5f ASCOPE – PMESII
- Lesson 3.5g Actor Evaluation
- Lesson 3.5h Situation Integration & COA Development
- Lesson 3.5i Short SPIE and situation paragraph
- Lesson 3.5j UN MPKI support to UN MDMP

Content and Learning Outcomes

- Content: AOE Introduction, Analysis of the Operation Environment, AOE phases
- Describe the requisite tools and knowledge to analyze the operating environment
- Explain the application of AOE in support of the UN Military Decision-Making Process

Analysis of the Operation Environment (AOE)






Figure 13: The 3 Phases of AOE

Operating Environment Evaluation (OOE) Phase 1

- Physical terrain
- Information terrain
- Human terrain



Actor Evaluation (AE) Phase 2




- All relevant actors
- Emphases of threat groups




ASCOPE - PMESII

	P Political	M Military	E Economic	S Social	I Infrastructure	I Information
A Areas	District Boundary, Party affiliation areas	Coalition/ANSF bases, historic ambush/IED sites	Bazaar areas, livestock dealers, auto repair shops	Traditional picnic areas, bazaars, outdoor shura sites	Irrigation networks, water tables, areas with medical services	Radio/TV/paper coverage areas, word of mouth gathering points
S Structures	Provincial / District centers, Shura halls, Polling sites	Provincial / District police HQ, INS Known leader house/business	Bazaar, Wheat storage, Banks	Mosque, Wedding halls, Popular restaurants	Roads, bridges, Electric lines, Gabion walls, dams	Cell, radio, TV Towers, Print shops
C Capabilities	Dispute resolution, Local leadership, INS ability to have impact	ANSF provides 24/7 security? QRF present? INS strength / weapons	Access to banks, Ability to stand drought? Development	Strength of tribal/village traditional structures, Mullahs	Ability to build / maintain roads, walls; check dams, irrigation systems	Literacy rate, availability of electronic media, Phone service
O Organization	Political parties, INS group affiliation, Gov & NGO org.	Coalition/ANSF present, INS groups present	Banks, large landholders, Merchants, money lenders	Tribes, class, families, sport, shuras, youth shuras	Government ministries, Construction companies	News organizations, influential mosques, INS IO groups
P People	Governors, councils, elder mullahs, parliamentarians	Coalition, ANSF, INS military leaders	Bankers, landholders, merchants, money lenders	Mullahs, Maliks, elders, Shura members, Influential families	Builders, road contractors, local development councils	Media owners, mullahs, maliks, elders, heads of families
E Events	Elections, Shuras, Jirgas, Provincial council meetings, speeches	Kinetic events, unit RIPs, loss of leadership, operations	Drought, harvest, business openings, loss of business, good/bad crop	Friday prayers, holidays, weddings, deaths, births, bazaar days	Road/bridge construction, well digging, center/school construction	Friday prayers, publishing dates, IO campaigns, project openings CIVCAS incidents


Situation Integration (SI)- Phase 3



Fusing the OEE and AE results




SI- COA Development- Phase 3



Situation Overlay

**Most Dangerous and Most Likely
Courses of Action**



Event Overlay

Lesson Take Away

- AOE is essential to the UN Military Decision-Making Process
- AOE is specifically adapted to UN Peacekeeping Operations
- AOE consists of three phases:
 - Phase 1: OEE
 - Phase 2: AE
 - Phase 3: SI and COA Development

Questions

Learning Activity

Discussion of UN MPKI AOE process

Instructions:

- Explain the purpose of the AOE process.
 - Explain why the UN has developed the AOE process.
 - Name and briefly describe the three phases of the AOE process.
- Prepare to present your answers verbally in class

Time: Approx. 10-15 minutes

Group work and Discussion in plenary



Lesson 3.5b

Analysis of the Operating Environment (AOE)

Operating Environment Evaluation;
Analysis of the Physical Terrain (PT)



Content

- APIR and APII
- Mapping
- Terrain features and key facilities
- LLOCs, WLOCs, relief and vegetation



Learning Outcomes

- Explain Area of Peacekeeping Intelligence Responsibility (APIR)
- Explain Area of Peacekeeping Intelligence Interest (APII)
- Using a map conduct an analysis of PT, including identifying terrain features and key facilities
- Identify key LLOCs, WLOCs, relief and vegetation



Relevance

- Movement is constrained and restrained by physical terrain (PT)
- Physical terrain is affected by climate and weather
- Human, information domains exist in physical terrain
- COAs can exploit the opportunities that Physical Terrain provides
- Terrain affects the COAs available to actors that pose as a threat to the UN mandate



Activity

Importance of Physical Terrain in military operations

Instructions:


- Discuss what is meant by the "Physical Terrain" (PT)
- Discuss how the Physical Terrain is affected by climate and weather and its impact on the conduct of military operations.
- Illustrate by using examples from military history or your own experiences where a good analysis of the Physical Terrain resulted in the success of a mission and/or where a poor analysis of the Physical Terrain seriously hampered or even prevented the accomplishment of a mission

Approximate Time: 15-20 minutes



Where is Analysis of Physical Terrain in the AOE process?

- Analysis and conclusions of PT, plus conclusions on Climate & Weather
- Analysis and conclusions on Human Terrain (HT)
- Analysis and conclusions on Information Terrain (IT)





Physical Terrain is one of 3 interconnected layers in OEE



Physical Terrain (FT)
incl. Climate, weather, flora and fauna.
(Natural and man-made – infrastructures)



Human Terrain (HT)
(Actors and groups)



Information Terrain (IT)
(Factors and relations)



AOE

Analyses of the Operating Environment

Human factor orientated

Threat and opportunities are integrated

Phase 1

OEE

Operating Environment
Evaluation

Physical terrain
b. Human terrain
c. Information terrain

Phase 2

AE

Actor Evaluation

Emphasis on influencing
/ threatening actors
and opportunities

Phase 3

SI

Situation Integration

Emphasis on interactions (systems) on the ground
between **factor developments** and **actor behavior**
presented in integrated narrative scenario's and ACOA's

Three 'terrains' are interrelated




Physical Terrain

- **Living space** for actors:
 - Live on land and off
 - Influenced by where, when they can live move and work
 - How they use it
- **Focus** on Area of Peacekeeping-Intelligence Responsibility (APIR)
- And wider Area of Peacekeeping-Intelligence Interest (APII)
- Helps visualization of OE



APIR. area given to UN Forces; has responsibility for the production and provision of peacekeeping-intelligence / understanding

APIR and APII





Learning Activity

How to analyze and evaluate the Physical Terrain (**PT**):

- **Situation:**
 - Use the scenario to identify APIR and APII
- **Task:**
 - Define the Area of Peacekeeping Intelligence Responsibility (APIR) and the Area of Peacekeeping Intelligence Interest (APII)
- **Time:** Approx. 10 min -group work and discussion



Terrain Features

- Physical Terrain consists of two distinct terrain features:
 - Natural
 - Manmade



Learning Activity

- **Situation:**

- Use the scenario to identify terrain features

- **Task:**

Use mapping and other assets to:


- Identify physical terrain features (Natural and man-made)
- Mark on map

Key Question: How will this affect the actions of the human terrain?

- **Approx. Time: 10 Min**



Example of a map showing key facilities





Learning Activity

Example of 3CF analysis of key facilities in Sector EAST

FACTOR	DEDUCTION	OUTPUT
Physical terrain:	1.1 LL EAST – WEST	1.1 IR
1. LLOC in SCT EAST	1.1.1 Main LL is critical for both UN / UNHCR / LP / AG	- What is the condition of the road?
2. Entrances to SCT EAST	2.1 Main entrance from ERIYA to GARIYA	- What is the type of surface
3. Airfields in SCT EAST	2.1.1 LLOC through mountains	2.1 IR
4. Relief in SCT EAST	2.1.2 LLOC go's through tunnel	- What are the characteristics of the tunnel surroundings
5. Bridges in SCT EAST	2.1.3 Tunnel is key entrance	5.1 IR
	3.1 1x Airfield in SCT EAST	- Condition of the bridges
	4.1 Strong relief EAST of SCT EAST	- Classification of the bridges
	5.1 Bridges in SCT EAST	RFI
	5.1.1 3x bridges are critical for entrance from ERIYA	



Learning Activity

Key Facilities

- **Situation:**
 - Use the scenario to identify all key facilities in your AIR
- **Task:**
 - Study your sector map and identify key facilities
 - Mark on Map with a clear legend
 - Insert factors into the 3-column format (3CF) and make deductions
 - Draw up a list of IRs
- **Time:** Approx. 20 minutes (group work and discussion)

FACTOR	DEDUCTION	OUTPUT
Bridges	Are bridge classifications sufficient for UN convoys?	RFI
Dam at X		
Electric power plant at Y		



Types of Terrain Analysis and Overlays to Complete



Use of mapping

- Accurate up-to-date mapping is essential
- Digital and analogue
- Map scale: 1:50,000 or 1:100,000 for OE
- Details and clarity important
- Close-up imagery for conducting small-unit operations
- Use separate overlays or digital overlay layers
 - Don't reproduce map, highlight objects, elements for making conclusions
- One overlay per specific topic/factor to focus information and to combine single overlays as needed



Overlay Symbols

	Key Terrain
	Restricted Terrain
	Severely Restricted Terrain
	Built/up Areas
	Rivers & Lakes
	Land Lines of Communications (LLC)
	Rail road
	No go waterway
	Slow go waterway*
	Bridge
	No go waterway**
* Outside Rainy season	
** Already in Slow- or No go area	



Terrain Overlays


The different Terrain Overlays that allow us to conduct the analysis of military aspects of the terrain are:

- Land Lines of Communication (LLOC)
- Water Lines of Communication (WLOC)
- Relief
- Vegetation



Land Lines of Communication (LLOCs)

-  Key Terrain
-  Restricted Terrain
-  Severely Restricted Terrain
-  Built/up Areas
-  Rivers & Lakes
-  Land Lines of Communications (LLC)
-  Rail road
-  No go waterway
-  Slow go waterway*
-  Bridge
-  No go waterway**
- * Outside Rainy season
- ** Already in Slow- or No go area





Water Lines of Communications(WLOCs)



Key Terrain



Restricted Terrain



Severely Restricted Terrain



Built/up Areas



Rivers & Lakes



Land Lines of Communications (LLC)



Rail road



No go waterway



Slow go waterway*




Bridge



No go waterway**


* **Outside** Rainy season

** Already in Slow- or No go area





Relief





Vegetation

LEGEND




Lake




Jungle / Rainforest / woodlands



Grassland type Savannah




Savannah




Desert




Stone Desert



Mountainous area

 **UNIGAR** – GARYA main map (PKMI pilot course 2019-1)





Learning Activity

- **Situation:**
 - Use the scenario identify LLOCs, WLOCs, Relief, Vegetation in the AIR
- **Task:**
 - Study sector map; identify key LLOCs, WLOCs, Relief and Vegetation
 - Mark on Map with a clear legend
 - Insert factors into the 3-column format (3CF) and make deductions
 - Draw up a list of Information Requirements
- **Time:** 30 minutes (group and discussion)

FACTOR	DEDUCTION	OUTPUT
MSR from Town A to B	Threat Actor A needs to control for supplies. May challenge UN FOM UN need to control MSR. Local population requires security in this area.	RFI. Where are vulnerable areas for UN convoys



Take Away

- Understand Area of Peacekeeping Intelligence Responsibility (APIR) and term Area of Peacekeeping Intelligence Interest (APII)
- Be able to conduct a simple analysis of the PT of an area of operations
- Identify terrain features and key facilities
- Identify key LLOCs, WLOCs, relief and vegetation
- Integrate your analysis into the broader AOE/MPKI products



Questions



Lesson 3.5c

Combining Physical Terrain (PT) Factors



Lesson 3.5c Content

- Military Aspects of the Terrain
 - Map Overlays
- Military Aspects of the Weather
 - Weather Effects Matrix



Learning Outcomes

- Conduct an analysis of Physical Terrain, by identifying the military aspects of the terrain
- Classify terrain areas according to the mobility afforded, i.e. “unrestricted”, “restricted”, “severely restricted”
- Produce a Combined Obstacle Overlay and an Avenue of Approach Overlay
- Assess the impact of climate / weather on PT as exemplified by a Weather Effects Matrix




Military aspects of the terrain

- Why do we need to determine the Military Aspects of the terrain?
 - To determine its effects on Military Operations
- What are the Military Aspects of the Terrain?
 - Observation & Fields of Fire
 - Cover & Concealment
 - Obstacles
 - Key Terrain
 - Vital Terrain
 - Avenues of Approach
- Consider all of these factors when analysing terrain, but always focus on the ones of most relevance to the specific situation at hand.




Observation & Fields of Fire



- Observation applies to what can be seen / needed to gain information about actors
- Fields of Fire applies to what can be hit



Cover and Concealment Overlay



- Cover is the protection from direct and indirect fires
- Concealment is protection from observation



Obstacles

Obstacles: natural or man-made obstruction to disrupt, fix, turn, canalize or block movement





Terrain Mobility Classifications





Key terrain

Key terrain gives an advantage to forces or opposing groups



Key Terrain: 



Vital ground

- Ground of importance
- Retained or controlled for mission success




Vital ground:





Combined Obstacle Overlay



- The COO integrates the evaluations of the various factors into a single product that depicts the effects of the environment on mobility




Learning Activity

- **Situation:**
 - Using the course scenario create a combined obstacle overlay in your AIR.
- **Task:**
 - Study the map and completed overlays and create:
 - Obstacle overlay
 - Key Terrain and Vital Ground overlay
 - Insert factors into the 3-column format (3CF) and make deductions
 - Draw up a list of Information Requirements
- **Time:** 30 minutes (group work and discussion)

FACTOR	DEDUCTION	OUTPUT
Border crossing at Point X is Key Terrain	Threat Actor A needs to be able to pass through BXP to reach consolidation area. UN needs to control/surveil BXP. Local population Traders will need BXP open to meet market expectations.	RFI. Who controls BXP X?



Mobility Corridor Overlay





Learning Activity

- **Situation:**
 - You are still analyzing the terrain and are about to finalize and disseminate the products.
- **Task:**
 - Study the map and create the AAO and the MCOO
 - Insert factors into the 3-column format (3CF) and make deductions
 - Draw up a list of Information Requirements
- **Time:** 30 minutes (group work and discussion)

FACTOR	DEDUCTION	OUTPUT
Good LLOC moving from east to west, surrounded by plains.	Threat Actor A requires cover and concealment to move and may choose a different AoA. Threat actor B needs to space to move armour and so will likely choose this AoA.	IR. What terrain areas will confirm or deny threat actor COA?



Remember

You are not alone:

- Terrain Analysis a total UN staff effort

Get support:

- Engineer staff (G-3)
- GIS cells (both military and civilian)

Use mnemonics:

- OCOKA- **O**bservation & fields of fire, **C**over and concealment, **O**bstacles (manmade / natural), **K**ey terrain, **A**venues of approach

Why and for whom?

- To understand the terrain and its effects on our operations
- For the staff, not just for the intelligence branch





Weather and Climate

Date:	Sat 17 Aug 2019	Sun 18 Aug 2019	Mon 19 Aug 2019	Tue 20 Aug 2019	Wed 21 Aug 2019
Weather type					
Max Temp °C / °F	44°C / 111°F	40°C / 104°F	34°C / 93°F	33°C / 91°F	30°C / 86°F
Min Temp °C / °F	27°C / 81°F	34°C / 93°F	28°C / 82°F	17°C / 63°F	17°C / 63°F
Clouds	Clear	Scattered	Broken	Overcast - Rain	Overcast - Rain
Precipitation	0 - 15 mm	0 - 15 mm	0 - 15 mm	225 - 290 mm	250 - 300 mm
Humidity	75 %	75 %	80 %	75 %	75 %
Wind direction	SW ↗	SW ↗	SE ↘	E ←	E ←



AOE

Analysis of the Operating Environment

Human factor orientated

Threat and opportunities are integrated



Phase 1

OEE

Operating Environment
Evaluation

Phase 2

AE

Actor Evaluation

a. Physical terrain

b. Human terrain

c. Information terrain

*Inter-relation, interaction and
'flow'*

Emphasis on influencing
/ **threatening actors**
(Threat Evaluation - **TE**)
and opportunities

Phase 3

SI

Situation Integration

Emphasis on interaction (systems) on the
ground between factor developments and actor
behavior presented in integrated predictive
scenario's and ACOA's



Difference Weather and Climate

Weather:

- Short-term state of the atmosphere
- Can vary from time to time or location to location
- Always includes time and location

Climate:

- Long-term pattern of weather
- Long-term = 30 years or more
- Average weather over many years in one specific place














Weather Effects on Operations

- Visibility
- Wind
- Precipitation
- Cloud cover / ceiling
- Temperature
- Humidity





Weather forecast and Effects Matrix

Date:	Mon 25 Nov 2018	Tue 26 Nov 2018	Wed 27 Nov 2018	Thu 28 Nov 2018	Fri 29 Nov 2018
Weather type					
Max Temp °C / °F	27°C / 81°F	24°C / 75°F	23°C / 74°F	23°C / 74°F	23°C / 74°F
Min Temp °C / °F	17°C / 63°F	16°C / 61°F	12°C / 54°F	11°C / 52°F	11°C / 52°F
Clouds	Clear	Scattered	Broken	Overcast - Rain	Overcast - Rain
Precipitation	0 – 15 mm	0 – 15 mm	0 – 15 mm	225 – 290 mm	250 – 300 mm
Humidity	25 %	25 %	60 %	75 %	75 %
Wind direction	SW 	SW 	SE 	E 	E 
Sunrise and set	06.07 / 18.58 hour LT	06.08 / 18.59 hour LT	06.09 / 19.00 hour LT	06.10 / 19.01 hour LT	06.11 / 19.02 hour LT
Moonrise and set	20.26 / 07.47 hour LT	21.04 / 08.33 hour LT	21.37 / 09.19 hour LT	22.17 / 10.04 hour LT	22.57 / 10.51 hour LT
Illumination % night	Illumination 88.5 %	Illumination 81.6 %	Illumination 73.4 %	Illumination 64.1 %	Illumination 53.9 %
Weather effects matrix					
Date:	Mon 25 Nov 2018	Tue 26 Nov 2018	Wed 27 Nov 2018	Thu 28 Nov 2018	Fri 29 Nov 2018
UN Personnel				Heavy rain	Heavy rain
UN Materiel				Heavy rain	Heavy rain
Rotary Wing and VSTOL				Visibility	visibility
Fixed wing - transport				Visibility and wind	visibility
UAV				Visibility & wind	Visibility & rain
Movements (roads)				Flooding risk	Flooding risk
Movements (off-road)					Condition & Flooding
Communications				Distance reduction	Distance reduction
Specific effects on UN Operating Environment		NSTR	NSTR	DPRE / Flooding	DPRE / Flooding risk NCAG / TERR IED
Legend:	Non-assessable / NSTR	Favorable	Marginal	Unfavorable	



Learning Activity

Situation: Using the weather forecast on the matrix supplied to you, decide what affects this will have on Sector ISR assets

Time: 30 minutes (group work and discussion)

FACTOR	DEDUCTION	OUTPUT
Fog due on 07 Dec 2019	Threat Actor A likely to attempt to move to exploit lack of UN ISR resources.	Action. UN to deploy OP on NAI 1.



Take Away

- PT analysis is crucial to OEE as it is the basis for analysis of the Human and Information Terrains
- Terrain analysis overlays are based on accurate mapping and is essential to MPKI and MDMP
- Climate and weather affect PT
- COAs for the UN and mandate spoilers are determined by PT



Questions?

Lesson 3.5d

Human Terrain (HT)

Analysis


Content

- Introduction to HT
- HT and gender
- HT evaluation
- HT mapping / overlays
- Items of High Importance (IHI) List

Learning Outcomes

- Explain why HT is important
- Develop a HT evaluation in a sector
- List IHIs for the UN and threat actors
- Develop map overlays for HT

Introduction to HT



The Centrality of Human Terrain




HT - Central element of the operating environment

- Humans are **causes** of conflict
- Humans are **victims** of conflict



Human Terrain – Elements



Human Terrain- Part of AOE


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
Human Terrain (HT)

(Actors and groups)



Information Terrain (IT)

(Factors and relations)




UN Operating Environment (OE)


(post) conflict ECO-system



Human Terrain-part of AOE



HT Mapping example - APIR and APII



MPKI Cell must understand HT- APIR and APII

- Actors do not respect national borders
- Events in one area can influence another

HT: So what?

- Understanding risks and threats
- Central to threat actor activity
 - Supporter / facilitator
 - Victim
- Understanding vulnerable population
- Understanding and locating hotspots – intercommunal / intracommunal, religion / tribal boundaries
- Capability of threat actors
- Intent of threat actors



Human Terrain – Gender

HT: What is 'gender'?

- Social attributes, opportunities, relationships associated with male or female
- Defines power relations in society
- Defines what is expected, valued in a woman or a man
- Gender is socially constructed and context-dependent
- MPKI analyst must understand how society interacts

Human Trafficking



Child abduction



Human cage



Forced prostitution



Forced labor



Forced marriage



Organ theft



Selling baby



Forced child beggar



Trafficking boat

HT: Gender – Impacts

- Conflict affects women and men differently
- Women more likely subjected to sexual violence
- Men and boys can also be victims
- Boys and girls recruited as child soldiers
- More males die from landmines
- More girls become child brides

HT: Gender – Impacts

“To prevent casualties, peacekeeping missions need tactical intelligence... Missions do not lack high-tech resources to collect intelligence. They lack the basics, especially human intelligence, networks of informants, situational awareness, and capacity to communicate with the population.”

Improving Security of UN Peacekeepers (Santos Cruz Report)

“Recent peacekeeping experience confirms that uniformed female personnel play a vital role in reaching out and gaining the trust of women and girls within local communities, understanding and detecting their unique protection needs and tailoring the responses of peace operations”

High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO Report)

HT: Gender – Early Warning

MPKI must be predictive; gender indicators provide early warning:

- Absence of women / children / men
- Girls not attending school
- Escalation of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
 - Ill-discipline / lack of C2
 - Attempt to undermine social cohesion
 - Attempt to alter ethnic balance

Relies on understanding of HT / patterns


HT: Gender – Developing IRs

- Does ethnic group A support peace process
 - Do ethnic group A females support peace process
- Does Village X support Armed Group Y
 - Do Village X females support Armed Group Y
- Role women play in recruitment
- Role women play in facilitation
- Role women play in radicalization
- Women in leadership roles- Formal / informal
- Women have access to conflict-resolution mechanisms?
- Women have access to humanitarian assistance?

HT: Gender – Acquisition

- Include Gender Adviser in MPKI
- Encourage Mixed-gender patrols
- Ensure gender is considered in patrol reporting
- Capture gender disaggregated data
- Be aware of gender indicators – report them
- Info-sharing with gender advisers / focal points, JMAC, Human Rights, Women/Child Protection Advisers

Human Terrain Evaluation



HT- ASCOPE PMESII – Factors

	Political	Military	Economic	Social	Infrastructure	Information
Areas						
Structures						
Capabilities						
Organizations						
People						
Events						

- Completed from basic and current intelligence
- What is known become factors for further analysis
- What is unknown become information requirements
- Process is ongoing

3 Column Format – Evaluate Factors

Factor	Deduction	Output

- Take each identified factor from what is known (ASCOPE PMESII)
- Make relevant deductions- significance of factor; So What?
- List Outputs:
 - Information Requirements
 - Items of High Importance
 - Constraints, Limitations, Freedoms
 - Risk
- Maintain written record

Learning exercise

Tasks:

Using the below as a guide, provide deductions and outputs for the following factors:

FACTOR (what is known)	DEDUCTION (so what)	OUTPUT (next steps)
Majority IDPs Eastarian	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Intercommunal conflict may be less likely within IDP camp• Local Eastarian population may be broadly supportive of IDP presence	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• IR: What minority ethnic groups are represented in camps?• IR: Are there any new displacements that could alter the ethnic balance in camps?
Majority Christian		
North and South Eri Province ethnically homogenous		
Governor in North Eri from minority Dotan		
Most locally-generated revenue directed to Garville		

Approx. Time: Consider 10 minutes, answer 10 minutes

Learning exercise

FACTOR (what is known)	DEDUCTION (so what)	OUTPUT (next steps)
Majority Christian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Catholic Church leader may be influential • Pattern of life likely to involve observance of Christian traditions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • T: Conduct key leadership engagement • PG: Consider timings of major patrols or activities (Sunday morning)
North and South Eri Province relatively ethnically homogenous	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intercommunal conflict may be less likely • Population may not be tolerant of new arrivals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IR: Where are faultlines between ethnic groups? • IR: Are there more radical elements within either group?
Governor in North Eri from minority Dotan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Possible unrest directed at Governor / local authorities • May increase tensions in lead-up to elections • Governor could play key role in managing any intercommunal tensions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IR: Is there a history of public protest? • IR: What mechanisms exist to manage local tensions? • T: conduct key leader engagement with N Eri Governor
Most locally-generated revenue directed to Garville	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Possible unrest directed at government of Garland • Population may have unrealistic expectations of UN support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IR: Where are lower socio-economic areas? • T: Consider strategic messaging to manage population expectations


HT: Mapping

- Method of visualising factors
- Humans do not deal well with large volumes of Information
- A visual approach enhances and creates understanding
- Mapping can be:
 - Digital
 - By hand



HT: Mapping – Process


- Map of APIR
- 3 Column Format
- Mapping
 - Ethnic, tribal, religious groups
 - Rich and poor areas
 - Permissive, non-permissive areas
 - Threat actor areas of control
 - Pro and Anti Government areas
 - Vulnerable population areas
 - **IDP / Refugee areas / camps**
 - Illegal mining
 - **Schools and hospitals**



HT: Mapping – Overlays

- Use different colours and shading to provide clarity


- Author name
- DTG of completion
- Label (Ethnic Overlay)
- Clear Legend
- NOT obscure map detail
- 3 coordination points
- North




[illegible]

The map illustrates the Nimba Mountains region in northern Mali, showing various geographical features, settlements, and administrative boundaries. Key features include the Nimba Mountains (green), the ERI area (blue), and the North and East provinces (orange). The map also shows the Niger River, the White Line Lake, and several towns and villages. The map is labeled with 'NIMBURU MOUNTAINS', 'Uncrowded NIMBA area', 'NORTH and EAST', 'Small NIMBA sections in Northern woodlands', 'ERI area', 'East prov.', 'EAST', 'ERI controlled area', 'North prov.', 'Controlled by TUI settlers', and 'Controlled by TUI settlers'. The map also shows the Niger River, the White Line Lake, and several towns and villages.

Permissive, Semi-permissive, Non-permissive Overlay



Combined HT Overlay



Items of High Importance(IHI) List

- Generally tangible
- Area or a physical item
- Central to mission accomplishment
- Identified during 3 Column Format evaluation
- Examples:
 - Armed Group- MLRS or A/Tk weapon
 - UN-Refugee Camp
 - Local population- water source or market

HT: IHI List – So what?

- UN can target a threat actor's IHI
- UN can protect its own IHIs
- UN can protect civilian population's IHIs
 - Gain support
 - Ensure consent

HT - Outputs

- Deductions
- Information requirements
- Risks
- Constraints, limitations and freedoms
- Planning guidance
- Items of high importance
- All outputs must be collated and recorded

Take Away

- HT evaluation for a sector
- Understand ASCOPE PMESII and HT factors
- Understand IHIs for UN and Threat Actor
- Be able to complete HT map overlays
- HT important tool in POC planning

Questions

Learning Activity - Exercise

- **Task:** Commence Human Terrain Evaluation for your Sector

- **Process and Outputs:**

Complete 'People' row of ASCOPE PMESII

- List Factors
- List Information Requirements

Use 3 Column Format to Evaluate Factors

- List Deductions
- List Information Requirements / Tasks

Complete map overlays

- Ethnic groups
- Locations of key leaders



Lesson 3.5e

Analysis of Information Terrain

Lesson Content

- Understanding the peacekeeping information terrain
- Information requirements of the information terrain
- Analysis of the information terrain
- Working with the public information function


Learning Outcomes

- Explain the peacekeeping information terrain
- Describe information requirements for the information terrain
- Apply techniques to analyze the information terrain
- Explain public information function

Understanding Peacekeeping Information Terrain

- Information environment, is where individuals, organizations, systems collect, process, disseminate, or act on information
- Consists of 3 key elements: **actors, resources** and **the employment of resources** by actors to influence others

Understanding the Peacekeeping Information Terrain



- Resides within air, land, sea and space domains
- 3 interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive
- Close relationship with HT and PT

Dimensions of the Information Terrain

Physical Dimension

- Information environment overlaps with physical world
- Information systems and networks
- Computers and communications systems and supporting infrastructure

Informational Dimension

- Information is collected, processed, stored , disseminated, displayed , protected
- Information itself and the medium
- Links physical and cognitive dimensions
- Where automated decision-making takes place

Cognitive Dimension

- Where human decision-making takes place
- Dimensions of intangibles such as morale, public opinion, situational awareness
- Key characters : perceptions, emotions, awareness and understanding

Understanding the Peacekeeping Information Terrain

- Not simple
- Associated technologies accessible to everyone
- Growing information operations (IO) capabilities for actors
- Actors capable of countering UN efforts through propaganda

Learning Activity # 1

Case 1:

In 1994, a radio station, Radio Mille Collines, played a crucial role in launching, inciting and directing the Rwandan genocide and triggered conflict throughout the Great Lakes region

Instructions:

Discuss how the information terrain of UN peacekeeping operations can impact mandate implementation. You will receive a detailed Handout for use in this case.

Time: Approx. 20 minutes (group discussion)

Information Requirements of the Information Terrain

- Physical properties
- Informational properties
- Cognitive properties

Information Requirements of the Information Terrain

Population/Local Nationals

- How do the local nationals communicate
- How do they influence / advertise
- Any media bias linked to demographics or religion

Information Requirements of the Information Terrain

Host Nation

- How do host nation security forces communicate
- Is this secure
- Do the host nation security forces conduct information operations / influence media or social media

Information Requirements of the Information Terrain

Threat Actors

- How does threat actor communicate?
- Is this secure
- How does threat actor communicate with local nationals
- Does threat actor conduct information operations / influence media or social media

Information Requirements of the Information Terrain

UN Forces

- Collect information from the opponent media
- Exploitation opportunities
- Communicate with local nationals via host nation media or social media
- Conduct information operations / influence media or social media

Learning Activity # 2

Arguments for and against using social media for UNMMIG

1. Situation

Use social media to support the mission by promoting the mission, enhancing communications and sharing information.

2. Instruction

Conduct a short discussion about the Pro's and Con's regarding using social media by UNMMIG in Garland.

3. Approx. Time: 20 minutes Group work and discussion

Analysis Techniques: ASCOPE – PMESII

	Political	Military	Economic	Social	Infrastructure	Information
Areas						
Structures						
Capabilities						
Organizations						
People						
Events						

- Completed from basic and current intelligence
- What is known become factors for further Analysis;
- What is unknown become Information Requirements

Ongoing process throughout the Mission life cycle

Analysis Techniques: Three Column Format

- Find the known factors
- Drawn from basic and current intelligence:
 - List key physical factors- people, organizations, areas, structures, capabilities
 - List key informational factors- systems, penetration
 - List key cognitive factors- cultural, historical, social

Column One – Known Factors

Factor	Deduction	Output
Ron influences Tribal Group A		

Column Two – Deductions

Factor	Deduction	Output
Ron influences Tribal Group A	Tribal Group A likely to adhere to Ron's Political beliefs; Ron is a key leader in the UN AOR; Ron may be a target for Threat group B	

Column Three – Outputs

Factor	Deduction	Output
Ron influences Tribal Group A	Tribal Group A likely to adhere to Ron's Political beliefs; Ron is a key leader in the UN AOR; Ron may be a target for Threat group B	IR. What are Ron's political beliefs? IR. What is Ron's attitude to the UN? IR,. What is Ron's attitude to threat group B?

Learning Activity # 3

What do you know about your sector (factors)?

What are your unknowns (IR)?

Consider:

Physical (areas, structures, people, organizations),
informational (systems, penetration), cognitive
dimensions (how people are influenced)


Approx. Time: 15 min

Information Terrain Mapping

Intelligence staff should consider producing the following overlays:

- Telecommunications infrastructure
- Cell-phone blackspots, internet blackspots
- Locations of group meeting areas
- Pro-UN media and extent of coverage
- Anti-UN media and extent of coverage
- Electromagnetic spectrum usage and overview

Information Terrain Mapping



Support to Public Information Functions

Input / advice in the PI planning process:

- Physical dimension
- Informational dimension
- Cognitive dimension

Learning Activity # 4

Tasks: - Identify Knowns

- Identify IRs

- Analyze using 3-column format

Outputs: List of IRs; record of relevant deductions;
Terrain overlay.

Tip: Have one-member recording IRs, and another recording deductions; put two students preparing the overlay based on knowns and deductions

Time: 1.5 hours

Take Away

- The success of peacekeeping operations depends on information and information systems
- An effective information strategy is an operational necessity
- Analysis of the information terrain is key to understanding the peacekeeping information environment and decision-making
- Intelligence staff must work closely with the public information function for planning and executing operations

Questions



Lesson 3.5f

ASCOPE – PMESII



Content

- ASCOPE
- PMESII
- ASCOPE – PMESII Matrix

	P Political	M Military	E Economic	S Social	I Information	I Infrastructure
A Areas	Areas - Political (District Boundary, Party affiliation areas)	Areas - Military (Coalition / LN bases, historic ambush/IED sites)	Areas - Economic (bazaars, shops, markets)	Areas - Social (parks and other meeting areas)	Areas - Information (Radio/TV/newspapers /where people gather for word-of-mouth)	Areas - Infrastructure (Irrigation networks, water tables, medical coverage)
S Structures	Structures - Political (town halls, government offices)	Structures - Military / Police (police HQ, Military HHQ, locations)	Structures - Economic (banks, markets, storage facilities)	Structures - Social (Churches, restaurants, bars, etc.)	Structures - Information (Cell / Radio / TV towers, print shops)	Structures - Infrastructure (roads, bridges, power lines, walls, dams)
C Capabilities	Capabilities - Political (Dispute resolution, Insurgent capabilities)	Capabilities - Military (security posture, strengths and weaknesses)	Capabilities - Economic (access to banks, ability to withstand natural disasters)	Capabilities - Social (Strength of local & national ties)	Capabilities - Info (Literacy rate, availability of media / phone service)	Capabilities - Infrastructure (Ability to build / maintain roads, walls, dams)
O Organizations	Organizations - Political (Political parties and other power brokers, UN,)	Organizations - Military (What units of military, police, insurgent are present)	Organizations - Economic (Banks, large land holders, big businesses)	Organizations - Social (tribes, clans, families, youth groups, NGOs / IGOs)	Organizations - Info (NEWS groups, influential people who pass word)	Organizations - Infrastructure (Government ministries, construction companies)
P People	People - Political (Governors, councils, elders)	People - Military (Leaders from coalition, LN and insurgent forces)	People - Economic (Bankers, landholders, merchants)	People - Social (Religious leaders, influential families)	People - Info (Media owners, mullahs, heads of powerful families)	People - Infrastructure Builders, contractors, development councils)
E Events	Events - Political (elections, council meetings)	Events - Military (lethal/nonlethal events, loss of leadership, operations, anniversaries)	Events - Economic (drought, harvest, business open/close)	Events - Social (holidays, weddings, religious days)	Events - Info (IO campaigns, project openings, CIVCAS events)	Events - Infrastructure (road / bridge construction, well digging, scheduled maintenance)




Learning Outcomes

- Describe what the acronym ASCOPE-PMESII represents
- Explain the ASCOPE-PMESII and how it can assist the MIO
- Apply and complete a ASCOPE-PMESII matrix



ASCOPE – PMESII & Human Terrain (HT)





Introduction – ASCOPE – PMESII Matrix

	P Political	M Military	E Economic	S Social	I Information	I Infrastructure
A Areas	Areas - Political (District Boundary, Party affiliation areas)	Areas - Military (Coalition / LN bases, historic ambush/IED sites)	Areas - Economic (bazaars, shops, markets)	Areas - Social (parks and other meeting areas)	Areas - Information (Radio/TV/newspapers /where people gather for word-of-mouth)	Areas - Infrastructure (Irrigation networks, water tables, medical coverage)
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ASCOPE

- **A** – Area
- **S** – Structures
- **C** – Capabilities
- **O** – Organizations
- **P** – People
- **E** – Events



ASCOPE - Areas





ASCOPE - Structures





ASCOPE - Capabilities





ASCOPE - Organizations




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Afghanistan Institute for Civil Society



ASCOPE - People

Ethnic Groups





ASCOPE - Events





PMESII

- **P** – Political
- **M** – Military
- **E** – Economics
- **S** – Social
- **I** – Information
- **I** – Infrastructure



PMESII - Political

- **Political:** National, regional, local





PMESII – Military





PMESII – Economic





PMESII – Social





PMESII – Information





PMESII – Infrastructure





ASCOPE – PMESII Matrix

	P Political	M Military	E Economic	S Social	I Information	I Infrastructure
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3-Column Format

Factors identified and unknowns listed (Political-People)

FACTOR	DEDUCTION	OUTPUT
Leader of Village X is John Snow, who is a Government loyalist.	John Snow probably has access to government funds. John Snow probably has influence over the local population.	RFI. Is the village pro-Government ? RFI. Is John Snow pro-UN?
Local leader of villages A, B & C unknown		RFI/IAP



Other Tools

- **STEMPLES** - Social, Technological, Environmental, Military, Political, Legal, Economic, Security
- **PEST**- Political, Economic, Social, Technological
- **PMESII-PT** - Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, **Physical environment, Time**
- **DIME** - Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, i.e. instruments of power available primarily to state actor



Take Away

- ASCOPE PMESII are tools to help identify knowns for analysis and unknowns for RFIs/IAP
- ASCOPE factors are **dimensions** in which the PMESII **operational variables** (systems and sub-systems)
- ASCOPE – PMESII is central to Human Terrain Evaluation
- ASCOPE – PMESII can be colour coded to denote levels of confidence



Questions



Learning Activity

Instructions:

- Produce an ASCOPE – PMESII Matrix for your Sector
- Focus on the Human Terrain.
- Provide **at least one example of a known** and **at least one unknown** for each intersecting area
- Analyze 2 knowns using the three column format
- Create two questions for the IAP on the basis of the unknowns

Approx. Time: 60 minutes



Lesson 3.5g

Actor Evaluation

Content

- Actor evaluation and analysis overview
- Threat analysis
- Threat actor templates- COWARD & 3 column
- PIN and SWOT analysis
- Center of gravity (COG) analysis

Learning Outcomes

- Develop and develop a basic threat actor template
- Explain assess capability and intent
- Describe opportunity and inhibiting factors
- Apply the COG analysis
- Explain the links between actor evaluations and COA development

Actor Evaluation

- Organize, store information on relevant actors
- Reveal unknowns about relevant actors
- Create understanding of:
 - Doctrine or TTPs
 - Actor's capability to conduct operations
 - Actor's doctrine or modus operandi
 - Tactics against UN forces
 - Adversary objectives
 - How the actor operates



Actor Evaluation Relevance

MLCOA		MLCOA Description: <i>Using effects terminology, what is the Actor's / Threat Actor's mission</i>	
MLCOA Intent Schematic		Actor / Threat Actor Msn: End state: SOM: Shaping: Decisive: Sustaining: Main Effort:	
Timeline (if applicable):			
Functions Protection: Info & Int: Firepower: Manoeuvre: Logistics: Command & Control:	SWOT / CoG Analysis Strengths: Weaknesses: Opportunities: Threats: Centre of Gravity:	IHI List	
		PIRs	
		I&W	



Who are
relevant
actors?



Actor Analysis- Conflict Pyramid

Level 1 (upper level)


- Military, political, religious leaders
- Government representatives
- International organisations

Level 2 (mid-level)

- Respected figures in certain society
- Ethnic or religious leaders
- Academics, professionals
- Heads of NGOs

Level 3 (grassroots level)

- Local leaders, elders
- NGOs
- Women's, youth groups
- Health workers
- Refugees' representatives
- Peace activists



The conflict pyramid is based on the distinction drawn by John Paul Lederach (1997) between the upper, mid and grassroots levels of conflict management.

Learning Activity

Time:

Approx. 10 minutes

Task:

- Identify the relevant actors (people / groups)
- Assign actors a location / position on the conflict pyramid

Hint:

Use ASCOPE PMESII tool

Processes

Actor Evaluation Templates:

- Basic Intel
- Current Intel

Analysis based on known:

- Positions, Interests, Needs
- SWOT analysis
- Centre of Gravity Analysis

So what?

- Create understanding
- Identify Information Gaps
- Identify Items of High Importance
- COA development
- Calibrate UN response

Basic Templates

Situational Awareness based on current and
basic Intelligence

What is known?

What is happening?

Threat Actor Evaluation

COWARD

- Capabilities
- Organisational Structure
- Weapons and Equipment
- Asymmetric TTPs
- Reinforcement Capabilities
- Doctrinal Approach (Defence, Attack etc)



3 COLUMN FOMAT

SO WHAT

- How to weaken
- Prevent from acting
- Critical Capabilities
- Vulnerabilities
- Items of High Importance

*Helps develop
overlays and most
likely / most
dangerous COAs*

Exercise

Using COWARD format, construct a basic threat actor template for ONE threat actor in your AIR.

Hint:

- Use the three-column format
- Use the Types of Terrain as a Framework

Required Output:

- Uncover unknowns;
- List Items of High Importance;
- How is the Threat Actor likely target the UN?

Relevant Actor Template

Actor Name:	Detail
How and why group formed?	
Mission?	
Key leaders and detail	
Hierarchy	
Geographical location	
Extent and level of influence of environment	
Structure and organisation	
Operational History	
Evolution	
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures	
Capabilities (strength, arms, logistics capability)	
Intent (ideology, goals/objectives)	
Tactical Doctrine	
Interests	
Needs	
Influence on other actors?	
Support of other actors?	
Supported by state actors? If so, how?	
How would a UN presence benefit this actor?	
How would a UN presence harm this actor?	
Is this actor a threat to the UN?	
How could this actor impact UN Mission and Mandate?	
Greatest strength – critical capability?	
Greatest weakness – critical vulnerability?	
Centre of Gravity	
SWOT	

Analytical Tools and Approaches


Applied current and basic Intelligence

So what, the why something is happening

What is next

(COA development, forecasting of threats)

Threat Analysis



Exercise

- How do we assess capability?
- How do we assess intent?
- What is opportunity?
- What could an inhibiting factor be, and how will this affect the above?

An inhibiting factor could impact capability intent, and opportunity

Threat Analysis - Rating

Threat Level = Capability x Intent

Capability	Threat Score
Very High	6
HIGH	5
SUBSTANTIAL	4
MODERATE	3
LOW	2
MINIMAL	1

Intent	Threat Score
Very High	6
HIGH	5
SUBSTANTIAL	4
MODERATE	3
LOW	2
MINIMAL	1

Likelihood: subjective assessment based on knowledge of intent, opportunity, inhibiting factors

Likelihood	%
Almost Certain	>90%
Highly Likely	70-90%
Likely	50-70%
Realistic Possibility	40-50%
Unlikely	20-40%
Highly Unlikely	0-20%

Threat Analysis – The so what?

Threat	Minimal	Low	Moderate	Substantial	High	Very High
Likelihood						
Almost Certain						
Highly Likely						
Likely						
Probable						
Unlikely						
Highly Unlikely						

**Advise Commander:
Accept or Reject or Mitigate**


Exercise

- Assess threat presented by one armed actor in your AIR
- Assess likelihood of an attack on UN Convoy
- What is the so what?

Analytical Tools and Approaches

Positions, Interests, Needs Analysis


- **Positions-** stance taken by a conflict party, articulated in media or from official communications
- **Interests-** of a conflict party are what they need to meet their needs
- **Needs-** goals pursued by an individual or group to survive (Objective and Subjective)



So what?

- Can we help or undermine an actor
- Will UN ops impact an actor
- How will an actor react

Understanding Actors



PIN Analysis

Exercise: Carry out a PIN Analysis of the Islamic State.

Step 1 (List primary Factors)

- What is the threat actor's position?

- What are the threat actor's interests?

- What are the threat actor's needs?

Step 2 – Apply the 3 Column analytical framework (so what?).

Step 3 - Outputs:

- How will these factors affect how the group will react to a UN presence?

- How will these factors affect Threat Group objectives (End state)?

- How will these factors affect how it will choose to operate (Method)?

SWOT Analysis

Identify Actor's Internal:

- Strengths
- Weaknesses

Identify Actor's External:

- Strengths
- Weaknesses

Strengths (Internal) <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Identify the capabilities which give an advantage• Identify the characteristics which give an advantage• Identify how the object might use those capabilities / advantages	Weaknesses (Internal) <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Identify the capabilities which give a disadvantage• Identify the characteristics which give a disadvantage• Identify how they might be exploited
Opportunities (External) <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Identify the external conditions available and helpful to the object• Identify how the opportunities might be enhanced / denied	Threats (External) <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Identify the external conditions which could damage the object• Identify how those threats may be enhanced / reduced

SWOT Analysis

Exercise:

Conduct a SWOT Analysis of the primary threat actor in your Sector.

Step 1 (List primary Factors)

- What are its strengths (internal)?

- What are its weaknesses (internal)?

- What are threats to the NGO (external)?

- What are the opportunities (external)?

Step 2 – Apply the 3 Column analytical framework (so what?).

Step 3 - Outputs:

- How will these factors affect how the group reacts to the UN?

- How will these factors affect Threat Group objectives (End state)?

- How will these factors affect how it will choose to operate (Method)?

Centre of Gravity Analysis

What is a Center of Gravity?

Gives an actor its moral, physical strength, will to act, freedom of action

Levels of Center of Gravity

Strategic- Diplomatic support, Alliances

Operational- a specific assets, military, economic etc

So what:

- Break down an Actor's characteristics to undermine or strengthen
- How an actor behaves to maintain CC, to gain CRs, to mitigate CVs
→ Link to COA development

Entity's aim/ objectives	
Centre of Gravity	Critical Capabilities
Critical Vulnerabilities	Critical Requirements
Conclusions	

COG Analysis – How?

Based on all you know about the Actor and the Environment:

- Brainstorm as a team - where does the actor or entity get its moral and physical strength, its freedom of action, and its willingness to act?
- What does the COG allow the entity to do – critical capabilities (CC)?
- What are the key vulnerabilities through which the COG can be affected - critical vulnerabilities (CV)?
- What are the essential conditions, resources, and freedoms that make it an effective COG (CRs)?

COG Exercise

Exercise: COG Analysis of the main threat actor in your Sector AO.

What is its Operational Center of Gravity?

What are the:

- Critical Capability - Method/COA choice)

- Critical Requirements - Objectives / Mission / End state

- Critical Vulnerability (Method)

Apply the 3-column analytical framework?

Actor Evaluation: Relevance?

MLCOA		MLCOA Description: <i>Using effects terminology, what is the Actor's / Threat Actor's mission</i>	
MLCOA Intent Schematic		<div>Actor / Threat Actor Msn:</div> <div>End state:</div> <div>SOM:</div> <div>Shaping:</div> <div>Decisive:</div> <div>Sustaining:</div> <div>Main Effort:</div>	
Timeline (if applicable):			
<div>Functions</div> <div>Protection:</div> <div>Info & Int:</div> <div>Firepower:</div> <div>Manoeuvre:</div> <div>Logistics:</div> <div>Command & Control:</div>	<div>SWOT / CoG Analysis</div> <div>Strengths:</div> <div>Weaknesses:</div> <div>Opportunities:</div> <div>Threats:</div> <div>Centre of Gravity:</div>	<div>IHI List</div> <div>PIRs</div> <div>I&W</div>	

Take Away

- There are several tools and templates to help you conduct actor analysis
- COWARD / 3 column format are useful tools
- Understanding actor's capability, intent, opportunities and inhibiting factors will assist the analyst
- COG analysis is a useful tool in better understanding of actors

Questions

Lesson 3.5h

Situation Integration and Course of Action (COA) Development





Content

- Situation Integration
- COA Generation
- Identification of ML/MDCOA
- Inclusion of AE outputs: Mission, Intent, End State.
- Drafting a Scheme of Manoeuvre
 - Phasing and tactical functions
- COA Schematic
 - Situation and event overlays



Learning Outcomes

- Explain the linkage between the Terrains (physical, human and information), Actor Evaluation and the development of COAs
- Explain how the FACES criteria is used to assess COAs and identify ML and MD
- Explain the difference between NAI and TAI and how they facilitate the confirmation of an actor COA
 - Using an event overlay to illustrate these
- Explain what is depicted on a COA board



Phase 3 - Situation Integration

- Fuses results from AOE and Actor Evaluation (Phase 1 and 2)
- Identification how the operating environment shapes actor capabilities and TTPs
- Relates capabilities, intentions, and TTPs to the ground enabling the assessment of Actor Courses of Action (ACOA)
- Most Likely and Most Dangerous ACOA
- Mission specific

MLCOA COA Schematic

COA SCHEMATIC

AOE
+
Situation
Integration

Actor / Threat Actor
Msn:

End state:

Actor
Evaluation

SOM:

Shaping:

Decisive:

Sustaining:

Main Effort:

Situation
Integration

Timeline (if applicable):

Actor Evaluation

Functions
Protection:

Info & Int:

Firepower:

Manoeuvre:

Logistics:

Command & Control:

Actor
Evaluation
+
Situation
Integration

SWOT / CoG Analysis

Strengths:

Weaknesses:

Opportunities:

Threats:

Centre of Gravity:

Actor
Evaluation

IHI List

Actor
Evaluation

PIRs

3CF outputs and Event Overlay


I&W

Situation
Integration



Situation Integration: Context

- Nothing in this presentation relates to the scenario you have been given.
- The UN mission as the basis for this Situation Integration is the **UN force has been tasked to establish a TOB south of a WALESI.**
- Situation Integration is always mission specific.
- Remember that you are learning an analytical process that can be used at all levels. It is scalable from Strategic to Tactical level planning.
- This process is about the fusion of all the analysis and situating it in time and space.



Intent/Purpose. DISRUPT UN activity without becoming decisively engaged. UNDERMINE UN presence within the Sector.

MSN. Conduct small arms ATTACK on UN bases IOT REINFORCE their IO campaign.

Endstate. UN being forced to increase security at its bases makes UN a static force, unable to deploy to more than a handful of urban areas. IK increases its control to more areas of Sector west.

Scheme of Manoeuvre:

Shaping:

- Hate speeches. UN as the target.
- Small teams will forward mount to urban areas to prepare.
- Surveillance of UN base and UNMMIG force movements.

Decisive:

- Once recce screen is in place, the attack teams will move forward to conduct attack.
- Use of VHF radios to control the attacks. Assessed firing point will be from southern edge of urban area.
- Attack will last NMT 5-10 minutes as per previous attacks. Wpns will be dropped or taken to local caches.

Sustaining:

- Teams will withdraw before decisively engaged using terrain to cover movement.
- Increased messaging and propaganda will follow shortly after attack claiming responsibility to undermine UN credibility.

I & W:

- Increase in anti-UN propaganda.
- Increased surveillance of UN TOBs;
- Testing of UN security procedures involving unarmed personnel by day and night;
- Significant change to pattern of life in and around UNMMIG bases;

IHI:

- Weapons caches;
- Sniper rifles

Weaknesses

- VHF radios can be intercepted.

Strengths

- Ability to blend in with population.
- Cover provided to East iot support withdrawal.

Tactical Functions:

1. C2 – decentralised command structure. Use of VHF.
2. Info & Int – Population support base
3. Firepower – Sniper rifles (U/K variant) and AK47 variants.
4. Manoeuvre – Urban – use of motorbikes, light role.
5. Protection – OPSEC and COMSEC
6. Sustainment – Use of population and hides to secure lethal aid.



Situation Integration



- Where can they operate-Physical, Human, Information Terrain
- How do they operate-Capabilities

Equals

How, where, when the actor will operate and where should the UN monitor / how can we affect them



Key outputs from Situation Integration

- Assessed actor mission, intent, end state
- Assessed actor scheme of manoeuvre
- COA schematic
- COA boards: most likely (MLCOA) and most dangerous (MDCOA)
- 'Golden Thread' products support Phase One brief
- Identification of IRs and updated IAP
- **Remember these are mission specific**



ACOA Generation

- Why do we need actor COAs?
- Why do we focus on all relevant actors?
- How do they help commanders and staffs?



ACOA Scenario Generation

- Key product from Analysis of the Operating Environment
- Provides commander with detailed assessment of how actors affect the mission
- Allows commander to prioritise assets
- Plan for MLCOA and MDCOA




COA Generation

- More than two COAs exist
- Staff given two in order to assist in Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) planning:
 - Most likely
 - Most dangerous



Phase One Brief – why is it relevant?





Identification COAs

- Many COAs identified
 - Mind-mapping/Brain-storming
 - Competing Hypothesis
 - Critical Pathway Analysis
 - Back-casting
- Identified COAs are scored using FACES
 - Subjective scoring based on application of analysis, experience and intuition.
 - Supported by current intelligence





FACES Criteria

- **Feasible**

- A feasible COA can accomplish the mission within the given time, space and resource limitations.

- **Acceptable**

- An acceptable COA must have the right balance between cost, risk and the potential advantage gained.

- **Complete**

- A complete COA incorporates the key elements of decisive, shaping and sustaining phases.

- **Exclusive**

- An exclusive COA must differ significantly enough from other possible COAs.

- **Suitable**

- A suitable COA can be executed within the Commander's intent.



Identifying MLCOA

- MLCOA is the COA assessed **most likely to achieve (Threat) Actor's intent and end state**
- **FACES** criteria applied to COAs
Feasible, Acceptable, Complete, Exclusive, and Suitable
- Supported by current intelligence picture for actor to achieve mission
- Supported by intelligence - actor had prior success in execution



Identification of MDCOA

- MDCOA is the (Threat) Actor's **COA that would have the greatest impact on UN mission.**
- FACES test applied
- Supported by doctrine, TTPs, current intelligence picture
- Requires greater planning, resources and risk to actor but represents **greatest threat to UN mission**



Selection ML and MDCOA

COA	Likelihood of achieving Actor's end state (Score 1-5)	Impact on UN mission (Score 1-5)	FACES criteria met
1	2	1	N
2	4	2	Y
3	2	2	Y
4	1	2	N
5	2	5	Y

Which is the MLCOA?
Which is the MDCOA?



Selection ML and MDCOA

COA	Likelihood of achieving Actor's end state (Score 1-5)	Impact on UN mission (Score 1-5)	FACES criteria met
1	2	1	N
2 MLCOA	4	2	Y
3	2	2	Y
4	1	2	N
5 MDCOA	2	5	Y



Scope

Develop a suitable Actor Course of Action to include:

- Intent, End State and Main Effort
- Scheme of Manoeuvre
- Tactical Functions
- Identifying Indicators & Warnings
- Items of High Importance List
- COA Schematic
- COA Boards



Defining Intent, End State and Main Effort

- **Intent:** Concise statement of what the actor intends to do and why; expressed via **EFFECTS TERMINOLOGY** to be achieved.
- **End State:** Aim at the end of an operation, indicates objective achieved. Where the actor wants to be at mission accomplishment.
- **Main Effort:** Activity the actor considers crucial to mission success
- This is identified during Actor Evaluation stage but **analysed further to make it mission specific.**




Example Intent, End State and Main Effort

- **Intent:** To SEIZE or ISOLATE GARLANDIAN military bases and SECURE government installations and infrastructure in GARLAND; FIX reinforcements from entering Sector East and FACILITATE a pro-ERIYAN political take-over

In Order To

- **End State:** Force the WITHDRAW of GARLANDIAN military forces and to allow for Sector East entry into the ERIYAN Federation
- **Main Effort:** To FIX reinforcements with AT mines and IEDs

IK will conduct harassment ATTACKs and widespread DISRUPTION activity in order to ISOLATE UN forces.



MSN. Conduct small arms
ATTACK on UN bases IOT
REINFORCE their IO
campaign.

Endstate. UN being forced to increase security at its bases makes UN a static force, unable to deploy to more than a handful of urban areas. IK increases its control to more areas of Sector west.

Shaping:

- Hate speeches. UN as the target.
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- Teams will withdraw before decisively engaged using terrain to cover movement.
- Increased messaging and propaganda will follow shortly after attack claiming responsibility undermine UN credibility.

- Increase in anti-UN propaganda.
- Increased surveillance of UN TOBs;
- Testing of UN security procedures involving unarmed personnel by day and night;
- Significant change to pattern of life in and around UNMMIG bases:

- Weapons caches;
- Sniper rifles

- VHF radios can be intercepted.

- Ability to blend in with population.
- Cover provided to East iot support withdrawal.

1. C2 – decentralised command structure. Use of VHF.
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4. Manoeuvre – Urban – use of motorbikes, light role.
5. Protection – OPSEC and COMSEC
6. Sustainment – Use of population and hides to secure lethal aid.



Exercise

Defining Intent, End State and Main Effort

Task: Each syndicate is to draft an intent, end state and main effort for one threat actor within their Sector

Approx. Time: 40 minutes.

- **Intent:** A concise and precise statement of what the Actor / Threat Actor intends to do and why; expressed as the effects they intend to achieve.

In Order To

- **End State:** The aim to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. It is, in short, 'where the Actor / Threat Actor wants to be, mission accomplished.'
- **Main Effort:** What the Actor / Threat Actor considers to be the activity which is crucial to the success of the mission



Scope


Develop a suitable Actor Course of Action to include:

- Intent, End State and Main Effort
- Scheme of Manoeuvre
- Tactical Functions
- Identifying Indicators & Warnings
- Items of High Importance List
- COA Schematic
- COA Boards



Scheme of Manoeuvre (SOM)

- Where, when, how the Actor achieves its purpose:
 - Routes
 - Objectives
 - Boundaries
 - Timings
- Conclusions from AOE, AE should be highlighted
- Use SOM in explaining phases:
 - Shaping
 - Decisive
 - Sustaining



Tell a story about how Actor will conduct activity from start to finish



SOM – Shaping Phase

- Tasks to create/preserve conditions for success of the decisive act.
- Actor shapes space to complement their plan
- Some shaping tasks:
 - Use of crowds
 - Moving personnel, equipment
 - Influence of a population
 - Deception plan
 - Reconnaissance
 - IED construction
 - Fixing elements of UN forces



SOM – Decisive Phase

- **Action** that leads to successful completion of the mission
- Task that makes the plan unique
- May include these verbs for a threat actor:
 - Destroy
 - Neutralise
 - Secure
 - Seize
 - Clear
 - Disrupt



SOM – Sustaining Phase

- Activity to reinforce success
- Once Actor has executed their plan, these are sustaining activities / tasks to consolidate gains
- Examples:
 - Distribute
 - Propaganda
 - Use social media
 - Cache weapons
 - Resupply ammo
 - Shadow governance
 - Intimidation



Exercise: Draft SOM

Task:

Each syndicate will draft a SOM for one threat actor within their Sector

Approx. Time: 45 minutes.

RECAP:

SOM consists of the following phases:

- Shaping
- Decisive
- Sustaining



Scope

Develop a suitable Actor COA to include:

- Intent, End State and Main Effort
- Scheme of Manoeuvre

- **Tactical Functions**

Applicable to Threat Actors

- Identifying Indicators & Warnings
- Items of High Importance List
- COA Schematic
- COA Boards



Checklist – Tactical Functions

- Description of functions that Threat Actor does prior, during, and after operations
- To assist in describing COAs

- **Command & Control**
- **Information & Intelligence**
- **Firepower**
- **Manoeuvre**
- **Protection**
- **Sustainment**



Command & Control (C2)

- **C2** – Will the Actor / Threat Actor be able to effectively exert command and control over their subordinates during the COA? What sort of C2 will they use i.e. Mission Command? What C2 vehicles/nodes are vital for them?
- Individuals
- Vehicles
- Locations
- Type of Command
- Method of Command

Now think about I&Ws, Items of High Importance, and NAIs/TAIs

Or

What does seeing it indicate?

What would be the impact of removing it?

Where it will be?



Information & Intelligence

- **Info & Int** – How is Actor going to gather information and intelligence? What sort of information and intelligence are they trying to gather on us to assist their mission? How can we deny this to them?

Now think about I&Ws, Items of High Importance, and NAIs/TAIs

What does seeing it indicate?

What would be the impact of removing it?

Where it will be?



Firepower

- **Firepower** – Firepower destroys, neutralises and suppresses; how will the Actor / Threat Actor use their firepower during the CoA?
- Will it be used in Shaping, Decisive, Sustaining?
- What are the UN most vulnerable to?
- How will they use it and in what groupings?

Now think about I&Ws, Items of High Importance, and NAIs/TAIs

What does seeing it indicate?

What would be the impact of removing it?

Where it will be?



Manoeuvre

- How does the Actor / Threat Actor move?
- What assets do they have available to them?
- How can we deny them?

Now think about I&Ws, Items of High Importance, and NAIs/TAIs

What does seeing it indicate?

What would be the impact of removing it?

Where it will be?



Protection

- **Protection** – How will Actor look to protect their force? Includes physical protection, screening force or flank guard; communications i.e. encrypted radios etc.
- Their deception plan should be considered

Now think about I&Ws, Items of High Importance, and NAIs/TAIs

What does seeing it indicate?

What would be the impact of removing it?

Where it will be?



Sustainment

- **Sustainment** – How will the Actor be able to sustain CoA? Some of this may have been included in the Sustaining Phase, however, this is more logistical than theoretical and should add detail
- How far can go & long can they fight without replenishment?
- Generation of recruits?
- Propaganda?
- Medical plan?

Think about I&Ws, Items of High Importance, and NAIs/TAIs

What does seeing it indicate?

What would be the impact of removing it?

Where it will be?



Exercise: Tactical Functions

Task:

Each syndicate will draft a list of tactical functions for one threat actor within their Sector. State how these functions will be employed in each phase of Operations.

Highlight any critical information relating to Tactical Functions for your Threat Actor.

Approx. Time: 30 minutes.

RECAP: The Tactical Functions are:

- Command & Control
- Information & Intelligence
- Firepower
- Manoeuvre
- Protection
- Sustainment



Scope

Develop a suitable Actor COA to include:

- Intent, End State and Main Effort
- Scheme of Manoeuvre
- Tactical Functions
- Identifying Indicators & Warnings
- Items of High Importance List
- COA Schematic
- COA Boards



Indicators & Warnings (I&W)

- Things once observed allow us to assess COA
- Some I&W can be shared by multiple COAs
- No point in having I&W, if all COAs share same
- Be specific, detailed and explained
- Ties into Shaping Phase of SOM and into NAIs
- More detail can be assessed in SOM leads to more I&Ws



Exercise – Indicators and Warnings

Task:

Each syndicate is to draft a list of Indicators and Warnings for one Threat Actor within their Sector.

Approx. Time: 10 minutes

Recap:

- Those things that once observed will allow us to assess that this COA has been chosen by the Actor / Threat Actor.
- They should be specific, detailed and explained. They should tie into both the Shaping Phase of the SOM and into the suggested NAIs



Scope

Develop a suitable Actor COA to include:

- Intent, End State and Main Effort
- Scheme of Manoeuvre
- Tactical Functions
- Identifying Indicators & Warnings
- Items of High Importance List
- COA Schematic
- COA Boards



Items of High Importance (IHI) List

- Assets, the loss of which would significantly damage the Actor's capability **to achieve mission**
- Examples:
 - Scouting screens
 - Facilitation routes
 - C2
 - Nodes
 - Communications
 - Key leader
- Also think about our UN/Own Force IHIs



Exercise: IHIs

Task:

Each syndicate will draft a list of IHI for one Threat Actor within their Sector.

Approx. Time: 10 minutes

RECAP:

IHIs are those assets, the loss of which would significantly damage the actor's capability to achieve his intentions.



Scope

Develop a suitable Actor COA to include:

- Intent, End State and Main Effort
- Scheme of Manoeuvre
- Tactical Functions
- Identifying Indicators & Warnings
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COA Schematic


- Integration and fusing of outputs from the current situation in line with the Actor's intent
- Graphical representation depicting Actor's intent and Scheme of Manoeuvre
- Graphic depicts effects (where applicable) / activity related to the ground in space and time
- Comprises two outputs:
 - Stage One: Situation Overlay
 - The activity applied to the ground
 - Stage Two: Event Overlay
 - A Decision Support Overlay
 - Situating NAIs/TAIs



COA Schematic: Stage One – Situation Overlay

- Actor's doctrine, TTPs related / moulded to terrain (mobility corridors, known operating areas)
- Graphically represented
- Based on their methods of operating
- COA schematic produced for every COA
- Should include an assessment of their routes, objectives, boundaries, timings where applicable
- **Recap:** this outlines your assessment of the Actor's Scheme of Manoeuvre

Example: Situation Overlay





Exercise: Create a Situation Overlay

Task:

Each Syndicate create a Situation Overlay for their respective Sector.

Approx. Time: 45 mins

Include:

- One Threat Actor's doctrine, TTPs related / moulded to the terrain (using mobility corridors, known operating areas etc.)
- Threat Actor's routes, objectives, boundaries etc




COA Schematic: Stage Two - Event Overlay


- **Recap:** Where should UN forces monitor / look to affect actor- (Event Overlay)
- The EO is a graphic representation of the acquisition areas of interest based on the identified actor / threat actor COAs
- Depicted by NAIs; monitored areas for indicators....refugees, firing locations etc.
 - Identifies where critical events likely to occur
 - Confirms or denies an actor's chosen COA
- Often depicted by Target Areas of Interest (TAIs); where to look to have an EFFECT on the actor



How NAIs confirm/deny COAs



Example: Event Overlay





Event Overlay - Summary

Event Overlay visualizes / identifies NAIs and potential TAIs. Decision Support Overlay

- NAI: expected actor activity along point or area in the operating environment
- NAI confirms or denies ACOA
- TAI: Area or point in the operating environment to influence an actor interdiction to abandon or alter ACOA
- NAIs and TAIs must be on the IAP & allocated an acquisition capability



Exercise: Event Overlay

Task:

Each Syndicate creates a Event Overlay for their respective Threat Actor within their Sector.

Approx. Time: 10 mins

Include: Graphical representation of where likely events are to occur – Identification of NAIs, TAIs



Scope

Develop a suitable Actor COA to include:

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- Scheme of Manoeuvre
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- Identifying Indicators & Warnings
- Items of High Importance List
- Intent Schematic
- COA Boards

MLCOA COA Schematic

COA SCHEMATIC

AOE
+
Situation
Integration

Actor / Threat Actor
Msn:

End state:

Actor
Evaluation

SOM:

Shaping:

Decisive:

Sustaining:

Main Effort:

Situation
Integration

Timeline (if applicable):

Actor Evaluation

Functions
Protection:

Info & Int:

Firepower:

Manoeuvre:

Logistics:

Command & Control:

Actor
Evaluation
+
Situation
Integration

SWOT / CoG Analysis
Strengths:

Weaknesses:

Opportunities:

Threats:

Centre of Gravity:

Actor
Evaluation

IHI List


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- VHF radios can be intercepted.

Strengths


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2. Info & Int – Population support base
3. Firepower – Sniper rifles (U/K variant) and AK47 variants.
4. Manoeuvre – Urban – use of motorbikes, light role.
5. Protection – OPSEC and COMSEC
6. Sustainment – Use of population and hides to secure lethal aid.

MDCOA

IK will conduct a complex ATTACK using SIEDs in order to NEUTRALISE UN forces.



Intent/Purpose.

NEUTRALISE UN forces in the Sector to undermine UN presence in GARIYA.

MSN. Conduct a complex ATTACK on UN base IOT SECURE FOM and undermine UN forces.

Endstate. UN being forced to withdraw from sector. UNMIGAR ability to provide security undermined. IK secures total control of sector.

Scheme of Manoeuvre:

Shaping:

- Coercion of vulnerable IDPs.
- Facilitation of SIED and influx of IED expertise into the AO.
- Staging into urban area prior to conduct of attack.

Decisive:

- Use of SIEDs to breach UN FOB perimeter. Followed by ground attack in force.
- Use of VHF radios to control the attacks and as back-up should SIED not be victim operated.

Sustaining:

- Securing of FOB before withdrawal in order to maintain critical capability.
- Increased messaging and propaganda will follow shortly after attack claiming responsibility undermine UNIGAR credibility.
- Replenishment of IED components.

I & W:

- Increased coercion activity within IDP camps.
- Increase in facilitation of IED components;
- Staging of IED facilitators/SMEs into the AO.

IHI:

- IED SMEs

Weaknesses

- VHF radios can be intercepted.

Strengths


- Ability to blend in with population.
- Cover provided to East iot support withdrawal.

Tactical Functions:

1. C2 – decentralised command structure. Use of VHF.
2. Info & Int – Population support base
3. Firepower – IED vests, AK47 variants.
4. Manoeuvre – On foot. Use of population and urban areas.
5. Protection – OPSEC and COMSEC
6. Sustainment – Reserves in depth.



Event Overlay – Decision Support





Take Away

- There is an important analysis link between AOE, Actor Evaluation and development of COAs
- The physical, human and information terrains and Actor Evaluation are building blocks to COA development
- FACES criteria is an important tool to assess COAs
- Scoring of COAs and feasibility within the current intelligence picture, actor's TTPs and capabilities are key to developing situation and event overlays
- NAI and TAI and how they facilitate the confirmation of a COA
- The COA Board, situation and event overlays are important MIO tools



Questions?



Lesson 3.5i

Short Peacekeeping-Intelligence Estimate (SPIE) and Situation Paragraph

Content

- Introduction
- SPIE Format
- Situation paragraph
- Exercise

Learning Outcomes

- Refine and consolidate AOE analysis
- Produce a completed SPIE
- Produce a Situation Paragraph

MPKI Support to UN MDMP



SPIE Format

INTRODUCTION

THE SPIE

The Current Situation <i>(Summary paragraph)</i>
Own Mission / Objectives <i>(Summary paragraph)</i>
Relevant Actor Situation <i>(Summary paragraph)</i>
Key Assessments / Deductions <i>(Summary paragraph)</i>

AOE

AOE

Factor	Deduction	Output
Physical Terrain		
Human Terrain		
Information Terrain		
Weather Effects		
Actor Evaluation		

THREAT EVALUATION

Threat Evaluation

Aim and End State		
Assessed Actor/ Threat Actor Aim	<i>(Summary paragraph)</i>	
Assessed Actor/Threat Actor End state	<i>(Summary paragraph)</i>	
Factor	Deduction	Output

THREAT INTEGRATION

Threat Integration

Relevant Actor MLACOA		
MLACOA Schematic	<i>(Summary paragraph)</i>	
Factor	Deduction	Output
Relevant Actor MDACOA		
MDACOA Schematic	<i>(Summary paragraph)</i>	
Factor	Deduction	Output

SPIE Format: Introduction

THE SPIE

The Current Situation
<i>(Summary paragraph)</i>
Own Mission / Objectives
<i>(Summary paragraph)</i>
Relevant Actor Situation
<i>(Summary paragraph)</i>
Key Assessments / Deductions
<i>(Summary paragraph)</i>

SPIE Format

AOE

Factor	Deduction	Output
Physical Terrain		
Human Terrain		
Information Terrain		
Weather Effects		
Actor Evaluation		

For Example:

AOE		
Factor	Deduction	Output
Physical Terrain		
The Bridges in the AO are all single lane	1. Civilians are vulnerable to being robbed on bridges	T - Provide checkpoints on bridges
	2. Likely place to ambush convoys	PG - Consider reaction force to reinforce checkpoints
The only hospital in the AO is 100km from the main refugee camp.	1. Any refugees needing urgent medical care are likely to die before reaching the hospital	PG - Consider locating a military hospital near the Refugee Camp
		IR - How effective is the host nation ambulance service?
Etc...		
Human Terrain		
All politicians are subject to tribal influences	1. Political decisions are likely to reflect tribal rather than national interests	IR - What tribes do the politicians belong to?
		IR - What are the key objectives of each tribe represented in government?
Etc...		
Information Terrain		
Etc...		

SPIE Format

Threat Evaluation

Aim and End State		
Assessed Actor/ Threat Actor Aim	(Summary paragraph)	
Assessed Actor/Threat Actor End state	(Summary paragraph)	
Factor	Deduction	Output

For Example:

Threat Evaluation		
Aim and Endstate		
Revolutionary Front of Southland (RFS) Aim	To overthrow the Government of Southland and expel all foreigners from Southland, including non-ethnic Southlanders born in Southland	
RFS Endstate	RFS government in power, all non-ethnic Southlanders expelled from Southland, all Southlanders on a keto diet	
Factor	Deduction	Output
RFS cells operate predominantly in urban areas	1.1 RFS primary support is likely among wealthier urban Southlanders	PG - Consider using local media to promote the benefits of UN presence
	1.2 The RFS support base has good access to TV, Internet and cell networks	IR - How is RFS funded?
Etc...		
Aim and Endstate		
Southland Revolutionary Front (SRF) Aim	Etc..	
SRF Endstate	Etc...	
Factor	Deduction	Output
Etc...		

SPIE Format


Threat Integration

Relevant Actor MLCOA		
MLCOA Schematic	(Summary paragraph)	
Factor	Deduction	Output
Relevant Actor MDACO		
MDACO Schematic	(Summary paragraph)	
Factor	Deduction	Output

For Example:


Threat Integration

RFS MLCOA



RFS will most likely develop their political wing to compete with the government, at the same time their military arm will disrupt urban government services in order to discredit the government, a key task being fund-raising among the wealthy urban Southlanders.

RFS MDCA



RFS will expand their military operations into rural areas, targetting vulnerable civilians in ordrr to undermine confidence in the UN and government

Factor

Deduction

Output

Etc...

SRF MLCOA

Etc...

Situation Paragraph

The Situation Paragraph for the Warning Order:

- Is derived from the SPIE
- Provides enough information to orientate UN personnel to the current situation

Situation Paragraph

The Situation Paragraph for the Warning Order:
Contains a brief summary of:

From the SPIE:

- Current situation..... Introduction, Current Situation
- Physical terrain analysis..... AOE: Physical Terrain
- Human terrain analysis..... AOE: Human Terrain
- Information Terrain analysis..... AOE: Information Terrain
- ASCOPE PMESII..... Key elements from the AOE
- Actor evaluation..... Threat Evaluation/Integration
- Other important information to support planning

Take Away

- The SPIE is a consolidation and refinement of the 3 Column Format analysis conducted during the AOE process
- Repeated deductions and/or outputs should be consolidated or eliminated
- The Situation Paragraph of the Warning Order is derived from the SPIE
- The Situation Paragraph should help decision makers to plan

Questions

SPIE and Situation Paragraph Learning Activity



Lesson 3.5j

AOE-UN MPKI support to UN MDMP


Content

- MPKI support to UN Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
- Phase 1 brief
- Mission Analysis
- COA Development, Analysis and Selection
- Production of the OPORD


Learning Outcomes

- Explain how MPKI products such as AOE supports the staff
- Explain why the Phase 1 brief is important
- Explain how MPKI supports the UN MDMP by phase

MPKI support to UN MDMP




Receipt of Mission Brief



- What do we already know?
- Collection assets and mapping products available
- Initial Commander guidance
 - PIRs/SIRs to initial IAP
 - Mission specific planning begins
- Start mission-specific AOE

Phase One Brief – why is it relevant?



Phase One Brief

- Informs / situates commander and staff prior to planning
- AOE foundation – ‘Golden Thread’ products:
 - Physical, human, information terrain analysis
 - Actor evaluation
 - Situation integration with assessed ML/MD COAs

Phase One Brief – Template

Serial	Topic
01	Scope. Overview of what the Phase 1 Brief is going to cover and what briefing aids are going to be used.
02	Intelligence foundation. What intelligence the brief has been based on and inform the Commander of any intelligence gaps that are pertinent to the Mission. Include Vital Intelligence
03	Key assumptions and outputs. Inform the Commander of the key deductions and judgements you have identified from conducting AOE.
04	Ground in general. The Physical Terrain. Orientate the Commander and Planning Staff to the ground including weather effects. Physical Terrain Analysis
05	Ground in detail. The Mission Specific Physical Terrain in more detail. Depending on the type of mission to be conducted (Defensive / Offensive), inform the Commander of the specific ground detail that will affect his/her mission including any key infrastructure.
06	Human and Information Terrains. Factors that are pertinent to the mission are likely to include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tribal and ethnic laydown • Displaced persons and refugees • NGOs • Key leaders • Pattern of life • HN armed forces • Infrastructure (Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academic, Refuge, Medical, Security, Other) • Information environment – social media trends (supportive/resistant to UN presence), media reporting, local communication capabilities Human and Information Terrain Analysis
07	Threat Evaluation. Analysis of all threat actors that are pertinent to the mission, to include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat actor assumptions • Threat actor organisations and hierarchies including Key Leaders • Threat actor TTPs • Threat actor equipment and capabilities • Strengths and Weakness and Centre of Gravity Analysis Actor and Threat Actor Evaluation
08	Situation Integration. How will the threat actors and human factors affect the mission when considered in relation to the physical environment? To include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Actors' Courses of Actions. Most Likely and Most Dangerous. • Updated Intelligence Acquisition Plan based on known intelligence gaps Situation Integration

Phase One Brief – Summary

- Mission specific
- Not telling the Commander all you know
- No more than 45 minutes
- Focus on situation integration and not the ground
- Know audience
- Keep it simple
- Remember the ‘Golden Thread’ products

Example of a Phase One Brief

Mission

- UNMMIG deploys in three conflict affected areas (sectors west, east, and north) of GARLAND, for the duration of its mandate to ensure: a safe and SECURE environment for all civilians in its area of operations; to FACILITATE the freedom of movement of humanitarian aid convoys; to MONITOR and report on violations of ceasefires, and of human rights violations; and, where possible, to ASSIST the government in the re-establishment of State authority.

Sector East mission is to establish a TOB south west of BINGA to DISRUPT IK freedom of movement, REASSURE local population and IDPs iot to establish SECURE environment and ASSIST Government of GARLAND.

Scope – Part One

- Vital Intelligence
- Key Assumptions and outputs (if applicable)
- Analysis of the Operating Environment
 - Ground in General
 - Ground in Detail
- Information Terrain
 - GSM/Radio coverage
 - Local media – TV and Radio – are they supportive of UN?
 - Use of social media
 - Local communication systems/meetings.
- Human Terrain Analysis
 - Tribal/Ethnic Laydown – if important
 - Key actors: NGOs, Key Leaders, Refugees etc.
 - Pattern of life – If applicable
 - HN Armed Forces

Scope – Part Two

- Actor Evaluation

 - Locations/organisations/capabilities/TTPs

 - COWARD

 - SWOT/COG

- **Situation Integration**

 - **ML / MD COA**

- Event Overlay NAI/ TAI

- Recommended PIRs

 - Updates to IAP


 - Known intelligence gaps

Analysis - So what?


Vital intelligence

- SIGINT report 2245Z03MAY19_003 suggests increased IK movement of arms and ammunition into caches within BINGA
- HUMINT report 0935Z01MAY19-002 states that IK have conducted public speeches in the IDP camp stating that UN forces are the enemy of GARLAND and should be forced to leave immediately
- HUMINT report 0718Z29APR19_001, which has not been corroborated and is assessed as C3, states that coercion activity of local civilians to join the IK cause has increased
- **Key assumptions based on current intelligence:** It is assessed that any UN activity within the vicinity of BINGA will result in an armed / kinetic IK response


Analysis of the Operating Environment (AOE)




Ground in general – Mission specific




Restricted Terrain




Ground in general – Known Routes / Avenues of Approach



Ground in detail – Mission specific




Ground in detail – Mission specific



Information Terrain

Information Terrain – Mission specific



How do population communicate?


How robust is this network?

How secure is it?


How does it affect our mission?

Human Terrain

Human Terrain – Mission specific




Human Terrain – Mission specific














Where could the actor get its support?
Which areas are permissive to UN?

Human Terrain – Mission specific

Any complexities that could affect our mission?
Movement through the town e.g. pattern of life activity?
Situation within IDP camp?
HN Security Force laydown?




Date:	Mon 25 Nov 2018	Tue 26 Nov 2018	Wed 27 Nov 2018	Thu 28 Nov 2018	Fri 29 Nov 2018
Weather type					
Max Temp °C / °F	27°C / 81°F	24°C / 75°F	23°C / 74°F	23°C / 74°F	23°C / 74°F
Min Temp °C / °F	17°C / 63°F	16°C / 61°F	12°C / 54°F	11°C / 52°F	11°C / 52°F
Clouds	Clear	Scattered	Broken	Overcast - Rain	Overcast - Rain
Precipitation	0 – 15 mm	0 – 15 mm	0 – 15 mm	225 – 290 mm	250 – 300 mm
Humidity	25 %	25 %	60 %	75 %	75 %
Wind direction	SW 	SW 	SE 	E 	E 
Sunrise and set	06.07 / 18.58 hour LT	06.08 / 18.59 hour LT	06.09 / 19.00 hour LT	06.10 / 19.01 hour LT	06.11 / 19.02 hour LT
Moonrise and set	20.26 / 07.47 hour LT	21.04 / 08.33 hour LT	21.37 / 09.19 hour LT	22.17 / 10.04 hour LT	22.57 / 10.51 hour LT
Illumination % night	Illumination 88.5 %	Illumination 81.6 %	Illumination 73.4 %	Illumination 64.1 %	Illumination 53.9 %
Weather effects matrix					
Date:	Mon 25 Nov 2018	Tue 26 Nov 2018	Wed 27 Nov 2018	Thu 28 Nov 2018	Fri 29 Nov 2018
UN Personnel				Heavy rain	Heavy rain
UN Material				Heavy rain	Heavy rain
Rotary wing & MV				Visibility	visibility
Fixed wing - transport				Visibility and wind	visibility
UAV				Visibility & wind	Visibility & rain
Movements (roads)				Flooding risk	Flooding risk
Movements (off-road)					Condition & Flooding
Communications				Distance reduction	Distance reduction
Specific effects on UN Operating Environment		NSTR	NSTR	DPRE / Flooding	DPRE / Flooding risk NCAG / TERR IED
Legend:	Non-assessable / NSTR	Favorable	Marginal	Unfavorable	


How does it affect the mission?
What pertinent detail is included here?

Actor Evaluation – Mission specific

- **Known locations? Are they assessed locations?**
- **Known numbers?**
- **How old is the data that forms the basis of that assessment?**




Actor Evaluation – IK



- What is the important data? Who is important and why?
- How does the leader maintain control and deliver orders?
- Has this organisation changed due to the success of UN missions?

IK – COWARD – Key Takeaways

Capability	Organisation	Weapons + Equipment	Asymmetric TTPs	Reinforcement / Logistics	Dispositions / Doctrine
Little is known about its key leaders, but the 'Nimr' (NFDK) is known to be the overall military leader.	Katibats – operating in respective clan areas	Small Arms – AK variants. Sophisticated Sniper capability SIEDs	Hit and run ambush attacks against host nation security forces	Each Katibat has a religious and military leader.	Standard insurgent / guerrilla TTPs.
religious leaders to deliver propagandistic sermons targeting its enemies Limited campaign given size of grouping No evidence of capability to conduct a spectacular	IK has a decentralized leadership model, with key leaders – of which little is known - based in Abusir; Katibats don't operate as a single entity – each comprises sub-groups. Excellent COMSEC	use females in SPBIEDs SVBIEDs	IK not capable of large-scale conventional operations against UNMIGAR or the GAF. IK asymmetric attack capabilities have increased as a result of the recent influx of combat-hardened Jihadist fighters from the 6 th	Support from population who believe in their ideology. the group utilizes caches of weapons, hidden on both sides of the border, enabling personnel to evade detection at GAF checkpoints	Unlikely to surrender



Key Takeaway
RPG-7 could be used in SA role (800m range). Threat to UN aviation and light-armour.



IK – SWOT – Mission specific

Strengths

- **COMSEC**
- Local knowledge
- **Decentralized Leadership**
- Reputation and propaganda

Opportunities

- Weak Host Nation Security Forces
- Expanding Links with the AWF
- Lack of formal economic opportunities
- Structural causes of the conflict

Weakness


- Requirement for religious justification
- Physical Terrain
- Local support not guaranteed
- Composition
- **Capability**

Threats

- Deployment of UNIGAR
- Coalition between regional partners
- **International CT operations**

Centre of Gravity: Support of the population

Situation Integration



Intent/Purpose.

DISRUPT UN activity without becoming decisively engaged. UNDERMINE UN presence within the Sector.

MSN. Conduct small arms **ATTACK** on UN bases IOT **REINFORCE** their IO campaign.

Endstate. UN being forced to increase security at its bases makes UN a static force, unable to deploy to more than a handful of urban areas. IK increases its control to more areas of Sector west.

Scheme of Manoeuvre:

Shaping:

- Hate speeches. UN as the target.
- Small teams will forward mount to urban areas to prepare.
- Surveillance of UN base and UN force movements.

Decisive:

- Once recce screen is in place, the attack teams will move forward to conduct attack.
- Use of VHF radios to control the attacks. Assessed firing point will be from southern edge of urban area.
- Attack will last NMT 5-10 minutes as per previous attacks. Wpns will be dropped or taken to local caches.

Sustaining:

- Teams will withdraw before decisively engaged using terrain to cover movement.
- Increased messaging and propaganda will follow shortly after attack claiming responsibility undermine UN credibility.

I & W:

- Increase in anti-UN propaganda.
- Increased surveillance of UN TOBs;
- Testing of UN security procedures involving unarmed personnel by day and night;
- Significant change to pattern of life in and around UN bases;

IHI:

- Weapons caches;
- Sniper rifles

Weaknesses

- VHF radios can be intercepted.

Strengths

- Ability to blend in with population.
- Cover provided to East iot support withdrawal.

Tactical Functions:

1. C2 – decentralised command structure. Use of VHF.
2. Info & Int – Population support base
3. Firepower – Sniper rifles (U/K variant) and AK47 variants.
4. Manoeuvre – Urban – use of motorbikes, light role.
5. Protection – OPSEC and COMSEC
6. Sustainment – Use of population and hides to secure lethal aid.



Intent/Purpose.

NEUTRALISE UN forces in the Sector to undermine UN presence in GARLAND.

MSN. Conduct a complex ATTACK on UN base IOT SECURE FOM and undermine UN forces.

Endstate. UN being forced to withdraw from sector. UN ability to provide security undermined. IK secures total control of sector.

Scheme of Manoeuvre:

Shaping:

- Coercion of vulnerable IDPs.
- Facilitation of SIED and influx of IED expertise into the AO.
- Staging into urban area prior to conduct of attack.

Decisive:

- Use of SIEDs to breach UN TOB perimeter. Followed by ground attack in force.
- Use of VHF radios to control the attacks and as back-up should SIED not be victim operated.

Sustaining:

- Securing of TOB before withdrawal in order to maintain critical capability.
- Increased messaging and propaganda will follow shortly after attack claiming responsibility undermine UN credibility.
- Replenishment of IED components.

I & W:

- Increased coercion activity within IDP camps.
- Increase in facilitation of IED components;
- Staging of IED facilitators/SMEs into the AO.

IHI:

- IED SMEs

Weaknesses

- VHF radios can be intercepted.


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Tactical Functions:

1. C2 – decentralised command structure. Use of VHF.
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3. Firepower – IED vests, AK47 variants.
4. Manoeuvre – On foot. Use of population and urban areas.
5. Protection – OPSEC and COMSEC
6. Sustainment – Reserves in depth.

Event Overlay – Decision Support



- Explain to Commander the pertinent NAIs and TAIs – what are they identifying or trying to affect? Which COA?
- NAIs / TAIs to be recorded in IAP
- Must have detailed description


Priority Intelligence Requirements

- Where are the IK bed down locations within urban areas?
- What support do they have from the local population / delegation / security forces?
- What vulnerabilities does IK's C2 have to intercept?
- Critical Intelligence Gap
- What is the level of IK influence within the IDP camp?
- What is IK's IED capability?

Verbal Briefs – Tips


- Remove distractions
- Follow formats, avoid scripts
- Determine time to brief- stick to it
- Identify and arrange aids
- Pertinent information only
- Briefer- experience more important than rank
- Eye contact
- Rehearse – this is vital

Mission Analysis




- MPKI contribution to mission analysis
- PIR confirmation
- Warning Order 2 – Situation paragraph – if change / update from Warning Order 1.

COA Development




- MPKI supports planning team
- Confirm Actor's COAs
 - Most Likely
 - Most Dangerous
- Update IAP and OE situation
- Supports own forces COA brief
- Inputs from Phase One Brief / continuous AOE

COA Analysis and Selection



- Supports COA analysis and selection (relevant threat/actors)
- Consider MPKI actions required during mission execution
- Provide MPKI contingencies to “test” the plan
- Draft situation paragraph for WARNO 3

Production of the OPORD



- MPKI guidance on control measures
- De-confliction of acquisition and operational activities
- Draft situation paragraph, peacekeeping-intelligence annex
- Supports staff branch annexes
- Supports Mission Rehearsal – raise scenarios and contingencies (Red-teaming / war-gaming)

Takeaway

- PKI support for the MDMP provides inputs to be integrated during all phases of the planning process
- The Phase One brief is the MPKI cell's moment to situate and inform the Command and Staff prior to the conduct of planning
- An updated peacekeeping-intelligence picture and 'testing' of the potential COAs will inform planning and shape the COA Brief
- The role of the MPKI staff during mission rehearsal is to raise realistic and relevant scenarios involving the physical, information and human terrains to test the plan and ensure that it is viable in relation to possible contingencies

Questions?



Lesson 3.6

Intelligence Support to POC Planning

Content

- Introduction
- POC Planning Structure
- Intelligence Inputs

Learning Outcomes

- Explain why POC Planning is important
- Identify intelligence inputs to POC Planning

POC Mandates

- Majority of UN missions are tasked with POC mandate
- More than 95 % of peacekeeping personnel are deployed in missions with a POC mandate
- All recently established missions equipped with POC mandate



POC PLANNING



POC PLANNING



Mission Mandate



Receipt of mission

Unit Planning

Unit Plan is endorsed and approved by Sector Commander

UN Regional HQ

- Political
- **Security (Military)**
- Humanitarian

Phases of Response



Prevention


Pre-emption

Response


Consolidation

Military POC planning and intelligence efforts focused here for groups associated with a high-risk criteria


POC PLANNING



POC PLANNING



POC PLANNING – MISSION ANALYSIS



INTELLIGENCE

PRODUCT



- Terrain Analysis
- HTA
- ASCOPE-PMESII

- HTA
- Relevant Actor Analysis/Evaluation
- Terrain Analysis

- HTA
- Relevant Actor Analysis/Evaluation
- Terrain Analysis

- HTA
- Relevant Actor Analysis/Evaluation
- Terrain Analysis

POC PLANNING – MISSION ANALYSIS



**INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCT**



- Threat Analysis/Evaluation/Integration
- SPIE
- Situation Paragraph

- HTA
- Relevant Actor Analysis/Evaluation

- Terrain Analysis
- Threat Analysis/Evaluation/Integration

POC PLANNING – MISSION ANALYSIS



ASSESSMENTS:




- Terrain Analysis
- HTA
- ASCOPE-PMESII
- Threat Integration

- Terrain Analysis
- HTA
- Relevant Actor Analysis/Evaluation


- Threat Evaluation
- Timelines/Pattern Analysis

- Professional intelligence advice

INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCT



POC PLANNING



Take Away

- In parallel to the MDMP, each level of command will conduct POC planning that Intelligence Analysts need to support
- Analysts need to understand the products of POC planning in order to provide products that assist planners
- The only difference between threats to force and threats to civilians is perspective