



IED-Threat Mitigation - Senior Leadership Brief





Overview

1. Fundamentals of IED Threat Mitigation

2. Threats and Trends

3. EH Threats Associated with EOD, ERW, and IED

4. Issuing a Threat Assessment to a Tactical Force

5. IED Impact



Overview

6. Common Incident Management Requirements

7. Roles and Training

8. Operating in IED Environments



Uganda






1. Fundamentals of IED Threat Mitigation



Aim

1. Identify the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and other Explosive Ordnance (EO), thus supporting prevention of IED attacks.
2. Develop and organize IED Threat Mitigation (TM) capabilities to support protection from IEDs.






Triggers & Longer-term drivers of conflict

- Corruption - corrupt, abuse of power, authoritarian or repressive governments / officials
- Sense of Injustice / Repression
 - Rigged Elections
 - Bias Leaders
 - Exclusion, discrimination or marginalisation within society
 - Lack of fair and equal representation / power sharing
- Overpopulation
 - Population growth leading to migration and poverty
- Climate change
 - Forced Migration
 - Competition for scarce resources
 - Food Insecurity
- Unemployment / Joblessness
 - Poverty
 - Lack of hope and bleak outlook leading to desperation



Triggers & Longer-term drivers





IED-TM Objectives

IED-TM Objectives
(Secure Environment)



Force Protection




Protection of Civilians



IED Threat Reduction




Example IED System





Key Operational Activities

Predict:





Key Operational Activities

Prevent:




Afghan policemen escort captured aggressors



Key Operational Activities

Mitigate:





Key Operational Activities

Detect:





Key Operational Activities

Neutralize:







Key Operational Activities


Exploit:

- Record and analyze materials
- Methods of operation
- Relationships
- Capabilities





Example IED System





2. Threats and Trends



3rd Law of Motion

...for every action there is an
equal but opposite reaction...

Isaac Newton, 1686



Threats & Trends

Threats & Trends

- IED threat is an evolutionary threat.
- Retains relevance through ingenuity in manufacturing and deployment methods.
- Easy access to IED making methods (mainly online), low tech IEDs can transcend into high-tech.
- Varies regionally.



Peacekeeping Operations





Can you see any risk?







14 Oct 2017






Kenya



Jan 2019





Libya



2019 Benghazi



CAR



30 June 2020 – CAR, Yadee





07 July 2020 – CAR





Protests





16 Feb 2021 - CAR





Democratic Republic of the Congo

Date & Time: Sun, Jun 27, 2021, 21:35:10 GMT+2

Position: +000.494891° / +029.474177° ($\pm 4.7\text{m}$)

Altitude: 1152m ($\pm 3.5\text{m}$)

Datum: WGS-84


Azimuth/Bearing: 195° S15W 3467mils True ($\pm 12^\circ$)

Elevation Angle: -06.6°

RC found 4m away from
body

TOC Main entry location

Bomber dead body and blast location





Nigeria



2011 – Nigeria UN Offices





12 Oct 2013 Nigeria







Lebanon – Post 2006

- *RC VBIED 24 June 2007 Spanish*
- *IED 16 July 2007 Tanzanian*
- *RCIED 08 Jan 2008 Irish*
- *RCIED May 2011 Italian*
- *CWIED 26 Jul 2011 French*





Lebanon



Italian UNIFIL, Saida, Lebanon 26 May 11



French UNIFIL, Saida, Lebanon 26 July 11

***** ALL ROAD SIDE *****



Can you spot anything?





16 Aug 2012 - Find





16 Aug 2012 - Find

- Foot Patrol
- Previously Cleared Area





16 Aug 2012 - Find






16 Aug 2012 - Find





16 Aug 2012 - Find





Can you spot the odd one out?






Can you spot the odd one out?





08 Sep 2012 - Find






08 Sep 2012 - Find



Picture 4 – Device from the corridor



08 Sep 2012 - Find





08 Sep 2012 - Find



Picture 5 – Device



South
Sudan






July 2016



Figure 1 - Area in general




July 2016





July 2016





July 2016






July 2016



Confirmed or Potential IED attacks since 1997





Threats & Trends Info

- U2 Branch
- UNDSS
- Joint Mission Analysis Cell



3. Explosive Hazard Threats



Types of Hazards

- Explosive Ordnance (EO)
- Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)
 - Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)
 - Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO)
- Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)



ERW Hazards

- Include UXO and AXO
- Wide variety of types
- Inhibit freedom of movement
- Explosive and mechanical hazards
- Use in IEDs
- Threat to all





IED Threats





IED Threat Mitigation



- Comprehensive approach applied to physical, procedures, and training measures
- Reduce impact of IED use and incidents



4. Issuing a Threat Assessment to a Tactical Force




5. IED Impact





24 June 2007










Impact of the Attack

- 3 died at the scene,
- Another 3 were evacuated and died later of their injuries





Tactical Impact



ECM
Jammers

Pressure Plate
IED
kills 3 AMISOM

August
2016



16 Civilians
Killed

April
2017

7 Civilians
Killed

Aug
2017



Remotely Control Armed
Pressure Plate 3
AMISOM Casualties

Aug
2017





Operational Impact



Route Search
Teams

January
2017

Sector 2
Metal Detector
Destroyed

February
2017

Sector 5
Metal Detector
Destroyed

March
2017

Sector 1
Metal Detector
Destroyed

May
2017

Sector 4
Metal Detector
Destroyed

June
2017

July
2017




New Equipment
Issued

Technical Report to Force
Commander

September
2017

December
2017





Strategic Impact

REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE PRINCIPAL MAGISTRATE'S COURT AT WAJIR
MISC APPLICATION [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] PLAINTIFF
VERSUS
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE SERVICES.....1ST RESPONDENT
DIVISIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICER, WAJIR.....2ND RESPONDENT
10/7/2013
[REDACTED]
C/C Alsha
[REDACTED] Motor vehicle can be released. My clients do not intend to pursue any other claim against the government. We have a report that the items are not drugs.
[REDACTED] counsel: On 13th June the vehicle was impounded to investigate some samples. Results of the report were availed on 4th July 2013 by government chemist. It confirmed all the six samples were sodium sulphate, sodium bicarbonate etc. In view of that conclusion the items are not explosives as earlier believed. In view of this the state does not have a basis to withhold the said motor vehicle. We pray that since the exhibits were not prayed for, they should be removed and kept.
[REDACTED] Report is very clear. I pray for both the exhibit and motor vehicle be released because no offence has been proved.
Court: There is no objection to the government analyst report. The items contained have not been indicated to be the ones used to manufacture explosives. The police have been in custody of the lorry and the items for more than one month. The plaintiff has given an indication that they would not sue the government for compensation. On this basis I order that the lorry and the items be released forthwith to [REDACTED] identity card and log book for KBQ 133U.
Certified true copy of the original

Court case- July 2013

KBQ 133U



Lorry intercepted with Sulphuric acid, 18 Oct 2017



Sulphuric acid intercepted

Other chemicals procured: Potassium nitrate, Ammonium nitrate, Hydrochloric acid, sorbital (fine sugar), Ethanol and Acetone





Sample of Improvised Black explosive



Beletweyne, 03 Sept 20



Bariire, 28 Feb 20



Xaaji Caali, 12 Feb 20



Burgavo, 24 Feb 20



United Nations

S/2020/949



Security Council

Distr.: General
28 September 2020

Original: English

Al-Shabaab's sourcing of improvised explosive device components

Chemical analysis of improvised explosive device components

116. In 2019, the Panel reported that Al-Shabaab was manufacturing its own home-made explosives, having at its disposal a readily available supply of improvised explosive device components (S/2019/858, para. 10). Analyses received during the reporting period confirmed Al-Shabaab's use of nitroglycerine as an explosive, potassium nitrate as oxidizer and charcoal as fuel in its manufacture of certain improvised explosive devices.¹²¹

117. Nitroglycerine is produced from glycerol and a mixture of sulfuric and nitric acids. According to improvised explosive device disposal and Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center experts interviewed by the Panel in August 2020, Al-Shabaab is likely to have the technical skills to manufacture its own nitroglycerine, which is not listed in annex C to resolution 2498 (2019). The Panel recommends that annex C should be amended to include nitroglycerine in its part I (see annex 5.1 (strictly confidential)).



6. Common Incident Management Requirements



Incident Management

- EOD task
- EOD/IEDD advises on scene commander





Incident Management

- Command and control (C2) considerations
- EOD operates in conjunction with:
 - Security
 - Search
 - Force Protection (FP)






7. Roles and Training




All Arms Responsibility





Explosive Hazard Awareness Training Blocks

- Module 1 – EHAT Overview
- Module 2 – IED Types
- Module 3 – 5Cs
- Module 4 – Search & Threat Assessment
- Module 5 – EOD/IEDD Roles
- Module 6 – Ground Sign Awareness






EOD

EOD Core Capabilities:

- CMD activities
- IEDD activities
- Support mission partners
- Operate in concert with other capabilities





CMD

- Basic EOD mission; disposal of ERW - UXO/AXO
- CMD operations do not include IEDD
- CMD operations remove explosive hazards in AO
- Key enabler in IED threat mitigation; disposing of key components used in IEDs



IEDD

- Process of preventing an IED functioning as intended.
- IEDD is a component of EOD
- Operate within their capabilities
- Operator specific selection and training
- IEDD capabilities driven by assessed threat





First Responders

- Finding unit, fire, medical, police
- May be target of secondary devices
 - Train all on IED awareness






8. Operating in IED Environments



IED-TM in Mali





Route Clearance Package

- Identify and remove IED and explosive hazards
 - Freedom of movement
- Specifically Equipped
- Capability varies based on contributing countries






Route Analysis Criteria

Considerations:

- Safe havens
- Check points
- Phase lines
- Danger zones





Mitigation Measures



- Avoid routine behaviour
- Vary routes and timing
- Maintain a high level of alertness



Mitigation Measures

- Plan check posts and patrols
- Conduct training on response procedures
- Maintain a quick response capability





Mitigation Measures



- Maintain vigilance
- Report any suspicious activity
- Assume follow-on attacks
- Vehicle spacing



TTP Development

Effective TTP development should include:

Convoy reactions to:

- IED events
- Ambush
- Medical emergencies






TTP Development



- Plan routes
- Establish pre-mission procedures
- Assess risks during pre-operation planning
- Manage risks



IED Response Requirements



10 Liner



Notional HQ Support

- Establish policy and distribution of IED-TM assets
- Monitor workloads and priorities
- Act as POC for intelligence coordination
- Establish communication guidelines for all assets
- Coordinate supporting activities



Questions?



Summary

Evolving

The situation will continue to evolve, so too must the response.
Every Action has a reaction

Complex

Over simplifying the problem fails to acknowledge the challenge.
All Arms responsibility

Proper Preparation

Training can provide the request skills to plan, operate and react.



IED-Threat Mitigation - Senior Leadership Brief



