INTRODUCTION TO PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS 3

Implementing POC

Key considerations for the tactical level

Preparatory Notes to Instructors

AIM

To familiarize peacekeeping personnel with:

- Planning considerations at tactical level and their connection with the mission POC strategy.

AUDIENCE

This module has been designed for UN uniformed personnel at **tactical level to be trained during the pre-deployment training (PDT) phase**, especially battalion and FPU commanders and staff and individually deployed military and police personnel as military observers, military liaison officers, military advisers and individual police officers.

LEARNING OUTCOMES

On completion of Introduction to POC 3, participants will be able to:

1. Understand field missions POC strategies and its linkages with tactical aspects
2. Understand the four phases of the protection response
3. Identify key partners in the mission to implement POC mandates
4. Understand planning and cross-cutting considerations impacting the implementation of POC

TRAINING SEQUENCE

Introduction to POC 3 is the third and last session of Module 1, Introduction to Protection of Civilians. This session should be followed by the Learning Activity.

DURATION

Part 1 Introduction to POC 1	**Lecture/Presentation**	**Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment**
	40 min.	10 min.
Part 2 Introduction to POC 2	**Lecture/Presentation**	**Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment**
	40 min.	10 min.
Part 3 Introduction to POC 3	**Lecture/Presentation**	**Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment**
	40 min.	10 min.

Part 4	Explanation of the exercise	Group discussion	Group presentations in plenary
Learning Activity	5 min	45 min	50 min

METHODOLOGY

- The following points outline a suggested methodology. Experienced instructors may choose to use alternative methods and activities to present the material and key messages in this unit. Availability of time may permit additional students to formulate questions after each presentation.
- Training is divided into 50 minute blocks with 10 minute break periods between each block.
- This module will include lecture issues followed by group questions/discussion and learning activities as appropriate.

Part 1, 2 and 3:

- Presentations using the provided PowerPoint slides;
- Informal question and answer periods (as determined by instructor).

Part 4:

- Small group discussion and solution to the requirements of the Learning Activity;
- Short presentations to be made by the small groups, followed by plenary discussion on the questions proposed by the Learning Activity.

INSTRUCTOR PROFILE

Module 1 (Introduction to POC 1, 2, 3 and the Learning Activity) is best presented by an instructor who has personal experience in a peacekeeping operation with a Protection of Civilian (POC) mandate, preferably as battalion and FPU commander or staff or company commander, with a solid understanding of the operational concept of POC and how it's implemented in the mission(s). Instructor should have undergone a formal training course on the UN Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTM) and UN POC at national or international level.

INSTRUCTOR PREPARATIONS

Required Readings:

- Charter of the United Nations;
- United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (also known as the Capstone Doctrine);
- OCHA/DPKO Study on the Protection of Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges (2009);
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS (Draft) Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations;
- OCHA Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians;
- DPKO/DFS Lessons Learned Note on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective Into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations;

- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective Into the Work of the United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Mainstreaming the Protection, Rights and Well-being of Children Affected by Armed Conflict within UN Peacekeeping Operations;
- Analytical and Conceptual Framing of Conflict Related Sexual Violence (UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict);
- Secretary General's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations forces of International Humanitarian Law;

Equipment:

- Computer and provided session slides;
- Projector and screen for slides.

Materials:

- Copies of the *Draft Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations* and of the *DPKO Protection of Civilians Operational Concept* (one per participant). For copies, please download the electronic file at:

http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx

PARTICIPANT PREPARATIONS

All participants must have a strong familiarity with the following:

- UN Core Pre-deployment Training Materials;
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS (Draft) Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Security Council Resolutions (please download from http://www.un.org/en/documents/):

- Concerning Children and Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1612), 2005.
- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1674), 2006.
- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1894), 2009.
- Women and Peace and Security, (S/RES/1325), 2000.
- Women and Peace and Security, (S/RES/1960), 2010.

MATERIALS REFERENCED IN THIS MODULE

- DPKO/DFS Draft Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) strategies in UN Peacekeeping *Operations* (2010)
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2009)
- DRAFT Explanatory Note on Protection of Civilians Language in Security Council Mandates for Peacekeeping Missions
- Henry L Stimson Center, Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Washington, D.C, (2011)
- Integrated Mission Planning Process Guidelines: Role of the Field; Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences
- Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2008)
- OCHA Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians
- OCHA/DPKO Study on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations (2009)
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping

- Protection of Civilians (POC) Resource and Capability Matrix for Implementation of UN Peacekeeping Operations with POC Mandates (2012)

SYMBOLS LEGEND

☞	Note to the Instructor (Some background information for consideration and mention)
	Speaking Points (The main points to cover on the topic). Ideally the speaking points are presented in the instructor's own words.
	Mission Specific (A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information
e.g	Example (Stories that illustrate a point or key message)
?	Sample questions (A list of potential questions to pose to participants)
	Handout (Indicates a handout is provided to participants at this point)
	Film (A film that is suggested as either a core or optional activity)
	Core Learning Activity (An activity that is strongly recommended for inclusion)
+	Optional Learning Activity (An activity that can be used if there is time and it is appropriate for the participant group. Guidelines for these activities are provided at the end of the unit or part – as indicated in the text)
🗝	Key summary points (Key messages that are worth repeating at the end of the session. Alternatively, the instructor can ask participants what are the main messages they are taking from the session. Instructors can then fill in any points that have been missed.)

Session Notes

1. INTRODUCTION



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

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

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- This presentation intends to discuss responses to the important question on how operational (mission) level documents such as the Mission POC Strategy provide guidance to mission components when they are drafting their concepts of operations and work plans and how that is translated to tactical level plans and activities.

- The presentation also places focus on military and police tactical tasks to be preformed by infantry battalions and formed police units as a preparation for the mission-specific modules with scenarios and requirements.

- Finally a discussion on threats and vulnerabilities is presented. The idea is to call attention to aspects related to POC and not to discuss military and police planning processes since they may vary according to national peculiarities.

2. MISSION POC STRATEGY

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- Comprehensive **POC strategies are designed to bring coherence in approach, minimize gaps, avoid duplication and maximize the mission's ability to ensure the protection of civilians** through the use of its available capacities (civilian, military, police and support elements of the mission).

- By **clarifying the role and activities of the mission and modalities of interface with key partners**, comprehensive POC strategies also ensure better coordination with other actors working on POC.

- Additionally, POC strategies are an important tool for senior mission leadership to ensure that missions take a pro-active approach to POC. Senior mission leadership have an important responsibility in this respect, and must remain engaged in both the development and implementation of comprehensive POC strategies.

  ☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *Currently a number of POC mandate field missions are developing or reviewing their POC strategies, including the four missions object of scenario-based exercises (MONUSCO, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNAMID).*

- **A coherent protection response requires consultation and coordination with all protection actors (UN and non UN)** in order to organize all available protection resources to address protection threats in a proactive, logical way.

☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *Acknowledge that it can be very difficult to coordinate between mission and non-mission partners with different agendas and mandates.*

- The strategy is for the peacekeeping operation but coordinating instructions and mechanisms with external partners should be present in the strategy in order to address cooperation with the UNCT and the Protection Cluster (Humanitarian actors).

- Once finalized the strategy should be endorsed by the Head of Mission and the UNCT. The document itself should be disseminated to all mission components involved in the protection of civilians so that they are aware of their responsibilities and can develop their own plans. Key partners, such as the Protection Cluster, shall also receive a copy of the strategy.



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- POC strategies are drafted at the operational level and aim to ensure that tactical-level tasks contribute to the mission's POC objectives. POC planning is a tool to anticipate POC risks so it can address them in coordination with other protection actors.

- **Operational**: Other important elements of the POC strategy, such as identifying activities to be undertaken by the mission to address those risks, analyzing the resources and capacities required to implement the POC mandates will be decided at the operational level.

- **Tactical**: **Identify actual and potential POC risks in the mission area:** The mission's efforts to protect civilians must be based on a thorough analysis of the POC risks facing the population.

  ☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *As we will see shortly, the analysis of the POC risks must be derived from analyzing the threats posed to the population and their vulnerabilities.*

  ☞ *Military and police components operating at the tactical level contribute to risk analysis through collecting and sharing information they collect as part of their normal activities, as we have just discussed. The Military Component also normally conducts their own risk analysis at tactical level (infantry battalions, sectors and the FHQ).*

- **Tactical**: **Contribute to providing an overview of the protection actors:** Uniformed personnel at the tactical level are often familiar with protection actors they work alongside with. It is also important for the mission to have a picture of the local Government's capacity and willingness to protect civilians.

- **Tactical**: **Benefit from a clarification of roles and responsibilities and of POC coordination mechanisms:** Coordination of roles and responsibilities across components within the mission or with other protection actors is an important part of the strategy development. Uniformed personnel at the tactical level can use this opportunity to clarify the expectations placed upon them and their capacity to meet them.

  ☞ ***Note to Instructor: It is very important for the tactical level operators at battalion and FPU level*** *to understand a mission POC strategy and how this document impacts on the Military and Police Components revised CONOPS and operation orders and plans. A POC strategy provides the operational level guidance to allow the components HQs to draft plans and orders that will ultimately affect the battalion and FPU levels, including the military observers, military liaison officers and individual police officers.*

e.g MONUSCO's **System-Wide Protection Strategy** was developed in 2010 in a joint effort with OCHA, and UNHCR in its role as protection cluster lead. The mission protection strategy recognizes that MONUSCO does not have the operational capacity to position troops in every locality, given DRC's size, infrastructural gaps and security challenges. <u>It therefore needs to</u>

maintain its ability to intervene decisively, by keeping a strategic and tactical reserve, and avoiding dispersal of its forces

3. THE FOUR PHASES OF PROTECTION RESPONSE



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

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- **Important aspects on the Four Phases of Protection of the DPKO Operational Concept**.
- **Non-sequential nature of the phases**. The DPKO Operational Concept lays out the four phases of the protection response. These phases may or may not be sequential. They could be understood as four categories of activities which might operate simultaneously depending on the nature of the threats. These phases are part of Tier II of the POC concept, which deals with physical protection.

- **Protection responses in each phase**. Ideally a protection response at tactical or operational level should be integrated in the sense it combines capabilities from the different mission components (military, police and civilian components) and is coordinated with mission partners.

e.g As such, during the Prevention phase, for example, patrolling carried out by an infantry battalion could have the participation of individual police officers and human rights officers in joint patrols to monitor developments in the security situation. The area infantry battalion commander could receive support from the mission Political Affairs Component to engage local leadership on how better to pre-empt violence amongst communities. FPU could be tasked to protect a important humanitarian food depot in close coordination with mission partners and etc.

- **Phase 1 – Assurance/Prevention**. The measures in this phase are aimed at reassuring the local population of the mission's intent to protect them, mainly through routine, passive measures. This is the phase in which units and MILOBs/IPOs teams conduct tasks to be visible, interact with local population, their leaders and local protection actors such as agencies and NGOs. **It is also a vital phase to gather and share information in a permanent attempt to anticipate threats.**

  ☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *Most of the times conducting these actions helps units to prevent or pre-empt a threat from developing. In other situations, due to a lack of proper capabilities as communications, intelligence and mobility, a POC threat may not have been anticipated and there is a need to enter into the response phase.*

- **Phase 2 – Pre-emption**. Where measures under Phase 1 prove insufficient, or when heightened risks are detected, more active, pre-emptive measures may be required. It is important to note that it may be also the case that an infantry battalion has part of its area of operations with a company conducting tasks related to prevention and other part with another company conducting pre-emptive measures.

- **Phase 3 – Response**. When the threat of physical violence to civilians is apparent, more active measures aimed at deterring potential aggressors from conducting hostile acts may be

necessary. At this stage, the violent behavior is already underway and steps must be taken to compel the aggressor to comply. Direct military action should be considered as an option.

- **Phase 4 – Consolidation**. This range of activities addresses the stabilization of a post-crisis situation. The aim is to assist the local population and host authorities to return to a state of normalcy, and create the conditions in which a return to crisis is diminished.

☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *The effective prevention and deterrence of violence against civilians requires an effective early warning system and a consistent, credible and proactive (as opposed to reactive) operational approach and a mobile posture.*

e.g Mobile operating bases (MOB / TOB) improve mission reach, enhanced deterrence and response capabilities.

☞ *Though the "phases" as described in the Strategic Framework relate primarily to Phase II (physical protection) activities actors operating primarily in Tier I (Protection through the political process) and III (Protection through the creation of a protective environment) must adjust their activities to reflect changes and escalation of the real time challenges in the mission's area of responsibility.*



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- **Protection Response**. It might take the form of mission (operational) level multidimensional response or an immediate tactical level response provided by an UN infantry battalion,

company or FPU who has to address a critical situation related to protection of civilians from physical harm. **These concepts should be integrated into military and police planning processes of contingents whatever are the national peculiarities or different planning processes.**

- **Military tactical tasks such as patrolling, observation and liaison, amongst others are basic tools to understand the environment**. Most of the times rightly conducting these actions permits units to prevent or timely pre-empt a threat to develop. In other situations, due to a lack of proper capabilities such as communications, intelligence and mobility, a straight forward response must be delivered.

- **In all cases, good information sharing and coordination with other actors deployed in the area of operations is highly necessary**. HUMINT (human sources) is normally the main source of information and remains decisive to have an accurate picture of the situation.

☞ ***Note to Instructor:*** *The Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, in consultation with Member States, are making efforts to provide POC mandate field missions with modern means of surveillance, information gathering and early warning (as an example, unmanned aerial vehicles are planned to be furnished to MONUSCO).*

4. PLANNING AND CROSS-CUTTING CONSIDERATIONS



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- **Importance of planning and cross-cutting considerations**. Planning for these tactical tasks require full understanding that protection of civilians is the mission end-state, **an operational purpose that triggers several different tactical tasks**.

- It might take the form of mission level multidimensional response or an immediate tactical level response provided by a UN infantry battalion, company or FPU. These concepts should be integrated into military and police planning processes of contingents in addition to other planning processes that may happen concurrently.

- The four phases of response (prevention, pre-emption, response and consolidation) should be **reflected in the tactical plan of infantry battalions, companies and eventually FPUs**.



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- **The real military and police capacities to protect civilians must be clearly defined and understood by the operational level (Mission)**. It is not uncommon that the mission HQ , host government and mission partners create high expectations of military capabilities of infantry battalions without recognizing aspects as:

a. UN infantry battalions / companies are tactical elements designed to operate under a Brigade which provides guidance and assets; battalions when acting independently are not tactically self-sufficient;

b. UN infantry battalions operate isolated in an environment with several constrains on information gathering and are not well equipped to perform intelligence driven operations, essential to protect civilians;

c. Battalions normally operate in a huge area of operations: there are communication and mobility issues that can not be underestimated (here we are talking of wheeled versus tracked vehicles for example).

☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *There are also other factors present in military and police planning processes related to mission, adversaries, terrain, time, public opinion, leadership etc.*



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Contingent and battalion commanders / FPU need **to understand when and how concepts and guidance issued in the mission POC strategy are incorporated in the military / police plans and how they should be translated to the tactical level battalion / company / FPU orders.**

☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *this slide requires a sound understanding on how the UNHQ and the mission military component (and similarly the police component) plan.*

☞ *In the context of the integrated mission planning process and after guidance is provided, the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) in the UNHQ prepares a strategic military concept of operations (CONOPS) that translates the military tasks present in the mission mandate into a solid concept. The concept informs the mission military employment concept, phases of operation, threats, task organisation, lines of operation, structure and boundaries, partners and coordination structures and other relevant aspects. At this stage, DPKO also drafts the rules of engagement.*

☞ *The mission FHQ receives and refines the CONOPS by incorporating senior guidance and other inputs, including the mission POC strategy and as soon as it is finalised. The FHQ also develops an Operation Order that derives from the refined military CONOPS and the Force Commander issues his/her FC directives.*

☞ *When it comes to the tactical level, battalions also develop their own operation orders based on higher (FHQ) guidance and documentation. In the whole process, from the mission (operational) to sector or battalion level (tactical), POC must be inserted as a relevant if not the most relevant issue, depending on the emission mandate.*

☞ *A mission that has POC as the main mandated task, should have a military component preparing orders and plans that put* ***POC at the center of the planning process and as the main tactical goal.*** *In such situation, the tactical orders should reflect an analysis that took into consideration POC local threats, the local population vulnerability and the battalion capabilities to take action (prevent, pre-empt, respond and consolidate).*



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- **The four phases of response (prevention, pre-emption, response and consolidation) should be reflected in the tactical plan which main goal is protection of civilians.**

- Planning for these tactical tasks require full understanding of higher guidance on protection of civilians. **It makes all difference to have POC as the desired end state. It changes the way you plan and conduct routine and special tasks, how you gather and share information and your degree of preparedness to tackle POC situations.**

  ☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *Naturally amongst the eight POC mandated missions there are huge differences. A brief comparison between MINUSTAH and MONUSCO is enough to realize that the military components from these missions plan and conduct operations to protect civilians differently. In Haiti, for example, the threats against civilians are quite different from those existing in DRC.*

e.g **UNOCI has developed an Implementation Matrix** which identifies relevant actors and actions to counter risks identified. This should form the basis of operational documents, such as work plans, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and other instructions to the mission and its components in implementing the POC mandate. **The Implementation Matrix is based on four phases of action: preparing for risk in day-to-day activities, responding to heightened risk through pre-emptive measures, responding to actual threats of physical violence, and stabilizing the situation after a crisis has occurred.**

5. EARLY WARNING AND CRISIS RESPONSE



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- Identify mechanisms that the mission will establish to articulate what role external actors, including the host authorities and local population will play in these mechanisms, as the systems function best when they are well coordinated with local counterparts. However, due caution is necessary in not exposing the population to harm in setting up such systems.

- Missions have many points of presence in the country. Those should be part of an early warning system and be properly orientated to interact with local communities under an early warning framework.

- Crisis response: The mission shall articulate the rapid decision-making process to address POC crises, involving the relevant components.

e.g **UNMISS developed a Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for Conflict Early Warning and Early Response (CEWER)**, which sets out a process for the systematic collection and processing of threat information. The CEWER states that the Chief of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), in consultation with the Protection of Civilians Advisor, heads of mission components and sections, State Coordinators and the UN Country Team (UNCT), shall develop national Priority Information Requirements (PIRs) and a mission-wide Collection Plan for approval by the Mission Leadership Team (MLT). Each State Operations Centre (SOC) shall develop state-specific PIRs and a Collection Plan for approval by the State Coordinator. The mission Military and Police Components and the subordinated units are an important part of the system.

6. EXPECTATION MANAGEMENT



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Slide 18

- Management of expectations is a mission crucial activity that affects the PKO`s credibility and legitimacy. It should be undertaken by a range of measures as:

  - At the UNHQ: SRSG briefing and reports to the UNSC, meetings with main TCCs, PCCs and donors, media conferences etc;

  - At mission level: undertaking of a consistent pubic information campaign, aiming to target the different elements that must be informed, conducting of media conferences, meetings and briefings with neighbour countries, meetings and briefings with host countries authorities and civil society representatives etc.

- **The mission must also clearly communicate its mandate, capabilities and achievements to host authorities and other key stakeholders**. Senior mission leadership must recognize that a pro-active and ongoing expectations management effort requires resource – both human and material – in order to be implemented.

- **Public information campaigns** are highly important, especially regarding the international community, the host government, the local population and the mission partners. However, particularly on POC, it is not easy to inform what peacekeepers can do and can not do to the local population only by radio. It seems necessary to establish good communication and liaison mechanisms to interact with local population, through local authorities and leaders (religious, ethnical etc), using interpreters, community liaison assistants and other mission-specific solutions.

- **At tactical level**, any tactical commander, battalion, company or FPU commander and also individually deployed personnel such as military observers, military liaison officers and individual police officers **must understand the need of managing expectations of the local population**. The battalion operation order should have a public information annex explaining how the battalion or equivalent unit intends to manage expectations, including liaison with local leaders, public information campaigns, etc.

7. INFORMATION GATHERING AND ANALYSIS



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

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- **One of the keys to protect civilians is intelligence activities. Information gathering is essential and to do it the battalion (company or FPU) needs to develop a collection plan.** The mission level joint structures as the JMAC and JOS expect unit commanders to

send timely, accurate and opportune information that will be processed and resent to end users as intelligence.

- Amongst several existing sources of information it is important to note that the population is by far the most relevant. Regular exchanges and meetings with local leadership as well as frequent contact with locals and the use of community liaison assistants or similar arrangements are valuable means to gather information.

- If a well prepared collection plan is in place, as any military / police unit, a battalion or FPU has good analysis capacity and can process information to produce limited intelligence needed for the unit and the higher echelons.

- Humanitarian organizations, NGOs and missions elements deployed in your AOR are also important sources of information. In general, all these organizations are partners for the protection of civilians and confidence must be built with them to interact and coordinate in case of necessity. Sharing information relevant to the protection of civilians is a delicate process that requires very good communication, transparency and respect by the different roles and responsibilities of the actors deployed in your area. It is important to respect their reservations on disclosing information that is vital for them to operate.

  ☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *It is important to note, as said before, that DPKO/DFS are providing field missions with more intelligence related assets to conduct information gathering, analysis and dissemination. MINUSMA Military Component for example is structured with one Intelligence Unit.*

8. ROBUST POSTURE AND DETERRENCE



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

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- **Robust Posture**. A Chapter VII Mandate with language concerning the use of all necessary means and POC as a priority mandated task is normally enough to set the tone for a robust posture. In face of the mandate and the mission leadership guidance, **tactical level commanders will adopt the appropriate robust posture according to directives issued by higher military and police commanders**.
- **Presence**. The impact of mere presence cannot be underestimated. Deploying to the right place at the right time can have a deterring effect and add credibility to messages being delivered through other channels.

- **Posture**. It is the "body language" of the force, which should say: "one does not mess around with the UN." Posture can affect the perception of both rebels/opponents and the local population.

- **Deterrence: resolve, credibility, responsiveness**. Deterrence is the actions that the mission, particularly the military component, takes to make people aware that there will be consequences to harming civilians.

  ☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *To ensure deterrence, the mission needs to show its resolve, i.e. to signal its unequivocal determination backed up with a robust capability.*

  ☞ *It also needs to be credible, through projecting a tough, alert and professional image. Credibility means that the aggressor believes in the mission's ability to achieve its mandate.*

  ☞ *The mission needs to be responsive to threats, through demonstrating its capacity to quickly muster overwhelming force.*

9. VULNERABILITIES AND RISK OF ATTACK: ANALYZING PROTECTION THREATS



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

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THREAT = CAPACITY X INTENT X OPORTUNITY

- Consideration of the history, motivation, and capabilities of the negative forces, as well as the group's logic for harming civilians and the relationship between that logic and the overall aim of the group.

  ☞ ***Notes to Instructor: Threat Assessment*** *- A threat CONTINUES to be a threat until it is determined (through reliable intelligence and analysis) that the belligerent in question no longer has the MEANS, or the INTENT to carry out the threat.*

- **What is the motivation for the violence?** (e.g. is violence indiscriminate and aimed primarily at "soft", easily attacked targets, or is it targeted at specific groups or individuals for political or military strategic reasons? Etc).

- **Is the perpetration of violence against civilians essential to the *survival* of the belligerent group?** (e.g. Is violence mainly perpetrated for looting and re-supplying belligerents, for the purpose of forced recruitment or forced labour? Is it necessary to the *political* or *military* survival of the group?)

- **What does the *motive* for violence against civilians tell us about the necessary *protection response* to each given belligerent group?** (e.g. If violence is strategically used against specific communities then a deterrent posture might be effective, but if violence is opportunistic, then effective deterrence would require "a peacekeeper in every village and

behind every tree" and is not practical. In this case it might be necessary to employ a more proactive posture designed to seize the initiative from belligerent forces.) **Note that violence against civilians is never justified, regardless of the motive.**



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e.g

Walikale Attacks (North Kivu - 30 July to 2 August 2010)

(The following is information largely based on the Official UN Report on the Walikale mass rapes: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/BCNUDHRapportViolsMassifsKibuaMpofi_en.pdf)

*1. Walikale-centre, the administrative centre of the territory, is located around **135 km west of Goma.** The territory of Walikale is rich in minerals, and consists mainly of mountain ranges covered with abundant indigenous forests. From 30 July to 2 August 2010, a coalition of combatants of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Mayi Mayi Sheka as well as residual elements of Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel Nsengiyumva,1 a group composed of dozens of fighters, systematically attacked civilians in 13 villages situated along the Kibua-Mpofi axis in the groupement of Ihana, Wanianga sector, Walikale territory, North Kivu province.*

*2. **During four days, assailants travelled across the 13 villages** along the Kibua-Mpofi axis, beginning with the village of Bunangiri, some 4 km from Mpofi, and proceeding towards Kibua. The coalition elements then reportedly divided into groups of two, three, and six individuals.*

Some travelled through the forests to reach the villages while others used vehicles stolen to traders in order to move more easily along the axis.

3. The security situation in the targeted villages prior to the launching of the attacks makes it clear that the ***weakness of the State authority in Walikale territory*** *has been one of the causes of the proliferation of the armed groups which have monopolized control over the mining industry and are trafficking arms in the region, thus causing increasing insecurity for the civilian population.*

*4. A large number of ci****vilians were raped, including women, men, girls and boy,*** *by a coalition of combatants from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and the Mayi Mayi Sheka, as well by residual elements of Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel Nsengiyumva. In addition,* ***many houses and shops were looted, and civilians were abducted*** *and subjected to forced labour by the assailants*

5. ***While emphasizing that the primary responsibility for protecting civilians lies with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)****, the UNJHRO staff observed the* ***difficulties encountered by the soldiers of*** *the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* ***(MONUSCO)*** *based in Kibua in their mission to protect civilians, the core element of the MONUSCO mandate.*

6. FARDC and PNC. *Reliable sources indicated that FARDC soldiers deployed in Walikale are involved in minerals trafficking. However, there were no FARDC soldiers on this axis, because the 211th* ***FARDC brigade had moved out*** *to its new area of deployment, while the soldiers of the 212th FARDC brigade opposed the rotation.* ***The PNC is present along the attacked axis*** *and there are police stations in Kibua, Luvungi, and Kembe. However, these posts along the axis, each of which is equipped with one AK-47 assault rifle, have a total of about 10 men.*

7. MONUSCO Troops. The "Company Operating Base" (COB) in Kibua*, whose area of jurisdiction includes the villages attacked by the coalition of armed groups, received around 80* ***newly deployed troops*** *on 27 and 28 July 201020, as a result of MONUSCO troops' rotation. The troops had not undergone specific training regarding the protection of civilians and interaction with communities in the context of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The COB*

*had **no "Community Liaison Interpreter"** (CLI). Once or twice a week, the peacekeepers stationed in Kibua conducted day patrols to the east and west of Kibua. **No night patrol** had been conducted in the area of responsibility of the Kibua base prior to the attacks, although the civilian population was of the opinion that attacks and other acts of violence by the armed groups generally took place at night. **The capacity of Kibua peacekeepers to gather information and intervene was limited by operational constraints, in particular lack of military logistics, the inaccessibility of the telephone network, the poor road conditions, the insecurity in the region, long distances between villages and the remoteness of the area**. The previous team of the COB in Kibua used to hold security meetings every Monday with village chiefs and elders, as well as representatives of the FARDC and PNC. Since his arrival in Kibua at the end of July 2010, the **new COB commander has reportedly had sporadic bilateral meetings** with the deputy chief of the groupement, who was then told to relay the information to chiefs of localities and villages.*

*8. **Once informed** of this situation, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo **(MONUSCO) deployed**, on three occasions, teams, including staff from the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) to the area. The first team went to the area from 13 to 17 August 2010 to assess the security situation, evaluate the protection needs of the local population and verify the allegations of human rights violations against civilians. Given the scale and seriousness of these violations, the UNJHRO deployed a special fact-finding team (hereinafter "the team") from 25 August to 2 September 2010 in order to carry out an in-depth investigation into these human rights violations and determine the context and sequence of the attacks, as well as the victims, the alleged perpetrators, and possibly, their motives. **MONUSCO later deployed two Temporary Operating Bases (TOBs) in different locations. The DRC Government also deployed more FARDC and PNC troops in the region.***

- **It is essential that a permanent and regular threat analysis be conducted by battalions, companies and FPUs, and individually deployed peacekeepers (teams of MILOBS, IPOs and MLOs)**. Such assessment can only be effective if the military and police establishes a trustful relationship with the local leaders in the area of operation. UN PKOs still have very limited capacity to gather information using modern technology; therefore most of the information is collected through human intelligence processes. **To exercise a minimum**

ability of protecting local civilians it is necessary to have their confidence in sharing information on the existing threats.

- The assessment itself shall contain the analysis of the threat characteristics, its capacity to inflict damage, intent to commit attacks and the existence of a favorable opportunity to undertake an attack. **Military and police have to reach out to local communities as much as possible to establish ties, understand the local dynamics and the existing threats**. It means most of the time an intensive day and night patrolling and liaison plan. These activities also include information sharing with local UN partners.

- There may be many **operational constrains to protect civilians**. As a military and police commanding officer you know your capabilities. You can not alter or shape an unforgivable terrain. You can however do your best to cover your area of responsibility and be well informed. A sound threat assessment may give you the opportunity to proactively deploy your troops in the right location at the right time or even request the Force of Police HQ to support you deployment (with air assets for example) or to reinforce your positions.



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- Vulnerabilities are based on the characteristics of the civilians (individual and community factors) and the factors that can lead to and compound those vulnerabilities (environmental factors.)

- **VULNERABILITY = (INDIVIDUAL OR COMMUNITY FACTORS) X (ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS) / (ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE)**

- **Individual or Community Factors:** Age, gender, sex, ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, social status (both rank and different social powers and freedoms e.g. between men and women.

- **Environmental factors (of the civilians):** Status as an internally displaced person or a refugee increases vulnerability. Also, environmental factors such as geographic location (both a logistical consideration, and a tactical one – e.g. are you cordoning off and defending an IDP site, holding a town, or protecting civilians in a more diffused area – and what are the different postures required for each), level of urbanization, level of state authority and capacity in that area, level of infrastructures (e.g. roads) and communication (e.g. phone network) etc.

- **Access to Assistance:** Consider the ability of individuals, families and communities to access assistance and interact with outsiders/institutions – consider language barriers, relative freedom of movement, possible social or political barriers to communication with outsiders, etc. (e.g. would vulnerable women - whether in powerful or marginalized families – be able to seek assistance themselves, or would social norms or structures be a barrier to communication with peacekeepers?) … devise assessment (and communication…see Module 4, section 4) strategies to overcome these barriers.

- **Self-Sufficiency**: Many communities have developed self-protection strategies, including early-warning capacities, self-defence capacities, or even strategies as simple as flight when an attack is detected. UN protection assessments and plans should take into account the self-protection strategies and capacities of local communities and seek to support those to the extent possible.

  ☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *Refer to the DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations.*

  ☞ *Refer to children – both boys and girls- as a specific subset of civilians that are particularly vulnerable in times of war. Children face unique threats and protection risks (such as heightened threat of recruitment, abduction and sexual abuse.)*

  ☞ *Remark on the differences in the broad category of civilians (example: the needs of civilians in villages or IDP sites in Haiti are very different from the needs of civilians in villages of IDP sites in South Sudan etc).*

☞ *'Self-Defence" forces have, in some cases, morphed into negative armed actors in their own right. These should be approached with extreme caution.*

10. PRIORITIZING RISKS AND ALLOCATING RESOURCES



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- **A multidimensional response is reflected in the components` individual work plans**. The articulation of roles and responsibilities shall be consistent with those spelled out in the ISF.

- Early warning and response measures are likely to work best when they are well coordinated with the local authorities. Inclusion of local communities in early warning efforts is equally important.

- A number of missions and troop contributors have pointed to a simple but at times overlooked lesson in protection: presence. Projecting mission presence, including through standing military and police patrols and other force deployments, is a measure that has been implemented by all peacekeeping operations, and is one of the most visible and reassuring forms of security that a mission can provide to the local populace. In addition to acting as a deterrent to potential aggressors, it allows mission personnel to build familiarity with the environs and better understand the concerns of the population.

- **The DPKO - OCHA Study concluded that ROE are not a major impediment to UN missions taking robust action to protect civilians,** including the proactive use of deadly

force when necessary (permitted in anticipatory self-defence or to protect civilians where there is a reasonable belief based on credible evidence that an attack or threat is imminent).

- The issue of ROE relates back to two issues: clarity of the CONOPS and political will.

☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *Options to address the gaps.*

- *At mission (operational) level*; Reprioritize objectives/activities; explore mobilization of resources available to external protection actors, where practical; redeploy resources and staff as required (e.g. to areas at risk); mobilize additional resources, such as through the creation of trust funds or groups of friends; training.

- At tactical level: After dominating the operational environment, Battalion, Company and FPU commanders **need to conduct POC risk analysis**. They will receive guidance from the FHQ / SHQ based on the CONOPS, operation orders and directives. However, they have also to prepare their own plans to address the local POC risks which analysis and planning fall under their responsibility. These plans should take into account how other UN and non-UN partners are expected to react under the envisioned circumstances

- *At NYHQ level: i*nform the Security Council and the 5th Committee of the General Assembly about the identified gaps; discuss with T/PCCs in NYHQ the possible removal of national caveats or to inquire the possibility for the contributing countries to bring additional resources; increase targeted training on POC, including on sexual violence and child protection, and the legal obligations of parties to conflict and the peacekeeping mission components themselves, to raise knowledge and awareness in pre-deployment and in-mission training through the integrated mission training centers (IMTC).

- **POC risks must be prioritized** by taking into consideration the relative **PROBABILITY** of attack (based on existing human rights reporting, intelligence and historical analysis) as well as the relative **IMPACT** that the mission can have on each given risk. (e.g. the Protection Clusters in DRC allocated mission POC resources by designating “Must Protect,” “Should Protect,” and “Could Protect” areas based on ongoing analysis of available resources and protection risks).

- **Good planning should incorporate civilian, police and military resources, allows a multidimensional response**, and should focus on the most **LIKELY** scenario, and the **WORST CASE** scenario, based on the analysis of risk, probability and impact.
- Planning processes should **take due consideration of the host Government's willingness and ability to protect civilians** in the face of the most likely and worst case scenarios as identified.



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11. REDUCING THREAT AND VULNERABILITY



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- A military or police force can take measures to reduce vulnerability of the local population and to reduce a threat posed against the same local community. Each area commander shall analyse local POC risks, prioritize them and determine his/her unit capabilities to protect civilians.

e.g **Joint Protection Teams JPTs** are designed to help military outposts—Company Operating Bases—to better understand the socio-political context around them and the threats to civilians. Composed of staff from the offices of Civil Affairs, human rights, political affairs, child protection, public information and sometimes the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) Section (as well as humanitarian agency staff), they are deployed on a temporary basis not only to provide information gathering and analytical support, but also to help design context-specific civil and military measures to protect civilians and liaise with local authorities. Civil Affairs plays a key role in organizing JPTs and in drafting 'protection planning' matrices with other protection partners to assist prioritize the military activities related to POC. The JPTs and joint planning matrices follow on from an established pattern in MONUC of civil–military cooperation and a 'joint protection' concept in operation since at least 2006. **Similar structures are also established in other missions like UNMISS** where Integrated Monitoring Teams (IMTs) were developed as a joint cross-mission mechanism to monitor the disarmament process in Jonglei in March 2012) and **UNAMID** (Sector Joint Protection Groups (SJPGs), Field Protection Teams (FPTs).

- There are other **patrolling techniques** (beyond the firewood patrols) to help protect civilians in areas where they may be exposed to threats. Many missions undertake similar protective activities for example in ensuring that regular patrols route through locations such as rivers where women or children wash clothes, or locations where civilians travel to collect water; or to and from markets and where crops are tended, Such patrolling decisions have been improved in missions such as MONUC where JPTs have allowed for greater information sharing and planning around vulnerability and threat assessments.

- Improving the capability of UN peacekeeping operations to operate at night can be a major factor in improving civilian security.

☞ ***Notes to Instructor:*** *It is important to balance the distribution of resources in order to develop/maintain the ability to prevent/deter violence, respond quickly to rapid onset*

crises, and implement proactive "operations" which "seize the initiative" (influence/compel) from negative forces.

☞ ***A multidimensional response** is reflected in the components` individual work plans. The articulation of roles and responsibilities shall be consistent with those spelled out in Mission-Wide Protection of Civilians Strategy. (That, in turn, shall be consistent with the ISF.)*

12. SUMMARY OF KEY MESSAGES

☞ ***Note to Instructor:** Outline the main points that have been covered during the session.*

- **POC strategies are drafted at the operational level** and aim to ensure that tactical-level tasks contribute to the mission's POC objectives. POC planning is a tool to anticipate POC risks so it can address them in coordination with other protection actors.
- A coherent protection response requires consultation and coordination with all protection actors (UN and non UN) in order to organize all available protection resources to address protection threats in a proactive, logical way.
- It is very important for the tactical level operators at battalion and FPU level the understanding of a mission POC strategy and how this document impacts on the Military and Police Components revised CONOPS and operation orders and plans. A POC strategy provides the operational level guidance to allow the components HQs to draft plans and orders that will ultimately affect the battalion and FPU levels, included the military observers, military liaison officers and individual police officers.
- The **four phases of the protection response** must be incorporated to the military and police planning processes. The phases relate primarily to Phase II (physical protection) activities. Nevertheless, actors operating primarily in Tier I (Protection through the political process) and III (Protection through the creation of a protective environment) must adjust their activities to reflect changes and escalation of the real time challenges in the mission's area of responsibility.
- A mission that has POC as the main mandated task, should have a military component preparing orders and plans that **place POC at the centre of the planning process and as**

the main tactical goal. As such, tactical orders should reflect an analysis that took into consideration POC local threats, the local population vulnerability and the battalion capabilities to take action (prevent, pre-empt, respond and consolidate).

- Military and police units and individually deployed personnel (MILOBs, IPOs and MLOs) are a very important part of the mission early warning system. Both components normally have a significant number of points of presence in the mission area to cover the entire mission area of operations. The same rationale applies to the information and gathering system.
- At tactical level, any tactical commander, battalion, company of FPU commander but also individually deployed personnel as military observers, military liaison officers and individual police officers must understand the need of managing expectations of the local population.
- In face of the mandate and the mission leadership guidance, tactical level commanders will adopt the appropriate robust posture according to directives issued by higher military and police commanders.
- It is essential that a **permanent and regular threat analysis** be conducted by battalions, companies and FPUs, and individually deployed peacekeepers (teams of MILOBS, IPOs and MLOs). Such assessment can only be effective if the military and police establishes a **trustful relationship with the local leaders** in the area of operation.
- POC risks must be prioritized by taking into consideration the relative PROBABILITY of attack (based on existing human rights reporting, intelligence and historical analysis) as well as the relative IMPACT that the mission can have on each given risk.
- Good planning should incorporate civilian, police and military resources, allow a multidimensional response, and should focus on the most LIKELY scenario, and the WORST CASE scenario, based on the analysis of risk, probability and impact. Each tactical commander, following instructions given by the FHQ and PHQ must prepare its own plans.



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