# **Learning Activity- EOD STM**

# Table Top Exercise (TTX)

# Description / Primer

**Purpose**: This exercise is a learning activity to consolidate the learning outcomes and help reinforce the lesson "Take Away".

**Target Audience:** In training EOD leadership, staff and key personnel of the deploying staffs that deploy EOD.

**Definition:** TTXs are set in an informal setting where the target audience is able to discuss the principles and concepts of operating in a United Nations Peacekeeping operation using the hypothetical, scenario, specific situations and incidents. This TTX is based on a modified Course of Action (COA) development process with a set of criteria for analysis based on United Nations integration. This exercise is used to help reinforce the learning objectives. More importantly, this TTX helps participants to better understand the manifestation of integrating units in a peacekeeping environment. Also, it can be a learning activity that reinforces and helps TCCs, prior to deployment, make adjustments to their current planning, policies, procedures, training, logistics, resources, and command and control. The effectiveness of a TTX is derived from the energetic involvement of participants and their assessment of recommended revisions to the COAs that may affect current policies, procedures, and plans to be able to operate effectively/ efficiently in a UN peacekeeping environment.

## Methodology:

Participants are encouraged to discuss issues in depth through a slow-paced problem-solving methodology, rather than the rapid, spontaneous decision making or a long drawn out detailed orders development drill. Instead, the TTX is

a modified COA development process. Using their national problem-solving doctrine, methodology, the military decision-making process (MDMP), troop leading procedure (TLP), analyze the situation/scenarios, mission/tasks, and present an analysis of COAs to be executed in a UN peacekeeping operation.

Additionally, injects "what if" drills and brainstorming potential incidents that may occur during the discussion in order for the EOD units to be ready to respond and take corrective actions. The effectiveness of a TTX is derived from the active involvement of participants and their assessment of possible adjustments and revisions to their current procedures and plans to be tailored to a peacekeeping environment.

Facilitators/Instructors / Mentors: Under the guidance of experienced instructors and mentors, the participants will facilitate the process and discussions of the suitability, flexibility, advantages, and disadvantages of the COAs and the potential issues. Instructors should highlight the adequacy of the core elements of the COAs in support of peacekeeping operations and if needed, assist the participants in bridging any gaps in this transition from a national standard military operation toward peacekeeping operations and peacekeeping environment. Responsibilities:

- Do not act as a lecturer, but as a guide, oversee knowledge sharing.
- Record all ideas / critical points without judgment.
- Try to generate solutions by the participants.
- Encourage contributions by all members (not just senior officers).
- Identify ideas that can be combined.
- Review, vet, and prioritize ideas with participants.
- As an experienced peacekeeper help bring out or share knowledge and lessons learned without driving a particular solution.

• Conduct an orientation upfront with the participants that covers; overall aim, objectives, outcomes, requirements, methodology, constraints, timeline, rules and recorder's responsibilities.

### Participants:

- Deduct, study and analyze the scenarios, situations and your tasks; consider possible COA and merits.
- Be part of the discussion without judging other participant's input.
- Be a good listener, do not interrupt (senior leaders let subordinates give input).
- Help in providing key points to the recorder.
- Generate possible criteria for analysis that focus on UN operations.
- Provide consideration to be looked at in support of a UN peacekeeping operation vice your own national military operation standards.
- Help in the discussion as it relates to SOPs, ROE, Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and host nation law.
- As an experienced peacekeeper, help bring out or share knowledge and lessons learned.

### Possible Timeline model (modify as required):

### **Step 1 Orientation:**

10 min Purpose/Method/Process

10 min Situation and Scenario Orientation

(Recommend Facilitators hand out a fact sheet/summary and a copy of the scenario, situation, and incidents)

### Step 2 TTX 1:

1-hour COA development (4 break-out groups)

40 min, Present COA (10 min each group)

20 min, Pick one COA for analysis / discussion with specified criteria (record key points butcher board)

10 min +, Insert inject for discussion; 10 min for each inject (record key points, butcher board)

5 min, have every member write down their own ideas reference key points effecting the Unit in UN operations

15 min, Summary and lessons learned (go over key points using criteria)

# Step 3 TTX 2 (facilitator deems necessary / time permitting):

30 min additional injects with different scenarios or new task separate COA

# Step 4:

10 min After Action Review and conclusion of lessons learned and reinforce during the TTX

# Scenario


The current crisis in Carana (see attached map), an island country off the eastern coast of Southern Africa, has its origins in pre-colonial times. In the 1800s the Cambo tribe was forced to flee from its ancestral lands around Karaoy and Shamalgan by the more powerful Payat. The Payat retained possession of the land now called Greater Pyatiletka, while the Cambo eventually settled east of the Payat, in what is now the province of Cambona. The Cambo have never abandoned their claims to Greater Pyatiletka.

During the 1960s, the Cambo launched an unprovoked attack on Greater Pyatiletka, which the Payat successfully halted. The areas held by the belligerent parties at the end of those hostilities established the current provincial boundaries. Those boundaries have never been accepted by belligerents, despite efforts by the Carana Government to mediate. Since then, repeated minor combats have taken place between the two provinces, and both sides have formed militias that have caches of weapons and landmines at their disposal.


In recent times, the Cambo Independent Security Council (CISC) and the Payat Resistance Movement (PRM) have launched several attacks on each other's provinces. Despite heavy fighting which has resulted in a large number of casualties, especially among the civilian population, neither of the belligerents has been able to achieve its military objectives. The Carana Government was unable to provide safety and security to civilians in the area because all security forces are securing the capital region. Carana has been able to negotiate a ceasefire (Treaty of Windhoek) and both parties agreed to international mediation and intervention.

The UN has responded by deploying an observer mission primarily, with a small military security force, EOD detachment, DDR element and police force via a UN mandate; United Nations Mission in Carana (UNMIC), to monitor the belligerent parties and assist the Carana Government in the protection of civilians. The Treaty of Windhoek set in motion the establishment of a demilitarized zone (DMZ) 10 km either side of the current provincial boundaries and disarmament of militias (DDR). UNMIC has now been deployed for 8 months.

# Map of Carana



# Sector 2 Area Overview



# Situation

During the past month, various incidents have occurred that indicate an upsurge in tension among the two parties, including several shooting incidents, reports of smuggling, unrest and recruitment in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps near Shamalgan, and evidence of freshly laid anti-personnel mines and IEDs. In recent days there has been a continuous deterioration in the security situation in the AOR. The locals are complaining that the government and the UN are not doing enough for their safety and security. They are still witnessing an armed robbery, kidnapping, human rights violations by armed groups, unemployment and bad roads among others. They are accusing the UN of doing nothing to improve the situation. In view of this, they have decided not to allow the UN to go on any further patrols as part of their mandate. This morning, your team woke up only to observe that the locals had surrounded and block all routes to and from the UNMIC Pyatiletka DDR site.

# **Current Events**

The Alpha Company Commander who is providing security at the DDR site has asked your battalion commander for an EOD team once the protests end in order to help triage the munitions being turned in and keep the DDR process on schedule.

About 20 mines ago a World Food Program (WFP) convoy observed an IED being emplaced near an intersection where UN and civilian convoys usually travel (vic 43TFJ383135). The Special Representative of the Secretary-General has tasked the Chief Military Observer to facilitate in reducing tensions with the armed groups and local leaders to help stabilize the situation and reaffirm the UN's commitment to the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. Your battalion commander thinks this is a good idea because this is a primary part of the UNMIC mandate.

About 30 minutes ago members of the Cambodian Engineer Platoon located at Shamalgan, undertaking work in support of the UNDP and UNICEF in building offices for the UN IDP Camp at (43TFJ295057), were contacted by a civilian contractor involved in drilling boreholes at the centre of the Camp. They informed the Cambodian Engineer Platoon that they had found a rocket when they were excavating a site. The drilling contractor is working as a contractor for the UNDP. No Cambodian engineer personnel have taken any action or approached the area but have instructed that all work should cease, and the area should be cleared. They also advised that SHQ should be contacted to determine how the item should be dealt with? The UNDP country director contacted the SHQ Commander to have the item removed ASAP.

# Task

You are a 3 person staff serving as the focal point on the Inf Bn staff. You have the task to plan, organize, prepare, and instruct the EOD teams to conduct operations to facilitate reducing tensions, assist DDR operations, and ensure the POC; (to include dealing with the IED and mine threats). Develop COAs for the execution of these tasks/mission; and what guidance and instructions do you give the EOD teams?

### Instructor Notes

This point in the TTX forces the teams to identify trends, assess their assets, and develop a plan to deal with three ongoing events which are in different areas but affect each other. The reported roadside IED is potentially the most dangerous but unconfirmed. However, it is delaying the food convoy from getting to the IDP camp. The rocket at the construction site has a sense of urgency from the UNDP Country team lead. It is in a highly-populated IDP camp but likely stable. The third event is the request to support the DDR activity and is being requested by one of the Force Commander's Commanders. The delays at the DDR sites are being caused at least in part by protests about the conditions at the IDP camp. There are competing tactical, operational, and strategic tensions at play that the EOD Focal point will have to assess.

### Airfield Event

At 0530hrs this morning a rocket impacted and exploded Payat City Airport.

Approximately 30 seconds later, a second rocket impacted and skidded along the runway coming to rest at the intersection between the runway (33/15) and the taxiway. At 0545hrs all air traffic and operations at KIA were suspended and the Airport placed into lockdown until UN Operations advise otherwise.

It is now 0600hrs, a resupply of much needed medical supplies and ration packs for the UN IDP Camp is due to land at 0730hrs. At 0750hrs, the UN SRSG along with a high-level delegation is due to land, returning from an international donor conference in Geneva.

### Instructor Notes on Airfield Event

Two rockets were fired, and both hit the runway. This likely means that the Point of Origin is in line with the runway. As international standard runway numbers indicate their orientation, in this case, 330 degrees/ 150 degrees. If they refer to the Explosive Hazard Historical Database, they might discover that there was an earlier IRL incident but the IRL and rockets were REPORTED to be destroyed by the local EOD. No evidence was provided. They should be concern about the point of origin because there could still be more rockets on the IRL that are still counting down or may have misfired but can quickly be rewired and launched. CORDON should be 360-degree security. This includes indirect fire in this case.

The IED on the side of the road is roughly along this line of flight as well. It could have been a UXO and not an IED.

There appear to be aircraft on the ramp that is within the hazard area of the rocket. If they provide the technical advice to the command that the aircraft should be moved a safe distance away.

The Explosive Hazard Database indicates that there is a Local EOD team. Since this is a civilian airport, will the local EOD team respond? Do they want the MILEOD team due to military ordnance?

Since the incident is on a civilian airport, they will have to coordinate access and movement with airport authorities.

Are there any host nation agreements about who will respond on the airfield or how the chain of custody of evidence will be maintained? Task 3

Today at H-Hour, a group of former rebels who were signatories to the DDR process arrived in a 3-vehicle convoy at the UN DDR Centre to undergo processing and decommissioning of a variety of small arms, ammunition, landmines, and RPGs. Having been met by the UN head of the DDR Centre at the entrance, a PBIED bomber walked up to the gate and having forced himself into the middle of the group and initiated a suicide belt. Within seconds up to three other attackers began firing assault rifles and throwing grenades. It is reported that 2 of these attackers managed to gain access to the centre with one killed outside by some of the former rebels who were reporting for processing. Confused reports have stated that both the attackers within the centre have been neutralized with UNDSS stating all firing had ceased by H+1. Some witnesses have stated the attackers are wearing suicide vests, with others saying they are wearing assault vests with ammunition within them. One witness stated that one attacker was clearly seen trying to use a switch with a wire running into his vest before he was shot. It is not clear if the two attackers inside the centre are dead with UNDSS having the area cleared of all persons. Headcount has been initiated. Social media posting of the events is streaming online at present with # UN Attack trending.

# Facilitator Guide- Recommend coaching the students in these areas of consideration:

- Contact the closest protection force for security awareness.
- Contact the security warden for necessary security arrangement.
- Task organize for the mission to deal with the armed groups, dissatisfaction civilian population, and POC (including mine and IED threats).
- Convey the situation to your chain of command, use reports.
- What resources are needed for the site and coordination?
- Who else can help with the POC mandate and execute the proper procedures for the site?
- Break up in two groups and independently deduct and analyze the mission/tasks and consider possible COAs and merits of COA
- In general, how will you organize?
- How will you facilitate security both to civilians, UN personnel and your own personnel?
- If required, how do transport of personnel and equipment; request support helio, logistics and medical spt?
- How will you support your operation?
- How will you command and control and communicate, whom do you report to?
- Any other considerations, DDR personnel etc.
- Have the students use the TTPs, principles provided and reinforce "what to


do".

- Because you are operating in a UN peacekeeping environment under UN policies, procedures, SOFA, ROE, etc.; are there areas or specific tasks, techniques, or procedures that may have to be adjusted from your current national / contingent military SOPs and policies (highlight these in the discussions).
- 1. Develop a set of agreed criteria for analyzing COAs (focus on the above bullet).
- 2. Groups should brief the collective group on COA using a simple sketch or drawing for a visual aide.

### Possible Injects:

- a. Locals' unwillingness.
- b. Stone-pelting.
- c. Roadblock while conducting verification patrols.
- d. A unit nearby gets stuck in the minefield.
- e. Civilians being attacked while you are conducting ops.

# Task Organization



# Capabilities

# **EOD Platoon Capabilities**

- PAX 25
- Capability Level
  - 1 Section CMD (Level-2)
  - 1 Section CMD (Level-3)
  - 1 Section IEDD (Intermediate)
  - 1 Level-3 Operator (Platoon NCOIC)
- 3 x Mine Protected Vehicle (PMV)
- 1 Commercial drone with 30 min TOF
- 1x Dismounted Crew

# UNMIC Explosive Hazard Database

crater and destroyed on site.	net leg below the shee.	- CO IIII	SUIKe	IDF Camp vio strike	0.00
EOD Tm 1 searched the local area and found 4 more AP mines and remnants of the detonated munition. They were all PMN-2 landmines. The devices were moved into a nearby	A 12 year old girls was gathering wood for cooking when it appears she stepped on an AP mine. She survived but lost		AP mine	Outside the west fenceline of the Shamagan	3
Local EUU removed the munitions after documenting the cache for evidence. Charges were brought against the shop owner and his 3 sons. The disposition of the case is unknown but there was an plea from a Cambonian elder to have the man transferred to a Cambonian jurisdiction where he could get a "fair trial." The Karaoy mayor declined.	During a counter drug raid in market area Karaoy police found a cache of 20 previously used TM-62 landmines, 10-PMN-2 AP mines, 12-RPG-7, and various small arms.	Local EOD2	Cache	Karaoy Market 2 Km north of Camp Karaoy	면
	eastern edge of the "old minefields" along the river approx. 10 km north of Camp Karaoy. They found one pickup truck from Cabo-Quick-Construction partially destroyed inside the marked area. Two unidentified teens were found dead from blast injuries at the scene. Several AT and AP mines were scattered about the area. It appeared that the boys were	Local EOD 2	AV mine strike	vic 43TFJ467198	B.46
Local police LU says that their bomb squad was quick to destroy the "old Chinese munitions." No further information could be acquired about the devices. The local Bomb Squad didn't document anything from the scene. It was unclear if the police actually had information and were not going to share or if there really was no records kept. There are a number of criminal groups that operate in the mining area primarily dealing in the legal export of precious metals and stones.	The site manager at Deepbore Mining Camp #12 found what he described as 3 rockets on a rack at the north end of the facility. They had to have been put there in the last few days because they had just removed pipe from this area during the previous week and would have seen it.	COBIEOD	P	Northwest Mining Camp 12 vio 43TFJ347177	P.90
Investigations and subsequent seaton or the take shore found 7 Valmyra Type 59 AP handmines. It was unclear how long the mines had been emplaced. Some appeared to be very weathered while others were in nearly factory condition. Locals say that they have not seen this type of thing around the lake before the IDP camp arrived. They blame refugees in the camp for the landmines but there appeared to be no evidence that this was the case. The mines were destroyed on site and mine warning signs installed on several of the	A group of girls were gathering water from the river when one of them stepped on the lanmine killing her and injuring 3 others.	vio 43TFJ295043 AP Mine Police EOD Tm 101	APMine	vio 43TFJ295043	D-92
Local police said they would remove and destroy the device after the recon. The final disposition is the device is unknown but local Payat police confirmed that it was removed.	An AP mine was found during recon of the UN DDR site. Based on the condition of the mine and the surrounding area to was determined that the mine was a MPN landmine that had been emplaced during previous fighting.	Previous EOD Tm 2	AP mine	Future Payat DDR Site vic 43TFJ6106	D-180
UXO was moved to centralized disposal area on southeast corner Camp Karaoy and destroyed.	RPG 7 found while excavating for the housing expansion of Camp Karaoy	Previous EOD Tm 1	Found	Camp Karaoy	D-180
Action Taken	Description	Responding Unit	Inciden	Location	Date