

KEY OUTPUTS:

- ASCOPE PMESII for the sector
- Information gaps identified and listed as Information Requirements
- Short human terrain-focused intelligence estimate using the 3-column format
- List of deductions and additional Information Requirements
- Human terrain overlays for ethnic areas, areas of armed groups, and non-permissive and permissive areas for the UN

Lesson 3.5e



AOE-Analysis of Information Terrain

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

The aim of this lesson is to introduce military peacekeeping-intelligence officers to the practices and processes of analysing the information terrain in UN peacekeeping operations.

Slide 1




Lesson 3.5e
Analysis of
Information Terrain

1

Information is a vital resource. Peacekeeping operations depend on information and information systems for many simultaneous and integrated activities. For peacekeeping operations to succeed, it is necessary for peacekeeping missions to gain and maintain information superiority. The first and foremost is to understand the information environment within which peacekeeping operations are conducted.

The aim of this lesson is to introduce military peacekeeping-intelligence officers to the practices and processes of analyzing the information terrain in UN peacekeeping operations.

Slide 2



Lesson Content

- Understanding the peacekeeping information terrain
- Information requirements of the information terrain
- Analysis of the information terrain
- Working with the public information function


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Here are the subject areas we will be covering.

The information environment (henceforth referred to as the Information Terrain) is an important aspect of the peacekeeping operating environment. For a comprehensive understanding of the peacekeeping information terrain, deliberate analysis of the information environment is required. This is often overlooked by some UN Forces, but it should be given the same time as an analysis of the physical terrain.

Frequently, the results of the MPKI section's analysis of the information terrain will inform the wider mission of public information or communications strategy.

Slide 3



Learning Outcomes

- Explain the peacekeeping information terrain
- Describe information requirements for the information terrain
- Apply techniques to analyze the information terrain
- Explain public information function

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Intelligence staff officers must understand both the peacekeeping information terrain and what the commander needs to know about it. They must also understand the analytical tools used to evaluate it and understand how to apply this knowledge in support of communication operations.

Let's review the Learning Outcomes for this lesson. At the end of the lesson you are expected to:

- Explain the peacekeeping information terrain
- Describe information requirements for the information terrain
- Apply techniques to analyse the information terrain

Slide 4

Understanding Peacekeeping Information Terrain

- Information environment, is where individuals, organizations, systems collect, process, disseminate, or act on information
- Consists of 3 key elements: **actors**, **resources** and **the employment of resources** by actors to influence others

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The information terrain is the space in which humans communicate. The information terrain governs how such communication occurs, and the systems that are used.

The transmission of information informs how people think and, in turn, how they act and react. Clearly, a comprehensive understanding of this is central to the understanding of the overall operating environment and to operational decision making, as this will have an impact on chosen actor Courses of Action.

The key elements of the information terrain include actors (leaders, decision-makers, individuals and organisations), resources (the materials and systems employed to collect, analyse, apply, or disseminate information) and the employment of resources by actors to influence others.



Interaction.


Actors. Ask the students which actors could influence the local population? Responses here include politicians, armed groups, community leaders, tribal leaders etc.

Resources. Ask the students what **resources** a key leader would need in this case? The response here is, among others, GSM towers, Internet access, and physical space and freedom to hold a meeting.

Employment of resources to influence others. Ask the students how these resources could be used to influence the local population, and what this could mean for the UN? Responses here include pro or anti-UN propaganda.

Interaction. Ask the students what it could mean if a local radio station was transmitting anti-UN propaganda in a part of the UN AO. How could this impact UN Operations? Would this help or hinder it? How could this influence the course of action that a group could take when meeting with a UN patrol?

Slide 5



Even though the information terrain is distinct from air, land, sea and space domains, it resides within each of them.


The information terrain is made up of three interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive. We will expand on this as we move through this lecture.

As such, it is closely related to the human terrain (those who employ information) and the physical terrain (which provides the conditions for the employment of information).



Interactive. Ask the students to discuss the links between the information terrain, the physical terrain, and the human terrain.

Slide 6



The physical dimension is composed of the command and control (C2) systems and supporting infrastructures that enable individuals and organisations to communicate. It is also the dimension where physical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. This includes the means of transmission, infrastructure, technologies, groups, and populations.



Interactive. Ask the students to identify the relevant infrastructure that supports the passage of information in their AOs. Responses include radio masts, GSM towers, internet coverage, TV masts, electricity lines. The list is endless.

It is important that we identify what is known and what is unknown. The unknowns are added to the Information Acquisition Plan (IAP).

The informational dimension is where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected.

The protection of UN information is governed by UN information security policy and executed by IT services, but the MPKI section must ascertain the following:

- Threat actor capabilities. For example, does a threat or otherwise, hostile actor have the capability to obtain UN information, or to prevent the UN from transmitting information?

- Threat actor vulnerabilities. Where does a threat actor have difficulty communicating and why? How does a threat actor communicate, and how could this be undermined?
- It is also a role of the UN MPKI section to find out where the physical terrain could prevent UN communications. These areas are known as communications blackspots

Slide 7

Understanding the Peacekeeping Information Terrain

- Not simple
- Associated technologies accessible to everyone
- Growing information operations (IO) capabilities for actors
- Actors capable of countering UN efforts through propaganda

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The information terrain of peacekeeping operations is not as simple as it might initially seem. The global information environment and its associated technologies are potentially available to everyone and can change rapidly.

As a result, actors now possess growing information capabilities. For example, regardless of their size, actors, including terrorist groups, can counter UN efforts through propaganda campaigns. They now have the capability to pass information, coordinate, exchange ideas, and synchronize their actions instantaneously.



Note to Instructor- Point out to the students that before 2007, social media had not penetrated most UN operating environments, but social media is now a significant factor influencing the information environment. The implication here is that the MPKI cell must constantly revisit the information terrain evaluation.

Slide 8

Learning Activity # 1**Case 1:**

In 1994, a radio station, Radio Mille Collines, played a crucial role in launching, inciting and directing the Rwandan genocide and triggered conflict throughout the Great Lakes region

Instructions:

Discuss how the information terrain of UN peacekeeping operations can impact mandate implementation. You will receive a detailed Handout for use in this case.

Time: Approx. 20 minutes (group discussion)

Key message: An actor's employment of information resources to influence others may impact a UN peacekeeping mission's mandate implementation, and the effective employment of information resources by a UN peacekeeping mission may also contribute to mandate implementation.



Interactive. Print out the narratives of the Radio Mille Collines case and hand out to the participants. Divide the class into groups and give them the necessary time to read the narrative. Attach at least one instructor to each group. Ask the participants to evaluate the study using the factor, deduction, output process. Ask the students to discuss the implications for the UN as they existed at that time from an information terrain perspective. Provide the students with the Handout in the Learning Activity folder Annex.



Instructor Note: See Annex B for Learning Activity #1 Handout- Radio Mille Collines transcript.

Slide 9

Information Requirements of the Information Terrain

- Physical properties
- Informational properties
- Cognitive properties

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Key Message. This slide is designed to make students think about the different components of the information terrain to develop a list of knowns, which become factors for further evaluation and unknowns, which will then become Information Requirements.

Collectively, the physical, informational, and cognitive properties of the information environment comprise step one of this process. These headings provide a start point for structured thinking. The Physical Properties of the information environment include people, places, things, and capabilities of information infrastructure and adversary information capabilities.



Interactive. Ask the class what should the MPKI section know about the physical environment in terms of place, structures, and information capabilities. Ensure the class notes what it does not know and stores these as IRs.

Examples should include The location of GSM, radio and TV masts, the penetration of such means, and the access of various actors to these means. The location of key information actors, locations where meetings are held etc.

Informational properties of the information environment include those systems and networks where information is created, processed, manipulated, transmitted, and

shared. It includes those properties relevant to the electronic collection, transmission, processing, storage, and display of information.



Interactive. Ask the class what the MPKI section should know about the information systems? Examples should include the area of mobile, radio, and Internet penetration. Access to information processing technology and hardware. Print media coverage.

Cognitive properties of the information environment are the psychological, cultural, behavioural, and other human attributes that influence decision making, the flow of information, and the interpretation of information by individuals or groups at any level in a state or organisation.



Interactive Ask the class what the MPKI section should know in this case? Examples would include: is it customary for a societal group to be influenced by means of communications? Are there psychological or historical factors that make this group particularly open or vulnerable to propaganda. The potential list is endless.



Note to Instructor- It is important that the students list both the knowns and the unknowns generated by the evaluation of the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions. Ensure that the students are aware that knowns will be brought forward for further analysis, while the unknowns will be transferred to the IAP.

Slide 10

Information Requirements of the Information Terrain

Population/Local Nationals

- How do the local nationals communicate
- How do they influence / advertise
- Any media bias linked to demographics or religion

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This slide commences step two of the structured process to iterate what is known and to develop information requirements. The actors in the peacekeeping information environment include the local population, the host nation-state actors such as the security forces and the non-state actors such as rebel factions or armed groups.

All these factors have access to information resources and have the potential to employ the information resources available to them to influence one another or the UN peacekeeping mission. Therefore, it is imperative for the UN mission to know each of these actors, the information resources available to each of them and how each of them may employ the resources to influence one another and the UN peacekeeping mission.

The information requirements concerning the local population may include but are not limited to:

- How do the local nationals communicate?
- How do they influence/advertise?
- Is there any media bias linked to demographics or religion?



Interactive Ask the class to think of other questions that the MPKI section should know as they pertain to the local population. If we do not know the

answer to any of these questions, then they become information requirements. Ensure that the students are aware that knowns will be brought forward for further analysis, while the unknowns will be transferred to the IAP.

Slide 11

Information Requirements of the Information Terrain

Host Nation

- How do host nation security forces communicate
- Is this secure
- Do the host nation security forces conduct information operations / influence media or social media

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The information requirements concerning the host nation may include but are not limited to: How do the host nation security forces communicate? Is this secure; do the host nation security forces conduct information operations/influence via media or social media?



Interactive Ask the class to think of other questions that the MPKI section should know as they pertain to the host nation. If we do not know the answer to any of these questions, then they become an information requirement. Ensure that the students are aware that knowns will be brought forward for further analysis, while the unknowns will be transferred to the IAP.

Slide 12

Information Requirements of the Information Terrain

Threat Actors

- How does threat actor communicate?
- Is this secure
- How does threat actor communicate with local nationals
- Does threat actor conduct information operations / influence media or social media

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Some actors in the host nation may employ information resources for their activities that may post a potential threat to the UN peacekeeping mission or the local civilians that the mission is mandated to protect. The intelligence staff must be able to identify potential threat actors and acquire necessary information concerning the threat actors.

Information requirements concerning threat actors may include but are not limited to:

- How does the threat actor communicate? Is this secure?
- How does the threat actor communicate with local nationals?
- Does the threat actor conduct information operations/influence via media or social media?



Interactive Ask the class to think of other questions that the MPKI section should know as they pertain to a threat actor. If we do not know the answer to any of these questions, then they become an information requirement. Ensure that the students are aware that knowns will be brought forward for further analysis, while the unknowns will be transferred to the IAP.

Slide 13

Information Requirements of the Information Terrain

UN Forces

- Collect information from the opponent media
- Exploitation opportunities
- Communicate with local nationals via host nation media or social media
- Conduct information operations / influence media or social media

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In addition to the information requirements about the local population and the host nation, the intelligence staff should also identify the essential elements of friendly information concerning the information environment for the planning and execution of UN information activities.

Essential elements of friendly information concerning the information environment include but are not limited to:

- Can we use host nation information infrastructure? Is it secure?
- Can we collect information from the opponent media?
- Are there exploitation opportunities?
- Can we communicate with local nationals via host nation media or social media?
- Can we conduct information operations/influence via media or social media?



Interactive Ask the class to think of other questions that the MPKI section should know as they pertain to the UN. If we do not know the answer to any of these questions, then they become an information requirement. Ensure that the

students are aware that knowns will be brought forward for further analysis, while the unknowns will be transferred to the IAP.

Planning for public information should be part of the peacekeeping strategy from its outset. A public information strategy allows the UN mission to ensure that the public can receive objective information about the peace process. In addition, public information can assist a peacekeeping mission in executing its mandate by establishing a favourable image of the mission, communicating clearly its role and objectives and winning acceptance and support for the mission's activity and ultimately the peace process itself. The MPKI section must always be prepared to support the PI section, just as it supports the operational sections and the UN MDMP.

Slide 14

Learning Activity # 2**Arguments for and against using social media for UNMMIG****1. Situation**

Use social media to support the mission by promoting the mission, enhancing communications and sharing information.

2. Instruction

Conduct a short discussion about the Pro's and Con's regarding using social media by UNMMIG in Garland.

3. Approx. Time: 20 minutes Group work and discussion



Interaction. Working in syndicate groups, have participants review the slide and then discuss the UNMMIG plan on the use of social media to share information with the local population. Ask them about the factors that they should consider before making a recommendation; ask to come up with pros and cons, and report back their findings to the entire class.

Help facilitate, and coach- what we are looking for in this case are some of the following considerations:

- What is the UNMMIG target audience?
- Does it use social media?
- What social media platforms does it use?
- Is there Internet coverage in the area?
- What languages does the local population speak?
- What kind of messages will be effective?
- Is the target population literate?

- *Will social media reach all the target audience; for example, do the elderly use social media?*



Note to Instructor- Additional information about social media:

Social media are web-based communication tools that enable people to interact with each other by both sharing and consuming information.

Social media include digital media tools that enable users to easily create, modify, link, share, and post content collaboratively through computers, mobile phones or tablets. Websites and applications dedicated to forums, microblogging, social networking, social bookmarking and wikis are among the different types of social media.

One of the features of social media is that they usually give users the flexibility to manage the information they see in their news feeds and even give feedback on what they want or don't want to see.

Slide 15

Analysis Techniques: ASCOPE – PMESII

	Political	Military	Economic	Social	Infrastructure	Information
Areas						
Structures						
Capabilities						
Organizations						
People						
Events						

- Completed from basic and current intelligence
- What is known become factors for further Analysis;
- What is unknown become Information Requirements

Ongoing process throughout the Mission life cycle

While we are approaching the development of information requirements for the Information terrain in a slightly different fashion, the ASCOPE-PMESII tool is also useful for highlighting what is known about the information terrain, and what is not.

Once again, by showing how the ASCOPE-PMESII tool can be applied to the generation of factors and information requirements, we create a structure for the MPKI section to work with, thereby assuring our evaluation is comprehensive. We have seen in earlier physical and human terrain lectures; we use the ASCOPE-PMESII framework to structure our thought processes.

In the case of information terrain, we focus on the information part of the PMESII acronym and match it with Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organisations, People, and Events. This will offer a relatively comprehensive overview of what we know and what we do not know.

Slide 16

Analysis Techniques: Three Column Format

- Find the known factors
- Drawn from basic and current intelligence:
 - List key physical factors- people, organizations, areas, structures, capabilities
 - List key informational factors- systems, penetration
 - List key cognitive factors- cultural, historical, social

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Key Message. The 3 Column Format tool will be used as a framework for analysis. The first part of this lecture involves the key knowns from our initial review of basic and current intelligence as it pertains to information terrain.

The knowns have been identified using the frameworks we have just used: the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions; and using ASCOPE-PMESII. The following process should be adhered to:

- List what the key factors pertaining to the physical dimension of information terrain: places, structures, key leaders, organisations such as threat groups and their known capabilities.
- List the key factors pertaining to the information dimension, such as information systems and penetration.
- List the key factors pertaining to the cognitive dimension such as important historical, cultural and social factors.
- List the key factors pertaining to the local population, to the host nations, to threat actors, and to UN Forces.

These are all the key knowns about the information environment.

Slide 17

Column One – Known Factors

Factor	Deduction	Output
Ron influences Tribal Group A		

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The 3-column format can be applied in evaluating the effects of the information terrain. Here is an example.

Slide 18

Column Two – Deductions		
Factor	Deduction	Output
Ron influences Tribal Group A	Tribal Group A likely to adhere to Ron's Political beliefs; Ron is a key leader in the UN AOR; Ron may be a target for Threat group B	

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Moving to the second column, make deductions based on what is known. As we have been previously shown, deductions or the 'so what' populate the second column of the three-factor process. This is where the MPKI section really earns its money.

Consider each factor as follows:

- So what for civilian population (tribal/religious/ethnic groups);
- So what for UN Forces
- So what for threat actors



Interactive Ask the students what the implication of the following factor: 'NO Internet connectivity in area X'. What are the implications or so what for each of those 3 groups? Responses could include such things as Tribal group A cannot be influenced by social media or other internet-based media; UN personnel will not be able to communicate using internet-based devices; Threat Actors can only communicate using GSM or radio-based capabilities. The students must record the deductions as they form a basis for further evaluation and will inform the MDMP.

Slide 19

Column Three – Outputs		
Factor	Deduction	Output
Ron influences Tribal Group A	Tribal Group A likely to adhere to Ron's Political beliefs; Ron is a key leader in the UN AOR; Ron may be a target for Threat group B	IR. What are Ron's political beliefs? IR. What is Ron's attitude to the UN? IR,. What is Ron's attitude to threat group B?

The third column will constitute a series of outputs or tasks as they relate to the information environment. These outputs can be additional information requirements, planning guidance or tasks for assets. Outputs for the MPKI section come in the form of Information Requirements, tasks for ISR assets, and/or planning guidance.



Interactive. Ask students to derive tasks from their previous deductions. For example, an information requirement relating to the threat actor could be 'is there GSM coverage in area X? Or consider bringing BGAN or another portable Internet system for UN Forces.

Slide 20

Learning Activity # 3

What do you know about your sector (factors)?

What are your unknowns (IR)?

Consider:

Physical (areas, structures, people, organizations),
informational (systems, penetration), cognitive
dimensions (how people are influenced)

Approx. Time: 15 min



Interactive Ask the class to break into their syndicate groups with each group focusing on their specific sector; Ask the students to list what they know and what questions they have about the information terrain in their sector; Guide the students to focus on: areas, structures and actors; resources available to actors; how information influences behaviour in their Area. Students should evaluate what they should know about information: areas in a UN AO; structures in a UN AO; capabilities in a UN AO; and organisations in a UN AO. Each group should focus on one topic only. Each group should produce a list of knowns and questions as to its output.

Slide 21

Information Terrain Mapping

Intelligence staff should consider producing the following overlays:

- Telecommunications infrastructure
- Cell-phone blackspots, internet blackspots
- Locations of group meeting areas
- Pro-UN media and extent of coverage
- Anti-UN media and extent of coverage
- Electromagnetic spectrum usage and overview


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Mapping can help the commander and the staffs visualize and better understand the information terrain. It is intuitive, and humans tend to process information better in visual form. The list of overlays the MPKI section is extensive, but the most important are listed above. It is important to remember that there is always a reason why an overlay is created. Intelligence staff should consider producing different overlays and combine them into one, noting that the normal map marking considerations should be adhered to, including:


- Three reference points to enable the correct positioning of the overlay on the map
- The DTG of the map so that the user knows if it is up to date
- A clear legend
- Clear colours to mark different themes
- The map detail should not be obscured
- The direction of North
- The signature of the creator
- Classification

For this course, students should include communications infrastructure; communications blackspots; pro and anti-UN media coverage.

Slide 22



Here is an example of combined information terrain mapping.

 **Interactive.** Ask the students what this overlay tells them. Based on our guidelines, ask the students what is missing here?

Slide 23

Support to Public Information Functions

Input / advice in the PI planning process:

- Physical dimension
- Informational dimension
- Cognitive dimension

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Key Message. While an effective public information strategy is a political and operational necessity, it is not the central role of the MPKI section. Rather, the MPKI section should be ready to support the UN Public Information Officer (PIO) or the strategic communications section.

Peacekeeping operations require the understanding and cooperation of all parties in the mission area, the general population, as well as the political and material support of the international community, to fulfil their mandates and ensure the security of United Nations personnel.

Depending on the level of literacy, communications infrastructure, media environment and level of civil society activity in the mission area, the public information program may include public relations activities aimed at community groups. Such activities may include briefings, “town hall” meetings, concerts, and theatrical performances.

The UN MPKI role in this regard is to support the Public Information Officer, or strategic communications section by providing them with the results of the analysis of the information terrain.



Interactive. Tell the students that the UN PIO plans to launch a messaging campaign in support of an UN-supervised ceasefire. The campaign will target a

specific tribal group. How could the UN MPKI section assist? Ask the students to approach this issue methodically using the three dimensions: the physical; the informational; and the cognitive. Responses here would be briefing the UN PIO on the following:

physical information dimension – how best to transmit the message. For example, there is no point in transmitting the information via TV programs if there are no TV masts in the tribal group's area. The MPKI section should explain how the physical terrain would help or hinder the passage of the UN message;

Information dimension: can negative actors block the transmission? If so, how can the UN prevent this from happening? How can the message best be transmitted? For example, if the tribal group is largely illiterate, then there is no point in printing pamphlets. The MPKI section should advise on protections needed, and the best means to reach the tribal group.

Cognitive dimension. How can the tribal group be influenced to act or react? How is the tribal group likely to react based on what is known about the group. Once again, this highlights the link between the information terrain and what we know about the human terrain.

Ensure the students understand that they will not operate in a PIO function, but that they should actively support the PIO nonetheless

Slide 24

Learning Activity # 4**Tasks:** - Identify Knowns

- Identify IRs

- Analyze using 3-column format

Outputs: List of IRs; record of relevant deductions;
Terrain overlay.**Tip:** Have one-member recording IRs, and another recording deductions; put two students preparing the overlay based on knowns and deductions**Time:** 1.5 hours

Interactive. Break the class into syndicate groups with each group focusing on their specific sector; Ask the students to work out what they know and what questions they have about the information terrain in their sector. Guide the students to focus on: areas, structures and actors; resources available to actors; how information influences behaviour in their AO;

Students should evaluate what they should know about information: areas in a UN AO; structures in a UN AO; capabilities in a UN AO; and organisations in a UN AO. Each group should focus on one topic only. Each group should produce a list of knowns and questions as to its output.

Slide 25

Take Away

- The success of peacekeeping operations depends on information and information systems
- An effective information strategy is an operational necessity
- Analysis of the information terrain is key to understanding the peacekeeping information environment and decision-making
- Intelligence staff must work closely with the public information function for planning and executing operations

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Summary

- The success of peacekeeping operations depends on information and information systems.
- An effective information strategy is an operational necessity.
- Analysis of the information terrain is key to understanding the peacekeeping information environment and decision-making.
- Intelligence staff must work closely with the public information function for planning and executing operations.

Lesson 3.5f



AOE-ASCOPE_PMESII

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

The ASCOPE-PMESII tool was briefly presented / shown during Lesson the AOE introduction lesson. During this Lesson the students will be taught how to use ASCOPE-PMESII in the further analysis of AOE – especially the Human Terrain – and to identify information/intelligence gaps that need to be filled.

ASCOPE-PMESII is a tool developed to focus intelligence collection and analysis on all relevant factors that can impact on operations – and not just the military factors.

Before starting the lesson prepare the following materials to be handed out to the students - preferably in soft copy:


- A generic ASCOPE-PMESII matrix explaining the general content of the individual boxes as shown in slide 5 for reference
- A blank ASCOPE-PMESII matrix to be filled out during the learning activity at the end of the lesson
- 3-column format form

Slide 1



ASCOPE and PMESII are analytical tools that are well-suited to the Operating Environment Evaluation in UN Peacekeeping Operations. The topic of this lesson is ASCOPE – PMESII. The acronyms stand for: Area – Structures – Capabilities – Organisations – People – Events (ASCOPE) and Political-Military – Economic – Social – Information – Infrastructure. This is one such tool in our toolbox to help us. It looks complex, yet it is not. It is very similar to an index in a book.

Slide 2




Content

- ASCOPE
- PMESII
- ASCOPE – PMESII Matrix

	P Political	M Military	E Economic	S Social	I Information	Infrastructure
A Area	Area - Political (Dance Boundary, Party, official area)	Area - Military (Casualty / IED area, human ambush/IED area)	Area - Economic (Stores, shops, markets)	Area - Social (Parks and other meeting areas)	Area - Information (Radio/TV/television / where people gather for entertainment)	Area - Infrastructure (Ingestion networks, water lines, medical coverage)
S Structures	Structures - Political (Town hall, government office)	Structures - Military (Police (Police HQ, Military HQ), locations)	Structures - Economic (Banks, markets, storage facilities)	Structures - Social (Churches, restaurants, bar, etc.)	Structures - Information (Cell / Radio / TV tower, point drop)	Structures - Infrastructure (roads, bridges, power lines, water, dams)
C Capabilities	Capabilities - Political (Dispute resolution, insurgent capabilities)	Capabilities - Military (Security posture, strengths and weaknesses)	Capabilities - Economic (Access to funds, ability to undertake major business)	Capabilities - Social (Strength of local & external ties)	Capabilities - Info (Literacy rate, availability of media phone service)	Capabilities - Infrastructure (Ability to build / maintain roads, water, dams)
O Organisation	Organisations - Political (Political parties and other power brokers, etc.)	Organisations - Military (Other units of military, police, insurgent (or private))	Organisations - Economic (Banks, large businesses, big businesses)	Organisations - Social (Religious, youth groups, NGOs / NGOs)	Organisations - Info (Media groups, influential people, other power brokers)	Organisations - Infrastructure (Government ministries, construction companies)
P People	People - Political (Dancers, models, artists)	People - Military (Soldiers from coalition, IED and insurgent forces)	People - Economic (Bartenders, waitresses, etc.)	People - Social (Religious leaders, influential families)	People - Info (Media owners, models, heads of powerful families)	People - Infrastructure (Business owners, development councils)
E Events	Events - Political (weddings, model meetings)	Events - Military (Military/coalition events, loss of leadership, operations announcements)	Events - Economic (weddings, business openings/closes)	Events - Social (weddings, religious events)	Events - Info (TV news, model openings, TV/CMS events)	Events - Infrastructure (wed / bridge construction, road digging, scheduled maintenance)

Here is the content we will cover in this lesson. The ASCOPE societal factors or dimensions (Area – Structures – Capabilities – Organisations – People – Events), and the PMESII systems/sub-systems (Political-Military – Economic – Social – Information – Infrastructure) The ASCOPE – PMESII Matrix, which is a tool used to systematically identify factors relating to the Human Terrain, and to highlight information gaps. The lesson will conclude with a scenario-based classroom exercise using the ASCOPE – PMESII Matrix.

Slide 3



Learning Outcomes

- Describe what the acronym ASCOPE-PMESII represents
- Explain the ASCOPE-PMESII and how it can assist the MIO
- Apply the ASCOPE-PMESII matrix

Let's review the Learning Outcomes for this lesson. When this lesson has been completed, you are expected to be able to explain the ASCOPE - PMESII headings, how the ASCOPE-PMESII matrix can assist us in identifying factors for further evaluation of the operating environment, and how it can drive the formation of the Information Acquisition Plan (IAP).

Throughout this lesson, students will be expected to demonstrate the understanding of ASCOPE – PMESII by completing an exercise in which you populate one or more intersecting boxes in the ASCOPE – PMESII Matrix based on the information provided in the exercise scenario.


Slide 4



Key Message: ASCOPE – PMESII is a very useful tool which enables the MPKI cell to systematically break down all the factors associated with the operating environment. However, it has a particularly strong relationship with the Human Terrain.

When using the matrix, we should consider populating it from three perspectives: the local civilian population and the organisations therein; friendly or allied forces; and threat actors. From the factors on the screen, you can see that we are not just looking at tangible 'things'. Rather, we consider all aspects, including beliefs.

Slide 5



Introduction – ASCOPE – PMESII Matrix

	P Political	M Military	E Economic	S Social	I Information	I Infrastructure
A Areas	Areas - Political (District Boundary, Party affiliation areas)	Areas - Military (Coalition / UN bases, historic ambush/IED sites)	Areas - Economic (bazaars, shops, markets)	Areas - Social (parks and other meeting areas)	Areas - Information (Radio/TV/newspapers /where people gather for word-of-mouth)	Areas - Infrastructure (Irrigation networks, water tables, medical coverage)
S Structures	Structures - Political (town halls, government offices)	Structures - Military / Police (police HQ, Military HHQ locations)	Structures - Economic (banks, markets, storage facilities)	Structures - Social (Churches, restaurants, bars, etc.)	Structures - Information (Cell / Radio / TV towers, print shops)	Structures - Infrastructure (roads, bridges, power lines, walls, dams)
C Capabilities	Capabilities - Political (Dispute resolution, insurgent capabilities)	Capabilities - Military (security posture, strengths and weaknesses)	Capabilities - Economic (access to banks, ability to withstand natural disasters)	Capabilities - Social (Strength of local & national ties)	Capabilities - Info (Literacy rate, availability of media / phone service)	Capabilities - Infrastructure (Ability to build / maintain roads, walls, dams)
O Organizations	Organizations - Political (Political parties and other power brokers, UN,)	Organizations - Military (What units of military, police, insurgent are present)	Organizations - Economic (Banks, large land holders, big businesses)	Organizations - Social (tribes, clans, families, youth groups, NGOs / IOs)	Organizations - Info (NEWS groups, influential people who pass word)	Organizations - Infrastructure (Government ministries, construction companies)
P People	People - Political (Governors, councils, elders)	People - Military (Leaders from coalition, UN and insurgent forces)	People - Economic (Bankers, landholders, merchants)	People - Social (Religious leaders, influential families)	People - Info (Media owners, mullahs, heads of powerful families)	People - Infrastructure (Builders, contractors, development councils)
E Events	Events - Political (elections, council meetings)	Events - Military (lethal/nonlethal events, loss of leadership, operations, anniversaries)	Events - Economic (drought, harvest, business open/close)	Events - Social (holidays, weddings, religious days)	Events - Info (IO campaigns, project openings, CIVCAS events)	Events - Infrastructure (road / bridge construction, well digging, scheduled maintenance)

Key Message: The purpose of this slide is to refresh the students' memory regarding the ASCOPE-PMESII matrix, last seen during the introduction to the Analysis of the Operating Environment. It shows the intersecting societal factors (ASCOPE) together with the operational variables or systems (PMESII), thus making it possible to guide the analysis of the Human Terrain.

This is the ASCOPE-PMESII matrix. You must first understand how to read it. Move across the societal factors on the horizontal axis and match it with the variables on the vertical axis. The example on the slide matches the Social with the social system's structures.



Interaction. Ask the students what they would expect to see in this box. Ask the students to consider it from a threat actor, friendly forces, and local population perspective. The factors that the students identify are moved to the 3-column format for further analysis. Quickly become apparent that the students lack some information on social structures. These information gaps should be recorded and sent forward as Requests for Information or should enter the Information Acquisition Plan (IAP).

Ask students to consider their own countries and to offer up what areas they may want to focus on, e.g. what areas of your economy you would focus on?

Slide 6



The ASCOPE elements are the societal factors in which the PMESII systems and sub-systems operate. Generally, ASCOPE-PMESII covers what the MPKI section should know about their operating environment. Here is what the letters in ASCOPE stand for: Area – Structures – Capabilities – Organisations – People – Events. Each of these dimensions has a series of sub-systems, which is why we cross-reference each dimension with PMESII.

Slide 7



A is for Area is the first ASCOPE factor and is the physical locations and terrain that affect all relevant actors. Areas are localities or physical terrains that have a direct impact on all actors.


The photograph illustrates an international border (between Germany and Poland).

Area factors may affect choices among relevant actors, such as the routes various relevant actors choose to travel, the places where relevant actors choose to settle, and the people with whom relevant actors choose to interact for various reasons. Area factors also impact the UN Force Commander's decisions during the planning and execution of operations.



Interaction. Ask the students for examples of this factor/sub-system before listing them. Examples include tribal regions, police districts, political boundaries, religious boundaries, territorial boundaries, military boundaries, polling stations, and government centres.

Slide 8



S is for Structures is the second ASCOPE societal factor and includes significant infrastructure such as bridges, religious sites, hospitals and schools. Structures are existing infrastructure. Examples include hospitals, bridges, communications towers, power plants, dams, jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants.

In the context of Peacekeeping Operations, some cultural structures maybe even more important, such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and museums. The photographs show (clockwise): a girder bridge, a Hindu temple, a hospital and a school. In a PKO environment, we cannot overemphasise the potential for problems and sensitivities when the UN operates near and around such structures.

Analysis of the relevant structures includes determining why they are important with respect to their location, functions, capabilities, and application. It is even more important to understand which structures matter, what their significance is to political and military strategy, and how they influence the decision-making and actions of relevant actors.

Slide 9



C for Capabilities is the third ASCOPE societal factor and includes such key functions as administration, food/water supplies, healthcare, social services. Relevant capabilities may include but are not limited to, administration, safety, emergency services, food distribution, agricultural systems, public works and utilities, health, public transportation, electricity, economics, and commerce. Sewage, water, electrical, academic, trash, medical, and security infrastructure are some of the essential services that may be relevant.

Capabilities often affect the security and quality of life of relevant aspects of the population and can sometimes influence decisions among the populace about whether to behave in a manner that assists a government or insurgency.

It is important to understand the interdependence each of these capabilities has upon one another, as well as upon other ASCOPE factors. Electricity affects the ability to bring in information and freshwater; water affects the ability to maintain sewage, prevent disease, and maintain quality of life for the population. These factors are all interdependent upon one another, and the impact of any action affecting one capability must consider the impact this action will have on other capabilities or factors.



Interaction. Ask the students for examples of this factor/sub-system before listing them.

Slide 10



O for Organisations is the fourth ASCOPE societal factor. Organisations can be political, religious, social, criminal, media, patriotic, and community watch groups, as well as other international organisations (e.g. the African Union), NGOs, merchants, squatters, and other groups. The photographs show the logos of the major political parties of France, a shura (meeting of a council of tribal elders) in Afghanistan, and the logo of an Afghan NGO.

Insurgents, counterinsurgents, and the population are not the only relevant actors within the Operating Environment, and it is important to understand how various organisations (or groupings) impact on the OE.



Interaction. Ask the students for examples of this factor/sub-system before listing them.

Slide 11



P for People is the fifth ASCOPE societal factor. Historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors should be considered when examining the people within the OE. The map shows the distribution of ethnic groups in Afghanistan, and some of the main political leaders in Afghanistan are shown in the photograph. Understanding who is where within the OE will almost always be a relevant factor in the decision cycles of each relevant actor.

For example, areas where people and terrorist armed groups transit, retreat, evade, or hide may have relevance. Knowing where squatters, the homeless, refugees, displaced persons, and outcast groups are and why they are there may also be relevant. The information environment has increased the ability of diaspora populations living abroad to have a direct effect on the attitude, finances, behaviour, and support of the population within the OE. The attitude and beliefs of this external (to the OE) population and how they affect internal behaviour should also be considered.



Interaction. Ask the students for examples of this factor/sub-system before listing them.

Slide 12




E for Events is the sixth ASCOPE societal factor and includes harvest seasons, dates for markets, public and religious holidays. Events are routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that affect the OE.

Some examples are planting and harvest seasons, elections, changes in government, key leader succession, economic reforms, political reforms, holidays, observances, anniversaries of key historical events, riots, and trials.

The photographs show Afghan farmers harvesting grain; people celebrating Now Ruz, the Persian New Year, at the shrine of Hazrat Ali in Mazar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan; and a local market in Afghanistan.

Events may spur an increase or decrease in armed attacks. For example, terrorist armed groups may escalate violence to prevent an election, or terrorist activity may decrease during a harvest season as they assist the population. The analysis helps determine which events are relevant and how events help shape the behaviour of relevant actors. Some factors to consider may be the political, economic, psychological, environmental, and/or legal implications of each event.

Slide 13



The acronym PMESII covers the systems listed on the slide. The PMESII components comprise the systems and subsystems that operate within the OE. Combined with ASCOPE, PMESII becomes a useful analytical tool in support of the OEE phase. (This will become apparent when the ASCOPE – PMESII Matrix is presented and explained.)

The development of a systems perspective should be founded on the identification and analysis of all mission-relevant characteristics of the various actors' PMESII systems. Because the relevance of PMESII factors and characteristics will depend upon the specific situation associated with each mission, there can be no definitive listing of all characteristics appropriate under all circumstances.

For example, some of the characteristics that may be considered significant during a sustained humanitarian relief operation may receive slightly less emphasis during operations to protect civilians against terrorist armed groups. The analysis of relevant actors' PMESII systems could provide significant indications regarding the circumstances (ideals, goals, territory) that may cause that actor or actors to resort to the use of force or to exercise other political options.

Slide 14



PMESII - Political

- **Political: National, regional, local**





P in PMESII stands for " Political" and includes the political system and systems at the national, regional and local levels. The political system is comprised of the central and local governments as illustrated on the slide by photographs showing Afghan President Ashraf Ghani receiving US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the first woman district governor in Afghanistan, and an Afghan village elder.

The political system also comprises political organisations (including political parties and interest groups), and regional/international actors who receive and process political system demands. Political considerations may also include international relations; foreign alliances; unofficial power centres (gangs, cartels, multinational organisations, and militias); and political or ethnic grievances and affiliations.



Interaction. Ask the students for examples of this factor/sub-system before listing them.

Slide 15



The “**M**” in PMESII stands for “**Military**” and comprises friendly forces, threat actors, and host nation security forces, including the police. Military as illustrated on this slide by photographs of Afghan National Army (ANA) troops on patrol, two female Afghan police officers, and Taliban fighters.



Interaction. Ask the students for examples of this factor/sub-system before listing them.

Slide 16



The **"E" in PMESII stands for "Economic"**, which includes agriculture, industry, and business; and is illustrated by these photos from Afghanistan of a field being harvested, a marble processing plant and a businesswoman whose company sells dried fruits, nuts, fruit juices etc.

An analysis of the economic system takes into consideration the sum total of production, distribution, and consumption of all goods and services in a country. This may be seen as the combination of the formal and informal economies.

Factors to be analysed could include:

- Type of economic model (capitalism, socialism, other)
- Major industries that drive the economy (manufacturing textile/apparel, vehicle, or machine tools)
- Agricultural base (i.e. food production)
- Economic relationship with other countries and with international trade (imports, exports, and the balance of payments)
- The health of domestic markets (i.e. the economic situation: growth, stagnation or decline)
- Opportunities for people to borrow money or own businesses.

- Relationship of the country to foreign investors and the international community for foreign aid and debt relief
- Labour force—skills and employment levels
- Factors regarding the informal economy (terrorist financing, narcotics trade, trafficking in humans, unregulated labour, and smuggling).
- Impact of corruption, accountability (or lack thereof), and transparency (or lack thereof) on the economic system.
- Sources of economic tension (e.g. between socio-economic classes and/or ethnic/religious groups in the population).

Slide 17



The " Social" in PMESII includes communities as represented by the photo of an Afghan village, religious (and ethnic) groups such as the Afghan Shia Hazaras in the second photo, and social classes. Bill Gates, as one of the richest men in the world, belongs in a socio-economic class of his own – together with nine other people. It is important to know the social system's framework in order to evaluate and dissect social interactions. Considerations for analysis could include:

- The cohesion of socio-religious groups
- Causes of societal pressures and discontent
- Impact of immigration and emigration
- The health of the population, including the availability of food and medical supplies
- Educational and economic opportunities
- Role of Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) and NGOs
- Types and extent of crime
- Presence and impact of separatist and terrorist armed groups
- Cultural differences among population
- Tolerance for religious freedom



Interaction. Ask the students for examples of this factor.

Slide 18



The first “I” in PMESII, which stands for **Information**, may be illustrated by print media such as the Afghan newspaper *Islah* Daily, the first women-only TV station in Afghanistan, and an Afghan using mobile phone communications.

The information system – or systems – in the OE are examined regarding national objectives, communication capabilities, and operations in support of a focus area. Primary subsystems include global information, national information, and defence information networks. Factors for analysis could include:

- Capabilities (reach and capacity (e.g. bandwidth)) of national communications systems (and the communications systems of non-state actors).
- Location of critical communications facilities.
- Foreign technical support to the construction and maintenance of internal telecommunications systems.
- Assessment of IT infrastructure.
- Censorship of the media and the internet.



Interaction. Ask the students for examples of this factor.

Slide 19



The second **"I"** in **PMESII** stands for **"Infrastructure"**, and is illustrated by these photos from Afghanistan showing a train on the railroad from Mazar-i-Sharif (in Afghanistan) to Uzbekistan; Highway 1, the main highway in the country; and the Kajaki Dam and hydroelectric plant.




Interaction. Ask the students for examples of this factor/sub-system before listing them.

An infrastructure system includes utilities, transportation, industry, and public facilities. Considerations for analysis could include:

- The ability of the utility network to support industry and the population.
- Sufficiency of water and wastewater facilities.
- Adequacy of the transportation network.
- Adequacy of public facilities in meeting the needs of the population.

Slide 20



ASCOPE – PMESII Matrix

	P Political	M Military	E Economic	S Social	I Information	I Infrastructure
A Areas	Areas - Political (District Boundary, Party affiliation areas)	Areas - Military (Coalition / UN bases, historic ambush/IED sites)	Areas - Economic (bazaars, shops, markets)	Areas - Social (parks and other meeting areas)	Areas - Information (Radio/TV/newspapers /where people gather for word-of-mouth)	Areas - Infrastructure (irrigation networks, water tables, medical coverage)
S Structures	Structures - Political (town halls, government offices)	Structures - Military / Police (police HQ, Military HHQ locations)	Structures - Economic (banks, markets, storage facilities)	Structures - Social (Churches, restaurants, bars, etc.)	Structures - Information (Cell / Radio / TV towers, print shops)	Structures - Infrastructure (roads, bridges, power lines, walls, dams)
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O Organizations	Organizations - Political (Political parties and other power brokers, UN,)	Organizations - Military (What units of military, police, insurgent are present)	Organizations - Economic (Banks, large land holders, big businesses)	Organizations - Social (tribes, clans, families, youth groups, NGOs / IGOs)	Organizations - Info (NEWS groups, influential people who pass word)	Organizations - Infrastructure (Government ministries, construction companies)
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E Events	Events - Political (elections, council meetings)	Events - Military (lethal/nonlethal events, loss of leadership, operations, anniversaries)	Events - Economic (drought, harvest, business open/close)	Events - Social (holidays, weddings, religious days)	Events - Info (IO campaigns, project openings, CIVICAS events)	Events - Infrastructure (road / bridge construction, well digging, scheduled maintenance)

This slide shows the “intersection” of societal factors (including examples for each ASCOPE characteristic) with the operational variables (PMESII). This makes it possible to systematically identify known factors and actors to be brought forward for further analysis in the 3-column format (Note to Instructor. The students can and should use this matrix before engaging in their evaluation of the operating environment as it will focus it, particularly as it relates to the human terrain. This helps the MPKIO Identify unknowns or information gaps, which will drive the formulation of the Information Acquisition Plan.

Here is an example of possible content – which by no means are exhaustive – of the ASCOPE – PMESII Matrix in which the ASCOPE societal factors “intersect” with the operational variables (PMESII) in the Matrix. The items listed in each “intersecting” ASCOPE – PMESII” box” are by no means complete but should give a general idea of the information/intelligence contained in or derived from the Matrix.

Using the ASCOPE – PMESII Matrix, it is possible to guide the analysis of the Human Terrain, systematically identifying factors for evaluation and unknowns.


In this example, we cross-reference people with political. This informs the MPKI cell that it should know who the local key political leaders are at all levels. The MPKI cell will make deductions based on their knowledge of this individual. If the answer is now known, then it becomes an RFI or enters the IAP as a general question. For example, who is the local political leadership in each town in the Sector AO?

As the matrix is filled, it can be 'colour-coded' using red, amber, green to highlight the level / confidence of knowledge and understanding. Green would mean the MPKI cell was confident of its understanding, and red would mean the section has extremely limited information on an area. Note the colours on the slide, what is this section confident in its knowledge, and what does it have significant information deficits?



Interaction. *Have the students take a moment to study the matrix; focusing on People. Ask them to develop additional RFIs.*

Slide 21



3-Column Format

Factors identified and unknowns listed
(Political-People)

FACTOR	DEDUCTION	OUTPUT
Leader of Village X is John Snow, who is a Government loyalist.	John Snow probably has access to government funds. John Snow probably has influence over the local population.	RFI. Is the village pro-Government? RFI. Is John Snow pro-UN?
Local leader of villages A, B & C unknown		RFI/IAP

Key Message: Factors identified from the ASCOPE-PMESII matrix as having an impact on the Operating Environment are analysed using the Three-Column Format (3CF). This includes factors for which there are information/intelligence gaps that must be filled.

When factors impacting on the Operating Environment are identified, we use the 3CF to analyse, deduce and determine the necessary output to address the factor in question.

The example on this slide is based on the intersection of people with political. Here we know that John Snow is the local leader of village X but know little else about him. It is important that we find out. Therefore, our unknowns drive further information acquisition.

Similarly, what we must list what we do not know. In this case, we do not know who the leaders of villages A, B, and C are. This becomes another RFI.

Slide 22



Other Tools

- **STEMPLES** - Social, Technological, Environmental, Military, Political, Legal, Economic, Security
- **PEST**- Political, Economic, Social, Technological
- **PMESII-PT** - Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, **Physical environment, Time**
- **DIME** - Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, i.e. instruments of power available primarily to state actor


ASCOPE-PMESII is simply a tool to facilitate a structured, systematic evaluation of what we know, and a means of recognizing and recording what we do not know.

There are other useful tools that can be used in conjunction with ASCOPE - PMESII:

- STEMPLES (Social, Technological, Environmental, Military, Political, Legal, Economic, Security)
- PEST (Political, Economic, Social, Technological)
- PMESII-PT (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical environment, Time), which are add-on variables to PMESII
- DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic), which are the instruments of power available primarily to actors

These tools, just like ASCOPE-PMESII, simply put structure on our approach to ascertaining a deeper understanding of what we already know and identifying what we do not know.

Slide 23




Take Away

- ASCOPE PMESII are tools to help identify knowns for analysis and unknowns for RFIs/IAP
- ASCOPE factors are **dimensions** in which the PMESII **operational variables** (systems and sub-systems)
- ASCOPE – PMESII is central to Human Terrain Evaluation
- ASCOPE – PMESII can be colour coded to denote levels of confidence

Summary

- ASCOPE PMESII is a tool that puts structure on the identification of knowns (for further analysis) and unknowns (for RFIs/IAP)
- The ASCOPE societal factors are the dimensions in which the PMESII operational variables (systems and sub-systems) operate.
- ASCOPE – PMESII is central to Human Terrain Evaluation.
- ASCOPE – PMESII can be colour coded to denote levels of confidence.
- ASCOPE-PMESII is best completed and stored in soft copy.

Learning Activity



Learning Activity

Instructions:

- Produce an ASCOPE – PMESII Matrix for your Sector
- Focus on the Human Terrain.
- Provide **at least one example of a known** and **at least one unknown** for each intersecting area
- Analyze 2 knowns using the three column format
- Create two questions for the IAP on the basis of the unknowns

Approx. Time: 60 minutes

RESOURCES

- An ASCOPE PMESII chart
- A three-column format chart
- Whiteboard or a flip chart and markers
- If possible, the ASCOPE PMESII chart and the 3CF should be given to students in soft copy and worked on a laptop

TIME

Approx. 60 -90 minutes

PREPARATION

Break into syndicates, try to assign one instructor per syndicate. Syndicates work on their sectors based on information from their sector information pack.

NOTE TO INSTRUCTORS:

Reinforce the learning outcomes and access the knowledge of the group and individuals

Lesson 3.5g



AOE- Actor Evaluation

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Slide 1



Lesson 3.5g
Actor Evaluation

1

Slide 2

Content

- Actor evaluation and analysis overview
- Threat analysis
- Threat actor templates- COWARD & 3 column
- PIN and SWOT analysis
- Center of gravity (COG) analysis

Here is the content we will cover in this lesson

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes

- Develop and develop a basic threat actor template
- Explain assess capability and intent
- Describe opportunity and inhibiting factors
- Apply the COG analysis
- Explain the links between actor evaluations and COA development

Let's review the Learning Outcomes for this lesson.

Slide 4

Actor Evaluation

- Organize, store information on relevant actors
- Reveal unknowns about relevant actors
- Create understanding of:
 - Doctrine or TTPs
 - Actor's capability to conduct operations
 - Actor's doctrine or modus operandi
 - Tactics against UN forces
 - Adversary objectives
 - How the actor operates



Key message: Evaluating all relevant actors present in a UN Area of Operations is critically important as it will allow you to develop an understanding of how these actors can positively or negatively affect the UN Mission and/or mandated tasks.

It is imperative that the MPKI cell actively acquires information on all relevant actors in its Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AIR) and in its Area of Intelligence Interest (AII). Note that a relevant actor is any important political, economic, humanitarian, or military figure or group that can have an impact on your operating environment.

Using data sheets, which will be outlined in this lecture set, to list all knowns about relevant actors can help you more readily identify what you do not know. This can help you identify information requirements for patrols or other sources.

Throughout this lecture set, we will demonstrate how Actor Evaluation can help identify: the doctrine or Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of a relevant actor (Note to Instructor: this could show how an NGO or an Armed Group functions); the relevant actor's capability to conduct operations (which could be positive or negative in a UN AO); the approaches that an armed actor could use in operations against the UN, its mission or its mandate; likely adversary objectives; and how an adversary may seek to operate.

Slide 5

Actor Evaluation Relevance		
MLCOA MLCOA Description: <i>Using effects terminology, what is the Actor's / Threat Actor's mission</i>		
MLCOA Intent Schematic		Actor / Threat Actor Msn: End state: SOM: Shaping: Decisive: Sustaining: Main Effort:
Timeline (if applicable):		
Functions Protection: Info & Int: Firepower: Manoeuvre: Logistics: Command & Control:	SWOT / CoG Analysis Strengths: Weaknesses: Opportunities: Threats: Centre of Gravity:	IHI List PIRs I&W

Topics such A Course of Action board (essential for operational decision making) for an adversary or other relevant actor cannot be completed without using the tools taught on this lecture. Indeed, every heading that you see here can be completed by combining the results of the Actor Evaluation process, with the results of your analysis of the Operating Environment.

Senior leadership's focus will be on adversarial actors, considering the threat they pose to safety and security/POC-related tasks, and the MPKI cell should apply these tools to all relevant actors. However, on initial deployment or for high-risk missions, it is important to focus on armed or adversarial actors as these will have the most impact on mandate implementation. Explain that therefore the course will generally use an armed actor for most examples.

For example, understanding the relevant actor's intent and overall objectives will help your MPKI cell will help you assess how the actor is likely to react, positively or negatively, to a UN Operation;

Similarly, understanding the relevant actor's capabilities (both organisational and operational) will ensure that you can accurately list them in the Functions column. This will also help your section to populate the Items of High Importance (IHI) list;

Slide 6



Key Message. Actor Evaluation should be completed for all relevant actors, not just those that are armed.



Interaction. Ask the students to suggest which groups are relevant actors are in a UN Operating Environment. Answers could include any person or group which through its interactions with the information, human, or physical terrain could affect the situation in a positive or negative way. Encourage the class to discuss what is and what is not a relevant actor.

Ask the students to give an example of a positive impact a relevant actor could have, and the negative impact a relevant actor could have. Offer the following example if assistance is needed: an NGO operating at a POC site can be a positive, stabilizing influence, but if that NGO was to cease operations, it would have a negative impact.

The example photos on the slide are just a few of the many available options. We are looking for: NGOs; local political or tribal leaders; women and children; different tribal or ethnic groups; religious leaders; non-state armed groups; state armed groups; terrorist groups. The potential list is long.

There is a tendency to focus on conventional threats to UN safety and security and to POC-related tasks. This is natural – even necessary – on initial deployment, but this slide is intended to demonstrate that all actors can influence your operating environment. If you can identify a wide variety of relevant actors; you will better understand a given operating environment.

Slide 7



Interaction. Before showing the slide, explain the concept of the Pyramid (given below) and then draw the conflict pyramid on a whiteboard or flipchart and ask the students for ideas to populate the chart. The students should be asked to justify why an actor is at Level 1, 2, or 3.

Key Message. The UN is generally deployed to conflict or post-conflict environment, where there is an existent threat to the local population. The conflict pyramid tool offers a framework for students to help them identify all relevant, influencing actors. Understanding the conflict pyramid is an effective framework to identify relevant actors and understands how to implement it.

The conflict pyramid offers a framework that acts as an aide to identifying relevant actors. The pyramid suggests that there are actors that have a strategic impact on a conflict. These are Level one actors. Typically, these actors are strong military actors or leaders, well known political leaders, government representatives, leaders of ethnic or tribal groups and/or international organisations. These actors have the capacity to influence the national-level situation or the situation within an entire UN Mission AO. It goes without saying that the MPKI cell needs to understand these personalities and conduct an actor evaluation on them;

Level two actors are generally found at the sub-national level. They may be actors, for example, that only impact a specific UN sector. These level two actors have a less obvious national impact, but are generally linked to level one actors and, as such, can be influenced by them. Examples include regional tribal, religious or ethnic group leaders; the heads of NGOs; regional armed groups; terrorist groups; regional military formations and leaders; regional political organisations. Level two relevant actors have often linked to both level one and three actors but can generally only influence at the regional level.

Level three actors are found at the local level. They have generally linked to level two actors, and less often to level one actors. They can impact the local operating environment. Examples of such actors are local leaders (IDP camp, a POC site, a local wise man), influential people such as local religious leaders, doctors, tribal chiefs, and/or policemen.

Slide 8

Learning Activity

Time:

Approx. 10 minutes

Task:

- Identify the relevant actors (people / groups)
- Assign actors a location / position on the conflict pyramid

Hint:

Use ASCOPE PMESII tool



Interaction. This mini exercise should take place in class. Based on the Sector-level information that has been provided to the class in reading material, ask the students to identify the relevant actors in their respective AOs, and where these actors sit in the conflict pyramid. Have them report back to the class

Approx. Time. 10-15 minutes

Slide 9

Processes

Actor Evaluation Templates:

- Basic Intel
- Current Intel

Analysis based on known:

- Positions, Interests, Needs
- SWOT analysis
- Centre of Gravity Analysis

So what?

- Create understanding
- Identify Information Gaps
- Identify Items of High Importance
- COA development
- Calibrate UN response


This slide will help us go through the analysis process. We will go step by step.



Interaction. Give the students a template to highlight what is known about the actors they have identified. Ask the student to:

- Collate and store the data on a PC in order to maintain corporate knowledge
- To structure what they know about actors, and to highlight what is not known
- Complete these templates from information that is stored on current and basic intelligence
- Take that known data and analyse it using the Positions, interests, needs, SWOT, and Centre of Gravity Analysis tools
- Identify what they do not know, or information gaps

Slide 10



The information that populates these basic templates will be taken from what is already known. This information exists in basic and current intelligence databases.

Slide 11

Threat Actor Evaluation


COWARD

- Capabilities
- Organisational Structure
- Weapons and Equipment
- Asymmetric TTPs
- Reinforcement Capabilities
- Doctrinal Approach (Defence, Attack etc)

3 COLUMN FOMAT

SO WHAT

- How to weaken
- Prevent from acting
- Critical Capabilities
- Vulnerabilities
- Items of High Importance



*Helps develop
overlays and most
likely / most
dangerous COAs*

This format is the UN method for systematically evaluating a threat actor in an Area of Operations. The acronym COWARD should be used and applied to the three-column assessment format. All threat actors in the UN AO should be examined/evaluated in this way. If you follow this process using the three-factor format, you will benefit from multiple insights (deductions) into the threat actor, which will all serve to enhance understanding.

The factors are the COWARD headings, that the deductions are the 'so what' for the UN, and the outputs are the actions to be taken. These can include, but are not limited to: identifying Items of High Importance (IHI), unknowns, threats to the UN, threats to civilians, threats to mandate etc.



Interaction. Asked the students what they consider capabilities to be. List these on a whiteboard. Capabilities can include armoured vehicles, artillery or indirect fire; anti- armoured vehicles; strength; communications; logistics; intelligence; operational security; the level of training; recruitment capabilities; propaganda. The list is endless.

Ask them to make some deductions on what they have listed. For example, if a threat actor has a high indirect fire capability then it can engage in stand-off

attacks, spotters may have to be located close to a UN base, the UN is vulnerable from a certain distance away.

An example of outputs, in this case, may include the following: sentries may be tasked with looking for spotters, the FOB will likely need bunker protection if the type of indirect fire asset that the threat actor has is unknown then that could become an information requirement (IR). The IR might be as follows 'what type of indirect fire assets does threat Actor A have?'.

Let's look at COWARD in more detail.

Organisation. The factors could be as follows: hierarchical like a conventional military force; it is important to examine such a force's Order of Battle to ascertain what kinds of units it uses (Brigade, Battalion, Company, platoon, section etc.), and how these units interact; look at how a conventional or unconventional force would organize for various types of operations; a cell-type structure or a network in the case of an unconventional threat actor. As an example, the types of deductions and outputs made in this case could be as follows: Factor – threat actor is organized in platoon-sized structures; deduction – this force needs to move through platoon-sized movement corridors; output – Information Requirements such as 'where is our FOB vulnerable to approach of a platoon-sized unit', this could become a Named Area of Interest (NAI).

Weapons. It is useful to list weapons such as HMG, MMG, LMG, sniper rifles, anti-armour, mines, indirect fire weapons, and small arms here. There will be some crossover with capability. Again, ask students to name one weapons system and progress through the three-column format. For example, if a threat actor has an anti-armour capability, it means that our convoys are vulnerable to attack, and Information requirement could, therefore, be to identify where the UN is vulnerable to such attacks on a particular patrol route, guidance to the commander or Operations cell might be to only use armoured vehicles while patrolling in areas where the threat group is known to operate.

Asymmetric Capabilities. We should look at what kind of unconventional approaches the threat group uses. Such things could include roadside bomb; IED capability (command wire or self-detonated); suicide bombers; VBIED; SVBIED; ambush etc.

Reinforcement Capability. Also, look at how quickly can the group reinforce while on operations and if the group can regain strength after operations or losses.

Doctrine. There will be some overlap with capabilities here, but it is more important that it is complete. You should look at how does the threat actor organize itself for defence, attack, or other forms of operations. Also, it is important to see how the threat actor organizes itself for asymmetric attacks. This should lead to a series of Information Requirements and tasks. For example, if the intelligence cell decides that a group tends to target the UN with IEDs before attacking with small arms, then an output could be 'where is the UN most vulnerable location to be attacked when patrolling', and the lead vehicle could be tasked with looking for IED ground sign, or covered areas from which threat group personnel could hide to launch a small-arms attack.

Slide 12

Exercise

Using COWARD format, construct a basic threat actor template for ONE threat actor in your AIR.

Hint:

- Use the three-column format
- Use the Types of Terrain as a Framework

Required Output:

- Uncover unknowns;
- List Items of High Importance;
- How is the Threat Actor likely target the UN?

12

Now let us do a mini-Learning activity that will help reinforce your understanding of the COWARD framework, and how it is applied in the three-column format



Interaction. Divide students into groups arranged according to the sector they are assigned. Ask each group to go through factor, deduction, output process with one part of the COWARD headings. Example, group one takes Capability, group two takes Organisation, group three takes Weapons, etc.

Using a flip chart with factor, deduction, and output headings; you, the instructor, should be allocated to assist each group, particularly when it comes to listing deductions and outputs. After their group work has them report back to the class with their findings. It is important that each group also offers a deduction or a 'so what?'. Students should identify Items of High Importance to the threat group and identify some information requirements;

Total Approx. Time: 20-30 min

Slide 13

Relevant Actor Template

Actor Name:	Detail
How and why group formed?	
Mission?	
Key leaders and detail	
Hierarchy	
Geographical location	
Extent and level of influence of environment	
Structure and organisation	
Operational History	
Evolution	
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures	
Capabilities (strength, arms, logistics capability)	
Intent (ideology, goals/objectives)	
Tactical Doctrine	
Interests	
Needs	
Influence on other actors?	
Support of other actors?	
Supported by state actors? If so, how?	
How would a UN presence benefit this actor?	
How would a UN presence harm this actor?	
Is this actor a threat to the UN?	
How could this actor impact UN Missions and Mandates?	
Greatest strength – critical capability?	
Greatest weakness – critical vulnerability?	
Centre of Gravity	
EWOT	

Key Message. The relevant actor template is used to store information on all relevant actors in the UN Area of Operations. It is important as it is a single form and can be handed over to subsequent deploying forces, thereby maintaining corporate knowledge. All MPKI Cells must maintain one.

This is a tool that helps maintain corporate knowledge, and that it is a living document. That is to say, that should be constantly updated as new information about the relevant actor is discovered. As you fill the template out, some detail may be missing. This missing information becomes an Information Requirement. Sentences highlighted in red are the product of more analytical approaches that will be taught later.


Naturally, there will be some detail that will overlap with the threat actor evaluation COWARD method. Look at the template and fill in what they know, and list what they do not know. The points that they do not know should be converted to IRs and sent to acquisition units or added to the IAP. You should maintain one template for a threat actor, and one for any other relevant actor, such as a political party or personality.

Slide 14



You should now realize that with a basic (using basic and current intelligence) knowledge of the relevant actors using the COWARD and relevant actor template, we can now move on to apply this knowledge to analytical tools to create greater understanding. This will help you to forecast threats; assess Courses of Action (COAs), and create a greater understanding of how the relevant actor will interact with the operating environment.

Slide 15



Here are a simple model and method to display the threat analysis.

Slide 16

Exercise

- How do we assess capability?
- How do we assess intent?
- What is opportunity?
- What could an inhibiting factor be, and how will this affect the above?

An inhibiting factor could impact capability intent, and opportunity



Interaction. Using a whiteboard or paper chart ask the students to comprise a capability, intent and opportunity list. Interactive as possible, ensuring all students participate. Encourage students to consider capability using the COWARD format.

If need be, remind students of the following:

Capabilities include any factor that allows the threat group to act and includes: weapons, logistics capability, lines of resupply, finances, recruitment, training, support of other state or non-state actors, disposition, composition, reinforcement capability, asymmetric capabilities, and any other factors that allow the actor to take action.

Intent. Is what makes the actor do what it does (why it takes a certain action. What motivates it, what are its objectives, both military and political. The intent is towards the UN. Also, look at 'how does the UN harm or hinder the threat actor from carrying out its intent.

For example, in some post-conflict states, the UN acts as a stabilizing factor. For some threat actors, this is not considered a positive development. Therefore

they may seek to deter the UN from operating in the AO using their various capabilities.

The intent should be considered under the following headings: threat actor ideology (religious, ethnic, nationalist etc.); threat actor objectives, which can be financial (organized crime or terrorist groups), territorial (secession, control of certain areas etc.); threat actor supporters – what its constituents expect of it; threat actor narrative or strategic messaging – what does it say it wants or will do. The list goes on.

Opportunity. This is straightforward. The threat actor cannot act, even if it wants to, against the UN unless the UN operates within its area of operations, or in an area where the threat actor has the capability to act through its network.

An inhibiting factor. This is something which may cause the threat actor not to act, even though it has the capability, intent and opportunity to do so. An example of this could be that the material cost of acting against the UN may be too high, or that the UN is popular amongst the local population or is doing good and to act against it would cost the threat actor support. Another example is where an extremist actor chooses not to act against the UN as it would prompt an external intervention. This was the case in southern Syria where UNDOF operated. In that case, an extremist actor had the capability, the overall intent, and the opportunity to act against the UN, but chose not to as it feared the intervention of external actors, which would have destroyed it.

The next slide will show how this process can lead us to a mathematical evaluation of the level of threat that a threat actor poses.

Slide 17

Threat Analysis - Rating

Threat Level = Capability x Intent

Capability	Threat Score
Very High	6
HIGH	5
SUBSTANTIAL	4
MODERATE	3
LOW	2
MINIMAL	1

Intent	Threat Score
Very High	6
HIGH	5
SUBSTANTIAL	4
MODERATE	3
LOW	2
MINIMAL	1

Likelihood: subjective assessment based on knowledge of intent, opportunity, inhibiting factors

Likelihood	%
Almost Certain	>90%
Highly Likely	70-90%
Likely	50-70%
Realistic Possibility	40-50%
Unlikely	20-40%
Highly Unlikely	0-20%

Key Message. Commanders do not like evaluations that have no basis in fact. They prefer quantifiable data. MPKI personnel must understand that for their evaluations to have added weight. They must have an audit trail.

Using the factors for capability and intent, we must assign a number from 1-6, with 1 being low and 6 being very high for both. This is a very subjective process, but in most cases, evaluations should not vary too much.

An example let us use a UN mission deployed into an area controlled by the Islamic State to demonstrate to how the process works.

Threat equals capability multiplied by intent. For example, if a capability is 5 and intent is 5, then the Islamic State poses a threat of 25. This is high, and so the MPKI cell can state that the threat posed by the Islamic State to the UN is high. The MPKI cell also knows that the Islamic State can attack the UN because the UN is operating in an area under its control.


However, now we must ask ourselves about inhibiting factors. Are there any reasons that the Islamic State might not attack the UN, considering the high threat it poses?

In any case, the threat is high, one cannot rely on inhibiting factors to mitigate it, and the threat must be mitigated, or at least presented to the commander so that he/she can make an informed operational decision. The commander can choose to accept, reject, avoid, or mitigate the risk.

The last item that should be considered is a likelihood. This is expressed using the language of likelihood shown on the screen. Again, this is highly subjective, but this is where opportunity and inhibiting factors can inform the assessment process. For example, while the threat posed by a threat actor may be high, a lack of opportunity or inhibiting factors may combine to make an attack 'unlikely'. Conversely, if the threat actor presents a high threat, if the threat actor can attack the UN, and if there are few or no inhibiting factors then the threat is high, and the likelihood of an attack could be very high.

The next slide shows how the threat analysis fits into mission planning.

Slide 18



Any threat that is SUBSTANTIAL or GREATER, with a likelihood higher than 'probable' must be mitigated. It is important that we inform Operational planners that a threat group presents a SUBSTANTIAL or above threat to the UN or to the civilian population.

The threat score combined with the likelihood of attack s an overall risk rating. This slide shows a graph as a traditional X/Y scale with Likelihood shown on the X-axis and threat shown on the Y-axis. If the threat is Moderate and the likelihood is probable, then the overall score falls into the yellow area. Operations personnel should be informed of this.

Similarly, is the threat being Substantial, and the likelihood of an attack is almost certain, the overall risk falls into the red zone. Operations personnel should be warned.

Slide 19

Exercise

- Assess threat presented by one armed actor in your AIR
- Assess likelihood of an attack on UN Convoy
- What is the so what?

If we understand how to accurately assess threat using an auditable process. We can better understand how to assess the likelihood of a threat and can express this to a commander.



Interaction. Divided students into syndicate groups by their sectors. Ask the students to:

- Use the threat evaluation tool
- Considering intent and capability to assess the threat
- List the threat actors that present a threat to the UN
- Assess the likelihood of this group attacking the UN
- Justify this
- Chart where the threat actor is on the threat / likelihood (Risk) matrix
- Explain their next action would be- example, the requirement on how we might mitigate the threat
- Using a whiteboard or paper chart

Approx. Time: 15-20 min.


Slide 20



Analytical Tools and Approaches

We will now move on to use more advanced analytical tools for actor evaluation. The students should be reminded that the SWOT, PIN, and COG analysis will provide answers which will help to populate their Course of Action (COA) boards, and considerations.

Slide 21



Key message: Working out the position, interests, and needs (PIN) of an actor deepens understanding. It will also help inform deliberations about how any relevant actor will react to a UN presence, operation, or change to the operating environment. A thorough (PIN) analysis can help the analyst understand how a UN operation or presence can help or hinder the relevant actor.

It is important to understand why a relevant actor adopts a certain position, what the relevant actor needs, and what its interests are. This will allow us to identify how the UN may have a positive or negative impact on the relevant actor and how the relevant actor may react.

This will help us decide on the course of action that a relevant actor may choose when faced with a UN operation, deployment, or any other change to the operational environment.

This can have serious operational repercussions. For example, if the UN deploys to a border post, it may undermine an actor's ability to raise funds by collecting taxes at illegal checkpoints, or it may prevent the actor from engaging in smuggling activity. This may adversely affect their 'need' for money and could lead to a violent course of action being taken against the UN.

Position, this is the public stance taken by the relevant actor. Generally, this is the relevant actor's stated mission. The relevant actor, in this case, could be an NGO with a mission of 'inoculating all children under the age of 5 against Ebola'. Similarly, it could be the Islamic State stating that it wants to 'create an Islamic Caliphate and to unite the Ummah'.

Interest. This is what the relevant actor are the things an actor needs to have in order to meet their objective and subjective needs. In the examples above, it is in the interests of the NGO to have safe and secure access to areas where children live, to have access to enough quantities of drugs, and to have a positive PR campaign about its operations. There are many more examples of what is in this NGO's interests. In the example of the Islamic State, it is in its interests to have, inter alia: a land to govern; people who can govern; finances to run a state; the ability to extract resources; an army; a police force etc.

Needs. This is what the relevant actor cannot live without. Generally, such things are food, water, shelter. These are objective needs and are things that everyone needs. However, there are also subjective needs. These are things that the relevant actor believes it cannot live without. In the example of the Islamic State, objective needs would be food, water, shelter, and subjective needs might be religious legitimacy; sharia law etc.

The key point is that every relevant actor has a position, has interests, and has needs.

A useful way to conduct a successful PIN analysis is to start with the relevant actor's mission statement. Sometimes this will be unclear and needs to be assessed on the basis of what its leaders say, and the group's strategic messaging.

This will allow the MPKI cell to work out the relevant actor's position - generally, this can be found in open sources. It is then useful to move straight to working out the relevant actor's objective and subjective needs.


Work out what interests it will have that will enable them to bridge the resource gap to guarantee their needs. For example, in order to assure food for its people, the Islamic State needs land on which to grow food. This means it is its interests to control land; to control water sources to grow crops; to have access to people to farm; to have roads; to have markets; to have access to a monetary system etc. The Islamic State also needs shelter; therefore, it is in its interests to have builders; town planners; raw materials etc. The list quickly becomes very long.

The 'so what' in this case is that if you can identify the interests and needs of a relevant actor, then you can identify how a UN presence can help or harm that actor. This will go a long way to creating a deeper understanding as to how these actors will react to a UN presence. This should inform mission planning and relevant actor course of action development.

For example, if an NGO requires access to a local population in an insecure part of the world, then an armed UN presence as an escort is in their interests. It helps the NGO. The NGO is, therefore, likely to have a positive perception of the UN.

Conversely, if a threat actor needs illegal mining revenues as a source of income, and the UN builds a FOB close by, then this is likely to adversely impact the group's financial interest. Naturally then, this group is likely to have an unfavourable perception of the UN.

Slide 22



This slide further simplifies the PIN concept.

Slide 23

PIN Analysis

Exercise: Carry out a PIN Analysis of the Islamic State.

Step 1 (List primary Factors)

- What is the threat actor's position?
- What are the threat actor's interests?
- What are the threat actor's needs?

Step 2 – Apply the 3 Column analytical framework (so what?).

Step 3 - Outputs:

- How will these factors affect how the group will react to a UN presence?
- How will these factors affect Threat Group objectives (End state)?
- How will these factors affect how it will choose to operate (Method)?



Interaction. Ask the class the following questions and facilitate discussion:

- What is the public position of the Islamic State is; the response should generally align
- What does the Islamic State need to be viable: responses should include objective needs: food, shelter, water, security, and subjective needs: money, Islamic faith, people, soldiers, etc.
- What are the interests of the Islamic State; interests should include: having religious legitimacy, controlling borders, sources of revenue, effective narratives and recruitment strategy
- Use the knowledge gleaned from this PIN analysis to develop the selection of factors for the three-column analytical format. (This will give them a series of deductions or so-what's?)


Facilitate the process. Guide / Coach to make deductions as they pertain to the UN, to the actor under consideration, and to the local population. This will enhance understanding.

For example, if the factor is the Islamic State needs an effective recruitment strategy, deductions could include: the Islamic State needs access to media channels; the Islamic State needs access to the internet; the Islamic State is vulnerable to a counter-narrative etc.

Ultimately, this process should enhance the students' understanding of any threat actor and how these factors could inform its chosen course of action.

Approx. The time allowed: 15-20 minutes

Slide 24



Key Message. This analytical tool is also designed to gain a deeper understanding of a relevant actor. It should be used to identify how the UN can help, in the case of a positive actor, or hinder, in the case of a threat or otherwise negative actor.

It is important to note that as SWOT factors are listed, they are analysed using the three-column format. This is to ensure that students move through the process in a systematic manner, always asking themselves what a SWOT factor means for the relevant actor, its COA selection, and for the UN.



Note to Instructor. As each term is explained, the instructor should stand at a whiteboard or flip chart and ask for examples of each term as they might apply to a threat actor and to a non-threat actor. This is important as the student must become accustomed to assessing all actors in the operating environment.

Strength: A strength is internal to the relevant actor. This is a capability of characteristic that gives a relevant actor strength. Strengths can be, among other things, diplomatic, political, military and security, economic, and social. It is important that students do not consider strengths only through the lens of security.

In the case of a non-threat actor such as an NGO, a strength may be a capable workforce, a good relationship with the community, steady funding, corporate knowledge etc. In the case of a threat actor, it may be a compelling anti-government

narrative, finances, asymmetric capability, a strong recruitment base, internal lines of supply, access to weapons. Students should focus on these strengths and should assess how the relevant actor uses them to its advantage.

A key point here is that a relevant actor is unlikely to act in a manner that does not align with its strengths. For example, an NGO that does not have strong skills in disease prevention is unlikely to engage in an anti-Ebola vaccination program. Similarly, a threat actor that has high asymmetric capabilities is unlikely to engage in a conventional all-arms attack on a UN FOB. This is the critical link between analyzing a relevant actor's strengths and its COA selection process.

The second key point is that if the UN threatens a relevant actor's strength through its operations, then that actor may choose to act against the UN. This is the second link to understanding a COA that this actor may choose to take.

Identifying a strength can also inform UN planning. For example, the UN could deliberately take action to undermine the strengths of a threat actor, or it could plan its operations so that the UN does not make itself vulnerable by allowing the threat actor to use its greatest strengths. For example, if a threat actor has a high-level of asymmetric capability, the UN may choose to use Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to surveil a route to ensure that a complex attack is not being prepared on the planned convoy route.

Weakness: A weakness is also internal to the relevant actor. This is a lack of a capability or characteristic that disadvantages the relevant actor. Weaknesses can be, among other things, diplomatic, political, military and security, economic, and social. It is important that students do not consider weaknesses only through the lens of security.

In the case of a non-threat actor such as an NGO, this could be not having employees that speak the local language, not having access to all-terrain vehicles, not having internet connectivity to conduct its business, having a poor understanding of the local environment. In the case of a threat actor, it could be not having the support of the local population, of not being able to raise funds, or of not having an IED manufacturing capacity.

Once again, the link to COA development is twofold: if the relevant actor does not have a capability, then it is unlikely to act in such a way that it would rely on that missing capability. A threat actor without an IED manufacturing capability is unlikely to choose to attack a UN convoy using this approach; moreover, if the UN acts in such a way as to exploit a weakness, then an actor might choose to act against the UN.

Identifying a weakness can also inform UN planning. If the actor is a positive influence, then the UN could decide to help the actor overcome its weaknesses through, for example, a CIMIC project. Similarly, if a threat actor has a weakness, the UN may wish to exploit this weakness through its operations.

Opportunity: Opportunities are external factors or conditions that are favourable to a relevant actor. Opportunities can be, among other things, diplomatic, political, military and security, economic, and social. It is important that students do not consider opportunities only through the lens of security.

Examples of opportunities to a non-threat actor such as a political leader could be a change regional/international security or political environment leading to support for a new policy, stability in a neighbouring country that allows for greater trade, a growing economy. For a threat actor opportunity could include a deteriorating economic environment an unpopular government policy which could facilitate recruitment or radicalization, or the possibility of an alliance with other groups.

The MPKI cell should examine the opportunities available to relevant actors as an indicator as to how they could influence the actor to act in a certain way. Once again, it is important to stress that opportunities will affect COA selection of all actors.

The MPKI cell should also consider how opportunities available to relevant actors can inform UN decision making and planning. The MPKI cell should consider how a UN plan would undermine a relevant actor's ability to exploit an opportunity. If, for example, the UN denies a threat actor an opportunity the threat actor could choose to act against the UN. The UN may also decide that it wants to actively undermine a threat actor's opportunities, and it is therefore important that it understands what these are. For example, if security breaks down in a neighbouring country, then the UN may identify the resulting porous borders to be an opportunity for a threat actor. The UN may decide that it will reinforce its positions or enhance patrolling in these areas as a result.

Threats: Threats are external factors or conditions that are unfavourable to a relevant actor. Threats can be, among other things, diplomatic, political, military and security, economic, and social. It is important that students do not consider threats only through the lens of security.

Examples of threats to a non-threat actor such as a political leader could be an unfavourable change regional/international security or political environment leading to reduced support for a new policy, instability in a neighbouring country that reduces trade, or a contracting economy. For a threat actor threats could include a UN deployment in its area of operations, new security policies, a national government or army that is increasing in strength or popularity.

The MPKI cell should examine the threats to relevant actors as an indicator as to how they could influence the actor to act in a certain way. Once again, it is important to stress that threats will affect COA selection of all actors.

The MPKI cell should also consider how threats to relevant actors can inform UN decision making and planning. The MPKI cell should consider how a UN plan would exacerbate the threats to a threat actor. Similarly, the UN may consider protecting a positive, relevant actor from an external threat.

Slide 25

SWOT Analysis

Exercise:
Conduct a SWOT Analysis of the primary threat actor in your Sector.

Step 1 (List primary Factors)

- What are its strengths (internal)?
- What are its weaknesses (internal)?
- What are threats to the NGO (external)?
- What are the opportunities (external)?

Step 2 – Apply the 3 Column analytical framework (so what?).

Step 3 - Outputs:

- How will these factors affect how the group reacts to the UN?
- How will these factors affect Threat Group objectives (End state)?
- How will these factors affect how it will choose to operate (Method)?

Key Message. The SWOT analysis is to be applied to the three-column format. This allows the students to not only identify the SWOT factors, but also to draw a 'so what' for both UN operations and planning, and relevant actor COA selection.



Interaction.


- Break the students into their syndicate groups.
- Ask the students to list the SWOT of the main threat actor in their Sector. When all SWOTs are listed, they become factors in the three-column analytical framework
- Ask the students after listing the factor is make a deduction
- Remind the students that deductions should be made based on what the factor means for the UN, for the actor under consideration, and for the local population
- Ask students to evaluate how this threat actor is likely to react to a UN convoy operating in its AOR
- Ask students to develop a list of unknowns or IRs

- *Remind the students that their deductions lead to outputs and can be included in Information Requirements, planning guidance or considerations for UN COA selection. It is important that these observations are given to the U/G 3 section or reach the commander for consideration*

Resources: Whiteboard or flipchart, pens. One instructor per group to guide the process.

The time allowed is about 30 minutes, with 10 minutes to brief/discuss.

Slide 26



Key Message. A centre of gravity (COG) analysis is an important part of evaluating what is important to a relevant actor. A relevant actor's COG, what that COG allows the actor to do, what the actor must do to maintain it, and how it is vulnerable is vitally important in evaluating how that actor will act (COA) or react in theatre. An actor must act to defend its COG, or it cannot achieve its mission or objectives.

The COG is not always a tangible thing. For example, a strategic COG could easily be the political support of an alliance or bloc. A COG does not have to be linked to resources or capabilities.

A COG can just as easily be something that gives an actor the moral strength, will, and freedom to act. The support of the UNSC could be a COG for an actor, depending on the circumstances of your evaluation. Similarly, a compelling narrative or strategic message could be the COG of a threat group. Using the example of the Islamic State, one could posit that its COG was a perception of religious legitimacy among its adherents.

A COG can also be something tangible, which gives a relevant actor the physical strength to act. However, this is most seen at the operational level and is often linked to specific assets. For example, if country A was beset by sanctions and could not finance its war effort or import arms, having a country that was willing to help country A undermine the sanctions regime could be an operational level COG.

Understanding the COG is key to determining what is most important to a relevant actor. Once more, this can inform UN mission planning. The UN can act to help or undermine a relevant actor's COG.

Moreover, if UN operations threaten the COG of a relevant actor, it is almost certain that it will act against the UN. This will help our assessment of a relevant actor's COA.

MPKIO should be able to use the tool shown on the slide and plot the COG.

Slide 27

COG Analysis – How?

Based on all you know about the Actor and the Environment:

- Brainstorm as a team - where does the actor or entity get its moral and physical strength, its freedom of action, and its willingness to act?
- What does the COG allow the entity to do – critical capabilities (CC)?
- What are the key vulnerabilities through which the COG can be affected - critical vulnerabilities (CV)?
- What are the essential conditions, resources, and freedoms that make it an effective COG (CRs)?

A COG cannot be evaluated in isolation, or as the first step in actor evaluation. Moreover, it is impossible for someone with no information or knowledge of a relevant actor, and its operating environment to work out its strategic and/or operational COG. This is why the COG is one of the final steps in actor evaluation and is only conducted after the human, information and physical terrain have been evaluated in the analysis of the operating environment, and after COWARD, PIN, and SWOT tools have been used in actor evaluation.

Critical vulnerability – how is the COG vulnerable? This is important as it could allow the UN to identify how to undermine a threat actor. It is also something that the UN could avoid doing if the actor is a positive influence on the operating environment. For example, if a local political leader facilitates a calm environment in his area, the UN should identify his COG and should attempt to avoid operations that would exacerbate his/her COG's critical vulnerabilities.

Critical requirements – what does the actor need to maintain its COG? What resources, freedoms or conditions does it need to maintain? It is important for the UN to understand this as a threat actor will seek to act to protect these critical requirements if UN operations or any other actor threatens them. For example, if an actor requires control of an artisanal mine to maintain its COG, it is likely to fight to protect it. Once again, this will inform its COA decision making process.

Slide 28

COG Exercise

Exercise: COG Analysis of the main threat actor in your Sector AO.

What is its Operational Center of Gravity?

What are the:

- Critical Capability - Method/COA choice)
- Critical Requirements - Objectives / Mission / End state
- Critical Vulnerability (Method)

Apply the 3-column analytical framework?




Interaction. The main learning outcome here is for students to develop a full COG evaluation and explain its links to System Integration and COA development. Break the students into their syndicate groups. Have the groups do the following:

- Considers one threat actor in its AO
- Based on what is known about the operating environment, go through the COG evaluation process as outlined in the previous slide
- Brainstorm ideas for the COG and label
- The time allowed for COG Analysis: 30 minutes, 10 minutes to brief/discuss
- List operational and strategic COG
- Select an operational-level COG
- Decide what COG allows the threat actor to do – critical capabilities
- Explain what makes that COG vulnerable – critical vulnerabilities

- *Describe the actor needs to ensure that the COG remains viable – critical requirements*
- *Place relevant information into the factor column of the three-column format*
- *Make deductions as to what these factors mean for the UN, for the threat actor, and for the civilian population*
- *Describe how these factors influence how or why the threat actor could choose to act against the UN*

Slide 29



This slide shows actor relevance.

- Items of High Importance. These come from the COWARD evaluation and the critical requirements of COA evaluation
- PIRs. These are drawn from every analytical process
- Mission and end state. These are drawn from the intent evaluation. What the actor wants to achieve. This can also be drawn from the PIN analysis. What is in the actor's interest, and what does the actor need
- SWOT and COG evaluation. These are drawn from the COG and SWOT analytical tools
- Combat functions or functions for a non-threat actor. These are drawn from the actor's Order of Battle, from its asymmetric capabilities in the COWARD format. Information can also come from the critical capabilities from the COG evaluation, and from the strengths evaluated in the SWOT analysis
- The Most Likely and Most Dangerous COA schematic comes from combining the MPKI cell's knowledge of the relevant actor, and how the actor is likely to interact with the physical, human and information terrain. In short, this schematic is a reduced System Integration or threat integration PICINTSUM

Slide 30

Take Away

- There are several tools and templates to help you conduct actor analysis
- COWARD / 3 column format are useful tools
- Understanding actor's capability, intent, opportunities and inhibiting factors will assist the analyst
- COG analysis is a useful tool in better understanding of actors

Summary

Here are the key messages of this lesson. Everything that we have done in this lesson informs the MPKI cell's understanding of a relevant actors most likely/most dangerous COA.

Lesson 3.5h



AOE-Situation Integration and COA Development

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

The Situation Integration phase is the culmination of the AOE process in which the results of the Operational Environment Evaluation and the Actor Evaluation are integrated to develop probable Actor Courses of Action (ACOAs) and to identify areas and activities (Named Areas of Interest) that can confirm or deny an actor's intent to pursue one or other ACOA. Situation Integration also identifies areas and activities (Target Areas of Interest) where it may be possible for the UN Force to achieve a desired outcome or effect and the Decision Points – in time and space – at which the UN Commander must decide to act in order to achieve the desired outcome.

The products of the Situation Integration phase – especially the Actor Courses of Action (ACOAs) feed directly into the UN Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Therefore, it is important that the students fully understand this phase of the AOE process and are able to identify the Most Likely ACOA (MLACOA) for each relevant actor in the UN Force's Area of Operations (AO) and the Most Dangerous ACOA (MDACOA) for each hostile (threat) actor in its AO. If it is not possible due to lack of time for the students to produce all the products resulting from Situation Integration during this class, the following adaptations may be made:


- Interactive activities may be omitted. The instructor presents the answers that should have been given by the students as examples to reinforce the slide message.
- The students should be allowed whatever time is available during the lesson to begin development of each product – i.e. to produce a quick, rough and incomplete draft or sketch – to ensure that they understand the process and the contents of the product.
- Further development and refinement of these products may – if possible – be assigned as “homework”
- Time and instructor support should be allocated for review and further development of these Situation Integration products during the TTX

Slide 1



The key point of this lesson is to demonstrate the logical links between the Analysis of the Operating Environment and Actor Evaluation with the development of courses of action.


Slide 2



We will cover the following topics during this lesson:

- COA generation – how we generate multiple, mission-specific COAs, and use the FACES (Feasible, acceptable, complete, exclusive, suitable) criteria to identify true COAs
- How we select COAs using the COA scoring tool to identify ML and MDCOA
- How we develop the COAs to provide a mission-specific assessment of Actor's Intent and End state
- How we 'tell the story' of the Actor's COA through drafting a scheme of manoeuvre. How this is enhanced through deeper analysis and relating Actor's TTPs and capabilities to the physical terrain
- How we brief that analysis – all the outcomes from Situation Integration and the graphical representation in order to provide a simple briefing tool
- Highlight the two outputs required for the COA schematic

Slide 3




Learning Outcomes

- Explain the linkage between the Terrains (physical, human and information), Actor Evaluation and the development of COAs
- Explain how the FACES criteria is used to assess COAs and identify ML and MD
- Explain the difference between NAI and TAI and how they facilitate the confirmation of an actor COA
 - Using an event overlay to illustrate these
- Explain what is depicted on a COA board

Let's review the Learning Outcomes for this lesson. At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the following actions:

- Explain the linkage between the Terrains (physical, human and information), Actor Evaluation and the development of COAs
- Explain how the FACES criteria are used to assess COAs and identify ML and MD
- Explain the difference between NAI and TAI and how they facilitate the confirmation of an actor COA
- Explain what is depicted on a COA board

Slide 4




Phase 3 - Situation Integration

- Fuses results from AOE and Actor Evaluation (Phase 1 and 2)
- Identification how the operating environment shapes actor capabilities and TTPs
- Relates capabilities, intentions, and TTPs to the ground enabling the assessment of Actor Courses of Action (ACOA)
- Most Likely and Most Dangerous ACOA
- Mission specific

Key Message. Situation Integration is the final phase of analysis. It fuses phases 1 and 2 to identify actor courses of action that will affect our mission.

Situation integration fuses all the analysis from phases one and two. It enables the intelligence staff to assess how the actor will operate – a predictive assessment through the identification of most likely and most dangerous courses of action for relevant actors. Reinforce the lesson that situation integration has to be mission-specific.

Slide 5




This slide is indicative of the current COA board (used in briefing the situation integration element of the Phase One Brief. These must be created for both Most Likely and Most Dangerous COAs.



Interaction. Ask the students what they can already complete on this board, based on the work they have done to date? Responses include all Actor Evaluation detail. The situation integration is the combination of the Actor Evaluation and the Analysis of the Operating Environment.

Slide 6




Situation Integration: Context

- Nothing in this presentation relates to the scenario you have been given.
- The UN mission as the basis for this Situation Integration is the **UN force has been tasked to establish a TOB south of a WALESI.**
- Situation Integration is always mission specific.
- Remember that you are learning an analytical process that can be used at all levels. It is scalable from Strategic to Tactical level planning.
- This process is about the fusion of all the analysis and situating it in time and space.


The mission for this AOE is UN force being tasked to establish a TOB south of WALESI. This should situate their subsequent analysis. The tools and processes they are being taught are scalable, i.e. and can be used at the strategic, operation and tactical levels. This process is about situating the analysis within time and space.

Slide 7




this slide is an example of a completed COA board. This is what your product should look like to achieve at the end of the lesson.

Slide 8



This slide highlights the 'flow' of the processes in order to get to situation integration.

Slide 9



Key outputs from Situation Integration


- Assessed actor mission, intent, end state
- Assessed actor scheme of manoeuvre
- COA schematic
- COA boards: most likely (MLCOA) and most dangerous (MDCOA)
- 'Golden Thread' products support Phase One brief
- Identification of IRs and updated IAP
- **Remember these are mission specific**

The key outputs from situation integration are:

- An assessed actor intent and end state – developed from Actor Evaluation to be more mission-specific.
- An assess actor scheme of manoeuvre. How will the Actor seek to enact their intent and achieve their mission-specific end state?
- The production of two COA schematics and two COA boards.
- Remember that there are some golden thread products that will assist in a briefing later – MPKI support to MDMP.

It will allow the MPKI staff to identify IRs and remind the students to update their IAPs.

Slide 10



ACOA Generation

- Why do we need actor COAs?
- Why do we focus on all relevant actors?
- How do they help commanders and staffs?




Interaction. *Why do we need Actor Courses of Action? Responses here may include: by predicting the way an actor will behave in a given set of conditions (the operational environment), in a particular set of circumstances (the UN mission), within that actor's capability set, we can better prepare our personnel to plan a response.*

Why do we focus on all relevant actors rather than just threat actors? In an in-extremis situation, we should prioritize threat actors as they can have a profound impact on the mission mandate. However, the COAs of many other actors are also important. For example, a political or tribal leader can influence the local population to behave or interact with the UN. This can lead to positive or negative outcomes for the UN. With advance warning, the UN MPKI cell hopes to avoid negative outcomes.

How can we help the Commander and his/her staff with Actor COAs? They assure that the identified threat can be mitigated. They inform operational planning for mission mandated tasks. They can identify problems before they occur. They help the commander priorities limited UN resources. For example, if the MPKI cell identifies that a population group is at risk from a threat actor, he/she can deploy protective forces to the area, ensuring that patrols are not sent to low-risk areas instead.

What kind of information should a COA contain? At a minimum, the actor mission, intent, scheme of manoeuvre and desired end-state.

Slide 11




ACOA Scenario Generation

- Key product from Analysis of the Operating Environment
- Provides commander with detailed assessment of how actors affect the mission
- Allows commander to prioritise assets
- Plan for MLCOA and MDCOA

ACOA generation is the key output from AOE. In briefing the commander, through the P1B in the MDMP process, the MPKI staff can provide the commander with a detailed understanding of how the relevant actors will affect their mission and mandate. In doing so, it will enable the commander to prioritize scarce resources and assets. It will enable the commander in their planning. If they plan to mitigate the threats and risks posed by the ML and MD COAs, then it will provide an initial steer for mission planning and contingency planning.

Slide 12




COA Generation

- More than two COAs exist
- Staff given two in order to assist in Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) planning:
 - Most likely
 - Most dangerous


More than two COAs exist. Through COA development, the MPKI staff should identify many potential COAs. Those that do not meet the FACES criteria should be discounted. The remaining COAs should then be assessed using the impact and capability criteria to identify the ML and MDCOAs. The ML and MDCOAs should then be developed in greater detail.

Slide 13





This slide highlights the relevance of the Phase One Brief (P1B). In conducting detailed analysis and briefing it to the commander, you can situate the planning staff to the operating environment and the relevant actors. In addition, you will provide an assessment of how those actors will look to affect the UN mission and therefore greatly assist the UN staff throughout the remainder of the planning process.

Slide 14



Identification COAs

- Many COAs identified
 - Mind-mapping/Brain-storming
 - Competing Hypothesis
 - Critical Pathway Analysis
 - Back-casting
- Identified COAs are scored using FACES
 - Subjective scoring based on application of analysis, experience and intuition.
 - Supported by current intelligence




During the COA identification process, several potential COAs will be identified.

Analysts can use several tools in order to assist in the identification of potential COAs. Tools that could be used are listed on the slide. Students should be reminded that more tools exist (e.g. cone of plausibility) and can be applied when the MPKI staff have time.

The identified COAs are then subjected to the FACES criteria with those COAs that don't meet all the criteria being discounted.

The scoring of COAs is subjective. Students should be reminded that they should rely on their intuition and experience and apply 'common sense'. However, the COAs must be supported by the current intelligence – MPKI staff can't simply create COAs without a supporting intelligence base.

Slide 15




FACES Criteria

- **Feasible**
 - A feasible COA can accomplish the mission within the given time, space and resource limitations.
- **Acceptable**
 - An acceptable COA must have the right balance between cost, risk and the potential advantage gained.
- **Complete**
 - A complete COA incorporates the key elements of decisive, shaping and sustaining phases.
- **Exclusive**
 - An exclusive COA must differ significantly enough from other possible COAs.
- **Suitable**
 - A suitable COA can be executed within the Commander's intent.

Here are FACES criteria. Take a minute to look at each one in turn and let us discuss.

Slide 16




Identifying MLCOA

- MLCOA is the COA assessed **most likely to achieve (Threat) Actor's intent and end state**
- **FACES** criteria applied to COAs
 - Feasible, Acceptable, Complete, Exclusive, and Suitable
- Supported by current intelligence picture for actor to achieve mission
- Supported by intelligence - actor had prior success in execution

The ML COA is that COA which is most likely to achieve the Actor's assessed intent and end state. It must be supported by the current intelligence picture and should have a history of achieving success.

Slide 17




Identification of MDCOA

- MDCOA is the (Threat) Actor's **COA that would have the greatest impact on UN mission.**
- FACES test applied
- Supported by doctrine, TTPs, current intelligence picture
- Requires greater planning, resources and risk to actor but represents **greatest threat to UN mission**

The MDCOA is the actor's COA that has the greatest impact on the UN's mission. It still must meet all the FACES criteria and be supported by the understanding of the Actor's TTPs and capabilities; it is not fantasy. However, we must give consideration that this COA will require the actor to commit greater resource, accept greater risk and may involve an increased level of planning.

Slide 18



Selection ML and MDCOA

COA	Likelihood of achieving Actor's end state (Score 1-5)	Impact on UN mission (Score 1-5)	FACES criteria met
1	2	1	N
2	4	2	Y
3	2	2	Y
4	1	2	N
5	2	5	Y

Which is the MLCOA?
Which is the MDCOA?

Key Message. The FACES criteria (Feasible, Acceptable, Complete, Exclusive and Suitable) are used to score all the identified COAs. In scoring them and annotating the results in a table as that shown, the MPKI cell can provide detailed analysis to the Command element how they came up with the ML and MD COAs and which COAs were assessed but dismissed.

The table shows that each column is scored out of 5 based on the assessment of the MPKI Cell. Other scoring methodologies can be used but, in practice, this simple and effective method is time saving and helpful.

A table is constructed in line with what appears on the screen. There are 4 columns: the first is a COA; the second is the likelihood that COA will achieve the actor's desired end state; the third is that impact that COA will have on the UN mission mandate, and the fourth verifies that it aligns with all FACES criteria.

The MPKI Cell should score each column out of 5. This allows for the quick identification of ML and MD COAs. Whilst this may seem an inaccurate method, the MPKI Cell must apply its detailed understanding of the actor. This will enhance as the operation develops, and the MPKI cell should look to revise their assessment accordingly.

Finally, the FACES criteria are applied to each COA:


- Feasible. Based on the current understanding of the actor's TTPs and capabilities, is the COA feasible for them to conduct

- Acceptable. Does the COA come with an acceptable level of risk
- Complete. Does the COA fully complete all the criteria expected of it? Does it have a start and an end with coherent and complete activity
- Exclusive. Is it distinct or does it copy other COAs
- Suitable. Does it match the actor's purpose or situation? Is this something the actor would do based on their beliefs, intent and history



Interaction. Based on the table shown on the slide, which is the most likely and most dangerous COA? Ask the students how they came up with their responses? Response: COA2 is the most likely as it best suits the actor. COA 5 is the most dangerous, as it has the highest impact on the UN mission.

Slide 19




Selection ML and MDCOA

COA	Likelihood of achieving Actor's end state (Score 1-5)	Impact on UN mission (Score 1-5)	FACES criteria met
1	2	1	N
2 MLCOA	4	2	Y
3	2	2	Y
4	1	2	N
5 MDCOA	2	5	Y

This is the answer to the previous question set at the bottom of slide 18, the previous slide.

Slide 20




Scope

Develop a suitable Actor Course of Action to include:

- Intent, End State and Main Effort
- Scheme of Manoeuvre
- Tactical Functions
- Identifying Indicators & Warnings
- Items of High Importance List
- COA Schematic
- COA Boards

Now let's shift to COA development. After we have identified the ML and MD COAs, the MPKI staff should look to develop them in greater detail. To do so, the MPKI staff should look to apply several developmental stages to the COA in order to draw out the critical analysis. The first step in this process is to define a mission-specific assessed actor intent, end state and main effort.

Slide 21



Defining Intent, End State and Main Effort

- **Intent:** Concise statement of what the actor intends to do and why; expressed via **EFFECTS TERMINOLOGY** to be achieved.
- **End State:** Aim at the end of an operation, indicates objective achieved. Where the actor wants to be at mission accomplishment.
- **Main Effort:** Activity the actor considers crucial to mission success
- This is identified during Actor Evaluation stage but **analysed further to make it mission specific.**


The intent is a concise statement of what the actor intends to do and why. Often military personnel use military effects terminology to ensure brevity and accurate use of language. However, this terminology may not always be applicable when talking about a civilian (non-Armed or non-threat) actor.

The end state is what the actor is trying to achieve. What does mission success for the actor look like? Where does the actor want to be at the end of their mission?

The main effort is one activity that needs to be achieved in order to ensure mission success.

Remember that this is mission-specific and scaled to the level you are working at. For example, the actor's strategic intent and end state will not be applicable at the tactical level.

Slide 22



Example Intent, End State and Main Effort

- **Intent:** To SEIZE or ISOLATE GARIYAN military bases and SECURE government installations and infrastructure in the GARIYA; FIX reinforcements from entering Sector East and FACILITATE a pro-ERIYAN political take-over

In Order to

- **End State:** Force the WITHDRAW of GARIYAN military forces and to allow for Sector East entry into the ERIYAN Federation
- **Main Effort:** To FIX reinforcements with AT mines and IEDs

There are several elements to the intent

Indeed, MPKI staff must be aware that an actor can have several intents There may be an over-arching intent where they seek to achieve a strategic aim, or where they seek to achieve something at the tactical level, For example, to counter UN activity in a specific location

However, Phase One briefs must be mission-specific If the MPKI cell is operating at the Force level, then the assessment of each actor's intent will likely be over-arching, whereas a tactical-level commander will seek to identify the intent of the adversary commander within his AO

A fully efficient MPKI cell must understand both levels of operations in order to understand how a strategic intent will drive tactical activity. The intent is a concise and precise statement of what the actor intends to do and why


Where applicable, effects-based terms such as task verbs are to be used Effects-based terms and task verbs have a clear definition and are widely understood by military personnel Using terms such as 'take out' instead of 'DESTROY' adds confusion and lacks the clarity of language Everyone the MPKI cell briefs must understand what is meant

In drafting the intent statement, MPKI staff must be clear in their language. The narrative must also be chronological in terms of activity

The intent leads to the end state. Therefore, we use the term 'in order to' i.e. an actor must do this in order to achieve their end state The end state is the result What does 'mission accomplished' look like for the actor? If the intent does not lead to the end state, then the intent is incorrect


Once we have identified the intent and end state, we can assess the main effort is that one activity the actor MUST achieve in order to be successful It is helpful if this is expressed as an effects-based or task verb to add additional clarity of language The main effort is annotated in the intent narrative; if not, then the intent narrative needs to be re-drafted

Slide 23



This slide is used as a reminder to illustrate the importance and relevance of this analysis. Where does it fit in the P1B and how it is briefed?

Slide 24



Exercise

Defining Intent, End State and Main Effort

Task: Each syndicate is to draft an intent, end state and main effort for one threat actor within their Sector

Approx. Time: 40 minutes.

- **Intent:** A concise and precise statement of what the Actor / Threat Actor intends to do and why; expressed as the effects they intend to achieve.

In Order To

- **End State:** The aim to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. It is, in short, 'where the Actor / Threat Actor wants to be, mission accomplished.'
- **Main Effort:** What the Actor / Threat Actor considers to be the activity which is crucial to the success of the mission

This exercise is to confirm understanding. A detailed understanding of the scenario for each sector is required. The syndicates must have read and understood the relevant detail. Activity conducted during Terrain Analysis and Actor Evaluation will have been the key foundation work to facilitate this analysis. This exercise seeks to identify the operational intent, end state and main effort due to the current level of detail in the scenario. A more detailed scenario, with a specific UN mission upfront, will allow for the generation of greater understanding during this phase.



Interaction. Have the students break out into their syndicates, reflecting their assigned sectors as outlined in the central scenario, and ask them to identify one relevant actor's intent, end state and main effort.


Ideally, the focus should be on the threat actor that syndicates have chosen to work on throughout the course. Students should be made aware that they will be asked to back brief their drafts with justification.

Allow approximately 30 minutes for this task, and 10 minutes for one group to present. Ensure the students are aware that one group will be asked to present the results.

When the results are presented, allow for constructive debate between the groups. Ask each group if the presenting group has provided a clear and

concise description. At all times, ask the students to provide the analysis behind their findings.

Slide 25



Scope

Develop a suitable Actor Course of Action to include:



- Intent, End State and Main Effort
- Scheme of Manoeuvre
- Tactical Functions
- Identifying Indicators & Warnings
- Items of High Importance List
- COA Schematic
- COA Boards

The next stage of COA development is drafting a Scheme of Maneuver.

Slide 26

Scheme of Manoeuvre

- Where, when, how the actor achieves its purpose:
 - Routes
 - Objectives
 - Boundaries
 - Timings
- Conclusions from AOE, TE should be highlighted
- Use SOM in explaining phases:
 - Shaping
 - Decisive
 - Sustaining

Unit	Zone	Priority	Remarks
1st Brigade	A	3	
2nd Brigade	B	2	No SCOTMANs with ED after H+2
3rd Brigade	C	1	Block insert
Cavalry Squadron	C	4	

The SOM is effectively a story describing how the actor will act. It effectively provides an understanding of where, when and how the actor will achieve their purpose.


Each COA will have an overlay depicting actor activity in effects graphics. The MPKI cell should situate this activity through the identification of routes, objectives boundaries and timings as a minimum.

Other headings can be used such as OCOKA (should the actor be conducting defensive activity); the acronym stands for Observation and Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, Key Terrain and Avenues of Approach.

The systematic analysis, using useful headings, will enable the MPKI staff to break down the activity into coherent actor activity.

Analysis of the terrains and actor during Phases 1 and 2 will provide the foundation details. A Scheme of Maneuver (SoM) will likely have three phases; Shaping, Decisive and Sustaining. These will be covered in turn.

Slide 27



SOM - Shaping Phase

- Tasks to create/preserve conditions for success of the decisive act, before, during, after
- Actor shapes space to compliment their plan
- Some shaping tasks:
 - Use of crowds
 - Moving personnel, equipment
 - Influence of a population
 - Deception plan
 - Reconnaissance
 - IED construction
 - Fixing elements of UN forces

The shaping phase will provide the clearest indicators and warnings (I&W) that a certain activity is going to take place. Therefore, detailed analysis at this stage will identify critical I&W – more on this will follow later. The shaping phase will contain all the required activity an actor needs to conduct to set the conditions for the decisive phase. Examples of shaping activity are highlighted on the screen.

Remember that this activity must be pertinent to the actor and be the feasible activity for the actor to conduct, for example, if they have no IED capability, or the current intelligence picture and understanding of the actor's TTPs and capabilities does not include an IED capability then it is not realistic to expect this to be a shaping activity.




Interaction. Ask the students to list the shaping activity required for a threat actor to attack a UN FOB? Responses should include reconnaissance, testing of UN TTPs, procurement of arms and ammunition, securing safe houses, test firing of weapons etc.



Note to Instructor. The instructor should look to draw out obvious examples of shaping activity such as reconnaissance, influence and facilitation activity. The slide contains a list of examples but is not exhaustive.

Slide 28




SOM – Decisive Phase

- **Action** that leads to successful completion of the mission
- Task that makes the plan unique
- May include these verbs for a threat actor:
 - Destroy
 - Neutralise
 - Secure
 - Seize
 - Clear
 - Disrupt

The decisive phase is where the action that achieves mission success takes place. For threat actors, this will include the decisive action and may include such effects verbs as those listed. The decisive phase will contain all the required activity an actor needs to conduct the activity that leads to mission success. Remember that this activity must be pertinent to the actor and be the feasible activity for the actor to conduct.

Slide 29



SOM – Sustaining Phase

- Activity to reinforce success
- Once actor has executed their plan, these are sustaining activates / tasks to consolidate gains
- Examples:
 - Distribute
 - Propaganda
 - Demand ransom
 - Use social media
 - Cache weapons
 - Resupply ammo
 - Blend in
 - Recruitment
 - Shadow governance
 - Intimidation

Key Message. Sustaining activity is that activity which enables the actor to reconstitute, reorganize, consolidate, and reinforce mission success.




Interaction. Ask the students how they think success is reinforced or sustained. Responses could include resupply, redeployment to key terrain or vital ground.

This is more than just logistical considerations. Examples of sustaining phase activity are listed on the slide. Sustaining activity allows the actor to reorganize, consolidate and reinforce success. This can be illustrated using task verbs and effects terms where applicable (such as withdraw, establish caches, intimidate, resupply) and should be situated in time and space. The sustaining phase will contain all the required activity an actor needs to reinforce mission success.

Remember that this activity must be pertinent to the actor and be the feasible activity for the actor to conduct, e.g. if they have no history of demanding a ransom, then this is not a feasible activity. If they do not have the capability to propagandize, then this is not a feasible activity etc.

Slide 30



Exercise: Draft SOM

Task:
Each syndicate will draft a SOM for one threat actor within their Sector
Approx. Time: 45 minutes.

RECAP:
SOM consists of the following phases:

- Shaping
- Decisive
- Sustaining

This exercise is to confirm the understanding of how to create a viable and credible scheme of manoeuvre for a threat actor. A detailed understanding of the scenario for each sector is required. The syndicates must have read and understood the relevant detail. Activity conducted during Terrain Analysis and Actor Evaluation will have been the key foundation work to facilitate this analysis.



Interaction.

Output / Task. A FACES Scheme of Manoeuvre, with shaping, decisive, and sustaining phases situated in space (on the map) and time (chronologically).

Have the students break out into their syndicates, reflecting their assigned sectors as outlined in the central scenario. Having already identified one relevant actor's intent, end state and main effort, the syndicates should draft an SoM for that actor. Emphasize that this is how the actor will accomplish its end state through its main and supporting efforts.

The instructor should provide a handout to each syndicate stating the activity.

The instructor should remind the students of the current stage. That the TOB has been established south of WALESI and that they are to build on the actor's mission-specific intent and end state through the development of the SOM. The instructor should look to emphasise that the SOM is a story of how the actor will conduct their mission in order to achieve their intent and end state. That the SOM is based in our current analysis of the actor's TTPs and capabilities, drawn out from AE.


*That the SOM should be complete, it should have a beginning, during, end. I.e. what does the actor need to achieve before, during and after the mission?
Time allocated: 45 minutes, 35 minutes for analysis and 10 minutes for a back brief.
Mentors/facilitators need to be present in order to ensure that students understand the requirement and are making relevant and logical deductions.*

The syndicates may need to be reminded that they are building on this previous analysis. Remembering this is mission-specific, the syndicates are to be reminded of the UN mission. Students should be made aware that they will be asked to brief their drafts with justification.

Allow approximately 20-30 minutes for this task, and 10-15 minutes for one group to present. Ensure the students are aware that one group will be asked to present the results. When the results are presented, allow for constructive debate between the groups. Ask each group if the presenting group has provided a clear and concise description. At all times, ask the students to provide the analysis behind their findings.

Resources: Students will need to be in their syndicate rooms with a sector map. The students should also use the intent, main effort and end state that they have previously drawn up.

Slide 31



Scope

Develop a suitable actor COA to include:


- Intent, End State and Main Effort
- Scheme of Manoeuvre
- **Tactical Functions**
- Identifying Indicators & Warnings
- Items of High Importance List
- COA Schematic
- COA Boards

← Applicable to Threat Actors

The diagram shows a list of components for a suitable actor COA. The component 'Tactical Functions' is highlighted with a blue box and a blue arrow points from a box labeled 'Applicable to Threat Actors' to it.

The next stage of COA development is understanding the Tactical Functions. Here is where we are in the process.

Slide 32



Checklist – Tactical Functions

- Description of functions that threat actor do prior, during, and after operations
- To assist in describing CoAs
 - **Command & Control**
 - **Information & Intelligence**
 - **Firepower**
 - **Manoeuvre**
 - **Protection**
 - **Sustainment**

Key Message. The Tactical Functions are a helpful checklist to identify how an actor will conduct a certain activity. It uses the knowledge of the actor's equipment and capability to assess how it will be employed during its scheme of manoeuvre.

A detailed understanding of weapons and equipment is crucial in making feasible assessments, e.g. the effective weapon ranges. Actor Evaluation will have identified most of the actor's capabilities, but more detailed analysis is required. In identifying an intent, end state and main effort, annotating this in an SoM, we can now analyse how a group will use its equipment to operate during each phase. When analysing the group's equipment and capabilities, and situating it to the ground, the MPKI cell will then ascertain if the actor SoM and overall COA is achievable


These are mainly applicable to a threat actor but may also be useful when looking at all armed groups. These are applied to the SOM in each phase. How will the actor look to achieve or implement these factors to best effect in order to achieve the desired outcomes at each stage of the SOM?

The headings to be evaluated are Command and control, information and intelligence, firepower, manoeuvre, protection, and sustainment. Each of these headings will be related to the actor SoM, during each of the three phases.

For example, if threat actor intent is assessed to be an attack on a UN FOB, then the following might be an MPKI assessment:

- During the shaping phase, the adversary will conduct command and control via encrypted mobile phone message apps It will gather information from reconnaissance on the FOB using civilians and through observing UN SOPs
- It will test its weapons systems and store them close by for use It will move in small groups using civilian cars to avoid detection The adversary will assure its Operations Security (OPSEC) by using small groups of fighters that operate in closed networks It will also operate in civilian clothes and without arms to ensure it is not targeted It will sustain itself by using local services

Slide 33



Command & Control (C2)

- **C2** – Will the Actor / Threat Actor be able to effectively exert command and control over their subordinates during the COA? What sort of C2 will they use i.e. Mission Command? What C2 vehicles/nodes are vital for them?
- Individuals
- Vehicles
- Locations
- Type of Command
- Method of Command


Now think about I&Ws, Items of High Importance, and NAIs/TAIs
Or
What does seeing it indicate?
What would be the impact of removing it?
Where it will be?

Based on your detailed evaluation of the actor's command and control capabilities, the MPKI cell must list these capabilities and assess how each will be used during the shaping, decisive and sustaining phases of the operation. Each time a C2 capability is listed, the MPKI cell should make deductions, and create new IRs.

This stage looks to identify how the actor will exert command and control throughout the conduct of the mission. By taking the analysis from AE and applying it to the ground relevant to this mission, the MPKI staff can make a detailed assessment of how the mission will be commanded and controlled. E.g. if the group uses cell phones to communicate, but the AO has no GSM coverage, then the MPKI staff must assess how the actor will conduct C2.

We must draw out the critical analysis by asking - What would be seeing a specific capability be indicative of? Where are the MPKI staff likely to see that capability employed? i.e. where should it be employed in order to achieve maximum efficiency? This will give the MPKI staff an initial steer for NAIs/TAIs. In addition, what would be the impact in the actor should that capability be denied to them?

Slide 34



Information & Intelligence

- **Info & Int** – How is Actor going to gather information and intelligence? What sort of information and intelligence are they trying to gather on us to assist their mission? How can we deny this to them?

Now think about I&Ws, Items of High Importance, and NAIs/TAIs


What does seeing it indicate?
 What would be the impact of removing it?
 Where it will be?

Based on your detailed evaluation of the actor's information and intelligence gathering capabilities, the MPKI cell must list these capabilities and assess how each will be used during the shaping, decisive and sustaining phases of the operation. Each time a piece of information and intelligence capability are listed; the MPKI cell should make deductions, and create IRs and CCIRs if there are unknowns.

How will the actor look to gather information / intelligence to support the planning and conduct of their mission? What capabilities could they employ? What considerations should MPKI staff look to implement in order to protect our own forces?

In addition to the points raised in the previous slide, the MPKI staff should look to make an assessment of where they are likely to see this activity being conducted and what the impact on denying/disrupting that activity would have on the actor.

Slide 35



Firepower

- **Firepower** – Firepower destroys, neutralises and suppresses; how will the Actor / Threat Actor use their firepower during the CoA?
- Will it be used in Shaping, Decisive, Sustaining?
- What are the UN most vulnerable to?
- How will they use it and in what groupings?

Now think about I&Ws, Items of High Importance, and NAIs/TAls

What does seeing it indicate?
 What would be the impact of removing it?
 Where it will be?

Based on your detailed evaluation of the actor's firepower capabilities, the MPKI cell must list these capabilities and assess how each will be used.


Firepower can achieve several effects and is not always employed within the decisive phase. MPKI staff must give consideration of how firepower can be used during all stages of the actor's mission. The MPKI staff should also be aware of what Actor's firepower represents a threat to UN forces.

MPKI staff should also assess the feasibility of employing firepower. What are the effective ranges? What are the optimum employment conditions for that firepower asset? In understanding this, the MPKI staff can identify where and how the firepower capability will be employed during the SOM.

The MPKI staff can then assess where they should look to focus acquisition assets to identify that capability and what stages of the actor's mission.

The MPKI staff should assess how the actor will be affected should that capability be disrupted or denied to them.

Slide 36



Manoeuvre

- How does the Actor / Threat Actor move?
- What assets do they have available to them?
- How can we deny them?


Now think about I&Ws, Items of High Importance, and NAIs/TAIs

What does seeing it indicate?
What would be the impact of removing it?
Where it will be?

Based on the already completed actor evaluation, the MPKI cell should already know how the actor can move, within its capabilities; for example, by foot, motorbike, vehicle, armoured vehicle, air, or boat. Now the cell must assess how the actor is likely to move, based on its chosen Scheme of Maneuver and the terrain.

The MPKI staff should look to assess how the actor is going to move during the conduct of their mission. What assets do they have available to them, and how are these affected by the physical terrain? Think about all stages of the SOM, how will the actor seek to use the physical and human terrains to their advantage? Where should the MPKI staff look to prioritize acquisition assets in order to identify that manoeuvre?

Slide 37



Protection

- **Protection** – How will Actor look to protect their force?
Includes physical protection, screening force or flank guard; communications i.e. encrypted radios etc.
- Their deception plan should be considered


Now think about I&Ws, Items of High Importance, and NAIs/TAIs

What does seeing it indicate?
What would be the impact of removing it?
Where it will be?

The MPKI cell should develop an understanding of how an actor protects its assets, its personnel, and its communications. This will allow the cell to understand how these protection measures will be or are likely to be employed during a specific COA.

The MPKI should look to assess how the actor will protect itself during operations? Just as UN forces would do, the actor will look to mitigate the threats and risks that they are likely to face. Will the actor look to decrease its communication activity (COMSEC)? Will the actor look to have a screening force to provide early warning of UN activity? If so, where will the actor look to situate this? The MPKI staff should look to identify opportunities to mitigate or negate the actor's protection measures.

Slide 38



Sustainment

- **Sustainment** – How will the Actor be able to sustain CoA? Some of this may have been included in the Sustaining Phase, however, this is more logistical than theoretical and should add detail
- How far can go & long can they fight without replenishment?
- Generation of recruits?
- Propaganda?
- Medical plan?


Think about I&Ws, Items of High Importance, and NAIs/TAIs

What does seeing it indicate?
 What would be the impact of removing it?
 Where it will be?

The MPKI cell should develop an understanding of how an actor sustains itself (food, water, ammunition, medical, etc.). Does the actor have a resupply or medical plan?

How will the actor sustain a COA? What does the actor need in order to conduct this COA? This is more than just logistical considerations. What should the MPKI staff look for, and where, in order to affect the actor's sustaining activity?

Slide 39



Exercise – Tactical Functions

Task:

Each syndicate will draft a list of tactical functions for one threat actor within their Sector. State how these functions will be employed in each phase of Operations. Highlight and list Items of High Importance to the Adversary.

Approx. Time: 30 minutes.

RECAP: The Tactical Functions are:

- Command & Control
- Information & Intelligence
- Firepower
- Manoeuvre
- Protection
- Sustainment

This exercise is to confirm understanding of the tactical functions and how they relate to each phase of the Scheme of Maneuver. Your understanding of the scenario for each sector is required. You must have read and understood the relevant detail. Activity conducted during Terrain Analysis and Actor Evaluation will have been the key foundation work to facilitate your analysis.



Interaction.

Have the students break out into their syndicates, reflecting their assigned sectors as outlined in the central scenario, and ask them to use the previously assessed threat actor's SoM and to assess how the adversary will employ its tactical functions during each phase (shaping, decisive, sustaining). Ask the students to back brief their drafts with justification.


Ensure the students are aware that one group will be asked to present the results. During the presentations, allow for constructive debate between the groups. At all times, ask the students to provide the analysis behind their findings. In doing the SoM, they should have highlighted I&W, Items of High Importance and possible NAIs.

The students are one step further in the development of the identified actor's COA; they should look to deepen the assessment of the COA by applying the

tactical functions for each stage. In doing so, this will enable the MPKI staff to deepen 'the story' and situate activity within time and space?

The instructor should provide a handout to the student about what is required from the exercise. The exercise will last 30 minutes, 20 minutes for analysis and 10 minutes for back brief.

Slide 40



Scope

Develop a suitable Actor COA to include:

- Intent, End State and Main Effort
- Scheme of Manoeuvre
- Tactical Functions
- Identifying Indicators & Warnings
- Items of High Importance List
- COA Schematic
- COA Boards


The next stage of COA development is understanding the identification of indicators and warnings. The identification of indicators and warnings is crucial to the identification of NAIs and TAls (more to follow in later lessons).

**Interaction.**

Ask the students why indicators and warnings are important.

If COAs are exclusive, indicators can quite accurately point to a particular COA. For example, an ambush on a convoy and a complex attack on a convoy are very similar adversary COAs. As such, the indicators for both will be similar. These should not be two distinct COAs. Conversely, the indicators for an attack on a UN FOB or an ambush on a UN convoy will be very different. In that case, the indicators will be a useful way to achieve early warning.

Slide 41




Indicators & Warnings (I&W)

- Things once observed allow us to assess COA
- Some I&W can be shared by multiple COAs
- No point in having I&W, if all COAs share same
- Be specific, detailed and explained
- Ties into Shaping Phase of SOM and into NAIs
- More detail can be assessed in SOM leads to more I&Ws

Indicators and warnings (I&W) are those factors that are observed during the shaping phase of the SOM. They should assist the MPKI staff in the confirming or denying of the actor's chosen COA. Some I&W will apply to more than one COA, so it is imperative that MPKI staff identify those

Slide 42



Exercise – Indicators and Warnings

Task:
Each syndicate is to draft a list of Indicators and Warnings for one threat actor within their Sector.
Approx. Time: 10 minutes

Recap:

- Those things that once observed will allow us to assess that this CoA has been chosen by the Actor / Threat Actor.
- They should be specific, detailed and explained. They should tie into both the Shaping Phase of the SOM and in the suggested NAIs




Interaction. The exercise should confirm that the students understand what constitutes an indicator and warning. Have the students break out into syndicates, reflecting their assigned sectors as outlined in the central scenario, and ask them to identify I&W during the shaping phase based on the SoM they have previously drafted.

Allow approx. 10-15 minutes for this task, and 5-10 minutes for one group to present. Ensure the students are aware that one group will be asked to present the results. When the results are presented, allow for constructive debate between the groups.

The instructor should give the students a handout stating the requirements of the exercise. This process should be relatively quick. The students are to look at the shaping phase of the SOM and look for the critical I&W for that phase.

Slide 43




Scope

Develop a suitable Actor COA to include:

- Intent, End State and Main Effort
- Scheme of Manoeuvre
- Tactical Functions
- Identifying Indicators & Warnings
- Items of High Importance List
- COA Schematic
- COA Boards

The next stage of COA development is identifying the Items of High Importance. Once the COA has been developed, the MPKI staff should look to analyse the COA and identify the critical capabilities the actor requires in order to carry out the SOM successfully. These are known as Items of High Importance.

Slide 44



Items of High Importance List (IHI)


- Assets, the loss of which would significantly damage the actor's capability to achieve mission
- Examples:
 - Scouting screens
 - Facilitation routes
 - C2
 - Nodes
 - Communications
 - Key leader
- Also think about our UN/Own Force IHIs

Key Message. The Items of High Importance will be familiar to those who understand doctrinal example of High Payoff Targets etc. IHIs are those assets which, should they be denied or lost, would significantly damage the actor's capability to achieve their intent.

The identification of IHIs is critical in assessing where UN forces can have a significant effect on an actor's intent. Identifying critical equipment or individuals throughout analysis of the actor, their TTPs and SoM, the MPKI cell can advise the Commander about which IHIs should be prioritized. IHIs have already been identified during previous processes, for example, during the Actor Evaluation phase and during the identification of tactical functions.

Examples of IHIs are listed on the slide. In addition to identifying the actor's IHIs, the MPKI staff should look at the UN forces and identify UN IHIs that will need to be protected.

Slide 45



Exercise – IHI

Task:
Each syndicate will draft a list of Items of IHI for one threat actor within their Sector.
Approx. Time: 10 minutes

RECAP:
IHIs are those assets, the loss of which would significantly damage the actor's capability to achieve his intentions.


This exercise is to confirm understanding. A detailed understanding of the scenario for each sector is required. The syndicates must have read and understood the relevant detail. Activity conducted during the SoM drafting will be crucial.



Interaction. Have the students break out into their syndicates, reflecting their assigned sectors as outlined in the central scenario, and ask them to identify one relevant actor's critical IHIs required for their SoM. Students should be made aware that they will be asked to back brief their drafts with justification. The instructor needs to provide a handout stipulating the requirements of the exercise. Time allocated: 10 minutes to include a 2-minute back brief to the instructor.

Allow Approx. 10-15 minutes for this task, and 5-10 minutes for one group to present. Ensure the students are aware that one group will be asked to present the results. When the results are presented, allow for constructive debate between the groups. At all times, ask the students to provide the analysis behind their findings.

Slide 46




Scope

Develop a suitable Actor COA to include:

- Intent, End State and Main Effort
- Scheme of Manoeuvre
- Tactical Functions
- Identifying Indicators & Warnings
- Items of High Importance List
- COA Schematic
- COA Boards

The next stage of COA development is drawing COA Schematics. The COA schematics are one of the 'golden thread' products. Once the actor's assessed mission / COA has been fully developed, we must capture this fused analysis in a coherent and concise product. The method that will be used during this course is the COA schematic.

Slide 47

The slide features a blue vertical bar on the left side. At the top of this bar is a small circular logo with the letters 'UN' inside. To the right of the bar, the title 'COA Schematic' is displayed in a large, blue, sans-serif font. Below the title, there is a bulleted list of four items. The first three items are at the top level, and the fourth item has two sub-items indented below it. The text is in a black, sans-serif font.

COA Schematic

- Integration and fusing of outputs from the current situation in line with the Actor's intent
- Graphical representation depicting Actor's intent and Scheme of Manoeuvre
- Graphic depicts effects (where applicable), related to the ground in space and time
- Comprises two stages
 - Stage One – Situation Overlay
 - Stage Two – Event Overlay


Key Message. The COA schematics are a 'golden thread' product and summarize in pictorial form, the analysis of the Phases. MPKI cells should prepare a schematic indicating what effects an actor seeks to achieve – situated geographically and overlaid on a map.

A Situation Overlay is a graphical representation of an Actor's available COAs. An Event Overlay is a graphical representation of where critical events are likely to occur (situated in time and space) and where IHLs are likely to be situated. An Event Overlay will result in NALs and assist in the monitoring of I&Ws.

If the SOM is a 'story', then the COA schematic is a 'painting' that illustrates that story. Effects graphics should be used to aid in the simplification of the drawing and to situate effects in time and space.

In producing the COA schematic, the MPKI staff will produce a situation overlay and an event overlay. These will be explained in more detail in the following slides.

Slide 48




COA Schematic – Stage One - Situation Overlay

- Actor's doctrine, TTPs related / moulded to terrain (mobility corridors, known operating areas)
- Graphically represented
- Based on their methods of operating
- COA schematic produced for every COA
- Should include an assessment of their routes, objectives, boundaries, timings
- **Recap:** this outlines your assessment of the Actor's Scheme of Manoeuvre

The situation is a graphical representation of the SOM. How will the actor conduct the assessed COA using the physical terrain? The Situation Overlay is the actor's TTPs and capabilities situated to the ground and should be a visual representation of the SoM. An SoM that is not feasible and based upon known actor TTPs is incorrect.


The actor's COA should be situated to the ground in time and space. This requires a detailed assessment of the actor's doctrine and capabilities and understanding of the terrains. This enables the MPKI to geographically overlay the COA on a map of the operating environment and assess likely locations for a pertinent activity to take place during each phase of the SoM.

Slide 49



This is a simple example of highlighting a situation overlay. The instructor should look to highlight how effects symbols have been used to depict where the specific activity will take place in time and space. By showing the phase lines, this enables those observing the product to situate the activity further. For non-threat actor COAs, the MPKI staff should look to use coherent images and symbols in order to illustrate the COA.

Slide 50



Syndicate Exercise – Create a Situation Overlay

Task:
Each Syndicate create a Situation Overlay for their respective Sector.
Approx. Time: 45 mins

Include:

- One Threat Actor's doctrine, TTPs related / moulded to the terrain (using mobility corridors, known operating areas etc.)
- Threat Actor's routes, objectives, boundaries etc




Interaction. Have the students break out into syndicates, reflecting their assigned sectors as outlined in the central scenario, and ask them to produce a situation overlay for their respective actor's COA.

The students will require overlay materials (map and acetate) and permanent marker pens, and provide a handout stating the aim of the exercise. The students will have 45 minutes to produce a situation overlay for the COA that they have produced.

When the results are presented, allow for constructive debate between the groups. Ask the non-presenting groups to comment on whether the overlay depicts the COA concisely.

Remind the students that this is a pictorial / graphical representation of the SOM and must situate the activity to the terrain. Also, students must add all key physical terrain features to the overlay in order to clearly define where the activity takes place in relation to the ground.

Slide 51



COA Schematic: Stage Two - Event Overlay

- **Recap:** Where should UN forces monitor / look to affect actor- (Event Overlay)
- The EO is a graphic representation of the acquisition areas of interest based on the identified actor / threat actor COAs
- Depicted by NAIs; monitored areas for indicators....refugees, firing locations etc.
 - Identifies where critical events likely to occur
 - Confirms or denies an actor's chosen COA
- Often depicted by Target Areas of Interest (TAIs); where to look to have an EFFECT on the actor


The Event Overlay outlines where UN assets should focus in order to confirm actor activity. This allows the Staff to prioritize acquisition assets.

The event overlay is a separate overlay the MPKI staff produce in order to identify NAIs and TAIs. In other nations, this is often described as a decision support overlay. This overlay allows the commander to prioritise assets in order to monitor/look for activity.

NAIs and TAIs are not just boxes on a map. They can be specific points, or lines (along routes) where an acquisition asset could be tasked to monitor.

The identification of key timings and NAIs / TAIs will enable the MPKI cell to confirm/deny an actor's COA and enable the commander to look to affect that COA if applicable.

Slide 52




This slide is a very simple example of how a series of observed indicators can confirm or deny an actor's chosen COA. The instructor should look to explain the diagram.

If we look at the left side of the slide, we can see the initial indicators, in the shaping phase, that the MPKI staff have identified as unique/distinct and indicative of the actor's MLCOA.

The NAI boxes indicate that these indicators have been observed. However, after the second indicator on the left, the black line over to the right, state that a new indicator has been observed, which is indicative of the MDCOA. Following the right-hand side flow, the instructor should point out that the second observed indicator then confirms that the actor has adopted the MDCOA. That is how NAIs can confirm or deny an actor's chosen COA.


TAIs are therefore placed in order to provide an option to the commander in order to affect that actor's chosen COA. This effect does not have to be a kinetic response, and UN personnel must be mindful that kinetic responses are largely the least applicable solution.

Slide 53



This is how the Event overlay would look on the COA board/map. Situation the NAIs and TAIs in space and time.

Slide 54




Event Overlay - Summary

Event Overlay visualizes / identifies NAIs and potential TAIs. Decision Support Overlay

- NAI: expected actor activity along point or area in the operating environment
- NAI confirms or denies ACOA
- TAI: Area or point in the operating environment to influence an actor interdiction to abandon or alter ACOA
- NAIs and TAIs must be on the IAP & allocated an acquisition capability

It is important to confirm the understanding of what NAIs and TAIs are, using clear definitions. This slide confirms the key definitions of NAIs and TAIs. Note that TAIs are not target specific and can be applied to information and other non-lethal effects; NAIs confirm/deny actor activity. Take a minute to read the definitions and if there are questions; let us ensure everyone understands these concepts before we move on to the lesson.

Slide 55



Syndicate Exercise – Event Overlay

Task:
Each Syndicate creates a Event Overlay for their respective Threat Actor within their Sector.
Approx. Time: 10 mins.

Include: Graphical representation of where likely events are to occur – Identification of NAIs, TAls.


**Interaction.**

Using the Situation Overlay already produced, ask the students to produce an event timeline and overlay – on a separate overlay – to situate NAIs and TAls. You will need to provide overlay materials and permanent markers. Provide the students with a handout to state the requirements of the exercise. Have the students break out into syndicates, reflecting their assigned sectors as outlined in the central scenario, and ask them to identify the relevant actors in their respective sector-level AOs.

Allow approx—10-15 minutes for this task.

When the results are presented, allow for constructive debate between the groups. From the timeline has been drawn, the syndicate should be asked how they analysed the timings depicted. Time: 10 minutes to include a two-minute back brief.

Slide 56




Scope

Develop a suitable Actor COA to include:

- Intent, End State and Main Effort
- Scheme of Manoeuvre
- Tactical Functions
- Identifying Indicators & Warnings
- Items of High Importance List
- Intent Schematic
- COA Boards

The final stage of situation integration is the completion of the COA boards for the ML and MD COAs that have been developed.

Slide 57



Key Message. COA Boards are the briefing aid used to present the Situation Integration analysis to the commander and their staff during the Phase One Brief. It is a 'golden thread' product and depicts all the analysis conducted by the MPKI Cell in a concise and clear format.


The COA board is the final stage of Situation Integration. It is a concise product depicting the analysis from Phases 1, 2 and 3, and it informs the Commander and their Staff regarding the ML and MD COAs during the Phase One Brief. This is, perhaps, the most important supporting product.

The slide depicts where each element of the COA board is drawn from this slide represents how all the analysis is fused into a briefing product.

We use a single COA board as a template and use an overlay (clean piece of acetate) for filling in the schematics and other required information for each ACOA. Remember to label each overlay appropriately.

As MPKI cells become more efficient, they will understand how important the 'golden thread' products are; therefore, time spent drafting presentable products depicting analysis will save time when producing briefing aids.

Slide 58



Here is an example of MLCOA Board.

COA Description. Using task verbs and effects terminology, describe the actor's mission in the form of a concise statement that is then illustrated in the COA schematic.

COA Schematic. A graphical representation of the SoM depicted on the map. The physical terrain should be drawn within this box.

Intent. Annotating the actor's intent.

End state. A concise statement of what the actor is trying to achieve.

SoM. Tell the story. What activity will the actor conduct during each stage – this MUST be depicted in the COA schematic.

I&W. State which I&W is pertinent to this COA.


IHI. State the critical IHI pertinent to this COA.

SWOT / COG analysis. State the key deductions relevant to the actor for this COA.

Tactical Functions. Explain how the actor is going to use its capabilities to conduct this COA, and during which phase.


Each COA board MUST be a standalone product that is clear, concise and contains all the relevant information. It is particularly important that the COA Schematic is clear and is supported by the analysis in the other boxes.

Slide 59




This is a very basic example of a completed MD COA board. COA Boards must be distinct; for example, the intent, end state, schematic, I&W, SWOT/COG, SoM for each the ML and MD COAs must be distinct. It is not good enough simply to copy the details from one COA to the other.

Slide 60



This is a very basic example of a completed Event Overlay.

Slide 61




Take Away

- There is an important analysis link between AOE, Actor Evaluation and development of COAs
- The physical, human and information terrains and Actor Evaluation are building blocks to COA development
- FACES criteria is an important tool to assess COAs
- Scoring of COAs and feasibility within the current intelligence picture, actor's TTPs and capabilities are key to developing situation and event overlays
- NAI and TAI and how they facilitate the confirmation of a COA
- The COA Board, situation and event overlays are important MIO tools

Summary

These are the key takeaways from the lesson. In real terms, the MPKI staff have developed a story, based on the assessment of the actor's TTP and capabilities related to the ground, of how the actor will operate against the UN mission in order to achieve their assessed intent and end state. The COA board paints a picture of that SOM and provides a succinct briefing tool to enhance the understanding of the staff.

Learning Activity

A presentation slide titled "Syndicate Exercise" with a UN logo in the top left corner. The slide contains the text: "Produce a MLCOA for one Threat Actor within your Sector." and "Time: 30 minutes".

Syndicate Exercise

Produce a MLCOA for one Threat Actor within your Sector.

Time: 30 minutes

NOTE TO INSTRUCTORS:

This exercise will reinforce the understanding of all the elements of the phases. Students should be aware that they will brief Commands using these COA boards and that it must be of an acceptable standard.

Break out the students into their respective syndicate rooms. The syndicates will develop an MLCOA for one threat actor in their sector. One (ML) COA board needs to be produced to confirm understanding. Ensure that the students are aware that one group will be asked to present the results.

Highlight that if the syndicates have completed previous analytical work in enough detail, this should be a simple exercise of transposing the details onto the COA Board. Remind the students that these boards will be used to brief the course and should be of an acceptable standard.

Approx. TIME:

Thirty minutes and 10-15 minutes for discussion.

Lesson 3.5i



Short Peacekeeping-Intelligence Estimate (SPIE) and Situation

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Slide 1




Lesson 3.5i
Short Peacekeeping-Intelligence
Estimate (SPIE) and Situation
Paragraph

Now we are going to cover the Short Peacekeeping Intelligence Estimate, (SPIE), and the situation paragraph format.



Interaction. Which part of the MPKI management cycle do these products fall under and contribute? Answer: Direction

Slide 2



Here is the content we will cover in this lesson.


Slide 3

Learning Outcomes

- Refine and consolidate AOE analysis
- Produce a completed SPIE
- Produce a Situation Paragraph

By the end of this lesson, you will have your analysis consolidated and be able to produce a completed Short Peacekeeping-Intelligence Estimate (SPIE) and a situation paragraph for inclusion in the Warning Order.

Slide 4



Key Message. The SPIE and a situation paragraph are products of intelligence integration with the Military Decision-Making Process.

MPKI supports decision-making with specific products during the planning process. The SPIE draft starts during the IPOE phase, where the AOE is conducted. The SPIE is a product of the AOE.


The situation paragraph will be produced by intelligence staff. It will be part of the Warning Orders, as the students can see in the slide of phases 1, 2 and 4, and the final product will constitute the OPORDER/Task Order, including the intelligence annex, when required.

You do not have time to produce an SPIE to support the receipt of the mission, but you will have time to deliver an SPIE product to support Phase 1 of the IPOE and include in the first warning order (WO). The situation paragraph is based on SPIE and is included in the WO 3 and OPORDER.



Interaction. What do you do if the situation changes between WO 3 and the production of the OPORDER? Answer: Update the SPIE, and the Situation paragraph as they are living documents.

Slide 5



Key Message: The 3 Column Format products that have been developed during the AOE process need to be refined and consolidated into an SPIE format to provide a clear understanding of analysis to date and provide a base for further analysis.

The SPIE format is used to consolidate our three-column analysis produced during the AOE. In the process of constructing the SPIE, we also have an opportunity to consider and further refine our factors, deductions and outputs, creating a more succinct product, focused on the commander's priorities.

During the analysis, it is usual for different factors to lead to the same deductions and outputs, so, as we consolidate our analysis into the SPIE, we should remove or consolidate any repeated deductions and outputs.

The SPIE format is broken into four parts:

- Introduction
- AOE, not the complete AOE, only key elements
- Threat Evaluation
- Threat Integration

Slide 6

SPIE Format: Introduction	
THE SPIE	
The Current Situation	
	<i>(Summary paragraph)</i>
Own Mission / Objectives	
	<i>(Summary paragraph)</i>
Relevant Actor Situation	
	<i>(Summary paragraph)</i>
Key Assessments / Deductions	
	<i>(Summary paragraph)</i>

Key Message: The introduction provides a reader with basic information to read into the situation and a summary of key assessments and deductions.

What do you think should have been included in the current situation paragraph?

The Current Situation is an indication of events within the area of interest that have led to the SPIE. It may include a brief description of political events, national relations, diplomatic relations, regional situation and third state and non-state actors.

Why do we include our Mission and objectives? Because it provides the UN mission and any key UN objectives or stakeholder objectives that help to focus analysis (by understanding mission and objectives, we can check that our factors are relevant to the mission and objectives, and therefore, refine our analysis).

Who might be the relevant actors in our AO? These can include civilians, humanitarians, NGOs, political, criminals, other UN agencies, economic, foreign, IDPs, refugees, etc. Under the Relevant Actor Situation, provide a brief description of the current threat actor and other non-threat actors that may impact the mission. Include any assessed mission, objectives and intent.

How do you decide what key assessments and deductions to include? List the most important deductions and assessments that you want the reader to be aware of. While Key Assessments/Deductions are placed in the first part of the SPIE, it is best to fill this in last, after you have completed the rest of the SPIE and consolidated all of your

assessments and deductions and know which ones are the key ones. Don't forget to go back and complete it!

Slide 7

SPIE Format		
AOE		
Factor	Deduction	Output
Physical Terrain		
Human Terrain		
Information Terrain		
Weather Effects		
Actor Evaluation		

For Example:		
AOE		
Factor	Deduction	Output
Physical Terrain		
The Bridges in the AO are all single lane	1. Civilians are vulnerable to being robbed on bridges 2. Likely place to ambush convoys	T - Provide checkpoints on bridges PG - Consider reaction force to reinforce checkpoints
The only hospital in the AO is 100km from the main refugee camp.	1. Any refugees needing urgent medical care are likely to die before reaching the hospital	PG - Consider locating a military hospital near the Refugee Camp IR - How effective is the host nation ambulance service?
Etc...		
Human Terrain		
All politicians are subject to tribal influences	1. Political decisions are likely to reflect tribal rather than national interests	IR - What tribes do the politicians belong to? IR - What are the key objectives of each tribe represented in government?
Etc...		
Information Terrain		
Etc...		

Key Message: In this part of the SPIE, simply transfer your factors, deductions and outputs from the relevant AOE products, then read through and refine them.

The AOE section of the SPIE is where you simply transfer your factors, deductions and outputs from the relevant three-column format AOE products that you have already produced. In the process of transferring factors, deductions and outputs:

- Consider and further refine your factors, deductions and outputs, creating a more succinct product
- Identify and remove or consolidate any repeated deductions and outputs
- The key is to make it clear enough for commanders and other interested parties to understand

Slide 8

SPIE Format

Threat Evaluation

Aim and End State		
Assessed Actor/Threat Actor Aim	(Summary paragraph)	
Assessed Actor/Threat Actor End state	(Summary paragraph)	
Factor	Deduction	Output

For Example:

Threat Evaluation		
Aim and Endstate		
Revolutionary Front of Southland (RFS) Aim	To overthrow the Government of Southland and expel all foreigners from Southland, including non-ethnic Southlanders born in Southland	
RFS Endstate	RFS government in power, all non-ethnic Southlanders expelled from Southland, all Southlanders on a keto diet	
Factor	Deduction	Output
RFS cells operate predominantly in urban areas	1.1 RFS primary support is likely among wealthier urban Southlanders	PG - Consider using local media to promote the benefits of UN presence
	1.2 The RFS support base has good access to TV, Internet and cell networks	IR - How is RFS funded?
Etc...		

Aim and Endstate		
Southland Revolutionary Front (SRF) Aim	Etc.,	
SRF Endstate	Etc...	
Factor	Deduction	Output
Etc...		

Key Message: Under Threat Evaluation, for each assessed actor or threat actor, provide a summary of their aim and intended end state, and any key factors, deductions and outputs from your analysis.

Of note, in the top portion of the slide, you will see SPIE format, more specifically “Threat Actor” summary required. We should also include relevant actors that have a positive or negative impact on the operation.


The Threat Evaluation section of the SPIE includes summary paragraphs of the assessed actor or threat actor’s aim and intended end state. These paragraphs may also include additional key information that helps a reader to understand the relevant actors and threat actors better.

Transfer the factors, deductions and outputs from your three-column analysis conducted during your evaluation of actors and threat actors.

In the process of transferring factors, deductions and outputs:

- Consider and further refine your factors, deductions and outputs, creating a more succinct product
- Identify and remove or consolidate any repeated deductions and outputs
- Repeat this process for each assessed actor/threat actor

Slide 9



Key Message: Under Threat Integration, for each actor and threat actor, provide MLACOA and MDACOA overviews and key factors, deductions and outputs.

The Threat Integration section of the SPIE includes a simple schematic and summary paragraph of the assessed actor or threat actor's MLACOA and MDACOA drawn directly from your MLACOA and MDACOA products. What should be in your schematic? The answer is whatever graphically communicates the actor's COA. Also, try to get as much relevant information without being confusing.

The summary paragraph should include:

- A broad statement describing the overall intent of the COA
- An explanation of any significant aspect of the COA that is not obvious from the schematic (i.e. don't waste time/space by describing anything in words that are obvious from the schematic), e.g. threat intent
- The reason why the COA is most likely or most dangerous
- Transfer the factors, deductions and outputs from your three-column analysis conducted during your development of the MLACOA and MDACOA

In the process of transferring factors, deductions and outputs:

- Consider and further refine your factors, deductions and outputs, creating a more succinct product.

- Identify and remove or consolidate any repeated deductions and outputs. Repeat this process for each assessed actor/threat actor.

Slide 10

Situation Paragraph

The Situation Paragraph for the Warning Order:

- Is derived from the SPIE
- Provides enough information to orientate UN personnel to the current situation

Key Message: Analysts use the SPIE to produce the Situation Paragraph for the Warning Order.

MPKI Staff provides the Situation Paragraph for the Warning Order.

The Situation Paragraph is derived mostly from the SPIE – you have done most of the thinking already so this is the process of simplifying your analysis even further so that decision-makers can quickly absorb the most important things to know about the situation.

So how do you decide? It should be brief but contain enough detail on the situation for subordinate units to initiate their planning processes. If units require more detail, they will raise an RFI for MPKI Staff to answer.

Slide 11

Situation Paragraph

The Situation Paragraph for the Warning Order:
Contains a brief summary of:

From the SPIE:

- Current situation..... Introduction, Current Situation
- Physical terrain analysis..... AOE: Physical Terrain
- Human terrain analysis..... AOE: Human Terrain
- Information Terrain analysis..... AOE: Information Terrain
- ASCOPE PMESII..... Key elements from the AOE
- Actor evaluation..... Threat Evaluation/Integration
- Other important information to support planning

Key Message: The format for the Situation Paragraph of the Warning Order is a guide, the critical thing being to include any important information that the analyst believes will help decision-makers better to understand the current situation in support of their planning.

The basis of the Situation Paragraph is an overview of the situation and the key deductions from:

- Physical terrain analysis
- Human terrain analysis
- Information terrain analysis
- ASCOPE PMESII – only put the major assessments that are not found in the other products
- Actor evaluation
- Other important information for planning

Slide 12

Take Away

- The SPIE is a consolidation and refinement of the 3 Column Format analysis conducted during the AOE process
- Repeated deductions and/or outputs should be consolidated or eliminated
- The Situation Paragraph of the Warning Order is derived from the SPIE
- The Situation Paragraph should help decision makers to plan

Summary

The SPIE brings all of the analysis to date together in an abbreviated format that is easy to follow and becomes the basis for the Situation Paragraph of the Warning Order in support of the UN MDMP.

Learning Activity

SPIE AND SITUATION PARAGRAPH EXERCISE

RESOURCES

- Class notes
- MPKI HB
- Pen and paper
- Exercise Instructions (see instructions into the folder materials)
- AOE 3 Column Format products

TIME

Approx. 2 hours (all times below are approximate based on skill sets)

PREPARATION

Break into syndicates, try to assign one instructor per syndicate. Syndicates work on their sectors based on information from their sector information pack.

NOTE TO INSTRUCTORS:

- Manage the time for the students, ensuring that they complete their SPIE as best they can after 50 minutes and begin the 10-minute discussion around the updated situation
- Have the students write the Situation paragraph after the 10 minutes discussion and stop them after 50 minutes
- If students complete their Situation Paragraph before 50 minutes, they may continue to work on their SPIE
- After the 50 minutes for the Situation, Paragraph begins the review.

TASK 1: Produce an SPIE (50 minutes)

Ensure that the students have the Exercise Instructions and their 3 Column Format products they produced during the Learning Activities in support of the AOE lessons (if some students have not been able to produce useful 3 Column Format products, you may allow students to use each other's products or provide an adjusted set of products). A suggested time allocation:

- 15 minutes to write the introduction.

- 5 minutes to transfer key factors, deductions and outputs to the AOE section.
- 5 minutes to transfer key factors, deductions and outputs to the Threat Evaluation section.
- 15 minutes to write the summary paragraphs and transfer schematics, key factors, deductions and outputs to the Threat Integration section.
- 10 minutes to review the SPIE and remove redundancy.

Look for students who are not writing and coach them. Check on the content of SPIE and resolve problems and coach students throughout the time.

TASK 2: Discussion and Produce a Situation Paragraph for a Warning Order (60 Minutes total for both. Discussion (10-15 minutes): Lead a discussion around any new insights gained as students reviewed their AOE products and consolidated analysis in the SPIE.

Ask students:

- What key deductions did your analysis reveal in the area of Physical Terrain?
- Why do key decision-makers need to understand this?
- What key deductions did your analysis reveal in the area of Human Terrain?
- Why do key decision-makers need to understand this?
- What key deductions did your analysis reveal in the area of Information Terrain?
- Why do key decision-makers need to understand this?
- What key deductions did your analysis reveal from your ASCOPE PMESII analysis?
- Why do key decision-makers need to understand this?
- What key deductions did your analysis reveal in the area of Actor Evaluation?
- Why do key decision-makers need to understand this?

Remind students that they may include any important information that they believe will assist decision-makers to better understand the current situation in a way that helps them to plan.

TASK 3: Produce the Situation Paragraph (50 minutes). Ensure that the students have their completed SPIE (if some students have not been able to complete an

SPIE, you may allow students to use each other's SPIE or provide an adjusted SPIE). Look for students who are not writing and coach them to get them writing.

A suggested time allocation could be:

- 20 minutes to write a brief overview/introduction.
- 20 minutes to transfer key deductions from the AOE section of the SPIE.
- 10 minutes to review the paragraph and remove redundant deductions and/or outputs.

TASK 4: Review the Exercise (10 minutes): Ask students what they found difficult – problem solve.

Lesson 3.5j



UN MPKI support to UN MDMP

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson



Interaction. Ask the students how they usually integrate intelligence with the planning of operations in their armed forces and to provide some lessons learned in that regard (what works – and what does not work).

Ask the students why we have a planning cycle and planning tools? Here are a few points to facilitate the discussion:

- Decision makers at all levels required detailed understanding of the operating area in order to inform their planning
- MPKI staff can provide predictive, forward looking assessment enabling informed decision making
- MPKI staff can support the other stages of the planning process in order to test the plan and enable contingency planning


Slide 1



Lesson 3.5j
AOE-UN MPKI support to UN
MDMP


This lesson will clearly outline how the UN MPKI cell supports the UN Military Decision Making Process. For the purposes of this course, this includes the Phase one brief, which will be detailed in this lesson, and Short Peacekeeping Intelligence Estimate, which will be shown in another lecture.

Slide 2



Here is the content we will cover in this lesson.

Slide 3




Learning Outcomes

- Explain how MPKI products such as AOE supports the staff
- Explain why the Phase 1 brief is important
- Explain how MPKI supports the UN MDMP by phase

Let's review the Learning Outcomes for this lesson.

Slide 4



Key Message. The importance of the integration between the intelligence and operation branches is critical for success. The peacekeeping intelligence support for the MDMP provides inputs that should be integrated during all phases of the planning process, as shown in the slide (right column).

Here is the Military Decision-Making Process as annotated on the slide. It shows the MPKI staff input. Keep in mind that intelligence is a continuous process and does not stop with the conduct of the Phase One Brief.

This is the endorsed UN Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). This has been authorised by the Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Peace Operations and now forms the basis for the UN Office of Military Affairs planning.

MPKI staff must ensure they own and control the MPKI processes – ensure that common assessment exist at all levels. Proactivity and personal relationships are key to ensuring effective intelligence flows between the intelligence community of interest.


The Chief of Staff (or empowered staff officer) will stipulate the planning timelines. Ensure that you, as MPKI staff, meet the stipulated timelines.

Concurrent activity. Once MPKI staff become more experienced and familiar with the MDMP processes, they will be able to identify areas where concurrent activity can take place.

Use clear and simple products. MPKI products should stand-alone and be understood by those with limited knowledge. Identify how a Commander likes the analysis to be presented and to produce appropriate products.

The input of the MPKI staff does not stop with the delivery of the Phase One Brief. AOE does not stop. MPKI staff need to engage at all levels to provide expert input to inform and test the planning.

Slide 5



The Receipt of the Mission Brief is conducted at the start of the MDMP and should not last more than 30 minutes.


It is unlikely that the MPKI branch will have all the information or a detailed analysis at hand, but they should brief the following key/critical information in general terms. In other words, tell what we already know about:

- The physical and human terrains
- Threat actors
- Acquisition assets and mapping that is currently available to the staff for planning (with assistance from GEO)

This is the first opportunity for the MPKI staff to start the peacekeeping-intelligence dialogue with the Commander. At this stage, it is important to identify initial requirements, prioritize acquisition, focus analysis confirm reporting procedures. The drafting of initial PIRs, CCIRs and IRs will follow, and the intelligence cycle will begin to function. You may want to refer to the lesson on Direction in the block of instruction on the MPKI cycle.

This phase will initiate the mission-specific AOE.

Slide 6



Key Message. The Phase One brief is the MPKI cell's moment to present the intelligence picture to the commander and staff and inform them of any intelligence issues prior to the conduct of planning.

The Military Decision-Making Process is shown and annotated on the slide. It specifies which MPKI staff input is required. It should be emphasized that intelligence is a continuous process and does not stop with the completion of the Phase One Brief.

Phase one of the MDMP is the Analysis of the Operating Environment – this is MISSION SPECIFIC. What has the commander been asked to do? The MPKI staff should look to provide a detailed AOE – which is delivered in the P1B, the Short Peacekeeping Intelligence Estimate.

The MPKI staff should seek the Commander's direction through the intelligence dialogue in order to frame the MPKI products.

In addition, the MPKI staff should look to write the initial situation paragraph to warning order one.

Slide 7

Phase One Brief

- Informs / situates commander and staff prior to planning
- AOE foundation – ‘Golden Thread’ products:
 - Physical, human, information terrain analysis
 - Actor evaluation
 - Situation integration with assessed ML/MD COAs

The Phase One brief comprises of the work done during terrain and actor evaluations, overlaid with the situation integration and Actor COA development, as it pertains to a specific UN mission or task.

It will be covered in more details in future slides, and you will be provided with a rough example to illustrate the key elements.

The P1B situates the commander and the staff before they develop UN COAs to meet the mission requirement.

The AOE foundation will ensure the creation of ‘golden thread’ products – those products that assist in the P1B such as physical, human and information terrain overlays, key actor capabilities including POC considerations etc.

Slide 8



Phase One Brief - Template

Serial	Topic
01	Scope, Open/No/Of which the Phase 1 Brief is going to cover and what briefing aids are going to be used.
02	Intelligence foundation. What intelligence the brief has been based on and inform the Commander of any intelligence gaps that are pertinent to the Mission.
03	Key assumptions and outputs. Inform the Commander of the key deductions and judgements you have identified from conducting ACP.
04	Ground in general. The Physical Terrain. Orientate the Commander and Planning Staff to the ground including weather effects.
05	Ground in detail. The Mission specific Physical Terrain in more detail. Depending on the type of mission to be conducted (Defensive / Offensive), inform the Commander of the specific ground data that will affect his/her mission including key infrastructure.
06	Human and Information Terrain. Factors that are pertinent to the mission are likely to include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tribal and ethnic divisions • Displaced persons and refugees • NGOs • Key leaders • Pattern of life • IRI armed forces • Infrastructure (Bridges, Water, Electricity, Academic, Refuge, Medical, Security, Other) • Information environment – social media trends (supportive/hostile to UN presence), media reporting, local communication capabilities
07	Threat Evaluation. Analysis of all threat actors that are pertinent to the mission, to include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat actor organisations • Threat actor organisations and hierarchies including key leaders • Threat actor TTPs • Threat actor equipment and capabilities • Strengths and Weakness and Centre of Gravity Analysis
08	Situation Integration. How will the threat actors and human factors affect the mission when considered in relation to the physical environment? To include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Actors' Courses of Action, Most Likely and Most Dangerous • Updated Intelligence Acquisition Plan based on known intelligence gaps

Key Message. The Phase One Brief (P1B) has a specific structure. This can be amended when looking at conventional or asymmetric environments, i.e. with a human-centric focus. What must be expressed is the importance of the Situation Integration element of the P1B.

Here is the P1B template in the handbook. This is a guide but provides a structure that the MPKI staff can follow to ensure that all relevant factors are included in the P1B. The red star highlights that situation integration is the most important element of the P1B and should have 50% of the time allocated to it. For example, if the P1B is 45 minutes in length, then 20 minutes should be allocated to the briefing of the situation integration.

The instructor should identify that other staff branches can assist in the production of the P1B, e.g. Physical terrain analysis can be assisted by the inclusion of engineering input, the human terrain can be assisted by POC or CIMIC expertise inclusion.

Slide 9

Phase One Brief – Summary

- Mission specific
- Not telling the Commander all you know
- No more than 45 minutes
- Focus on situation integration and not the ground
- Know audience
- Keep it simple
- Remember the 'Golden Thread' products

The P1B must be mission-specific – the AOE must be focused on the mission area.

A P1B should last no longer than 45 minutes – the focus of the P1B is the situation integration should have at least 20 minutes allocated to the briefing of the ML and MD COAs. The MPKI staff should be mindful of the audience being briefed. How does the Commander like the information to be briefed? Keep the brief simple. Ensure that relevant analysis is briefed coherently and simply.

Slide 10

Example of a Phase One Brief

The following example of a phase one brief is not consistent with the current scenario we provide.

Slide 11

Mission

- UNMMIG deploys in three conflict affected areas (sectors west, east, and north) of GARLAND, for the duration of its mandate to ensure: a safe and SECURE environment for all civilians in its area of operations; to FACILITATE the freedom of movement of humanitarian aid convoys; to MONITOR and report on violations of ceasefires, and of human rights violations; and, where possible, to ASSIST the government in the re-establishment of State authority.

Sector East mission is to establish a TOB south west of BINGA to DISRUPT IK freedom of movement, REASSURE local population and IDPs iot to establish SECURE environment and ASSIST Government of GARLAND.

For the purposes of the P1B example, the AOE is on Sector East. BINGA is a made-up town. In conducting initial mission analysis, the MPKI staff can look to draw out the critical elements to focus on during the conduct of the AOE. In this example, the threat posed by IK, the human terrain considerations relating to the population in the vicinity of BINGA and the IDP/POC considerations.

Slide 12

Scope – Part One

- Vital Intelligence
- Key Assumptions and outputs (if applicable)
- Analysis of the Operating Environment
 - Ground in General
 - Ground in Detail
- Information Terrain
 - GSM/Radio coverage
 - Local media – TV and Radio – are they supportive of UN?
 - Use of social media
 - Local communication systems/meetings.
- Human Terrain Analysis
 - Tribal/Ethnic Laydown – if important
 - Key actors: NGOs, Key Leaders, Refugees etc.
 - Pattern of life – If applicable
 - HN Armed Forces

The scope of the P1B is as follows. During the conduct of their P1B, we should look to draw out the key analysis for each heading, i.e. how the factors analysed during each heading effect the Commander's missions and tasks.

Slide 13

Scope – Part Two

- Actor Evaluation
 - Locations/organisations/capabilities/TTPs
 - COWARD
 - SWOT/COG
- Situation Integration
 - ML / MD COA
- Event Overlay NAI/ TAI
- Recommended PIRs
 - Updates to IAP
 - Known intelligence gaps

Analysis - So what?

We should look to draw out the key analysis for each heading, i.e. how the factors analysed during each heading effect the Commander's missions and tasks. The key learning outcome for this slide is that you should understand the situation integration and the briefing of the COA boards.

Slide 14

Vital intelligence

- SIGINT report 2245Z03MAY19_003 suggests increased IK movement of arms and ammunition into caches within BINGA
- HUMINT report 0935Z01MAY19-002 states that IK have conducted public speeches in the IDP camp stating that UN forces are the enemy of GARLAND and should be forced to leave immediately
- HUMINT report 0718Z29APR19_001, which has not been corroborated and is assessed as C3, states that coercion activity of local civilians to join the IK cause has increased
- **Key assumptions based on current intelligence:** It is assessed the any UN activity within the vicinity of BINGA will result in an armed / kinetic IK response


Vital intelligence:

At this stage of the P1B, the commander should be made aware of any vital intelligence that could affect the Commander's mission. The MPKI staff should look to assess what vital intelligence means in order to give a consolidated brief.

Slide 15


Analysis of the Operating
Environment (AOE)

Slide 16




This slide is to illustrate that the MPKI staff are not to brief the entire Area of Operations but to focus on the analysis to the area of terrain that is pertinent to the mission.

Slide 17




The ground in general. The briefer (as it could be GIS or engineer staff that briefs the ground) should look to provide key analysis of the ground in a structured manner; this could be from north to south, east to west; or by using acronyms such as ROBOT and OCOKA. In any case, the briefer should only brief that ground, in general, that is important to the conduct of the mission.

Slide 18



We should highlight the Combined Obstacle Overlay. This representation shows any areas of key or restricted terrain. This should be identified from the point of view of the (threat) actor and our (UN) capabilities. This diagram informs the commander how relevant actors can manoeuvre through the mission area, including our forces.

Slide 19



The MPKIO briefer should draw out the pertinent analysis such as assessment on route capabilities and whether knowledge gaps exist that require additional staff consideration (e.g. engineer recce to provide route assurance). The briefer should look to highlight any known timings to transit main and secondary routes in order to inform the staff about transit timelines.

Slide 20



The ground in detail.

This is where the MPKIO briefer should look to focus on the relevant mission area in more detail. In this example, the briefer should draw out the key analysis relating to the physical terrain required for the specific missions and tasks.

Slide 21




This is a continuation of the previous slide.

Slide 22

Information Terrain

Slide 23




The MPKIO briefer should explain what key analytical deductions are required. They are highlighted on the slide.

Slide 24


Human Terrain

Slide 25




Within the human terrain analysis, the briefer should draw out the key ethnic and tribal groups that live within the mission area.

Slide 26



A tribal overlay enables the commander to understand the tribal and ethnic lay down within the AO. Within this mission context, the commander should be made aware of all the possible drivers for friction. This should include all the IDP camp considerations and understanding.











Slide 27



Ask these questions when it comes to human terrain:

- Any complexities that could affect our mission?
- Movement through the town, e.g. pattern of life activity? The situation within IDP camp?
- HN Security Force laydown? What does this mean to the commander?
- How will the human terrain situation affect their plan?


Slide 28

Date:	Mon 25 Nov 2018	Tue 26 Nov 2018	Wed 27 Nov 2018	Thu 28 Nov 2018	Fri 29 Nov 2018
Weather type					
Max Temp °C / °F	23°C / 81°F	24°C / 75°F	23°C / 74°F	23°C / 74°F	23°C / 74°F
Min Temp °C / °F	13°C / 63°F	16°C / 61°F	12°C / 54°F	11°C / 52°F	11°C / 52°F
Clouds	Clear	Scattered	Broken	Overcast - Rain	Overcast - Rain
Precipitation	0 - 15 mm	0 - 15 mm	0 - 15 mm	225 - 290 mm	250 - 300 mm
Humidity	25 %	25 %	60 %	75 %	75 %
Wind direction	SW 	SW 	SE 	E 	E 
Sunrise and set	06:07 / 18:58 hour LT	06:08 / 18:59 hour LT	06:09 / 19:00 hour LT	06:10 / 19:01 hour LT	06:11 / 19:02 hour LT
Moonrise and set	20:26 / 07:47 hour LT	21:04 / 08:35 hour LT	21:37 / 09:19 hour LT	21:17 / 10:04 hour LT	21:57 / 10:51 hour LT
Illumination % night	Illumination 88.5 %	Illumination 81.6 %	Illumination 73.4 %	Illumination 64.1 %	Illumination 53.9 %
Weather effects matrix					
Date:	Mon 25 Nov 2018	Tue 26 Nov 2018	Wed 27 Nov 2018	Thu 28 Nov 2018	Fri 29 Nov 2018
UN Personnel				Heavy rain	Heavy rain
UN Material				Heavy rain	Heavy rain
Rotary wing & MV				Visibility	visibility
Fixed wing - transport				Visibility and wind	visibility
UAV				visibility & wind	visibility & wind
Movements (roads)				Flooding risk	Flooding risk
Movements (off-road)					Excessive rain/flooding
Communications				Distance reduction	Distance reduction
Specific effects on UN Operating Environment		NSTR	NSTR	DPRE / Flooding	DPRE / Flooding risk, Heavy rain
Legend:	Non-assessable / NSTR	Favorable	Marginal	Unfavorable	

How does it affect the mission?
What pertinent detail is included here?

The briefer needs to explain the impact of the weather during the mission period—for example, any effect on acquisition assets and manoeuvre. The briefer should draw out the critical analysis that would inform the commander of the specific freedoms and constraints provided by the weather.

Slide 29




Here are some questions the MPKIO should answer when briefing:

- Known locations? Have they assessed locations?
- Known numbers?
- How old is the data that forms the basis of that assessment?

Ensure a Mission specific actor evaluation and outlining the detail above for all known relevant actors.

Slide 30



The hierarchy of the group. Draw out key conclusions about the efficiency of the group.... What is currently known and unknown and how the group is likely to arrange itself. Key actors, whom the UN should look to affect.

Slide 31


IK – COWARD – Key Takeaways					
Capability	Organisation	Weapons + Equipment	Asymmetric TTPs	Reinforcement / Logistics	Dispositions / Doctrine
Little is known about its key leaders, but the 'Nimr' (NFDK) is known to be the overall military leader.	Katibats – operating in respective clan areas	Small Arms – AK variants. Sophisticated Sniper capability SIEDs	Hit and run ambush attacks against host nation security forces	Each Katibat has a religious and military leader.	Standard Insurgent / guerrilla TTPs.
religious leaders to deliver propagandistic sermons targeting its enemies Limited campaign given size of grouping No evidence of capability to conduct a spectacular	IK has a decentralized leadership model, with key leaders – of which little is known – based in Abusir; Katibats don't operate as a single entity – each comprises sub-groups. Excellent COMSEC	use females in SPBIEDs SVBIEDs	IK not capable of large-scale conventional operations against UNMIGAR or the GAF. IK asymmetric attack capabilities have increased as a result of the recent influx of combat-hardened Jihadist fighters from the 6 th	Support from population who believe in their ideology. the group utilizes caches of weapons, hidden on both sides of the border, enabling personnel to evade detection at GAF checkpoints	Unlikely to surrender

Here we ask the questions:

- What are the key capabilities that the group have?
- How are they likely to be employed?

Answers are key to the briefing.

Slide 32



Here note the RPG 7 variants are a threat to UN aviation and vehicles which lack the defensive aid suites and armour to counter the HEAT variants. Effective weapon ranges. How is the threat actor likely to use its capabilities on the UN?

Slide 33



Strengths:

The decentralised leadership model means that networks reconstitute quickly, even after key leaders have been eliminated. Moreover, even if one Katibat is critically weakened due to intel-led Security Force operations, others remain untouched and can assume the weakened Katibat's operational responsibilities.

COMSEC and OPSEC. This means it is difficult to use modern surveillance methods against the group.

Combat Experience on the 6th Continent. The group has access to combat-hardened fighters making them more effective fighters than the GAF and Abusir Forces; their tactical-level engagements are generally successful.

Ideology. The group's hard-line religious ideology makes them effective fighters. It also facilitates recruitment and the deployment of suicide bombers.

Access to sophisticated weaponry. The group's links to extremists operating on the 6th Continent and its control of desert trafficking routes means that it has access to increasingly modern firearms and ammunition.

Reputation/Propaganda. Fear of the group means that host nation (GAF and Abusir) security forces do not project force at night, and rarely stand and fight if a retreat is possible. This allows the group significant freedom of movement and action.

Ethnic make-up. The group's ethnic make-up allows it to use the local population as cover. This assists reconnaissance operation, and its ability to raise funds in urban areas through legitimate businesses.

Weaknesses:

The requirement for religious justification acts as an operational constraint. The group needs to justify its operations and target set to its base, let them lose popular support. The group is, therefore, vulnerable to effective counter-narratives.

Physical Terrain. Considering its Area of Operations comprises of the desert, there is little natural foliage to cover the large-scale movement. This is exacerbated during the wet season when the group is forced to use metaled roads. This makes the group vulnerable to aerial surveillance and attacks, undermining its ability to scale its operations.

Human Terrain. Support for IK is far from universal among the Abu. Indeed, most Abu resent the group for making them a pariah ethnic group in Garya. This has the potential to erode IK OPSEC as both UNMIGAR, and the GAF are likely (if security in outlying areas improves) to find sections of the population willing to act as informers, thereby reducing its FOM.

Composition. The fact that some personnel have fought in and been radicalised by the war on the 6th Continent makes the group less ideologically coherent than has been the case in the past. Evidence of this comes in the content of sermons of religious leaders associated with those that have fought on the 6th continent and those that have not. It is assessed that tensions between these groups make fictionalisation an increasingly realistic possibility. UNMIGAR/GAF strategic messaging could focus on this to weaken the group by encouraging in-fighting.

Limited access to modern armour defeating weapons systems. This affords UNMIGAR an advantage when moving in IK-dominate areas.

Lack of encrypted real-time communications systems. While this does improve COMSEC, it reduces the group's capability to react to surprise friendly force operations.

Opportunities:

Weak host nation security presence in the border and other inaccessible areas means the group has the potential to expand its presence.

Expanding links with the AWF. The group has the potential to widen its AO to Sector North and to conduct operations that will put additional pressure on the GAF.

Lack of formal economic opportunities available to the local population (Abu, Eri, and Nimba) means that the group can at least maintain and probably increase its recruitment. It is a realistic possibility that IK could widen its recruit and support base to non-traditional support groups.

Structural causes of the conflict (political and socioeconomic isolation of non-Tutu groups) remain unchanged across the country. This makes future alliances (ENLF, EIMF, Linohas, etc.) of convenience a realistic possibility.

Threats:

Deployment of UNMIGAR (and its mandate to professionalise the GAF) will reduce IK freedom of movement/action.

As Garya stabilises, economists expect Foreign Direct Investment in extractive industries to increase. This will increase employment opportunities for minority groups in the country. In time, this is likely to lead to the increasing integration of minority groups into the formal economy. Typically, this reduces the appeal of extremist groups.

Agreement of Abusir and Garyan Security Forces to work together on cross border operations. This reduces space for IK reorganisation and consolidation.

Ongoing International CT efforts which have now moved towards eastern Abusir. Drone attacks are expected to erode existing C2 structures at a rate that is faster than the group's ability to reconstitute – the group's decentralised structures notwithstanding.

Centre of Gravity:

COG – support of the population.

CCs. Recruitment contributes to OPSEC, to its ability to raise finances through front businesses, FOM and Action, legitimacy.

CRs. Sufficient revenues to pay recruits, maintaining the support of religious leaders to justify operations, maintaining a narrative of success, maintain the freedom to proselytise, capacity to deliver underlying security and some services to the population under its control.

CV – vulnerability to sophisticated counter-narratives/strategic messaging, expansion of state security, economic development, expansion of government services, fringe group operations, criminal activity of some members/exploitation of the local population.

So what? A sophisticated CT strategy is required to target the group's CRs.

UNMIGAR, X-border (international) CT kinetic operations and the professionalisation of the GAF should create the operational space necessary for economic development, the expansion of government services to minorities, and an end to impunity for


criminal/terrorist activity. This should reduce the group's appeal to its base, thereby undermining recruitment and its ability to raise funds.

Sophisticated counter-narratives can undermine the group's religious reason to deter and reduce the group's coherence.

Slide 34

Situation Integration

Slide 35



MDCOA.

IK will conduct an aggressive campaign of sophisticated attacks on UNMIGAR FOBs throughout Sector West. These sophisticated attacks will involve IDF, SVBIEDs, PBIEDs, and ground troops to assure maximum casualties, denying UNMIGAR access to most urban areas.

Intent/Purpose. To deny UNMIGAR access to all rural and most urban areas of Sector West, and to disrupt TCC political willingness to sustain UNMIGAR.

End state. Being forced to increase security at its bases makes UNMIGAR a static force, unable to deploy to more than a handful of urban areas. IK increases its control to more areas of Sector west.

SOM:

Shaping. Online hate speech targeting UNMIGAR increases. UNMIGAR becomes the target of radical preachers. The local population is warned not to cooperate with UNMIGAR, and those that do are targets for reprisal. IK moves weapons caches and a large number of fighters into key urban areas and increases IED/SVBIED/PBIED construction. Several safe houses are occupied. Reconnaissance and surveillance of UNMIGAR FOBs are conducted. IDF launch sites are prepared, and target registration begins from multiple launch sites.

Decisive. A series of attacks on UNMIGAR FOBs occur.

Sustainment. IK increases its control throughout the sector west, including in urban areas. Messaging/propaganda campaign to undermine UNMIGARs standing as a credible security provider in the eyes of the local population is maintained and increased.

Tactical Functions:

Protection. The group has no access to armour, but its structure, disposition, and ethnic composition provide a high level of OPSEC. The group also has good COMSEC.

Information and Intel. Can move within the local population—benefits from a local, albeit relatively small, support base which offers information on UNMIGAR movement.

Firepower. Small arms and IEDs (PBIEDs and SVBIEDs). Effective against UNMIGAR convoys.

Manoeuvre. IK is highly mobile. 4x4 vehicles offer an off-road capability, which reduces in the wet season. IK can also operate on foot over long distances and in urban areas.

Logs. Fighters can self-sustain for short periods. Use of local population/services possible due to support network and strong financial position.

C2. The group is widely dispersed, and its decentralised command structures offer operational freedom to individual groups.

Identifying Indicators & Warnings

Increase in anti-UNMIGAR propaganda (online, graffiti, religious sermons);

Reports of increased movement of IK cadres into urban areas, including the presence of extremists;

Reports of IK taking over safe houses in the area;

Increased surveillance of UNMIGAR FOBs;

Testing of UNMIGAR security procedures involving unarmed personnel by day and night;

Reports of movement of arms/explosives into urban areas;

Reports of large-scale attack rehearsals taking place;

IDF attacks from multiple launch sites indicative of ranging and target acquisition ongoing;

A significant change to the pattern of life in and around UNMIGAR bases;

Large gatherings of military-aged males in and around UNMIGAR bases;

Vehicles are moving at speed towards UNMIGAR gates.

Items of High Importance List:

Weapons caches;


IED makers;

Religious leaders;

Military commanders;

Financial enablers (financiers, front businesses).

Slide 36



MDCOA.

IK will conduct an aggressive campaign of complex attacks on UNMIGAR FOBs throughout Sector West. These complex attacks will involve IDF, SVBIEDs, PBIEDs, and ground troops to assure maximum casualties, denying UNMIGAR access to most urban areas.

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End state. Being forced to increase security at its bases makes UNMIGAR a static force, unable to deploy to more than a handful of urban areas. IK increases its control to more areas of Sector west.

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Firepower. Small arms and IEDs (PBIEDs and SVBIEDs). Effective against UNMIGAR convoys.

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
IED makers;

Religious leaders;

Military commanders;

Financial enablers (financiers, front businesses).

Slide 37



Here are the MAI and TAIs transcribed on the event overlay.

Slide 38

Priority Intelligence Requirements

- Where are the IK bed down locations within urban areas?
- What support do they have from the local population / delegation / security forces?
- What vulnerabilities does IK's C2 have to intercept?
- Critical Intelligence Gap
- What is the level of IK influence within the IDP camp?
- What is IK's IED capability?

This slide is used to inform the commander what the MPKI staff believe are the current PIRs relating to this AOE. This is an opportunity for the commander to confirm/change the MPKI effort. In addition, the MPKI staff should inform the commander where they have critical intelligence gaps, and this will enable the commander to prioritise acquisition assets, at this stage, to close some of the intelligence gaps.

Slide 39

Verbal Briefs – Tips

- Remove distractions
- Follow formats, avoid scripts
- Determine time to brief- stick to it
- Identify and arrange aids
- Pertinent information only
- Briefer- experience more important than rank
- Eye contact
- Rehearse – this is vital

Here are some briefing tips.

Remove distractions. The instructor should inform the students that it is important to remove distractions prior to briefing the commander.

Follow formats / avoid scripts. Formats are useful in order to structure the brief coherently. The P1B format in the handbook is a simple structure against which the MPKI can look to identify useful headings to inform no detail is missed.

Determine the time and stick to it. Ensure that you ask the commander how long you must brief. Should your P1B time be limited, it allows the MPKI staff to prioritise what is briefed to the commander – e.g. focus on the situation integration.

Identify and arrange aids. Ensure that the MPKI staff are aware of stage managing the P1B – ensure that overlays and briefing products are arranged coherently and logically. That transitions between overlays are rehearsed.


Pertinent information only. Do not brief the commander all that you know. Brief the commander what they need to know.

Experience is more important than rank. The rank of the briefer is not important. Ensure that the commander is being briefed by the individual that has the most knowledge about the subject matter being briefed.

Eye contact. This helps the briefer engage with the audience; in doing so, it ensures the audience is more likely to assimilate the information being briefed.

Rehearse—the most critical element in preparing for a brief. The instructor should ensure that the students understand that they have to rehearse. That is planning the AOE timeline, that they factor in the time to do a full rehearsal. A rehearsal will enable the MPKI to identify areas for development, but also make an assessment on timings for each element.

Slide 40



Phase Two is where the commander provides greater direction to their staff. This will enable the staff to understand the commander's thinking and identify the required COAs for further development.

MPKI support is critical to assist the commander and the planning staff. The MPKI staff should be aware that the commander will ask themselves at least four questions:


- What is my higher commander's intent?
- What are my specified and implied tasks?
- What are my freedoms and constraints?
- Has the situation changed, and in doing so, has it influenced my mission?

The MPKI staff should ensure that the Commander understands the threats and risks.

MPKI staff will confirm with the commander that the current PIRs are correct.


MPKI staff should look to update the situation paragraph for warning order 2 if that is required.

Slide 41



During this phase, the COA development teams will be working on possible COAs based on the commander's brief following mission analysis. The MPKI staff will provide support to each COA development group to provide SME advice regarding the AOE. MPKI Staff will still be conducting AOE and continue to develop understanding in addition to provide mission-specific AOE support. MPKI staff will support the COA development teams by 'testing' the COAs as they are being developed.


Slide 42



The commander will receive a back briefly from the COA development teams. The commander will assess and analyse each brief and provide direction on which COA has been selected. The commander could also ask the staff to combine COAs and provide further development.

The MPKI staff should provide input to test the chosen COA. This will enable the identification and mitigation of known threats and risks. The MPKI staff should look to inform the commander where MPKI activity needs to take place during each stage of the chosen COA, such as acquisition activity. The MPKI staff should provide an update to the situation paragraph for warning order 3 if required.

Slide 43



At this point in time, the staff will be writing an Operation Order to inform subordinate elements what missions and tasks are to be conducted, and the MPKI staff will draft the supporting intelligence annex and situation paragraphs. The MPKI staff should also look to provide guidance to the commander and planning staff regarding control measures, such as deconfliction of acquisition capabilities. Mission rehearsal – the role of the MPKI staff, is to raise realistic / testing scenarios. This confirms that the plan and its contingencies are viable.

Slide 44

Takeaway

- PKI support for the MDMP provides inputs to be integrated during all phases of the planning process
- The Phase One brief is the MPKI cell's moment to situate and inform the Command and Staff prior to the conduct of planning
- An updated peacekeeping-intelligence picture and 'testing' of the potential COAs will inform planning and shape the COA Brief
- The role of the MPKI staff during mission rehearsal is to raise realistic and relevant scenarios involving the physical, information and human terrains to test the plan and ensure that it is viable in relation to possible contingencies

Summary

In summary, the MPKI staff support all stages of the MDMP process. Staff must be proactive and look to provide expert situational awareness inputs.

The P1B is the MPKI staff's initial opportunity to situate the commander and the planning staff. The P1B products can be used throughout the MDMP to further assist planning.

Throughout, the MPKI staff should look to provide updates when new intelligence is raised or where the situation changes. The MPKI staff should also look to test the plan by including realistic actor scenarios in order to mitigate the identified risks and threats.

Lesson 3.6



POC Planning

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson


Slide 1

The image shows the United Nations flag, which is a light blue flag with a white emblem in the center. The emblem consists of a world map surrounded by a laurel wreath. The flag is waving against a clear blue sky.

Lesson 3.6
Intelligence Support to POC
Planning

We have looked at how PKI can support military planning in the MDMP process. The tools we have taught you are highly adaptable, and we expect you to shape them to fit any intelligence requirements for your commander. An important planning requirement for a UN Mission is for the Protection of Civilians or POC Planning framework, which as an MPKIO, we need to be prepared to support.

Slide 2



Here is the lesson content

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes


- Explain why POC Planning is important
- Identify intelligence inputs to POC Planning

On completion of this lesson, you will be able to explain the 3 Column Format and accurately derive, identify and fill in relevant factors, deductions and outcomes.

Slide 4

POC Mandates

- Majority of UN missions are tasked with POC mandate
- More than 95 % of peacekeeping personnel are deployed in missions with a POC mandate
- All recently established missions equipped with POC mandate



Above everything else is the fact that failure to protect may result in the loss of civilian life, which is tragic and the most important consequence. But POC is increasingly also coming to define the success and reputation of UN missions, meaning there are implications for the credibility and legitimacy of the United Nations and UN Peacekeeping involved.

Not all peacekeeping missions have a POC mandate. Yet, new mission routinely has been given a POC mandate. Additionally, since all the largest missions have a POC mandate, nearly all peacekeeping personnel work in a mission with POC mandate.


While agreement on the importance of POC was established quickly, finding consensus on what peacekeepers are expected to do in the context of POC has been difficult. In 2010, DPKO-DFS developed a commonly agreed upon Operational Concept, and 2015 the Policy on POC in Peacekeeping was created. It is important that MPKIOs understand the importance of POC and how best to focus their efforts to produce intelligence products that support POC planning.

Slide 5



POC Planning is similar to the MDMP process. Here is the basic POC Planning framework. While it is the same overarching process as the MDMP, the component parts may be a bit different.

Slide 6



Key Message: POC Planning flows from the Mission Mandate through each planning level, culminating in a POC component of the OPORD/PLANORD to Unit Commanders. Commanders are required to consider POC Planning in all their mission planning.

The Mission Mandate is always going to comply with and reflect over-arching laws and policies that require the protection of civilians. The Mission Mandate triggers POC Planning in parallel with other mission planning. The product of POC Planning is not so much a plan, but POC considerations to be incorporated in all mission planning.

POC Planning flows down to the Force Commander's OPORD, Sector Commander's OPORD to Unit Commanders who will be tasked with conducting POC Planning in their AOR as a part of their Receipt of Mission.

Note that at the sector level, close liaison with the Regional HQ is essential in understanding the Political and Humanitarian aspects of POC, in addition to the Security aspect of POC. The three pillars of responsibility in a UN mission are Political, Security and Humanitarian. The Military component's primary responsibility is within the security pillar. Therefore, the sector and force HQs must ensure that they support the unit commanders by coordinating with and help create synergistic efforts in support of POC planning via the other Mission components.


Unit POC Planning will focus on understanding the specific vulnerabilities to civilians in their AOR and planning proactive measures to both prevent and pre-empt abuses against civilians. Reactive measures to respond to abuses and consolidate those

responses in order to reduce the effects of abuses against civilians that have not been prevented.

Force and Sector HQs will follow the POC planning process, but Unit Commanders may use their national planning processes to create the POC elements of their plans, though they will be tasked with providing POC outputs in the required POC format so that Sector and Force HQs understand the tactical POC challenges and threats.

Once a unit commander develops their plan, the next higher HQs must endorse and underwrite that plan. This includes accepting the risks and assisting the unit commander in mitigating the risks. This may include accepting responsibilities for certain NAIs and TAIs inherent in the plans.

Slide 7



Key message: How UN peacekeeping missions respond to POC threats can be divided into four phases. The four phases are not sequential, and missions will often find their activities fall into different phases in different parts of the country at the same time, and some of the same activities may take place across all phases.

It is enough to know that the objective of this approach is to either eliminate a threat, or mitigate the risk to civilians associated with that threat. It must also be noted that these phases do not necessarily occur in sequential order and may be undertaken simultaneously or independently.


Here are the four phases:

- Prevention,
- Pre-emption,
- Response and
- Consolidation (threat has been mitigated/eliminated)

Action is necessary across all four phases, in line with the proactive approach taken by peacekeeping missions. In the prevention and pre-emption phase, the incident has not occurred yet, and missions can more effectively avoid violence by acting in these phases. In the response phase, missions respond to a violent incident that has already occurred, and in the consolidation phase missions support post-conflict activities. During


military planning for POC; intelligence efforts should be focused on the prevention and Pre-emption phases for groups associated with a high-risk criterion.

Slide 8



POC considerations are to be incorporated into all mission planning. While POC is considered separately in a wider MDMP planning, it is generally the same staff doing both. POC planning produces considerations that are injected into mission planning to ensure that POC occurs effectively.

Slide 9




Mission Analysis is where intelligence can add critical value. Under the POC Mission Analysis step, POC planners follow the process of:

- Identify and analyse all key actors in the AOR based on their relevance to the Protection of Civilians
- Select those key actors that represent a threat to vulnerable civilians and further analyse them
- Determine the level of risk (impact and likelihood) that threat actors pose to vulnerable civilians

The threat actors and the level of risk they pose to vulnerable civilians is then injected into mission planning to allow commanders to determine which civilian population/groups they need to protect, and how they will protect them.

This is where intelligence products can assist in POC planning to develop effective planning considerations for commanders.

Slide 10



Key Message: The 'Identify Key Actors' step of POC Mission Analysis includes analysis of the Civilian Population, Potential Perpetrators, Host State Forces and Other Protection Actors, all of which can be enhanced with the contribution of Intelligence Products.

Under the Identify Key Actors step, POC planners consider Actors in the following groups:

- Civilian communities, to provide an understanding of where and who they are, their location and make-up; hospitals, schools, IDP / refugee camps all should be analysed (armed groups recruitment and areas of kidnapping etc.)
- Potential Perpetrators – those who may potentially present a risk to vulnerable civilians (threat actors who present a risk to the force may not present a risk to civilians, and some actors may not present a risk to the force, but do present a risk to civilians)
- Host State Forces – to determine their ability and/or willingness to protect civilians, and particularly if they themselves pose a risk to vulnerable civilians
- Other Protection Actors – these are other Actors in the AOR whose purpose is to protect civilians




Interaction. Ask the students how the students this question: – Who might some humanitarian Protection Actors be?

Answer: the humanitarian/human rights component of the UN mission, the host nation, Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, local NGOs, etc.

In order to assist the POC planning process, we can contribute standard intelligence products as shown, to improve understanding of the Key Actors in the AOR. The only difference between our normal threat-based analysis and analysis in support of POC is that we must orientate our thinking to focus on potential threats to civilians.

Slide 11



Key Message: The 'Threat Analysis' step of POC Mission focuses on the potential effect that identified threat actors could have on civilian communities, all of which can be enhanced with the contribution of Intelligence Products.

Under the Identify Key Actors step, POC planners carry out the following:

- Provide an overview of the situation, including a summary of threats
- Analysis of the potential areas of concern between threat groups and civilian populations that may develop into abuses against vulnerable civilians – key areas of potential conflict include ethnic, religious, political or any other identified differences that may place specific civilian communities at risk from specific threat groups
- The Threat Matrix summarises threat actors and which communities they may target and how


In order to assist the POC planning process, we can contribute standard intelligence products as shown, to improve understanding of the Threat Actors in the AOR, nature of civilian communities, and how they may interact in a way that presents a risk to civilians. The only difference between our normal threat-based analysis and analysis in support of POC is that we must orientate our thinking to focus on potential threats to civilians from specific threat groups.



Interaction. Ask the students how the students this question: This is not an exhaustive list of suitable products – what else can you think of that we might be able to contribute?

Answer: Link Diagrams and Association Matrices showing interactions between civ communities and/or threat groups, Timelines if they show patterns of abuse that allow us to predict likely possible times that threats target civilians, etc. Analysts should consider contributing any product that clarifies the POC environment.

Slide 12




Key message: 'Risk Analysis' step of POC Mission Analysis considers how vulnerable civilian communities may be, how much protection they can rely on from other protection actors, and how dangerous each threat group is to each civilian community, which when put together allows planners to assess the risk to each civilian community, driving planning priorities.

Under the Risk Analysis step, POC planners consider the following:

- How vulnerable are specific civilian communities to each identified threat group? If a civilian community is not vulnerable to a threat group, they do not require protection
- How capable are other protection actors, such as Host Nation forces, of protecting the identified vulnerable civilian communities? If you cannot rely on other protection actors to protect vulnerable civilians, the UN Commander will need to plan to use their resources to protect those communities
- What is the level of danger (based on the capability, intent and historical actions against those identified vulnerable civilians) that identified threat actors present to identified vulnerable civilians? The level of danger contributes to determining the priority to protect
- Finally, taking into consideration the previous steps, what is the likelihood and impact of threat actions against vulnerable civilians? This determines the Commander's priorities for the protection of civilians

In order to assist the POC planning process, we can contribute standard intelligence products as shown, to improve understanding of building blocks of risk analysis. The only difference between our typical threat-based analysis and analysis in support of POC is that we must orientate our thinking to focus on potential threats to civilians.

Slide 13



POC Planning continues from Mission Analysis to COA production, Orders and Execution, all of which an intelligence analyst can contribute to if engaged in the POC planning process. During the other POC Planning steps, intelligence personnel should remain engaged in order to provide advice as appropriate.

Slide 14

Take Away

- In parallel to the MDMP, each level of command will conduct POC planning that Intelligence Analysts need to support
- Analysts need to understand the products of POC planning in order to provide products that assist planners
- The only difference between threats to force and threats to civilians is perspective

Summary

Intelligence Analysts need to be aware of POC planning and provide intelligence products that inform POC planners, just like you support the MDMP

Module 3



Operational Framework Wrap Up

At the conclusion of Module 3, some key elements should become clearer:

- A general understanding of the key operational framework covering a MPKIO operating in UN peacekeeping operation
- The main skillsets required for MPKIO operating in UN PKOs
- The Tabletop Exercise (TTX) will give you a better understanding of the MPKIO operations in a UN PKO along with the essential planning parameters, skills and tasks performed
- The MPKIO is an enabling asset
- The TTX provides you with some tools to apply in the employment of MPKIO, decision-making processes that might be used in a PKO and provides a platform for understanding how MPKIO support the mandate
- A focus on the tactical level employment of a MPKIO and a general overview of the operational level concepts to help leaders understand how a MPKIO can contribute to the accomplishment of the UN mandate



Instructor Note: For the Capstone Learning Activity (LA) go to the MPKIO RTP Annex C – TTX

R e f e r e n c e s



Glossary and Annexes

The following annexes and references can be found in separate folders to aid in the delivery of the modules:

- **Annex A:** PowerPoint Slide Lesson Presentations
- **Annex B:** Lesson Learning Activities and Capstone Tabletop Exercise (TTX)
- **Annex C:** Supporting documents, references and background material

Glossary (acronyms and abbreviations)

3CF	3 Column Format
ACH	Analysis of Competing Hypothesis
ACOA	Actor Course of Action
AE	Actor Evaluation
AI	Area of Intelligence Interest
AIR	Area of Intelligence Responsibility
AM	Acquisition Management/Manager
AOE	Analysis of the Operating Environment
ASCOPE	Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organisations, People, Events
Bn	Battalion
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirement
CIU	Crime Intelligence Unit
CMOS	Current Military Operations Service
COG	Centre of Gravity
COIST	Company Intelligence Support Team
Comd	Commander
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
Coy	Company
CC	Critical Capabilities
CR	Critical Requirements
CV	Critical Vulnerabilities
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DTG	Date Time Group
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
EMP	Electro-Magnetic Pulse
EO	Event Overlay
FHQ	Force Headquarters
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
G2	Sector Level Intelligence Staff
GA	Gender Analysis
GEO	Geospatial
GEOINT	Geospatial Intelligence
HIPPO	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
I&W	Indicators & Warnings
IAP	Intelligence Acquisition Plan
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IE	Intelligence Estimate
IHI	Items of High Importance
IM	Information Management
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
INTREP	Intelligence Report
INTSUM	Intelligence Summary
IO	Information Operations
IOTs	Integrated Operational Teams
IR	Intelligence Requirement
IR	Infra-Red
IRM	Information Requirements Management/Manager
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Centre
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
KT	Key Terrain
LN(s)	Local National(s)
MASIC	Military All-Source Information Cell
MICM	Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism
MDACOA	Most Dangerous Course of Action
MDMP	Military Decision-Making Process
MICS	Mission Intelligence Co-ordination Structure
MLACOA	Most Likely Course of Action
MSN	Mission
NAI	Named Area of Interest
OE	Operating Environment
OEE	Operating Environment Evaluation

OMA	Office of Military Affairs
OO	Office of Operations
OPINT	Operational Intelligence
OPO	Operations Order
ORBAT	Order of Battle
OS	Open Source
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
OTHR	Over The Horizon Radar
PBIED	Person-borne Improvised Explosive Device
PICTINTSUM	Picture Intelligence Summary
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirement
PK MIHB	Peacekeeping Military Intelligence Handbook
PKMI	Peacekeeping Military Intelligence
PI	Platoon
PMESII - PT	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical, Time
POC	Police Operations Centre
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
Recce	Reconnaissance
RFI	Request For Information
ROMB	Receipt of Mission Brief
S2	Battalion Level Intelligence Staff
SAR	Synthetic Aperture Radar
SI	Situation Integration
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIR	Specific Intelligence Requirement
SITMAP	Situation Map
SLT	Senior Leadership Team
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SPIE	Short Peacekeeping Intelligence Estimate
TAI	Target Area of Interest
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
TECHINT	Technical Intelligence
TPME	Task, Purpose, Method, End state
U2	Force level intelligence
UAS	Unmanned Aircraft System
UN	United Nations
UNHQ	United Nations Headquarters
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UV	Ultraviolet
VBIED	Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device
VG	Vital Ground

VHF	Very High Frequency
VLF	Very Low Frequency
VRN	Vehicle Registration Number
WARNO	Warning Order

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