



IED-Threat Mitigation - Senior Leadership Brief





4. Issuing a Threat Assessment to a Tactical Force



IED Threat Assessment

Achieved through a Combination of
Tasks at:

- Strategic level
- Operational level
- Tactical level


UN Security council resolution 2592 (30 August 2021)

strengthen capacities to mitigate against the threat of landmines, ERW and IEDs in Somalia and *recalling* that Member States are called upon to undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the sale, supply, or transfer of explosive precursors and materials to Somalia that may be used in the manufacture of IEDs,





Threat Analysis over time




Factors

- **Changes in IED incidents.**
- **Security forces activities.**
- **Resupply of IED components**
- **Rotation schedules.**
- **Weather patterns.**
- **Major operations.**
- **COVID pandemic.**



Impact of training on IED incidents (case study)




Factors

- EHAT and specialized training provided to troops.
- Rotation of troops .
- New Main Supply Routes used.
- Weather patterns.



Route Analysis



Factors

- Majority of IEDs encountered along MSRs.
- MSRs are differently impacted depending on AOR threat.
- Battalion Commanders need to know the threat levels along the MSR.
- Mobility planning is key prior to movement.



Route Analysis

ELEPHANT D	=	CRITICAL	DOUMENTZA	GOSSI	VOIED/RCIED /Cx ATK
ELEPHANT E	=	HIGH	GOSSI	GAO	VOIED/RCIED - Cx ATK
LION C1	=	LOW	GOUNDAM	TIMBUKTU	VOIED/CIED - Cx ATK
OCTOPUS A	=	HIGH	DOUMENTZA	TIMBUKTU	VOIED/CIED - Cx ATK
NUMBAT	=	LOW	KONNA	NIAFUNKE	VOIED
SCORPION	=	LOW	ANSONGO	TESSIT	VOIED/RCIED – Cx ATK
TIGER A	=	MODERATE	ANEFIS	KIDAL	VOIED/Mine

- Route analysis is key.
- Route reports for each particular route.
- Route segmentation
- Threat levels assessment along the route.
- Recommending protective measurers.


Threat Level	Protective measures
CRITICAL	Escort is recommended to include an appropriate number of armored vehicles with heavy weapon systems, as well as an EOD team
HIGH	Escort is recommended to include at least 2 armored vehicles with heavy weapon systems, as well as an EOD team
MODERATE	Escort is recommended with small arm weapons and EOD QRF in stand-by
LOW	No escort recommended but convoys should consist of a minimum of three vehicles




Information Sharing & Coordination- Troops

STAY ALIVE!


1ST TIME





2ND TIME



3RD TIME



 Cluster:
SARAH_GPA_2_saton_Gail@protonmail.com



STAY ALIVE!




**WEAR YOUR
HELMET
STRAP IN
CORRECTLY
TIE DOWN
LOOSE
OBJECTS**




 UNMAS

STAY ALIVE!


1ST TIME





2ND TIME



3RD TIME



 Cluster:
SARAH_GPA_2_saton_Gail@protonmail.com





Information Sharing & Coordination- Tactical comds

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IED Incident Awareness Report

Serial No: 20190207-01 - IED AWARENESS REPORT - AMISOM CIED CELL - 003 - 19



To: AMISOM

From: AMISOM CIED FUSION Cell

Subject: Deployment & management of AMISOM personnel during vehicle check point operations

Date Distributed: 07 FEB 2019

Incident Background

- On 02 FEB 19, AMISOM troops manning a vehicle check point (VCP) on the outskirts of Bardheere Town, Baidoa region, encountered a vehicle borne IED (VBIED) that exploded at the checkpoint during operations. 4 AMISOM soldiers were injured, and 1 was killed. The VBIED was assessed to be targeting the AMISOM Bardheere FOB.
- During the event, there were 3 vehicles parked close together at the VCP while the search was being conducted. As the EOD team was conducting the search of the first vehicle, an AMISOM soldier approached the second vehicle to ask the driver to disembark the vehicle. It was during this time that the second vehicle exploded.

Key Findings

- All 3 vehicles were parked in close proximity to each other at the VCP, and the driver was allowed to remain in the second vehicle/VBIED during the search. This gave him the opportunity to initiate the explosive payload.
- Part of the EOD team was deployed to conduct the vehicle search, and AMISOM soldiers were reported to be managing the vehicles and drivers.

Lessons Learnt

- Vehicles were allowed to park too close together during vehicle search operations. Two separate areas should be designated within the VCP. One area for conducting the search, and another for stopping & holding vehicles as they await their turn to be searched.
- Additional recommended VCP planning considerations:
 - Security deployed to the holding area where vehicles approach should be of sufficient quantity & equipped / armed to prevent potential belligerent drivers from attempting to dash their vehicle through the checkpoint.
 - Security deployed to the search area should be sufficient to manage & control the number of passengers that disembark the vehicle during search.
- All passengers of vehicles being searched must be made to disembark the vehicle & thoroughly searched for possible weapons & contraband, before commencing the vehicle search. Local law enforcement should be assigned to managing civilians, in the event any arrests needs to be made.
- Search should be conducted by a dedicated team, and deploying the EOD team only when suspicious item(s) have been discovered. EOD team must not be divided & deployed to undertake non-EOD tasks.

Images



Photo 1: Site of explosion, featuring the VBIED chassis



Photo 2: Remains of the VBIED after detonation

Contact

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Rapid Information Sharing

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY REPORT

24 APRIL 2020 SVBIED

BARAAWE AIRSTRIP

LOWER SHABELLE

DATE OF REPORT: 12 MAY 2020

Analysis of Significant incidents

OFFICIAL AMISOM USE ONLY

January 2019 - UNMAS AMISOM Support Project IED REPORT




IED Incident Monthly Analysis Report

Serial No: 01 - JAN 2019 - IED INCIDENT MONTHLY ANALYSIS REPORT - AMISOM CIED CELL - 001 - 19



To: AMISOM

From: AMISOM CIED FUSION Cell



1.0.0 Executive Summary

1.1.0 61 IED incidents were recorded in January 2019 in AMISOM AOR, causing an estimated 126+ casualties, mainly among AMISOM personnel and Somali Security Forces (SSF). The most targeted security force with IEDs has remained AMISOM. Its logistic convoys remain particularly impacted. The vehicle movement of SSF are also frequently targeted and result in higher casualties due to less protective equipment and less counter IED capacities.

Two VBIED incidents and at least five UVIED incidents were recorded in Mogadishu targeting government personnel and commercial structures frequented by local authorities. An SSF FOB in Bar Sunguni in Lower Jubba region was targeted by al Shabaab with a complex attack involving multiple VBIEDs.

AMISOM was not impacted by VBIED or UVIED attacks during the month of January.

IED incidents continue to mainly occur along Main Supply Routes (MSR) and secondary routes used by AMISOM and SSF forces. Most IEDs are buried on the roadside and are initiated by command radio control (RCIED). The latter is the method of choice for al Shabaab as it enables the militants to control the time of detonation along with the vehicle of choice, thus also avoiding impacting the local population.

Most IED incidents continue to occur in AMISOM sectors 1&3. Banaadir, Bay, and Lower Shabelle were the only regions to record 10+ IED incidents.

The MSR segments linking the federal capital Mogadishu to other main towns remain the most impacted by IEDs, including the MSR to Baidoa, to Beletweyne, and to Marka.

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Support Planning & Decision Making




Information Sharing & Coordination- Force HQ's




Type Of IED Incidents

● Explosion ● Find ● Hoax



IED INCIDENT LOCATIONS

● Explosion ● Find ● Hoax



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

IED INCIDENTS

39

TOTAL CASUALTIES

117


48

69

Total Fatalities Total Injuries

IED INCIDENTS TYPE BY SECTOR

● Explosion ● Find ● Hoax



INCIDENT CASUALTY RATE PER ASSESSED TARGET

0.00	3.93	0.00
AMISOM	SSF	Non-Security


Fatalities by IEDs

AMISOM	SSF	CIVILIANS	BELLIGERENT
0	26	20	1


Injuries by IEDs

AMISOM	SSF	CIVILIANS	BELLIGERENT
1	41	23	0

TOP ASSESSED TARGETS




TOP TARGET TYPES




IED Incidents Status

● Explosion ● Find ● Hoax




Incident Area

● Route ● Static



Day of the week





Questions?