



United Nations

Specialised Training Materials

for United Nations

Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit

for United Nations Peace Operations

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The Specialised Training Materials (STMs) for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations have been developed by the Integrated Training Service (ITS) of the UN Department of Peace Operations.

This version has been released for use by the Member States in their pre-deployment training for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The suite of STM products will be regularly updated so that it is fully responsive to the needs on the ground. Therefore, we strongly suggest that you check for updated versions before a training programme is conducted.

The latest STM versions can be found online at the Peacekeeping Resource Hub: <http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community>. A link to receive your comments and suggestions for improvement can be found in the resource hub at the same location.

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Integrated Training Service

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Preface

Background

The UN Department of Peace Operations has developed a suite of training packages to prepare peacekeepers for their deployment in missions. Amongst these packages is the Specialised Training Materials for specific United Nations Military Units (UNMU).

The Office of Military Affairs has developed Military Unit Manuals (UNMUM) and Handbooks designed to provide unit and sub-unit commanders, as well as, peacekeeping staff and other personnel with references how to prepare specific military units to undertake their tasks in United Nations peacekeeping operations. These documents provide a baseline of military doctrine for these training materials.

Additionally, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has developed a suite of lessons contained in Annex D as supplemental/reinforcing training materials/packet to this STM. These lessons are an introductory overview for a more substantial technical UNMAS collection of 92 separate training blocks of instruction for Peacekeeping forces. Lessons cover Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD) and IED Disposal (IEDD) competencies for dedicated Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and IEDD forces deploying in a peacekeeping environment.

Aim

These training materials aim to provide troop-contributing countries with a comprehensive training package that combines the Conceptual, Legal, and Operational Frameworks for specific type units. The STMs also mainstreams relevant aspects of the Protection of Civilians into frameworks/material. The STM includes small exercises, as well as, a more comprehensive scenario-based exercise, which can be run at the end of a course to strengthen participants' understanding how better to operate in a UN Peacekeeping environment. The training packages are designed for application in both pre-deployment and in-mission training.

Target audience

The priority target audience of this STM package is military decision-makers, staff officers, and tactical level unit leaders. However, leadership at all levels that

supervise, support and coordinate with the specific unit may benefit from this material.

Structure of the training materials

The package is constructed in three modules:

Module 1: Conceptual Framework

Module 2: Legal Framework

Module 3: Operational Framework

Annexes:

Annex A: PowerPoint Slide Presentations

Annex B: Learning Activity / Scenario-based Tabletop Exercise (TTX)

Annex C: Training Guidance / Training Model

Annex D: UNMAS Lessons and training materials

Annex E: References and background material

For all practical purpose, throughout the Specialised Training Material documents, lessons, and slides, we will use the abbreviation/ acronym "MLEOD" to refer to the United Nations Military Explosive Ordnance Unit both in singular and in the plural forms.

Acknowledgements

ITS would like to thank the subject matter experts from across the UN system, Member States and other regional and international organisations who provided feedback during the drafting process, and the numerous training personnel from national peacekeeping training institutions and field missions who participated in the development workshops. A special acknowledgement to the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS); and the following Member States and their Permanent Missions to the UN for their contribution to the STM development;

Canada
Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal
Kingdom of Spain
Republic of Ireland
United States of America
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Contact person

For any proposal of update or improvement of this package, or any questions about the training materials, please contact the project leader Mr. Rafael Barbieri (barbieri@un.org) or write to peacekeeping-training@un.org.

Any relevant update will be posted and explained on the Peacekeeping Resource Hub website (<http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community>). Instructors are encouraged to check that site regularly.

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Instructor Guidance



General Considerations for Instructors

This package is a compendium of critical training content for specific units operating in UN peacekeeping. No training material can cover the entire spectrum of complexity in a peacekeeping environment, with all its challenges and complexity. The STM package should, therefore, be viewed as the baseline to underpin related training efforts for military peacekeepers. However, when designing a course, trainers should be prepared to adapt these materials to the needs of their audience and structures. As a result, the duration of training courses delivered based on the materials may vary.

Concerning necessary competencies for participants to benefit from this training package, it is recommended that personnel receiving this training be proficient in basic military tasks (individually and collectively) at the tactical and technical level. As such, it is expected that a staff officer and or EOD technician be fully capable of performing their baseline skillset and knowledge of EOD and Counter IED before receiving the instruction. It is also critical for all participants to have received the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTM) as a prerequisite to this training. The CPTM contains fundamental principles, concepts and ideas to UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), which should be grasped by trainees before participating in the specific unit STM course. Instructors should develop and implement an initial written test and final test to reinforce learning objectives and evaluate the knowledge of participants.

The STMs can be downloaded from <http://research.un.org>

Instructor Profile

This training package is best presented by instructors who master the STM, have knowledge of EOD skills and IEDD and have previous experience working in a UN peacekeeping mission. Experience with the specific unit at the tactical level is essential. The knowledge on the mission where trainees are to be deployed is advisable, to be able to deliver a targeted course based on real experience. Finally, instructors should be familiar and comfortable with facilitator-based instruction and conducting scenario-based Tabletop Exercises (TTX).

Tabletop Exercise (TTX) Considerations

Contained in the STMs are TTXs. These exercises are scenario / situational driven learning activities to help consolidate learning outcomes and help reinforce the lessons “Take Away”. TTXs provide a learning environment tailored to facilitate discussions. They are set in an informal learning environment where the target audience can discuss the principles and concepts when operating in a United Nations Peacekeeping operation using the hypothetical, CARANA scenario and unit specific situations. The exercises help participants to understand better the manifestation of integrating units in a peacekeeping environment.




Methodology: Using national problem-solving doctrine, military decision-making process and troop leading procedures the participants analyse situations, missions and present Courses of Actions (COAs) to be executed in a UN peacekeeping operation. The effectiveness of a TTX is derived from the energetic involvement of participants under the guidance, of experienced instructors and mentors. Instructors should highlight the adequacy of the core elements and principles when operating in support of peacekeeping operations. Instructors should assist participants in bridging gaps in the transition from standard military operations to peacekeeping operations. Instructors must emphasize that C2, the support structure, and the coordination with the various actors in a UNPKO can be a challenge.

Training Characteristics

Training will vary for different units in different troop-contributing countries, based on priorities and resources. However, some fundamental training characteristics should be respected when delivering the course:

- Training should be interactive and encourage the participation of trainees
- Trainers should bring examples and antidotes from actual UNPKOs
- Training should be evaluated

Symbols Legend

	Interactive presentation or small exercises to engage the participants
	Suggested film segment to illustrate the content
	Note to the instructor to highlight particular aspects of the materials or point towards additional materials

Module 1



Conceptual Framework

Module 1 at a Glance

Aim

The aim of this module is to familiarize participants with the:

- Overview and concept of Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (MILEOD)
- Nature and characteristics, philosophy and principles of MILEOD and the nature of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)
- MILEOD Capabilities
- Organisational principles, flexibility and adaptability of MILEOD
- Generic MILEOD structures along with the organisational principles used by MILEOD and the United Nations
- Command and Control, responsibilities of key mission leaders and sections

Overview

Module 1 provides an overview of the conceptual framework related to MILEOD operating in a UN PKO to support and help contribute towards a successful achievement of the Mandate. It also examines the nature, capabilities, and characteristics of MILEOD and how they support the UN Mission components and, in some cases, the host nation.

Introduction

Slide 1



Key Message: Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units (MILEOD) can contribute decisively and in support of the achievement of the Mission's mandate. To date, MILEOD capabilities have been deployed to peacekeeping operations in many of the UN missions. To acknowledge nature, characteristics of MILEOD and their complementarity with the force and the other components in the mission, we need to be familiar with their conceptual framework.

The aim of Module 1 is to provide you with an overview of MILEOD in order to employ them appropriately and to familiarise you with the conceptual framework of how the MILEOD support UN missions.

It should be emphasized that this course aims to provide UN troop-contributing countries (TCCs) with a comprehensive training package that combines the Conceptual, Legal, and Operational Frameworks for the employment of UN Military MILEOD or MILEOD; starting here with the Conceptual Framework. This Specific Training Module (STM) also will help mainstream relevant aspects of the Protection of Civilians into the frameworks and materials. The STM includes learning exercises and discussions, as well as, a more comprehensive scenario-based exercise / Tabletop Exercise (TTX), which can be run at the end of a course to help strengthen our understanding how

better to utilise MILEOD in a UN Peacekeeping environment. This training package is designed for application in both pre-deployment and in-mission training.

The audience for this STM package includes military decision-makers, staff officers, and tactical level unit leaders, who during their UN deployment may be assigned to, employ, coordinated or perform missions with MILEOD. However, leadership at all levels that supervise, train, prepare, support and coordinate with MILEOD may also benefit from this material.

For all practical purpose, throughout the Specialised Training Material documents, lessons, and slides, we will use the abbreviation/ acronym “MILEOD” to refer to the United Nations Military Explosive Ordnance Unit both in singular and in the plural forms.

Slide 2

Module 1 Content

- 1.1 UN MILEOD Philosophy and Principles
- 1.2 Overview
- 1.3 Command & Control
- 1.4 Capabilities
- 1.5 Organization Principles & Unit Structure

2

In this Module that addresses the conceptual framework for MILEOD operating in a UN PKO, we will cover these lessons. MILEOD activities are always conducted in compliance with peacekeeping principles and ethos in mind. More importantly, MILEOD should always operate within the context of the Mission's mandate.

Module 1, the Conceptual Framework, will cover:

- 1.1 Philosophy and Principles
- 1.2 Overview of MILEOD
- 1.3 MILEOD Command and Control
- 1.4 MILEOD Capabilities
- 1.5 MILEOD Organisational Principles and Unit Structure

Lesson 1.1



EOD Philosophy and Principals

Lesson




Starting the Lesson



For an interactive start to Lesson 1.2, engage participants to seek their understanding of what they consider in a UN PKO the elements of EOD philosophy. Remind them that they may not differ too much from their own military.

To aid participants' learning, prior to the lesson have participants work in small groups and ask each group to come up with two or three elements. Record on a chart / white board and have them discuss just before you start the lesson.

Slide 3



Lesson 1.1
EOD Philosophy and
Principles

3

Let us proceed with more of the philosophy and the cornerstones that guide us in the United Nations as it pertains to EOD.

Slide 4

Lesson 1.1 Content

- Importance of EOD Philosophy & Principles
- EOD Philosophy
- EOD Principles
- EOD Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs)


4

Here are the topics we will be covering in this lesson.

Slide 5

Learning Outcomes Lesson 1.1

- Explain the importance of EOD philosophy and principles involved in supporting and deploying EOD assets
- Outline EOD philosophy and principles
- Explain EOD TTPs



5

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on this slide. Take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This will help to focus on the most relevant aspects of the lesson. MILEOD is an enabling asset that provides commanders with a unit that facilitates force protection, the POC and mobility.

We should consider EOD as a unique asset presenting specific capabilities. As an excellent training practice, let us review the learning outcomes:

- Explain the importance of EOD philosophy and principles involved in supporting and deploying EOD assets
- Outline the EOD philosophy and principles
- Explain the EOD TTPs and what considerations we should make

Slide 6

EOD Philosophy & Principles


Commanders and planners involved in force generation and use of MILEOD, need to be aware of EOD philosophy and principles that guide MILEOD operators in planning and execution of tasks and plans

**Preservation of life always FIRST PRIORITY
other priorities defined by FC**

Commanders and planners involved in force generation and the employment of MILEOD should be aware of the EOD philosophy and principles that guide EOD operators. The UN EOD philosophies are the baseline for UN EOD operations, and they include the following:

- The safeguarding of human life takes precedence over all else
- Property Preservation to prevent an item of EO causing damage
- The Removal of the Threat posed by an EO
- The Recording and Recovery of EO components. This process facilitates situational awareness
- The Return to Normality is important as EOD attempts to restore the situation to normality as soon as possible
- The prioritisation of the five parts of the EOD philosophy usually defined by the UN force commander. In every case, **preservation of life is always the priority**

Slide 7




The UN PKO EOD philosophy is so important we will go into more detail and review the concepts using this slide:

- **Save Life.** The safeguarding of human life takes precedence over all else. While this includes the lives of EOD personnel, there will be incidences where the safety of other UN personnel and civilians must take precedence over the safety of EOD personnel
- **Preservation of Property.** Property preservation to prevent an item of EO causing damage or aggressor utilised IEDs for achieving their aim
- **Removal of the Threat.** The removal of the threat posed by an item of EO is central to the raison d'être of EOD. Two specific circumstances where removal of the threat is a high priority is in a high tempo operational environment in which the higher commander's intent, in line with the mandate requires the clearance of an IED to allow operations to continue. Similarly, for IEDs with a chemical payload, the removal of that chemical threat is a priority
- **Recording and Recovery of EO Components.** Recording and recovery, in support of gaining better situational awareness as to the threats in the mission area

- **Return to Normality.** All EOD procedures are focused on restoring the situation to normality, as soon as possible and with safety in mind. This must be achieved with minimal damage as a goal. It may be necessary to use procedures to clear the threat quickly but cause damage. In such circumstances, a rapid clearance may cause damage to property, but a reduced disruption to UN operations offsets these
- The prioritisation of the five parts of the EOD philosophy depends on the UN Force Commander. In every case, **preservation of life is always the priority in all EOD activities**

Slide 8



In addition to UN EOD philosophy, all UN military EOD tasks and operations are conducted with the following UN EOD principles applied. These principles are derived from the UN EOD philosophy. There are seven principles that we will go into more detail in this lesson:

- The preferred Render Safe Procedure (RSP) should utilise remote means, in IEDD, the preferred RSP should utilise remote neutralisation through disruption
- Manual render-safe actions shall be carried out only as a last resort
- The operator shall be exposed to an EO item for the minimum time
- Mandatory safe waiting periods shall be observed
- Operations shall be planned
- The operator shall revert to remote means whenever possible
- Surveillance

Of note; the safe waiting periods are times which an EOD operator must allow to elapse following a decisive EOD action. The times are mandatory and cover both the primary and secondary safe waiting periods. The term "soak times" is used by some EOD communities to refer to the safe waiting period.

Slide 9

UN PKO EOD Principle 1

Preferred Render Safe Procedures
(RSP) utilize remote means



This slide outlines the first UN MILEOD principles.

Slide 10

UN PKO EOD Principle 2

Manual render-safe actions carried out only
as **last resort**

This slide continues to explain UN principles.

Slide 11

UN EOD Principle 3

EOD operator exposed for minimum time



Principle #3

Slide 12

UN PKO EOD Principle 4

Mandatory safe waiting periods
observed



9

Principle #4

Slide 13

UN PKO EOD Principle 5

Operations shall be planned



This slide outlines the principle of planning.

Slide 14

UN PKO EOD Principle 6

IEDD- preferred RSP is remote
neutralization through disruption



Here is principle #6

Slide 15

UN PKO EOD Principle 7

Operator revert to remote means when possible



Principle # 7

Slide 16




Remember, safe waiting periods are waiting times which an EOD operator must allow elapsing following a decisive EOD action, before making a manual approach. The times are mandatory and cover both the primary and secondary safe waiting periods. The term "soak times" is used in some TCC EOD communities to refer to the same things as safe waiting periods.

Slide 17

EOD TTPs

- Sensitive and classification
- Details not provided here
- Can be used by threats to counter and target MILEOD
- TCC not required to alter their TTPs for UN missions

A red rectangular stamp with the words "SENSITIVE MATERIAL" in white, bold, capital letters. Below the stamp is a yellow folder or binder, which is secured with a metal chain and a padlock, symbolizing restricted access to sensitive information.

Since Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) used by MILEOD are sensitive and classified by many TCCs. Details of TTPs are not provided in the MILEOD manual or this STM. TTPs can be used by aggressors who produce and deploy IEDs to counter these TTPs and exploit the knowledge to design IEDs.

Slide 18

TCC EOD TTPs

At TCC discretion-but **must comply** with:

- UN PKO EOD principles
- UN PKO EOD philosophy
- Effective, efficient and safe
- Leads to items rendering safe- disposal
- Within mission mandate / FC guidance


For these reasons, EOD TTPs used are at the discretion of TCC providing EOD capabilities to UN missions with the caveat that the TTP must be:

- Effective, efficient and safe leading to the rendering safe of items of EO or disposal of an IED
- In line with the mission mandate and EOD philosophy/principles

Slide 19


EOD TTPs

- EOD TTPs a national responsibility
- TCCs encouraged to share best practices and lessons learned
- Benefits all UN missions



While EOD TTPs are a national responsibility, TCCs in a UN mission are encouraged to share their EOD TTPs and best practices that would be a benefit to all UN EOD mission personnel.

Slide 20



Summary

The above relevant "Take Away" topics are part of the conceptual framework for the employment of MILEOD represents the core of this lesson. We should have a general knowledge of the items on this slide. Let us take a few minutes to address and discuss these boxes on the slide.

Reference Slide

Abbreviations

- EO: Explosive Ordnance
- EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal
- IEDD: Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
- INFOSEC: Information Security
- MEODU: Military EOD Units
- RSP: Render Safe Procedures
- TCC: Troop Contributing Country
- TTPs: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
- UN HQ: United Nations Headquarters
- UNMAS: United Nations Mine Action Service

Learning Activity

1.1

RESOURCES

N/A

TIME

3-5 minutes

PREPARATION

Ask the participants to answer the following questions.

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Reinforce the learning outcomes and assess the knowledge of the group and individuals.

Questions:

1. Which of the EOD philosophies will always be prioritised number 1?

Answer: Save Life

2. While EOD TTPs are a national responsibility, why is it essential for EOD TCC within a UN mission to share EOD TTP best practices and EOD lessons learned?

Answer: To the benefit from all mission's EOD personnel.

Lesson 1.2



MILEOD Overview

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson



For an interactive start to this Lesson, ask the participants if they have had experience in a UNPKO. Ask them to tell the group about their specific challenges with command and control, tasking orders, and the employment of the MILEOD.



Note to instructor – recommend that lesson 1.1 be presented by a trainer who has some personal experience in a MILEOD or Force HQs operating in a UN PKO.



Recommend that instructors review the “DPKO/DFS policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, (Ref. 2008.4) (February 2008). MILEOD is considered an enabling unit. Therefore, there are dual tasking authorities for the MILEOD; the FC has OPCON authority (inherent in OPCON is tasking authority; and the Civilian support leadership (Director, Chief, Service Delivery / DMS / CMS) also may have tasking authority for the day-to-day tasks / assignments. There must be a good working relationship between the Mission HQs and FHQs in UN Missions for this concept to work properly. Currently, in most missions MILEOD are tasked primarily by the Force Commander.

Slide 1



Lesson 1.2 Overview of United Nations Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units (MILEOD)

1

Key Message: As EOD units are a limited unique asset creating effects that contribute to the achievement of operational-level objectives, it is crucial that military decision-makers, staff officers, and tactical level unit leaders who employ or work with MILEOD are aware of their capabilities and limitations.

We will give an overview of the employment concept of a MILEOD. This means from this point forward. You should try to be in the mindset of wearing the Blue Beret that represents the UN.

The MILEOD must be fully integrated into the mission concept and operational and information/intelligence frameworks. The MILEOD has its unique characteristics that add a dimension in the accomplishment of the Mission's mandate. It is essential to understand that the MILEOD is not always deployed as part of the initial force structure of the UN Mission. Instead, it may be deployed only when needed to meet a specific contingency or crises.

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Slide 2

Lesson 1.2 Content

- Terminology – key terms
- UN use of the term EOD
- Role of MILEOD
- Aim of MILEOD deployment on Peacekeeping Missions
- Direct support provided by EOD activities
- EOD deployment considerations

2

Key Message: MILEOD is a specifically-managed operational asset which represents a capability that should only be employed for achieving specific objectives.

Here are the subject areas we will be covering. This lesson content explains some of the key EOD and, the use of the term EOD in the UN. It also covers the role and aim of MILEOD employment, as well as direct support provided by EOD activities. Finally, considerations that are needed to optimise MILEOD are also discussed.

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes Lesson 1.2

- Explain the key Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) terms
- Explain the role and aim of MILEOD deployment in Peacekeeping Missions
- Explain the direct support provided by EOD activities
- Outline what planning considerations should be included when deploying a MILEOD

3

Key Message: MILEOD is an enabling asset providing commanders with a unit that facilitates force protection, POC and mobility in the area of operations (AO). We should understand and consider EOD as a unique, useful asset presenting the Force Commander (FC) with a specific capability in the force structure.

In all good training practices, let us review the learning outcomes. At the end of the lesson, our aim is for you to be able to assimilate the essential roles, C2 and how the MILEOD fits in the UN structure. Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements:

- Explain the difference between the key EOD terms
- Explain the Role and Aim of MILEOD Deployment on Peacekeeping Missions
- Explain the direct support provided to Mission by EOD Activities
- Outline what considerations should be included when planning to deploy a MILEOD on a UN Mission

Slide 4

Abbreviations

• AO: Area of Operation	• IED: Improvised Explosive Device
• AXO: Abandoned Explosive Ordnance	• IEDD: Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
• BAC: Battlefield Area Clearance	• LOO: Lines of Operation
• BCMD: Biological and Chemical Munitions Disposal	• MILEOD: UN Military EOD units
• CBRN: Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear	• OPCW: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
• CMD: Conventional Munitions Disposal	• PKO: Peacekeeping Operations
• DtD: Defeat the Device	• ROE: Rules of Engagement
• EO: Explosive Ordnance	• TCC: Troop Contributing Country
• EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal	• UN: United Nations
• ERW: Explosive Remnants of War	• UNMAS: United Nations Mine Action Service
• FP: Force Protection	• UXO: Unexploded Ordnance
• HN: Host Nation	

6

As Abbreviations and acronyms can be confusing and used differently by your militaries, we wanted to show you early in this lesson, the abbreviations and acronyms that we will use for this lesson and future lessons. It is crucial that in a UN mission, we all use standard terms. Take a moment to review them, and if at any time during the lesson, an abbreviation or acronym appears to be unfamiliar; please raise your hand and ask the instructor to explain. Also, hard copies of this slide and other abbreviations could be distributed.

Slide 5

Terminology – Key Terms

- *Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)*
- *Explosive Ordnance (EO)*
- *Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD)*
- *Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD)*
- *Defeat the Device (DtD)*


7

EOD is a technical discipline within militaries with a complete set of terminology that describes the threats that it can be employed to deal with and the capabilities, tactics, techniques and procedures that they are competent in dealing with such threats. EOD is also closely associated with C-IED with terminology appearing in both fields of activity.

In-depth knowledge of all technical terminology is not required for all personnel employing or working alongside MILEOD; however, an understanding of some of the key terms can be helpful.

- Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
- Explosive Ordnance (EO)
- Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD)
- Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD)
- Defeat the Device (DtD)

Slide 6



EOD takes considerable operational time and training to develop operators. The term EOD is a collective one. The term includes procedures of detection, location, access, identification, evaluation, hazard mitigation, render safe, recording, recovery and final disposal. These procedures are used in the disposal of items of Explosive Ordnance (EO) or any hazardous material associated with an EOD incident.

The nine EOD procedures that are part of an EOD incident are:

- Detection procedures - Those actions taken by any means to discover the presence of an item or substance of potential EO significance
- Location procedures - Those actions within an EOD task which results in determining the presence and position of an item or EO
- Access procedures - Those actions taken to facilitate freedom of movement to the location of an item of EO necessary for subsequent EOD procedures
- Identification procedures - Those actions taken to establish the make-up and characteristics of an item of EO
- Evaluation procedures - Those actions taken to analyse the results obtained from EOD identification procedures to assess the likely mode of action it is and associated hazards along with those in the locality


NOTE: Some TCCs define identification and evaluation procedures under the combined heading of “diagnosis”.

- Hazard Mitigation - Application of control measures intended to reduce the likelihood of the initiation of an item of EO and or consequences of such an initiation.
- Render-safe procedures (RSP) - Actions taken on items of EO which cause such items to be placed in a state of tolerable risk unlikely to cause harm, injury or damage, through the application of unique EOD methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components thus preventing an unacceptable initiation.

NOTE: The action of placing an item of EO in a state of tolerable risk means it is unlikely to cause harm, injury or damage.

- Recording and recovery procedures - Those actions taken to document and retrieve items of EO or components thereof that are in an acceptable state of safety. These procedures include the reporting of EOD incidents.
- Final disposal procedures - Those actions within EOD which include demolition, neutralisation, burning or other appropriate means that result in the elimination (complete destruction) of explosive ordnance hazards. In some cases, the RSP is the final disposal.

Slide 7



Key Message: EOD, in its broadest sense, can dispose of all munitions that contain explosives, nuclear, biological or chemical agents. The STM refers only to MILEOD that deal with munitions that contain explosives. EOD activities involving nuclear, chemical or biological are specialised capabilities not covered in this STM.

Explosive Ordnance (EO) is defined as all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature.

There are 19 types of munitions included in the definition of EO. Clandestine devices are items specifically designed for concealed emplacement or appear like an innocuous item which functions when a person carries out an apparent harmless act. They use anti-handling devices or other conventional firing mechanisms in conjunction with a conventional initiator and main charge.

The term booby-trap has been used in the past in reference to clandestine devices; in these materials, they are considered being IEDs.

IEDs are devices fabricated or placed in an improvised manner. They incorporate destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and are designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. They may incorporate military supplies, but they usually are created from non-military components.

Slide 8

Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD)

Conventional Munition Disposal (CMD) refers to EOD operations conducted on ammunition used as conventional weapons

- Mine clearance upon ERW discovery
- Single & multiple ERW outside hazardous areas
- EO -deterioration, damage or attempted destruction




ERW = Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) & Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO)

Key Message: Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD) involves the majority of munitions that are covered in EOD, that is, 18 of the 19 types of munitions named in the definition of EO are covered under CMD.

CMD refers to any EOD operation conducted on ammunition used as a conventional weapon. CMD activities may be undertaken as follows:

- As part of mine clearance operations, upon discovery of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW); NOTE: Explosive Remnants of War refers to Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO).
- ERW discovered outside hazardous areas. Individual items can be disposed of as they are found or turned in. There are also larger scales of ERW disposal referred to as, Battlefield Area Clearance (BAC). This operation is systematic and controlled clearance of hazardous areas that do not include mines.
- To dispose of items of conventional EO which has become hazardous by deterioration, damage or attempted destruction.

Slide 9



IEDD is one of the core capabilities of EOD and is increasingly needed on UN PKO owing to the increasing use of IEDs in many UN Mission areas. Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) is the collective term referring to the following EOD procedures, intended to result in the final elimination of an IED; detection, location, access, identification, evaluation, hazard mitigation, rendering safe, component recording and recovery and final disposal.

Slide 10




Key Message: The term “Defeat the Device” is in everyday use and is a C-IED term that refers to one of the pillars of C-IED; however, the term is mistakenly used about EOD or IEDD.

The term “Defeat the Device (DtD)” is often used concerning EOD and IEDD activities. For clarity, it is defined here to avoid misunderstanding. DtD refers to a defensive line of operation undertaken as part of IED risk mitigation activities. They include all actions and activities designed to reduce the effects of IED initiations for safe operations, including:

- Search activities
- CMD activities
- IEDD activities
- Support to mission partners

Of the four named activities here within DtD, all are included in the EOD core capabilities.

Slide 11



Key Message: EOD can be defined differently by TCCs. In the UN, EOD has an overarching meaning in which there are three branches; they are CMD, IEDD, and CBRN.

EOD = CMD + IEDD. Since many nations use the term EOD, this manual will use the terms CMD and IEDD to refer to the separate EOD activities and capabilities. There is a distinction between the EOD branches CMD and IEDD. UN leadership should understand the differences. Requesting an IEDD element where CMD elements are required is not efficient, and requesting CMD elements where IEDD is needed is dangerous.


An IEDD capability should not be expected unless this requirement has been identified. Statements of Unit Requirements must clearly articulate this requirement early in the planning process.

There is a third EOD branch called Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN). This STM does not refer to the CBRN specialised capability. CBRN EOD is the term that refers to both Biological and Chemical Munitions Disposal (BCMD) and CBRN Weapon Disposal.

BCMD is defined as any EOD operation conducted on conventional munitions containing either biological or chemical agents or the recovery of containers that contain toxic substances. CBRN Weapon Disposal is a specialisation within CBRN EOD in which EOD techniques are applied.

The latest version of IMAS Test and Evaluation Protocol 09.30/01/2014 for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Competency Standards provides information on BCMD operator competencies

Slide 12



The fundamental role of MILEOD is to counter threats posed by Explosive Ordnance in support of Peacekeeping. MILEOD should always operate under a framework of four interrelated lines of operation (LOO: Prepare, Engage, Protect and Prevent).

The meaning of the four LOOs will be explained using this slide. More specifically, the roles of MILEOD can best be explained using the terms, prepare, prevent, protect, and engage.

PREPARE. As UN personnel operate in an explosive threat environment, general awareness will help assist in the process of ordnance identification and communication of the visible indicators. Also, overall preparedness will enhance the early detection of devices, minimise exposing personnel to the threat, and guide actions which will render ordnance safe or mitigate the effects.


PREVENT. MILEOD facilitate the disruption of a threat's network and the ability to construct and employ explosive devices. The recording and recovery of EO components and the technical information will help add to situational awareness. Better knowledge of an aggressor's capabilities and trends help operators plan and allocate resources. It is also beneficial to coordinate with civilian authorities, police, and Host Nation (HN) intelligence agencies to better access threats.

PROTECT. By detecting and rendering safe EO threats, we are protecting mission partners and civilians. This requires optimisation and integration of suitable technology solutions including:

- Surveillance for the information collection
- Technical information resources to enable trend and pattern analysis
- Qualified and well-equipped search and disposal teams
- Support elements such as Force Protection (FP) and medical assets

ENGAGE. MILEOD should engage with stakeholders and partners in a comprehensive approach to develop counter explosive threat capabilities. Close coordination with HN security forces is essential to raise their level of expertise. Within the general scope of UN peacekeeping missions, the HN must be able to take responsibility for countering threats.

Slide 13



This slide displays the Aim of a MILEOD Deployment in Peacekeeping Missions. Deployment of MILEOD in peacekeeping missions aims to defeat or to mitigate the effects of EO in order to:

- At the top left graphic, it says that MILEOD contribute to FP of UN personnel and partners
- In the top middle, we see the protect civilians
- In the top right of the slide, we show that a MILEOD allows freedom of action and movement
- Middle left, the red box represents the increase of UN troop confidence and effectiveness
- Middle right, MILEOD contribute to stabilisation initiatives as part of post-conflict or emerging societies through the removal of EO threats which can impact economic development and act as a source of energetic material for use in IEDs
- Last, in the bottom part of the slide, we see MILEOD through recording and recovery of EO items. These actions provide information that helps degrade IED networks

Slide 14

MILEOD Direct Support

- Enhance operational effectiveness
- Enhance operational efficiency
- Improve peacekeeper safety, security
- Support UN mandate

EOD activities are essential functions contributing to these goals. EOD activities are in direct support to enhance operational effectiveness and efficiency and improve peacekeeper safety and security in the field in support of the UN mission mandate.

- Effectiveness = A quality of a system, process of action that achieves the desired outcome or end state
- Efficiency = A quality of a system, process of action that achieves the desired outcome or end state within an acceptable time, financial, personnel and other resource constraints

Slide 15

MILEOD Deployment Criteria**Threat assessment dependant**

- EO assessed in mission area
- Tasks, requirements
- Threat's IED capability
- Unit structure, strength, equipment
- EOD operator trained and competent
- UN mandate , Rules of Engagement (ROE)
- Advised to coordinate with UNMAS considered best practice

Key Message: The principal consideration in all planning, maintenance and sustainment of an EOD capability is that it is aligned with the EO threat. As an EO threat can evolve in each area of operations over time, the UN requires an on-going EO threat assessment.

The requirement for deploying an EOD capability depends on the threat assessment for the specific mission environment. The following criteria directly influence the force configuration:

- The level of threat in each AO
- A potential or actual aggressor's IED capability
- Unit structure, strength and equipment
- EOD operator's education and competencies required will depend on the mission mandate, tasks and Rules of Engagement (ROE)
- The EOD activity within a peacekeeping mission, where applicable, it is advised to coordinate with the Mission's UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) office.

Slide 16

Lesson 1.1 Take Away

- The 9 possible procedures to dispose of EO or hazardous material associated with EOD incident
- EO refers to munitions containing **explosives**, nuclear fission, fusion, biological, chemical materials or agents
- Defeat the Device:
 - DLOO part of IED TM
 - Search
 - CMD
 - IEDD
 - Support partners

```

graph TD
    EOD[EOD] --- CMD[CMD]
    EOD --- IEDD[IEDD]
    EOD --- CBRN[CBRN EOD]
    subgraph Covered [Covered in this Manual]
        CMD
        IEDD
    end
    CBRN --- NotCovered[Not Covered in this Manual]
      
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
18

Key Message: MILEOD is a critical asset that contributes to the achievement of UN operational-level objectives. Military decision-makers, staff officers, and tactical level unit leaders must have a general understanding of their capabilities and limitations to employ them better.

To this end, such personnel should be aware of the following:

- The specialised and broad nature of EOD and the level of training and expertise of EOD operators
- EO can dispose of up 19 different natures of the EO depending on the qualifications of the individuals and units
- Defeat the device is a C-IED term that is related to EOD
- Understand the EOD Line of Operation (LOO)
- There are three branches of EOD with two of them covered in this SMT

Slide 17



Summary

Let us continue to review. Again I will stress that the MILEOD is a key asset creating effects that contribute to the achievement of the mission mandate and it is crucial that military decision makers, staff officers, and tactical level unit leaders who during the course of their UN deployment may be required to employ, or work with MILEOD and should be aware of their capabilities and limitations. Here are additional areas to take away from this lesson:

- EOD roles are under a framework of four Lines of Operation which are intended to provide enduring capabilities
- The output activities are shown to the right of the four lines of operation
- Aim of MILEOD deployment are six-fold as shown in the blue box
- The direct support provided by EOD to a UN Mission is shown in the tan coloured box

Learning Activity**1.1****RESOURCES**

N/A

TIME

3-5 minutes

PREPARATION

Ask the participants to answer the following questions.

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Reinforce the learning outcomes and assess the knowledge of the group and individuals.

Questions:**1. Define Explosive Ordnance?**

Answer 1: All munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion material, and biological or chemical agents.

2. What two branches does the term EOD refer to in this lesson?

Answer: CMD and IEDD

Lesson 1.3



Command and Control

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson


Slide 1



Lesson 1.3 MILEOD Command & Control (C2)

1

The importance of clear, fully understood, and an appropriate command and control (C2) of UN units within a Mission is essential. Because of the specialist operational enabling nature of MILEOD, they are often in high demand. The C2 control of MILEOD is essential in order to support the UN mission mandate.

 *Instructors ask the participants if they have any experience of C2 relationships in the UN and how they may differ from their own TCC C2 relationships in their military structures.*

Slide 2

Lesson 1.3 Content

- Introduction
- MILEOD focal point
- MILEOD C2 overview
- Force level C2 relationships
- Tactical level C2 and MILEOD assets
- Support C2 with MILEOD assets

2

The topics that will be covered in this lesson are listed on the slide. MILEOD is a critical operational enabling asset in UN PKO. Their command and control should be carefully considered. This lesson begins with an overview of C2 in a UN PKO Mission.

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes - Lesson 1.3

- Explain the importance and role of an MILEOD focal point
- Describe the complexities of MILEOD C2 on force, tactical and support levels

3

MILEOD is an enabling asset providing commanders with a force that facilitates protection, the POC and mobility. Proper C2 is essential to leverage MILEOD capabilities. As an excellent training practice, let us review the learning outcomes of this lesson:

- Explain the importance and role of an EOD focal point
- Describe the complexities of EOD C2 on Force, Tactical and Support levels

At the end of this lesson, students should be able to perform the actions described on the slide. Please take a few moments to read and understand the requirements. This will help to focus on the most relevant aspects of the lesson.

Slide 4

C2 Introduction


- Agreement prior deployment
- Timely, swift actions minimize disruptions
- Mission analysis defines C2
- FC nominates EOD focal point
- Maximize efficiency, effectiveness of assets
- C2 based on force, tactical, support levels

Establishing an efficient and effective C2 structure prior to the employment of a unit in the AO is of crucial importance.

Based on the mission analysis, the Force Commander defines the best C2 necessary for operational success. Furthermore, the force and sector commanders must nominate a suitably qualified EOD focal point to oversee and coordinate EOD activities. Also, this EOD focal point acts as the commander's EOD technical advisor.

The C2 of MILEOD is best outlined on three different levels, namely: force level, tactical level and a support level.


Slide 5



The unique technical nature of EO requires an advisor/coordinator on the FHQs staff. The EOD Focal Point is that individual who is part of the EOD coordination cell or a standalone staff officer responsible for EOD coordination. Here are a few points in reference to the EOD Focal Point:

- Provide leadership, direction, and coordination for EOD related activities
- Coordinate EOD related input into reporting
- Contribute to planning and mission orders
- Establish and manage guidelines on pre-initiation and blowing in place of EO
- Support operations to deny aggressors freedom to use EO
- Assess and evaluate UN and HN movement TTPs in support of FoM
- Provide general directions for the prioritisation of EO related information gathering with tactical operations
- Provide recommendations to the FC on EOD issues

Slide 6



Clear delineation of C2 for MILEOD is essential to ensure operational effectiveness and efficiency. The guidance on C2 is contained in the Policy on Authority, Command and Control for Peacekeeping Operations(FEB 2008).

Because MILEOD is a small specialised unit, arrangements are codified prior to deployment and frequently, addressed within the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Force Requirements, CONOPs or MOU. C2 for MILEOD in UN PKO refers to the relationship between the Mission HQ and the deployed EOD elements. The FC has OPCON of the MILEOD.

To best illustrate the need to delineate who exercises C2 over MILEOD in a UN PKO. Here are a few potential areas that should be considered. Is the MILEOD in a sector with units from their TCC? If so, is the MILEOD an organic asset of a larger unit? Last, is the MILEOD designated to be employed only for the specific use by that unit commander?

In the Bottom Right Box, the following C2 relationships can be utilized:

- **United Nations Command.** The authority vested in a military commander for the direction, coordination and control of military forces/personnel. Operational command has a legal status and denotes functional and knowledgeable exercise of military authority to attain military objectives or goals.

- **United Nations Operational Control.** The authority granted to a military commander in a United Nations peacekeeping operation to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned or military personnel, and to retain or assign tactical command or control of those units/personnel. Operational control includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub-units of a contingent, as required by operational necessities, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the contingent commander and as approved by the UN HQ.
- **United Nations Tactical Command.** The authority delegated to a military or police commander in a United Nations peacekeeping operation to assign tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
- **United Nations Tactical Control.** The detailed and local direction and control of movement, or manoeuvre, necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. As required by operational necessities, the HoM may delegate the tactical control of assigned military forces personnel to the subordinated sector and or unit commanders.
- **Administrative Control.** The authority over subordinate or other organisations within national contingents for administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other non-operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.

Slide 7

Tactical Level C2

- Commanders all levels recognize MILEOD technical expertise / recommendations
- MILEOD teams typically tasked in conjunction with other assets
- Considerations related to units on location

EOD working with Search& Force Protection

Who has C2 during phases of operation and how is C2 handed over?

When MILEOD teams/elements (CMD or IEDD) are task-organized, it is likely in conjunction with other UN military assets such as a force protection cordon and security or search elements.

A unit employing MILEOD assets must give special consideration to the tactical C2 of the MILEOD team commander and their relationship to other units and subunits at an EO/EOD scene/activity. Unit commanders must apprise themselves of the technical expertise of the EOD commander and take due cognisance of their recommendations.

MILEOD may have Counter Radio-controlled Warfare (CREW) assets and search elements organic with an established C2. In all situations, a clear C2 relationship is required before an operation or task.


Of note, some EOD references use the term remote-control (RC) in place of radio-control. CREW assets are often referred to as Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) assets. It is possible that in many cases where CREW and search assets/elements are not organic to MILEOD, they can be attached / in direct support of MILEOD.

In the cases where a MILEOD is working with a search unit, it is essential to establish and adjust the C2 during the various phases of the operation. That is to say; we must consider prior how and when the C2 responsibility is handed over to what unit or commander during each phase of an operation or activity. The C2 relationship between the force protection cordon and security element/unit and the MILEOD is to be addressed before the operation.

In the case that the local infantry commander has C2 of the operation, does this extend inside the cordon and evacuation, or is this under the C2 of the MILEOD commander? A common approach to these C2 issues during an EOD task is to establish an Incident Control Point (ICP). This is a location selected by the Incident Commander (IC) that makes the best tactical sense and facilitates command, control, and coordination.

Typically, the tactical commander of the unit providing local security is the IC and has C2 of the overall IED incident. The IC will coordinate the operation with advice from the EOD operator and other supporting capabilities. The EOD operator will advise the IC, and it is best practice to have C2 within the EOD cordon. After the task and following the mission standard operating procedures (SOPs), a full incident report should be submitted to the EODCC and the FHQ.

Slide 8



Clear C2 between multiple commanders on the scene of an EOD task is essential. The scene is often involving junior leaders in a high-pressure environment. Let us use this slide to review this concept of the IC and MILEOD.

Slide 9

Support Level C2

- EOD teams typically tasked with other assets
- Force protection, search, medical, comms, logistics
- CREW operator, signallers, search may be organic
- When not organic, C2 relationships need to be clear
- Must have scalable MILEOD capabilities
- C2 considerations when deployed by heli or boat

C2 relationships- explicitly articulated in appropriate orders

EOD teams are typically tasked, in conjunction with, other assets in dynamic and potentially hostile environments. At times where commanders of multiple elements may not be habitually associated, clear C2 relationships must be set and understood by all involved at the EOD activity.

C2 within the MILEOD needs to be addressed, and the C2 relationship between the MILEOD and attached assets. Examples are CREW operators, FP assets, communications specialists, and medics. This is important considering that EOD capabilities need to be scalable and have the flexibility to increase in size seamlessly to achieve the capability to defeat the threat.

Other examples of the importance of ensuring proper C2 considerations include the MILEOD working with support elements and non-organic transportation units. MILEOD deployed by non-standard means, e.g. helicopter, boat, and an armoured vehicle can pose C2 challenges. In such cases, the C2 between the MILEOD commander and the support element commander must be resolved before the operation. Also, such C2 relationships need to be articulated and written in an appropriate operations order, etc.

Slide 10

Lesson 1.3 Take Away

- Special nature of EOD activities require a designated advisor and coordinator
- Consideration for C2 relationships at force, tactical and support levels
- Clear delineation of C2 is essential
- C2 relationships established early and in writing
- CI and MILEOD relationships key to success on the ground
- Incidents can involve junior leaders from different units in high pressure situations

10

Summary

Students should retain the following key principles from this lesson. Let us review these topics.

- A key individual is the EOD Advisor and Coordinator
- Clear C2 relationships need to be established prior to an operation
- The CI and MILEOD C2 coordination processes are essentials for operational success

Reference Slide

Abbreviations

- Bn: Battalion
- C2: Command and Control
- CMD: Conventional Munitions Disposal
- CREW: Counter RCIED Electronic Warfare
- ECM: Electronic Counter Measures
- EO: Explosive Ordnance
- EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal
- EODCC: Explosive Ordnance Coordination Centre
- FC: Force Commander
- FoM: Freedom of Movement
- FP: Force Protection
- HN: Host Nation
- HoMC: Head of Mission Component
- HQ: Headquarters

- IC: Incident Commander
- ICP: Incident Control Point
- IED: Improvised Explosive Device
- MHQ: Mission Headquarters
- RCIED: Remote Controlled Improvised Explosive Device
- Regt: Regiment
- SC: Sector Commander
- SHQ: Sector Headquarters
- Sqn: Squadron
- SOFA: Status of Forces Agreement
- SOP: Standard Operating Procedures
- TCC: Troop Contributing Country
- SOFA: Status of Forces Agreement
- TL: Team Leader

12

Learning Activity**1.3**

RESOURCES

N/A

TIME

3-5 minutes

PREPARATION

Ask the participants to answer the following questions.

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Reinforce the learning outcomes and assess the knowledge of the group and individuals.

Questions:

1. What is the EOD focal point responsible for?

Answer: EOD or EO/IED risk and threat mitigations

2. Who has overall C2 of an IED incident?

Answer: The tactical commander of the unit providing local security.

Lesson 1.4



Capabilities

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Ask the students what they view as an EOD capability in a UN PKO? Record the capabilities provided on a white board. As a note, at the end of the lesson review the list as a group.

Slide 1





Lesson 1.4 UN MILEOD Capabilities

1

Slide 2

Lesson 1.4 Content

- Modern comprehensive approach to EOD
- CMD activities
- IEDD activities
- Mission Partners support

Support to Mission Partners

Mobility Planning Advice


FP Advice

CREW Asset Support

WTI

HN Support

Local Population Engagement



FP Use of CREW Assets

Specialist CREW Employment

2

Here is the content of this lesson.

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes Lesson 1.4

- Explain the modern approach to EOD operations
- Outline the differences and relationship between CMD and IEDD activities
- Explain the support that MILEOD can provide to mission partners

3

This slide displays the learning outcomes. We should be able to do this at the end of the lesson.

Slide 4

Core Capabilities of UN Military EOD units

Core capabilities of UN military EOD units include:

- CMD activities
- IEDD activities
- Support to mission partners



The capabilities of EOD personnel refer to the knowledge, skillsets, attitude and competencies that they are certified and qualified to perform. In addition, these qualifications are in conjunction with the specialised EOD equipment that is used and the ability to execute and safely respond to a CMD or IEDD activity. The core capabilities of the MILEOD include:

- CMD activities
- IEDD activities
- Support to mission partners

This lesson will go into more details explaining these core capabilities.

Slide 5

Modern Comprehensive Approach to EOD

Modern approach to operations is a comprehensive one which is often required in EO threat mitigation activities, wider ERW clearance operations and IEDD.

Comprehensive Approach!!

Other arms/capabilities often deployed in conjunction with EOD assets on ops e.g.



The modern approach to operations is comprehensive. This comprehensive approach model is often used, and principles required in addressing EO threat mitigation activities, the broader ERW clearance operations, and IEDD. In this regard, other capabilities are often deployed in conjunction with EOD assets within operations that include FP, search and CREW.

When employing search assets with and in support of EOD teams, close cooperation and coordination during the detection and location phase is required. Included in these considerations of search is the use of Explosive Detection Dogs (EDD).

In broad terms, EOD and search assets can be combined as a composite unit. Both capabilities can be organic or task-organized and brought together for a given operation. In either case, it is common for both assets to be deployed together.

Slide 6



The term ERW refers to UXO and AXO.

UXO = an EO that has been set, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use. It may have been fired, dropped, launched or projected; yet, it remains unexploded either through malfunction, design or other reason.

AXO = an EO that has not been used during an armed conflict has been left behind or dumped by a party to the conflict. It is no longer under any control. An AXO may or may not have been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use.

Slide 7

CMD – ERW Disposal

- ERW often taken not to include mines
- Mine disposal traditionally demined by TCCs
- Mine action by non-military organizations
- ERW disposal in relation to IED TM, include disposal of mines



Typically, the term ERW does not include mines. Mine-disposal is traditionally considered under a non-military classification. When undertaking the disposal of ERW concerning IED threats, it is also taken to include the disposal of mines. This slide addresses CMD activities.

Here we will consider conventional items of EO, more accurately we will refer to these activities as CMD. For this STM, the disposal of ERW will be undertaken by CMD teams; however, IEDD teams are qualified to undertake CMD up to IMAS level 3.

Slide 8

CMD – Relation to IEDD

- ERW disposal of traditional EOD
- Excludes activities involving IEDs
- ERW disposal is undertaken by CMD teams
- IEDD teams qualified CMD up to IMAS level 3



CMD is not the same as IEDD

Mines and items of ERW are often used directly as the main charge in IEDs. Their fuses in certain circumstances can be used as part of the initiator of an IED or the energetic material within the mine can be harvested to be used as the IED's main charge.

To review, the disposal of ERW refers to traditional EOD in that it excludes those activities that involve the disposal of IEDs and components thereof, i.e. IEDD. Since we are only considering conventional items of EO, it is more accurate to refer to these activities as CMD. For this manual, the disposal of ERW will be undertaken by CMD teams; however, IEDD teams are qualified to undertake CMD at least up to IMAS level 3.

Slide 9


CMD-Support to IED Threat Mitigation

- CMD not only remove hazards from AO
also removes IED components
- Key enabler in IED TM
- Mines & ERW items can be used in IEDs



These activities are essential because removing these explosive hazards from the AO; it removes the critical components used in IEDs. The removal of such components from a mission area is a key enabler in IED threat mitigation. It is often undertaken by UN agencies, such as UNMAS, in direct support of explosive hazard reduction efforts.

Slide 10



IEDD is a specialised skill requiring specific training and equipment. Typically, this equipment includes the use of remote control / operated vehicles (RCV / ROV).


The EOD IED Disposal Definition is the process in the location, identification, rendering safe and final disposal of IEDs. Final disposal refers to the final elimination of explosive ordnance hazards by explosive ordnance disposal personnel. This may include demolition, neutralisation, burning, or other proper means. In some cases, the RSP is the final disposal.

IED neutralisation refers to the process of preventing an IED from functioning as intended by the application of an external force which changes the environment around an IED. It can be permanent or temporary. It may not be possible to confirm neutralisation purely by visual means.

IEDD personnel should not be under pressure to operate outside their EOD capabilities except in extreme circumstances. It is therefore essential that any IEDD structure deployed to a UN Mission is consistent with the threat environment.

When facing a significant and sophisticated IED threat, an effectively trained, equipped and supported IEDD capability is required. The capabilities of an IEDD unit and the threat will determine the tasks to which they will perform.

Slide 11



The assessed IED threat should drive IEDD unit capabilities. The capabilities of an IEDD unit will determine the tasks to which they are appropriately qualified and equipped to effectively and safely respond to the threats. IEDD personnel should not be put under pressure to operate outside their capabilities except in extreme circumstances.

Any IEDD organisational structure deployed to a UN Mission must be consistent with the threat, the environment, and the relevant circumstances within the IED threat spectrum. When facing a significant and sophisticated IED threat, a well-trained, equipped and supported IEDD capability will be required to respond to such a threat.

Slide 12

IEDD Capabilities – Example

- Driven by the IED threat assessment (RCIED threat)
- Mission planning decides Counter RCIED Electronic Warfare (CREW) assets
- Employed - technology type, threat frequency targeted
- Deployed - existing team member or attached ECM specialist
- Maintained- Repairs and maintenance required
- Sustained – software, firmware, hardware upgrades

CREW is an abbreviation/acronym for Counter RCIED Electronic Warfare. An example of an IEDD unit's capabilities being driven by the assessed IED threat is the presence of an RCIED threat. If an RCIED threat is likely or present in the Mission AO, proper planning should include whether a CREW asset is required. The following are areas that need to be considered:

- Employed - technology type, threat frequency targeted
- Deployed by an existing team member or an attached ECM specialist
- Day to day service checks and maintenance
- Sustained – ensuring software, firmware and hardware upgrades. Additionally, the threat fill must be updated. The threat fill is the electronic code that is loaded into each CREW system containing the electronic frequencies to jam.

Slide 13

Support to Mission Partners


- CMD & IEDD - core EOD capabilities
- Mobility planning advice
- Force protection (FP) advice
- Electronic warfare support countering RCIED threats (CREW)
- Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI)
- Host nation support
- Local population engagement

All the core capabilities mentioned above are mutually interrelated and assist in the IED threat mitigation effort. Such support activities include the IED event technical and tactical analysis/advice on FP issues and the appropriate planning to mitigate IED threats. Such technical and tactical analysis via Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) also provides the input into the process of mitigating threats.

The following are support activities that contribute to mitigating the IED threats:

- Mobility planning advice
- Force protection (FP) advice
- Electronic warfare support in countering RCIED threats – CREW assets
- Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI)
- Host nation support
- Local population engagement

Slide 14



This diagram illustrates the support structure to mission partners; reinforcing what we discussed on the previous slide, Support to Mission Partners.

Slide 15


Mobility Planning Advice

Mobility & effort to maintain FoM in an IED threat environment is key operational activity

Contribute to FoM in an IED threat environment, advice for:

- **Terrain, route analysis to identify VP & VA**
- **Reduce IED risks at VP & VA**
- **Advice route clearance and use of assets**
- **Planning support**

A key input into the overall UN COP



Mobility and the effort to maintain FoM in an IED threat environment is one of the critical EOD operational activities. The aggressor often deploys IEDs to reduce or prevent UN FoM.

The loss of FoM often produces local security vacuums and non-permissive or semi-permissive environments. This provides the aggressors freedom to operate. As such, the maintenance of FoM within an IED threat environment is always a key focus of IED threat mitigation and one that considerable effort in relation to EOD activities are invested.

MILEOD activities facilitate the maintaining FoM in an IED threat environment. The advice the MILEOD provides in mobility planning is a direct support function that contributes to FoM.

Such advice comes in terms of terrain and routes analysis to identify Vulnerable Points (VP) and Vulnerable Areas (VA). Based on MILEOD advice, countermeasures can be taken to reduce the risk of IEDs at these locations. From the advice, measures could include the deployment of engineer assets to clear such VP and VA.

Because of their importance, let us explore in more detail the definitions of VP a VA.

- VP are those specific points where it is particularly advantageous for an adversary to position an ambush, using either IEDs, SALW (Small Arms and Light Weapons), or both. VP is typically characterised by prominent or a restrictive feature to force a checkpoint on the ground.
- VA are those areas where the ground lends itself to IED or SALW attack. Common characteristics of vulnerable areas include: previously used tracks and patrol routes; often used positions; linear features; Interior of buildings; canalised routes; long extended stretches of road; tactically important areas; high ground dominated areas; escape routes into and out; successive VPs nearby; and; exit or entry of areas of urban/rural interfaces


Slide 16

Force Protection Advice

**Technical EOD expert assistance WITH IED threats;
intended to mitigate the threat against personnel,
vehicles and friendly force locations**

FP advice may involve technical details on the level of PPE required or simple IED or wider explosive hazard threat awareness

FP advice can also extend to advice in relation to the provision of tactical advice in terms of the TTPs to be utilized by troops operating in an IED threat environment



A key input into the overall UN COP

FP advice is a broad area that involves the assistance of technical experts in EOD activities. For example, personnel FP advice may involve the provision of technical details on the level of personal protective required to reduce IED risks and explosive hazard threat awareness.

MILEOD can also provide technical advice on the level of armour protection required to mitigate IED blast threats, effects of Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFP), and Directionally Focused Fragmentation Charges (DFFC).

In terms of FP measures at UN locations, technical advice can be provided in terms of the level of overhead protection required to protect against indirect fires and the use of IEDs at entry points. MILEOD can assist in the layout of blast barriers to help counter Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) threats.

All MILEOD advice and assistance provides essential information and input into the overall UN COP.

Slide 17

Force Protection Advice

IED against UN Forces, SIDON, LEBONON 2011



Here is an example of an IED attack on UN forces in Lebanon in 2011.

Slide 18



We will continue to discuss MILEOD Force Protection (FP) advice support. Here is another example of an attack on a UN Patrol in Lebanon in 2007. Some specifics of the attack include:

- UN Alert Status Yellow
- A rocket attack occurred on an Israel location at the same time
- UN Patrol left their Post at 1720hrs and took a familiar road that was often used by the UN forces
- BMR APC provided e escort
- 2 X BMR APCs
- Ten personnel in BMR 1
- Eight personnel in BMR 2
- At 1750hrs, BMR 1 passes a Renault Rapid car parked near Khiam Village as BMR 2 passes the car detonates

Slide 19

EW Support Countering RCIED Threats

- Exploiting the electromagnetic spectrum
- Search, interception, identification of electromagnetic emissions
- Employment of electromagnetic energy to reduce / prevent hostile use of the spectrum
- CREW assets mitigate RCIED threats
- CREW assets use electronic: jamming, deception, neutralization

Electronic Warfare (EW) refers to military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing: the search for, interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions; the employment of electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum; and the actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.

EW support measures refer to that division of EW involving actions taken to search, intercept, and identify electromagnetic emissions to locate their sources for threat recognition. It also provides a source of information required for immediate decisions involving Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) and electronic protective measures.

EW support is an asset used in an environment where RCIEDs are a threat. ECM can be utilised to mitigate the risk posed by RCIEDs through its use of electromagnetic energy to prevent or reduce an IED aggressor's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. ECM utilised to mitigate the threat posed by RCIEDs is best referred to by the term CREW. There are three methods by which CREW assets can be utilised to mitigate the threat of RCIEDs:

- Electronic Jamming is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation or reflection of electromagnetic energy, with the object of impairing the effectiveness of hostile electronic devices, equipment, or systems
- Electronic deception is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, absorption or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to confuse, distract or seduce an enemy or his electronic systems

- Electronic neutralisation is the deliberate use of electromagnetic energy to either temporarily or permanently damage enemy devices which rely exclusively on the electromagnetic spectrum

Slide 20

Force Protection Using CREW Assets

- CREW assets used as an all arms IED TM asset on vehicles or personnel moving through an area with an assessed RCIED threat
- Use of CREW assets require additional planning
- Considerations for commanders using CREW assets is covered in UN EOD Military Manual

Best practice - expert advice be sought when planning movements requiring CREW assets

CREW assets can be used as an all arms IED threat mitigation asset on vehicles or on personnel that are required to move in an area with an assessed RCIED threat. When CREW assets with vehicles move, additional planning considerations are required. It is the best practice that expert advice is sought when planning moves requiring CREW assets.

Slide 21

Considerations Deploying CREW Assets

- Suite of systems to mitigate the assessed risks
- Virtual 'envelope' surrounding personnel
- Planning ranges, movement configurations
- CREW expertise with each deployment of the system
- Units deployed with multiple CREW systems
- Given to CREW assets, both mounted and dismounted
- De-conflict systems
- Adequate budgets to procure / life cycle management

This slide describes some of the key planning considerations that leaders should use when deploying CREW assets. CREW: Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device) Electronic Warfare, also known as Remote Control.

CREW asset deployment typically involves the employment of a suite of systems appropriately chosen to mitigate the risk posed by RCIED threats. CREW provides a degree of assured protection against RCIEDs in a virtual 'envelope' surrounding the personnel and equipment. There are many complex and competing factors that determine the effectiveness of this protective envelope.

The use of CREW assets is done in line with UN mission guidance. An accurate RCIED threat picture should be determined and the required fill developed for the technology type to be deployed.

Considerations should be given to the deployment of CREW expertise with each deployment. As specialist EOD use of CREW assets often involves personnel deliberately going into areas with an assessed RCIED threat, the highest levels of assured protection from their CREW assets is required and may consist of multiple systems to provide redundancy to allow specialist techniques to be applied.

For this reason, considerations should be given to the deployment of appropriately qualified CREW operators. If units are deployed with multiple CREW systems, special consideration should be given to ensure all CREW assets, both mounted and dismounted, are de-conflicted with each other and UN / HN communication systems.

The provision of adequate budgets to ensure a sufficient number of the appropriate type of CREW assets are procured and a complete life cycle management programmed financed to sustain the capability is essential.

Similarly, as part of the total life cycle budget, the level of expert technical support needs to be included in the planning. The level and number of dedicated technical experts required will be dependent on the type of CREW asset. The consequences of not financing this capability initially and long term can be extremely detrimental. Other considerations in deploying CREW include:

- Vehicles not tactically dispersed are exposed to the effects of one non-RCIED
- Not upgrading the hardware, firmware and software as the threat evolves can lead to troops being exposed to RCIED threat they believe they have protection against
- The deployment of inappropriately trained and experienced personnel charged with the responsibility of deployment, use and maintenance of these assets resulting in its ineffectiveness in mitigating the RCIED threat
- When CREW assets are resourced and financed appropriately, commanders must be aware that it is likely since the RCIED threat has been successfully mitigated, the IED threat aggressor is likely to change their tactics. It can then appear that the significant financial and other resource investment in CREW assets was wasteful

Slide 22

Specialised EOD use of CREW Assets

- Use of ECM by either search or IEDD personnel
- Environment assessed to have RCIED threats
- Separate planning considerations required
- Man-pack vs vehicle mounted systems
- Expert advice to commanders

Specialised EOD use of CREW assets refers typically to the use of ECM by either search or IEDD personnel operating in an environment that is assessed to have a potential RCIED threat.

Typically, such CREW sets will be man-portable and are referred to as man-packs; however, it is also common for such personnel to deploy in CREW fitted vehicles to mitigate such threats while in transit or when stationary in the area that they establish their Incident Control Point (ICP).

Separate planning considerations are required in the deployment and use of man-pack compared to vehicle-mounted CREW systems. Expert advice must be sought by commanders when they deploy such assets.

Slide 23

Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI)

- WTI - intelligence derived from processes , capabilities that collect, exploit, analyse *asymmetric threat weapons systems* support FP and targeting of threat networks
- Explosive Site Investigation (ESI) provides trained personnel to deploy in WTI roles
- WIT is closely related to WTI & ESI smaller units to undertake WTI & ESI in support of wider EOD efforts in an AO
- WTI is within IED TM that benefits all LOO. MILEOD provides technical information for device profiling and tactical information for event signature analysis
- Planning during force generation phase for IED must consider such capabilities and establish how IED components and related evidence is recovered to support judicial prosecution



WTI is defined as intelligence derived from the capabilities and processes that collect exploit and analyse the threat weapons systems to enable material sourcing, support to prosecution, FP and targeting of threat networks. It should be noted that WTI refers directly to asymmetric threat weapon systems.

Another term that provides a similar capability is Explosive Site Investigation (ESI). A TCC with ESI trained personnel may be suitable to deploy in WTI roles. Also, a term closely associated with WTI and ESI is the Weapons Intelligence Team (WIT), which refers to a small unit construct that deploys and undertakes WTI and ESI.

WTI is an activity within IED threat mitigation that benefits all LOO. Concerning EOD, it provides technical information to enable IED device profiling and event signature analysis.

Planning during the force generation phase for an IED affected UN mission must consider where such capabilities will be located and how IED component evidence is handled over for judicial prosecution.

Such capabilities can reside within IEDD teams, within Military Police or as a standalone dedicated WTI team. The decision depends on the IED activity level in the mission and the ability of those tasked to undertake WTI.

Slide 24

MILEOD Host Nation (HN) Support

- Under mandate / SOFA
- May involve support to UNCT, local government, international agencies, NGOs
- Facilitate partner activities; contribute to stabilization / security
- Coordinated with UNCT agency to ensure compliance and unity of effort
- Requires input, advice of EOD focal point
- Capacity building and training tasks done under authority / direction of HoM/SRSG
- May include building local humanitarian or HNSF EOD capabilities; involves significant planning, resourcing, coordination



MILEOD can if permitted, under the mission mandate, undertake HN support activities. This can involve support to the UN Country Team (UNCT), local government, the federal government, international aid agencies, and NGOs.

Examples of how MILEOD may undertake HN support include the provision of training, EOD capacity building, removal of ERW from sites, and Ammunition Security Management (ASM) initiatives. ASM often referred to as Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) and Physical Stockpile Security Management (PSSM).

Such activities should be appropriately coordinated with the UNCT to ensure unity of efforts and compliance with the mandate. ASM initiatives often are associated with Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives. Consideration of such HNSF activities requires the input and advice of the EOD focal point.

Capacity building and training tasks are done under the authority and direction of the UN Head of Mission / Special Representative of the Secretary-General. At times a Mission may have a mandate to build local humanitarian or HNSF EOD capabilities.

This is very much a training role, and the UN personnel tasked to undertake this should be appropriately trained, resourced and supervised. Unless tasked explicitly by the mission to do so, no TCC should engage in EOD training or mentoring.

When mandated and tasked to assist in the development of HN EOD capabilities, UN planners should examine what the current HN EOD capability is and how best to task a TCC EOD capability.

Joint ventures encourage greater local empathy with the UN Mission and assist in building security and fostering HN capacities. Also, the use of trusted HN security personnel to act as interpreters during EOD operations can be beneficial.

When a MILEOD conducts capacity building and training activities for residents or HN security personnel, it is essential to keep in mind that the demining or other EOD skills taught should be appropriate to local needs, and eventually self-sustainable.



Respect for the local culture and a partnering attitude will reap great rewards. Capacity building works to stabilise the AO. For example, local nationals can be trained in skills to recover land contaminated with ERW or mines.

Capacity building and training require MILEOD commanders and staffs to conduct liaison, coordination, and integration with civilian elements. The FHQ, Sector HQ, Battalion and Company UN-CIMIC Officers (U9/G9/S9) should be seen as the priority Military Staff to exchange information and analysis with civilian elements. However, UN-CIMIC Staff should establish links between Military subject matter technical experts (Staff Officers) and Civilian subject matter technical experts (e.g. UNMAS), when and where appropriate. UN-CIMIC supports the UN mission as a whole and, as a military staff function, the UN military components with their primary role of providing a secure and stable environment, within which humanitarian/development actors may carry out their activities

Slide 25

Local Population Engagement

- IED use loss of FoM and security vacuum
- Aggressors have freedom and control to operate
- Locals now less likely to cooperate
- Leads to non/semi-permissive environments
- MILEOD involve wider CIMIC and local population engagement to legitimise UN mission
- Similarly, culturally sensitive KLE a means for IED related information to be passed
- Initiatives that MILEOD can support local population engagement include MRE programmes and EID / explosive hazard education

The use of IEDs by aggressors typically results in initial and sometimes long-term loss of FoM in mission areas. The IED threat environment often creates a security vacuum in which aggressors have the freedom and control to operate where they can project their influence.

This lack of legitimate security for the local population results in a population that is less likely to cooperate or be seen to cooperate with UN or HN forces for fear of attack from the aggressors.

This leads to a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment. EOD activities are most effective when conducted with local support. Through EOD activities, FoM can improve and thus help secure civilians. MILEOD must involve CIMIC in population engagement programs that help legitimise the UN mission and its mandate. Any real or perceived affiliation with the military or other SCR mandated actors, could lead to a higher security risk to the civilian population and humanitarian/ development actors, possibly leading to the civilian population and humanitarian/ development actors being directly targeted by groups or organisations that are ideologically opposed to the Host Nation. Furthermore, such attacks could lead to loss of life of the civilian population/ humanitarians and to a suspension of humanitarian or development programmes which would aggravate the overall security situation in the affected AoR.

This is a broader mission issue beyond those involved in EOD activities; however, its importance as a UN Force with local support is more likely to gain information that they

can use to find IEDs. UN-CIMIC is a military staff function that contributes to facilitating the interface between the military, and civilian components of Security Council mandated missions, also encompassing the humanitarian and development actors in the mission area.

They can also provide information in relation to those who use IEDs which supports broader LOO in mitigating the IED threat in a mission area. The UN Force and MILEOD must facilitate such local population engagement and help secure the means for the local population to pass on information in closest possible cooperation, collaboration, and coordination with UN-CIMIC Staff.

For example, local patrols should know how to enquire about such information and react appropriately and know how to handle it when they are made aware. Similarly, appropriate and culturally sensitive is essential. Key Leader Engagement (KLE), facilitated by UN-CIMIC and other mission components like Civil Affairs, can be another means for such information to be passed. Initiatives that MILEOD can undertake that may support the local population may include mine risk education programmes and a more comprehensive explosive hazard threat education program with IED awareness in close coordination with UN CIMIC and UNMAS.

While all elements of a mission have a mandated responsibility to protect civilians in the local population, the MILEOD has distinctive capabilities that mitigate IEDs and help provide physical security for the local population.

Slide 26

Lesson 1.4 Take Away

Modern comprehensive approach to EOD operations involve CMD & IEDD activities in conjunction with FP, Search, EDD & CREW assets / elements

CMD = Disposal of Conventional Items of EO
ERW = UXO + AXO
ERW often does not include mines

EOD = CMD + IEDD CMD ≠ IEDD
 EOD capabilities = KSA & Competencies Personnel + Equipment & Spt Available
 IEDD Capabilities determined by threat and IEDD tasks

Support to Mission Partners:

- Mobility planning advice
- Force protection advice
- Electronic warfare support in countering RCIED threats – CREW assets
- Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI)
- Host nation support & local population engagement

25

Summary

Let us review the key elements of this lesson:

- Comprehensive approach involves CMD and IEDD
- ERW equals UXO and AXO
- Capabilities are the mix of KSA, trained personnel, and right equipment
- Support to the Mission is FP, FoM, planning, advice, CREW, WTI, and HN engagement

Reference Slide

Abbreviations		
• AO: Area of Operation	• HN: Host Nation	• RCIED: Remote Controlled Improvised Device
• ASM: Ammunition Security Management	• HNSF: Host Nation Security Force	• SALW: Small Arms and Light weapons
• AXO: Abandoned Explosive Ordnance	• HoM: Head of Mission	• SRSG: /Special Representative of the Secretary General
• CIMIC: Civil-Military Cooperation	• ICP: Incident Control Point	• SSR: Security Sector Reform
• CMD: Conventional Munitions Disposal	• IED: Improvised Explosive Device	• TCC: Troop Contributing Country
• CREW: Counter RCIED Electronic Warfare	• IEDD: Improvised Explosive Device Disposal	• TTPs: Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
• DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation	• IED TM: IED Threat Mitigation	• UN COP: UN Common Operating Picture
• DFFC: Directional Focused Fragmentation Charge	• IMAS: International Mine Action Standards	• UNIBAM: United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual
• DPKO: Department of Peace-keeping Office	• KLE: Key Leader Engagement	• UNCT: United Nations Country Team
• ECM: Electronic Counter Measures	• LOO: Lines of Operation	• UNMAS: United Nations Mine Action Service
• EDD: Explosive Detection Dog	• MA: Mine Action	• UXO: Unexploded Ordnance
• EFP: Explosively Formed Projectile	• MEODU: Military EOD Units	• VA: Vulnerable Area
• EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal	• Mil Eng: Military Engineer	• VBIED: Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
• ERW: Explosive Remnants of War	• MILORD: Military Ordnance	• VP: Vulnerable Point
• ESI: Explosive Site Investigation	• MP: Military Police	• WAM: Weapons and Ammunition Management
• EW: Electronic Warfare	• NGOs: Non-Governmental Organization	• WIT: Weapons Intelligence Team
• FoM: Freedom of Movement	• PPE: Personal Protective Equipment	• WTI: Weapons Technical Intelligence
• FP: Force Protection	• PSSM: Physical Stockpile Security Management	

Learning Activity

1.4

RESOURCES

N/A

TIME

3-5 minutes

PREPARATION

Ask the participants to answer the following questions.

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Reinforce the learning outcomes and assess the knowledge of the group and individuals.

Questions:

1. True or False; IEDD is not a specialist skill requiring specific training and equipment?

Answer: False

2. Can EOD units undertake HN support activities which can involve support to the UN Country Team (UNCT), local government, federal government international aid agencies and NGOs to facilitate these partner activities and contribute to HN stabilisation and security?

Answer: If permitted under the mission mandate and or SOFA.

Lesson 1.5



Organisational Principles and Generic Structures

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Slide 1



Lesson 1.5 MILEOD
Organisation
Principles and
Generic Structures

Slide 2

Lesson 1.5 Content

- Organising Principles
- Generic structure
- MILEOD requirements
- External support requirements
- Personnel requirements
- MILEOD equipment

2

Here is the content of this lesson.

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes Lesson 1.5

- Explain the conceptual framework for organizing a MILEOD using the principles discussed in this lesson
- List the basic generic elements of a MILEOD structure and explain the responsibilities of each element

3

As a training practice, let us review the learning outcomes of this lesson. At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on the slide. Take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This will help you to focus on the most relevant aspects of the lesson.

Slide 4

Organizing Principles

- Flexible and adaptable
- Interoperable
- Sustainable
- Deployable

We all agree on the importance of an efficient and effective organisational structure. Before we discuss the principles of a MILEOD organisation, we should understand the threats. Threats can be dynamic and changing; therefore, an analysis of the threats that include both a predictive analysis and pattern analysis is essential.

Aggressors using IEDs typically modify and develop their own TTPs to avoid countermeasures. On-going conflicts typically see the introduction of new or modified conventional munitions. This is particularly the case within an AO in which there is an on-going IED threat.

As a good practice, we will use these principles to help drive the organising process:

- Flexible and adaptable
- Interoperable
- Sustainable
- Deployable

Slide 5

Flexible and Adaptable

- **Rapidly align and refocus to meet diverse missions require**
- **Disciplined**
- **Trained**

An organisation that is flexible and adaptable has the tools to succeed. The ability to rapidly align; refocus to meet diverse mission requirements; well-led, disciplined, trained and competent throughout the spectrum of EOD operations are all attributes of a MILEOD that will contribute to the mandate. A wide variety of operational EOD tasks and skills are required to enable a unit to be flexible and adaptable. Here are a few areas that facilitate MILEOD flexibility:

- Mental and operational flexibility
- Conduct simultaneous operations in response to varying threat levels
- Give priorities and resources to operations and missions
- Rapidly adjust to new demands
- Disciplined and well trained

Slide 6

Interoperable


Capable of operating with others

- Forces
- Actors
- Agents
- Host Nation

Interoperable is the development of a joint and combined approach that adopts a multifunctional ethos to effectively engage with other participants in multinational and interagency EOD operations. MILEOD should be capable of operating in support of other forces, partners, and actors. A common infrastructure, materiel, equipment, training, C2 structures will help to facilitate interoperability.

Interoperability is required of EOD personnel. Harmonisation between TCC TTPs is necessary. Interoperability is also required with non-military actors in the mission areas, e.g. CIVPOL cordon and security personnel.

Slide 7



Sustainable is the provision, replacement and rotation of EOD personnel and materiel with the necessary means and facilities to complete all operational demands. The rotation of personnel and materiel must be planned in the force generation phase.

Assessment of the likely duration of the requirement for the provision of EOD capabilities in a UNPKO is required early-on in the force generation phase so that the rotation of personnel and materiel can be planned for and resourced.

Slide 8



Deployment considerations and criteria are a multifaceted concept developed through appropriate decisions on and investment in the following:

- Doctrine
- Organisation
- Training
- Materiel
- Leadership
- Personnel
- Facilities
- Interoperability

The deployability of MILEOD is essential to the success of the Mission. The readiness and rapid response of a MILEOD will facilitate EOD operations.

Slide 9

MILEOD Structure Variables

- CMD Functions
- IEDD functions
- Mission support activities

MILEOD must always be scalable in size and modular in function. The structure of a MILEOD will depend on the tasks, threat, AO, and support requirements. MILEOD may be required to perform the following roles in UN PKO mission:

- CMD functions
- IEDD functions
- Mission support activities


Slide 10

MILEOD Generic Structure

- EOD HQ Elements, Unit Commanders
- CMD Element
- IEDD Element
- EOD Support Cell


This slide displays a generic MILEOD structure containing an HQ element with CMD, IEDD and EOD support cell components.

Slide 11



This slide shows a diagram of the same and included are the subordinate teams and detachments within each element.

Slide 12



The MILEOD commander is responsible for the subordinate elements operating effectively and efficiently in an integrated manner. They are responsible for command, control, and communication. Also, the commander must coordinate with the Force HQS, Engineer advisor and Force Protection interlocutors. There are several options for structuring the MILEOD HQ.

Slide 13

CMD Element

- Capable of any EOD operations on conventional weapon ammunitions
- C2 element
- Ammunition focal point
- CMD teams

A CMD element can conduct operations that are associated with the ammunition used as a conventional weapon. A CMD element should have the following components:

- C2 element to include an experienced CMD operator
- Ammunition focal point
- CMD teams, to include
- Qualified CMD operators and drivers

Slide 14

IEDD Element Capabilities

- Location
- Identification
- Rendering safe
- Final disposal of IEDs

An IEDD element is capable of location, identification, rendering safe and final disposal of IEDs. An IEDD element should have the following components:

- C2 element that includes an experienced IEDD operator, leader, and an administrative support staff
- IEDD teams include at a minimum a qualified IEDD operator as team leader, and an IEDD assistant and driver
- IEDD team composition may vary following TCC national standards and UN DPKO Force Requirements

Slide 15

EOD Support Cell

- Provides maintenance technicians
- Technical maintenance section
- CREW (Counter Radio Electronic Warfare)

The slide describes the MILEOD Support Cell. It can also include a CMIC LNO. The support cell provides suitably qualified technicians responsible for all technical support required in terms of maintenance, repair, sustainment and upgrade of EOD hardware, firmware, and software equipment to sustain EOD capabilities.

Slide 16

Lesson 1.5 Take Away

- The organization of a MILEOD is based on the analysis of requirements , mission, AOR, tasks, and threats /hazards
- There are 4 principles to be considered when organizing and structuring a MILEOD: flexible, adaptable, interoperable, sustainable, and deployable
- There are 4 base elements that make up the generic structure of a MILEOD: HQ, CMD, IEDD , support

16

Summary

Students should retain the following key areas from this lesson. Let us review these topics:

- The organization of a MILEOD is based on the analysis of requirements, mission, AO, tasks, and threats / hazards
- There are 4 principles to be considered when organizing and structuring a MILEOD: flexible, adaptable, interoperable, sustainable, and deployable
- There are 4 base elements that make up the generic structure of a MILEOD: HQ, CMD, IEDD, and support

Learning Activity**1.5****RESOURCES**

N/A

TIME

3-5 minutes

PREPARATION

Ask the participants to answer the following questions.

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Reinforce the learning outcomes and assess the knowledge of the group and individuals.

Questions:

1. What are the five principles to be considered when organising and structuring a MILEOD?

Answer: flexible, adaptable, interoperable, sustainable, and deployable.

2. What four elements make up the MILEOD generic structure?

Answer: EOD HQ Elements, Unit Commanders, CMD Element, IEDD Element, EOD Support Cell.

Module 1



Conceptual Framework

After Module 1, a few concluding points are worth noting:

- A range of policies, manuals, guidelines, philosophy and principles have been developed over time to create an understanding of military units operating in UN peacekeeping missions
- Nevertheless, the implementation and execution of MILEOD in the mission is never straightforward, and the leadership, staff and troops need a general understanding and an open, flexible attitude within the United Nations' MILEOD conceptual framework in the employment of MILEOD
- The capabilities of a MILEOD can be leveraged to help execute the mandate. EOD personnel must establish a working framework based on this conceptual framework that will facilitate coordination, planning, and open dialogue with mission leadership and other interlocutors

Module 2



Legal Framework

Module 2 at a Glance

Aim

This module conveys to the key aspects of the legal framework governing their work.

Relevance

Module 2 empowers military operators to approach their task with confidence by providing them an understanding of the legal authority and underpinning their work, while also setting limits.




Learning Objectives for the Module

- Describe the key components of international law governing the UN's mandated tasks in peacekeeping
- Understand the relevance of the core legal concepts and norms
- Understand what the specific mission legal framework enables/obliges peacekeepers
- Identify and appropriately respond to violations of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law that you may observe
- Follow key policies of the Secretary-General and the Department of Peace Operations that are binding on all UN mission personnel

Overview

Lesson 2-1 provides an overview of fields of general international law, the UN Charter, international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. Lesson 2-2 reflects on aspects of the mission-specific legal framework that are relevant for the military component, including Security Council mandates, SOFA/SOMAs and the related issue of privileges and immunities, norms on discipline and accountability, binding norms in peacekeeping policies, and mission rules of engagement.

Symbols Legend Reminder

	Interactive presentation or small exercises to engage the participants
	Suggested film segment to illustrate the content
	Note to the instructor to highlight particular aspects of the materials or point towards additional materials

Lesson 2.1



International Legal Framework

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Overview

This module begins with an overview of how international law impacts the work of peacekeepers regarding their mandated tasks.

The term 'International Law' commonly refers to a body of law that governs the legal relations between or among States and international organizations. These training materials look at international law as a combination of binding law ("hard law") and non-binding law ("soft law"). Binding law refers to rules that are legally binding and that States must therefore apply, such as treaty law (i.e. conventions, agreements, and protocols), as well as customary law. Treaties ultimately become binding through a process of negotiation, adoption, and signature, followed by ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

The components of international law most relevant for the work of peacekeepers are International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law, and International Refugee Law. We end the lesson with the introduction of the United Nations Charter.

International Law

Slide 1



Let us now look at the first lesson of the legal framework.


Slide 2

Learning Objectives

- Apply rules of international law that establish the legal framework for peace operations
- Identify and describe violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law that UNMOs may encounter

Here are the learning objectives for lesson 2.1.


Slide 3



At the top of the hierarchy of norms depicted in this slide¹ are the UN Charter (the “UN’s constitution”) and fundamental norms of general international law. Even the Security Council must respect these norms (and does so in its practice). For instance, a peacekeeping mission could not be mandated to attack civilians or push back refugees to places where their life is at risk since this would entail breaches of fundamental norms of international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law.

In module 2.1, we are discussing the top two layers of the hierarchy of norms. The remaining sources of law in this graphic will be discussed in Module 2.2.

Slide 4



The Charter of the UN is the founding document of the Organization and the basis of all the Organization's work. The UN was established to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", and it, therefore, prohibits force between states, except in self-defence or with Security Council approval.

While the UN Charter does not make explicit reference to peace operations, it is undisputed that the UN Security Council may establish peacekeeping and special political missions. All UN peace operations are deployed based on:

- Chapter VI (deals with pacific settlement of disputes), or
- Chapter VII (binding measures to respond to breaches of the peace)

Special political missions or observer missions are generally deployed under Chapter VI. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions, which are often deployed after non-international armed conflict, usually have a mandate that invokes Chapter VII. This is done notably to clarify that they may use force to protect civilians, regardless of whether civilians are threatened by armed groups or (rogue) state forces.

In addition to ensuring peace and security and promoting development, the UN Charter also commits the UN to promote and encourage respect for human rights. For this reason, all peace mission personnel must respect human rights. The Policy on Human Rights in Peace Operations also requires all missions to advance human rights through the implementation of their mandate, even if they do not have an explicit human rights mandate or human rights component.

Slide 5



International Human Rights Law (IHRL)

- Dignity, freedom and equality
- Obligations of states
- Also covers non-state armed groups
- During war or other national emergencies
- UNMOs -ensure human rights- promoted, respected, protected, advanced " (UNMO Guidelines)





Ask participants who are entitled to human rights, and whose responsibility it is to protect them? Answers should include that every human being enjoys human rights and that state authorities are primarily responsible for upholding them.

Human rights are universal. Everyone is entitled to the same fundamental rights. There are some groups, who may have specific needs or are particularly at risk of discrimination and rights violations. These have been given specific rights protections (e.g. children, women, indigenous people, persons with disabilities).

IHRL always applies, including during armed conflict and other national emergencies (because that is when human rights are most under threat). Examples of human rights especially relevant to peacekeeping include the right to life, right not to be tortured, right not to be discriminated against, rights to food, water, health and education.

First and foremost, states must respect human rights and protect their population from threats by private actors (e.g. by diligently arresting and prosecuting perpetrators of rape). It is widely accepted today that armed groups with effective control over territory also have human rights obligations. In any case, UN practice considers that armed groups that commit atrocities such as summarily executing, raping, torturing or looting engage in human rights abuses.

UN policy also accepts that UN missions and personnel must respect human rights in their work. Example: The UN would not be allowed to discriminate based on religion in its hiring practices or use excessive force in violation of the right to life.

 ***UN Photo shows the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, where member states join to advance and protect human rights.***

Slide 6

International Humanitarian law (IHL)

- Applies to parties to armed conflict
- Military peacekeepers engaged as combatants
- Regulates conduct of hostilities
- Restricts means of warfare
- Protects those not engaged in hostilities, includes peacekeepers
- All ensure respect IHL




Parties must respect International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to armed conflict. States forces fighting each other in an international armed conflict must respect it. In a non-international armed conflict, the state military forces, and the non-state armed groups involved must abide by IHL.

Since impartiality is a central principle of peacekeeping, UN military forces are generally not a party to the conflict. However, IHL may apply temporarily to them for as long as they engage as combatants in armed conflict. Example: a peacekeeping force carries out an offensive operation against an armed group that poses a grave threat to civilians.

IHL regulates the conduct of hostilities. Example: Requiring parties to minimise as far as possible the harm to civilians not participating in the hostilities. It also out-laws specific means of war to reduce unnecessary suffering by civilians or combatants—for example prohibition of the use of any chemical or poisonous weapons in warfare.

All parties must respect IHL. Under its obligation to ensure respect for IHL, a state has to prosecute and punish non-state armed group members who commit serious violations of IHL amounting to war crimes.

 **Illustration shows the emblem of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which initiated the development of humanitarian law in the 19th century. The ICRC remains the neutral guardian of IHL in conflict areas across the world.**

Slide 7

International Criminal Law

- **War crimes**
Grave breaches -Geneva Conventions / serious IHL violations
- **Crimes against humanity**
Inhumane acts
- **Genocide:**
Intent to destroy national, ethnic, racial, religious groups
- **State duty to prosecute**
- **International tribunals**
(e.g. International Criminal Court)



Some violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are considered so grave by the international community of states that they are regarded as international crimes, namely war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

All states have to prosecute and punish such crimes if committed within their territory. Furthermore, the international community may set up international tribunals and courts to prosecute and punish international crimes. Example: In response to international crimes, the Security Council set up the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). States also established the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC has jurisdiction to pursue international crimes committed in states that have accepted its jurisdiction (more than 120 countries so far) and in places that were referred to the ICC by the Security Council (examples: Darfur and Libya).


There are three major categories of international crimes that you should know:

War crimes: Violations of fundamental rules found in the Geneva Conventions or other sources of IHL also entail war crimes on the part of the individuals who commit such crimes. As the name suggests, war crimes can only be committed in armed conflict.

Crimes against humanity: Where state authorities or armed groups commit inhumane acts such as murder, rape, torture in a systematic or widespread manner, this may entail crimes against humanity. Such crimes typically involve an underlying policy to commit crimes with an elaborated degree of planning at high levels.

Genocide: Under the 1948 Genocide Convention, killing or in similar ways targeting members of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group may amount to genocide. The perpetrators must act with the "*intent, to destroy, in whole or in part, the group, as*

such." It is not enough to kill some people because of their religion or race. There must be an intent to annihilate the entire group globally or in a specific area. The historical example that gave rise to the notion of genocide is the Holocaust, in which Nazi Germany tried to annihilate the entire Jewish population of Europe.

 ***The UN Photo shows the entrance to the International Criminal Court in The Hague, which has prosecuted international crimes committed in mission settings.***

Slide 8:

Sources of International Law	
International Human Rights Law <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN Charter • Human rights treaties • Universal Declaration of HRL 	International Humanitarian Law
	<u>International armed conflict:</u>
	Geneva Conventions Protocol I
	<u>Non-international armed conflict:</u>
International Criminal Law <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Int. criminal court • Customary Int. law 	Art. 3 Geneva Conventions Protocol II

The content of international humanitarian, human rights and criminal law is defined by international treaties that states signed and ratified. Many of the norms are practised and accepted by states that they have become customary law that binds all states.

Apart from explicit mentioning human rights in the United Nations Charter, states have adopted nine major human rights treaties. They cover civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and protect specific groups such as women, children, or persons with disabilities. Every state in the world has accepted several of these treaties. All states have also expressed their support for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was first adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. Most if not at all the rights in the Universal Declaration can be considered customary law.

International humanitarian law can be found notably the four Geneva Conventions and its two Protocols. Serving in our larger, multidimensional peacekeeping missions the norms applying in non-international armed conflict (NIAC) is most relevant: The most basic protection in NIAC is laid down in Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Further details are set out in Geneva Protocol II. Fundamental rules of international humanitarian law have also become international customary law.

International criminal law emerged from the practice of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals that prosecuted major crimes committed during World War II. The principles of international criminal law they developed have become customary law. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has summarised that law in one treaty.

Slide 9

Learning Activity: Identifying violations

- Several local sources provide information in a zone with armed group activity.
- Based on the information provided identify possible violations of:
 - International human rights law,
 - International humanitarian law,
 - International criminal law and/or
 - International refugee law?



You must be able to identify typical violations of international human rights law or humanitarian law when they observe them.

This learning activity provides cases that are based on recurrent realities in the field. Depending on the time available, the activity can be conducted in a plenary discussion only. Alternatively, participants can first discuss each case in small groups before a debriefing in plenary reveals the correct answer.

Participants should assume that they are on patrol in a conflict zone with armed group activity and are meeting with local persons. Based on the information they receive; they should consider which violations may have occurred. They should also be invited to indicate what course of action they would take in the light of the information received.



Please only reveal the correct responses in the pink text boxes on the next slides once participants had a chance to provide their response.

Slide 10

Case 1 – Cattle herding boy:

“A militia came to steal our cows. We had to flee into the swamps. They were shooting at everyone. We survived on wild plants & swamp water”



We must be able to identify typical violations of international human rights law or humanitarian law when they observe them. There will be a series of learning activities to assist our understanding of the legal framework. These learning activities provide cases that are based on recurrent realities in the field. Depending on the time we have available and the amount of discussion, we will modify the lesson timing as appropriate.

You should try to visualise that you are on patrol in a mission AO with armed group activity and are interacting with the local population. In the cases try to consider which violations may have occurred and what course of action you would take in the light of the information received.



Break the participant into groups in the plenary room. The participants can first discuss each case and then debrief plenary with the instructor facilitating the discussion using the following:


Violations to consider

Intentional attack; against civilians; Indiscriminate attack; Human rights to life; Pillaging; Arbitrary displacement; Right to housing and freedom of movement; Human rights to food, water and health

Here are additional detailed facilitator notes that can be used by the instructor. The information provided by the boy points to the following violations:

- *If the militia shot at civilians this is an intentional attack directed against civilians, amounting to a war crime, IHL violation and violation of the right to life. If the attackers shot randomly at both enemy fighters and civilians, this would be an indiscriminate attack (a war crime that also violates IHL and human rights)*
- *The villagers are victims of arbitrary displacement – if systematic or widespread, this can be a crime against humanity. Being forced to flee from their homes also violates their right to housing and their freedom of movement (which includes the right not to move)*
- *The theft of the cattle entails the war crime and IHL violations of pillaging. This places at risk the villagers' human rights to food and livelihoods. Because they must survive in the swamps, their right to clean water and health are also seriously under threats. In practice, the denial of clean water and healthcare might even kill more civilians than the initial attack itself*

According to mission SOPs, you should share information, with the chain of command, human rights component and protection of civilians coordination structure. Humanitarians can provide support in follow-ups. You record names and contact details of the witness and victims for follow-ups; however, all measures must be taken to treat info confidentially. Sensitivity needs to be taken when sharing victims and or witnesses that maybe be in harm. Sensitivity in these matters should always be considered, as widely shared info in the mission may leak.

 **UN Photo shows a boy in South Sudan, where civilians have often fled to vast swamp wetlands to protect themselves from violations by parties to armed conflict.**

Slide 11:

IHL: Conduct of Hostilities

- **Distinction** between civilians & combatants
- **Precaution** - minimize risks for civilians
- **Proportionality** - limit incidental harm to civilians




In their conduct of hostilities, parties to a conflict must abide by basic principles to minimise harm to civilians and civilian objects such as homes, hospitals, places of worship, etc. The protection of civilians in the conduct of hostilities builds on three basic principles.

The basic principles of IHL are the following:

- Distinction: In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, parties to the conflict always must distinguish between the civilians and combatants, and between civilian and military objects. Operations must only be directed against military objects. Indiscriminate attacks that do not distinguish between civilians and combatants are prohibited. Example of violation: Shelling an entire village with heavy artillery without trying to distinguish between military targets and civilian homes
- Precaution: In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimise, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. Examples of violations:
 - Before launching an assault, no effort is made to verify that the target is a military target
 - Soldiers take their position too close to civilians, placing them at risk of getting in the crossfire

- Proportionality: Loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive concerning the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. This means that when considering a target, the damage to civilians and their property cannot be excessive concerning the military advantage gained. Proportionality is not an issue if the target is purely military and no civilians are nearby. Example of violation: Bombing a private home housing dozens of civilians to kill one ordinary soldier who took shelter there

 ***Civilians often bear the brunt of conflict. The UN Photos show civilian homes that were burnt down during armed conflict and an elderly civilian injured.***

Slide 12:

Case 2 – local journalist:

“The HN army prohibits humanitarians to give aid to villagers from a particular ethnic group. They claim that some food will be diverted to rebel fighters. Malnutrition increased drastically, but we are not allowed to report it publicly.”



Here is another learning activity. Take some time to read over the slide, and we will discuss.



Working in syndicate groups have participants review the slide and then discuss. Then have syndicate groups report back brief the plenary. Here are a few areas to assist in facilitating the discussions.

Key areas:

- Rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need
- The human right to food, including freedom from hunger
- No discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity
- War crime of intentional starvation of civilians
- Human rights to freedom of expression, media and information

The information provided by the journalist does lead to the following violations:

- IHL requires parties to conflict to facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need. They may take reasonable measures to monitor the distribution and prevent diversion to enemy combatants. However, they must not deny food aid altogether to a group of civilians

- *The human right to food requires the state to ensure that its population is free from hunger. If it cannot provide enough food for its own population, it must call for humanitarian assistance and allow such assistance to be delivered*
- *The violations are aggravated by the fact that food aid is denied by discriminating against an entire ethnic group and placing it under collective suspicion of supporting the rebels*
- *If the intention is to starve civilians from that ethnic group, this would amount to a war crime and, if systematic or widespread, a crime against humanity*
- *Denying journalists from reporting about the situation delivery violates the journalists' right to freedom of expression and media. It also denies the general population freedom of information. This also since the censorship serves no legitimate purpose but seeks to cover up other human rights violations*


You must duly report this information up their chain of command and ensure that it is shared with human rights and humanitarian coordination components. An entire civilian population is at serious risk if the discriminatory denial of food aid can persist. The mission would probably advocate with the government to lift restrictions on reporting donors about urgent humanitarian needs.

 **UN Photo shows aid distribution after Cyclone Nargis. Initially, one affected country denied humanitarian organisations access to people in need, which the UN condemned.**

Slide 13

Case 3- Captured rebel fighter

“The army used heavy artillery to shell our military field hospital. Many of my wounded comrades were killed. Those who survived were captured and were not given any medical care by the army.”



Here is another learning activity. Take some time to read over the slide, and we will discuss.



Working in syndicate groups have participants review the slide and then discuss. Then have syndicate groups report back brief the plenary. Here are a few areas to assist in facilitating the discussions.

Key areas and violations to consider:

- An attack directed against hospital/place to care for wounded and sick
- An attack directed against a protected person or a wounded combat
- Duty to collect and care for the wounded and sick
- Human rights to life, health and physical integrity

Facilitation notes: more precisely and in detail; the following can be used to add to the discussion:

- IHL humanitarian law prohibits attacking hospitals and other places that take care of wounded or sick persons. This applies, even if the hospital in question treats only enemy combatants and no civilians. Directing an attack against enemies who are wounded or can for other reasons no longer fight (persons *hors combat*) is prohibited. The shelling of the enemy's hospital may, therefore, entail

a war crime. In contrast, it would have been allowed to take control of the hospital and arrest all the wounded fighters kept there.

- The failure to provide medical care to those captured violates IHL. Common Article 3 Geneva Conventions that applies to the non-international armed conflict requires parties to the conflict to collect and medically care for all wounded and sick, including enemy combatants.
- Along with the violations of IHL, the army would have also violated the human rights to life and health of the wounded fighters. Human rights pertain not only to civilians but also to soldiers and other combatants.

You should report the information received to their chain of command and the human rights component. The mission would also inform the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which regularly conducts visits to interned non-state fighters. You should also advocate on the spot with the commander of the internment facility where the captured rebels are kept, urging them to comply with IHL and providing urgent medical care to the captured fighters.



UN Photo shows a wounded SPLA soldier in South Sudan. Emphasise that international humanitarian law also protects soldiers, not only civilians.

Slide 14

Protected Persons under IHL



- Civilians not directly participating in hostilities
- Medical and religious personnel of armed forces
- Wounded, sick and others *hors combat*
- Prisoners of war & interned armed group fighters
- Peacekeepers (unless engaged in military hostilities)



Ask participants who are the civilians in the pictures. The armed herder on the right may well be a civilian who is only armed to protect his cattle from predators. In many mission settings, armed civilians are a common sight, and them carrying weapons like assault rifles does not necessarily mean that they are participants in hostilities between the parties to the conflict.

Under IHL, any person who is not or is no longer directly participating in hostilities shall be considered a civilian, unless he or she is a member of armed forces or groups. In case of doubt, the individual or group of individuals shall be considered civilian and afforded the protection owed to civilians until determined otherwise. Civilians may be in possession of arms, without necessarily being combatants. Under international humanitarian law, civilians who have arms, for example, for self-defence and the protection of their property but who have not been or are not currently engaged in hostilities are entitled to protection.

Members of armed forces or armed groups that are *hors de combat* ('out of battle') also enjoy protection under international humanitarian law. Notably, those who can no longer because they are wounded and sick must not be attacked but collected and medically cared for.

Prisoners of war (POWs) and interned/detained armed group fighters enjoy special protection. They must be treated humanely in all circumstances and not be subjected to any humiliating and degrading treatment. Unlike regular soldiers who become POWs, captured rebel fighters may be prosecuted for their participation in the armed conflict. However, this must be done before "a regularly constituted court, affording all the

judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilised peoples" (see Common Art. 3 Geneva Conventions.)

Peacekeepers, regardless of whether they are military, police or civilians, are protected under international law. Directing attacks against them may amount to a war crime. An exception applies only for as long as military peacekeepers engage in hostilities.

Slide 15

Case 4 – Girl associated with armed group

“For the young people here, it is just natural to join the rebels. When I was 14 years old, they gave me a gun and told me to shoot a deserter.”



Here is another learning activity. Take some time to read over the slide, and we will discuss.



Working in syndicate groups have participants review the slide and then discuss. Then have syndicate groups report back brief the plenary. Here are a few areas to assist in facilitating the discussions. Key areas and violations to consider:

- Grave violation of children's rights: recruitment
- Optional Protocol on Children and Armed Conflict
- War crime of enlisting children under 15 years
- War crime of murder
- Summary execution
- Human rights to life, integrity and education

Here are more detailed facilitation notes to add to the discussion:

- The Convention on the Rights of Children and Optional Protocol on Children and Armed Conflict says that no armed group or state forces may recruit or use children under 18 years. Enlisting 15-year-old children amounts to a war crime. It does not matter if a girl joined “voluntarily”; children are legally unable to provide free and informed consent to join an armed group.
- The United Nations considers child recruitment to be one of six grave violations of children's rights in armed conflict (see next slide). Child recruitment places the

affected children's rights to life, physical and mental integrity and education at serious risk.

- *Summarily executing a deserter amounts to an IHL violation and war crime of murder. However, considering that the girl was used as a child soldier without her valid consent, she should not be prosecuted herself. Instead, children who were associated with armed groups must be provided with special reinsertion programmes that provide them with the education and comprehensive care necessary to reintegrate into civilian life.*

You should report to their chain of command and the mission's child protection advisers. To the extent that relevant contacts exist, they should remind the rebel commanders concerned that children must not be recruited, and individuals involved may incur responsibility for war crimes.



UN Photo shows a young girl who was recruited into a rebel force and is seeking reinsertion support from the United Nations. It is important not to assume that armed actors recruit only boys. Support must also be extended to girls who were associated with armed groups. Girls may have been fighters. In many contexts, girls may also have been associated with armed groups as porters or cooks, or they were subjected to forced marriage and sexual enslavement.

Slide 16

Six Grave Violations against Children in Armed Conflict
(UNSC Resolution 1612) **MUST REPORT**



1. Killing or Maiming
2. Recruitment or use
3. Abduction of children
4. Sexual violence
5. Attacks on schools & hospitals
6. Denial of humanitarian access

Child:
Anyone under
18 years!



Annual UN Secretary-General Report on Children & Armed Conflict

- Tracks grave child violations in countries of concern
- Lists state forces and armed groups who commit child violations

No matter what local laws and traditions may indicate, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child considers children to be all girls and boys under the age of 18 years. The only exception is if local laws stipulate an age higher than 18, in which case the higher age becomes the guideline for UN peacekeepers.

Security Council Resolution 1612 (2005) recognises six grave violations against children during armed conflict. The violations were selected due to their obvious contravention of international law and severe consequences for the lives of children, and their ability to be monitored and quantified. The six grave violations are:

- Killing and maiming of children: Any action resulting in death or serious injury of children, including shelling, crossfire, cluster munitions, landmines
- Recruitment and use of child soldiers: Any person below 18 years who has been recruited by armed forces or armed groups as fighters, cooks, porters, spies, for sexual purposes
- Abduction of children: The unlawful removal, seizure, capture, apprehension, taking or enforced disappearance of a child either temporarily or permanently for any form of exploitation of the child.
- Rape and other forms of sexual violence against children: Any violent act of a sexual nature to a child, including forced pregnancy and enforced abortion

- Attacks against schools and hospitals: Physical attacks or threat of attacks on buildings, including targeted or indiscriminate attacks
- Denial of humanitarian access to children: Blocking free passage or timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to persons in need (including children)

The Secretary-General reports every year to the Security Council on state forces and armed groups who engage in grave violations against children during armed conflict. State forces that commit grave violations and take no measures to improve the protection of children are excluded from contributing to U.N. peace missions.



The photos show a 9-year girl who was deliberately maimed by an armed group during the armed conflict in Sierra Leone and a 17 years old boy. Both are considered children.

Slide 17

Case 5 – School teacher

*“Armed fighters occupied our school.
They took some of the girls with them.
We could not stop them or they would
kill us.”*



Here is another learning activity. Take some time to read over the slide, and we will discuss.



Working in syndicate groups have participants review the slide and then discuss. Then have syndicate groups back brief the plenary. Here are a few areas to assist in facilitating the discussions. Key areas and violations to consider:

Violations to consider:

- Grave child rights violation: Attack against schools
- Conflict-related sexual violence: Rape and sexual enslavement
- Freedom from torture
- The human right to life
- Non-discrimination based on gender
- Protection of schools as a civilian object
- The human right to education


Here are more detailed facilitation notes to add to the discussion:

- Special care must be taken in military operations to avoid damage to civilian buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, education or charitable purposes and historical monuments. Armed actors occupying a school are placing the building at risk because it may become a military target. For this reason, UN

policy prohibits UN forces from occupying school buildings under any circumstances

- *In many cultural contexts, people describe sexual contact only in very indirect terms. Given the overall circumstances, the teacher's reference to armed group "taking girls with them" suggests these are abduction for purposes of rape or sexual enslavement. This amounts to a war crime, grave violation against children, an IHL and a human rights violation. It also constitutes a case of conflict-related sexual violence, which UN missions must work to prevent as a matter of priority*
- *Under human rights law, rape by state forces or armed groups controlling territory is a severe form of gender discrimination. Abductions will have a drastic impact on the human rights to education in the area as parents will keep their children out of school to protect them*

You must report these cases to their chain of command and the mission's human rights component, women protection advisers and protection of civilians coordinators. If victims of sexual violence can be identified, they must be urgently referred to humanitarian agencies or state authorities that can provide medical, psychosocial and other necessary attention. Confidentiality must be strictly ensured in order not to stigmatise victims in their community. It also needs to be considered whether the teacher who provided the information needs protection from reprisals by the armed group involved. The mission needs to consider what steps it can take under its POC mandate to end the occupation of the school and abductions of girls.

 ***The UN Photo shows victims of child rape protected at a safe house in Liberia. Reemphasise that you must know referral systems for victims so they can receive support.***

Slide 18

Conflict Related Sexual Violence


- Incidents or patterns **in conflict or post-conflict**
- Rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, trafficking
- Sexual violence of comparable gravity against **women, men, girls or boys**



Security Council Resolution 1325 has advanced the women, peace and security agenda to increase the active participation of women in peacemaking and conflict prevention efforts. Under the broader umbrella of this agenda, it has also made the prevention and response to CRSV a priority for peace missions and the United Nations in general.

CRSV refers to incidents or patterns of sexual violence in conflict or post-conflict situations. CRSV includes rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity against women, men, girls or boys. Such incidents or patterns occur in and are linked to conflict or post-conflict settings or other situations of concern. It can have a direct or indirect nexus with an armed conflict or political strife. The link with conflict may be evident in the profile and motivations of the perpetrator(s); the profile of the victim(s); the climate of impunity/weakened State capacity; the cross-border dimensions; or, the fact that it violates the terms of a ceasefire agreement.

Although women and girls continue to be those primarily affected by CRSV, not least due to patterns of gender discrimination and inequality predating the conflict, boys and men are also victims of CRSV.

 **Men and women can be CRSV victims. The UN Photo shows a female rape victim being comforted by UNPOL and a man who was raped while detained as a political prisoner.**

Slide 19:



Your Responsibilities

- **Identify**
- **Record**
- **Report**
- **Confidential**
- **Refer victims (support)**
- **Intervention to protect**
- **Follow situation**



The Guidelines for military personnel in Peace Operations and the Policy on Human Rights in Peace Operations establish specific responsibilities for us regarding violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

You may be required to observe, monitor and report on developments impacting on the human rights situation, including human rights violations and abuses against children associated with armed forces or patterns of conflict-related sexual violence. You should be actively identifying concerns by reaching out to all sectors of society.

We must promptly record and share with the human rights component all allegations of violations we receive or observe for follow-up. Formal mechanisms such as SOPs will address such information-sharing.

Respect for the principle of confidentiality must always be maintained. Names of victims and witnesses should not be included in reports with broader circulation.

Based on established referral systems, we must promptly refer victims to providers of medical assistance, psychosocial support and protection.

In some cases, intervention, e.g. by raising an urgent concern with the party concerned, may be appropriate. The protection of civilians coordination structures must be alerted so they can initiate a concerted mission intervention.

Slide 20

International Refugee Law

- **1951 Refugee Convention:**
 - Fear of **persecution**- race, religion, political opinion etc.
 - International protected status
 - Protected under UNHCR mandate
 - Refugee rights
- **1969 African Refugee Convention**
fleeing **armed conflict**
- **1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees**
fleeing internal conflicts & general violence




When governments are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, individuals may suffer such serious violations of their rights that they are forced to flee their country and seek safety in another country. Since, by definition, the governments of their home countries no longer protect the fundamental rights of refugees, the international community has to step in to ensure that their basic rights are respected.

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is the foundation of international refugee law. The term “refugee” under the Refugee Convention refers to persons who have to flee their country due to a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Individuals suspected of crimes against humanity are excluded from refugee status.

Fleeing a country where an armed conflict is taking place qualifies a person only as a refugee if specific requirements are met (notably evidence of individual “well-founded fear of being persecuted”). However, regional instruments have expanded the scope of the refugee definition. Under the 1969 African Refugee Convention, refugees are also those who have to flee “events seriously disturbing public order” such as armed conflict.

For Latin America, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees expands the concept also to include persons who flee internal conflicts and generalised violence in their country.


Refugees are generally civilians, and the mission must hence protect them under its POC mandate. In addition, peacekeeping operations are often tasked with the creation of conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return or local integration of refugees and internally displaced persons.

 ***Refugees exist around the world. The UN Photo shows refugees in the Balkans.***

Slide 21

Case 6 – Refugee woman

“They are forcing us to go home. But our government will harshly punish us as soon as we cross the border. Our political police often rapes women who are deported.”



20

You must urgently report this information to their chain of command. The human rights component and the humanitarian country team; UNHCR must be informed so that they can advocate with the government to stop what amounts to a violation of refugee law and potentially an international crime. Here is another learning activity. Take some time to read over the slide, and we will discuss.



Working in syndicate groups have participants review the slide and then discuss. Then have syndicate groups report back to the plenary. Here are a few areas to assist in facilitating the discussions. Key areas or violations to consider:

- Freedom from torture (in the form of rape)
- Prohibition of non-refoulement under 1951 Refugee Convention and Convention against Torture
- Deportation as a war crime or crime against humanity


The following are the violations described in more detail to assist the instructor in the facilitation of the discussions:

- The refugee is at risk of rape and other arbitrary punishment if deported to their country of nationality. Rape by state agents regularly amounts to a form of torture.
- The country which plans to deport them is violating the fundamental principle of non-refoulement. Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, countries may not expel

or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Similarly, the Convention against Torture prohibits states from expelling, returning or extraditing a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture (e.g. rape by state agents, as in this case)


- *Forced displacement of the persons concerned, by expulsion from the country without grounds permitted under international law, may amount to the war crime of deportation (if committed in armed conflict) and/or a crime against humanity (if systematic or widespread)*

Slide 22



Rights of Refugees


- Prohibition of expulsion or return if real risk (“*Refoulement*”)
- Prohibition of discrimination for race, religion or country
- Freedom to practice religion
- Right to acquire property
- Access to courts
- Public education
- Freedom of Movement



Refugees enjoy special status and related rights under international law. Since they have lost the protection of their home country, which has persecuted them, they are under the protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Rights of refugees include, for instance:

- The right not to be subjected to refoulement (see the previous slide)
- No discrimination due to race, gender religion, social / origin
- Freedom of religion
- Right to acquire property
- Access to courts
- Public education
- Minimum treatment and assistance
- Freedom of Movement

 **The illustration shows the emblem of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Not to be mistaken with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).**

Slide 23

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

- Forced to flee (war / natural disaster)
- Have not crossed an international border
- No special international status
- Home state must protect
- Keep human rights & as citizens (e.g. right to vote).
- Protection reinforced by:
 - UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
 - AU Convention on Internal Displacement in Africa

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) may have been displaced due to armed conflict, generalised violence, violations of human rights, natural or human-made disasters. Unlike refugees, they have not crossed an international border, but remain in their own country.

The protection of IDPs and other affected populations within their own country is primarily the responsibility of national authorities. Unlike refugees, IDPs do not enjoy a special legal status under international law. However, the international community has a role to play in promoting and reinforcing efforts to ensure protection, assistance and solutions for IDPs. UNHCR generally considers them to be of concern to its mandate and the mission will often make special efforts to protect IDP sites under its POC mandate.

IDPs keep their human rights and their rights as citizens of the country. For instance, IDPs maintain their citizen's right to vote in elections. Therefore, the state must make arrangements for IDPs to vote at the site of their displacement.

In 1998, the UN Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs issued the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The principles, which have been repeatedly endorsed by the international community of states, summarise binding legal obligations that can be found in international humanitarian and human rights law.

The African Union has adopted the Kampala Convention on Internal Displacement in Africa, which further reinforces the protection of IDPs.

Slide 24

Lesson 2.1 Take Away

- UNMOs should have a general understanding of the UN Charter, human rights, IHL and refugee law because it informs their work
- UNMOs must be able recognize, record and report violations, while ensuring due confidentiality for victims and witnesses

Questions?

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Summary

Key takeaways for this lesson include the following. Let us review these topics:

- IHRL, IHL and refugee law are key parts of the legal framework governing UN peace operations. They inform important aspects of our work.
- Human rights are a core pillar of the UN, the UN Charter commits to promoting universal respect for human rights. Peacekeepers must recognize and respond to human rights violations and abuses by others, and must respect international law in their own activities.
- IHL applies to armed conflict, setting limits on the means and methods of combat. It protects the civilian population and people who are not or no longer part of the conflict, e.g. the wounded or peacekeepers.
- The rights of refugees and IDPs are reinforced by international documents.

Additional Learning Activity**2.1****Slide 25**

Learning Activity: Group Discussion

An armed group has often attacked refugees looting their property and abducting young women and girls.

The armed group lives in a village along with civilians of the same ethnic background. The members generally do not wear uniforms.

The state security forces are planning to launch operations to neutralize the group.

How should the operations be conducted to comply with international law?



This optional learning activity aims to reinforce the lessons learned. Participants should discuss the scenario first in smaller groups before a debriefing in plenary.

These elements should be identified in the discussion:

- *The armed group commits serious IHL violations and human rights abuses. These may entail international crimes including the war crime of looting and, for the abductions, enforced disappearance of persons, rape and sexual enslavement.*
- *The armed group violates the principle of precaution because it set up positions close to civilians and fails to distinguish themselves through uniforms. However, these violations do not absolve the state forces from respecting IHL itself.*
- *The situation is of special concern to the mission under its mandates on human rights, protection of civilians, child protection and conflict-related sexual violence.*

- The state authorities have duties under human rights and IHL to protect the population in its territory – including refugees – from such violations. Pursuing an operation to neutralise the group, seeks to implement this duty

The operation must be conducted in compliance with IHL and human rights so that it does not place other civilians at risk, in particular:

- *Principle of precaution to minimise harm for the civilian villagers. In practice, state forces should gather intelligence to know where precisely armed group fighters live and where civilians.*
- *Principle of distinction of civilians and military targets. In practice, the armed force could surround the village, demand a surrender of the group and, failing that, give civilians a chance to evacuate before launching their operations. Those exiting the area would have to be promptly screened to ensure no armed group fighters can escape.*
- *Principle of proportionality to ensure that civilian losses do not outweigh military advantage gained. Security forces should not use explosive weapons with a large and imprecise impact radius in their operations (e.g. large mortars or heavy artillery) given that they may incidentally kill a disproportional number of civilians.*

 **The UN Photo shows armed group fighters, mostly wearing civilian clothes.**

Lesson

2.2



United Nations Peace Operations-Specific Legal Framework

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Starting the Lesson

Overview

Apart from general international law, peacekeeping missions and their activities are also governed by a peacekeeping specific legal framework that includes:

- Security council resolutions and mission mandates contained therein
- Status of Forces or Status of Mission Agreements between UN and host state
- Agreements between UN and troop or police contributing countries,
- Secretary-General and UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) policies
- Rules of Engagement and Directives on the Use of Force
- Mission-specific SOPs and directives

This legal framework shapes all UN peace operations and their activities.

Peacekeepers are expected to carefully read and understand the mandates, agreements policies and directives relevant to their work. Compliance is mandatory for all peacekeepers, irrespective of whether they are military, police or civilians.

Peacekeepers must know about essential privileges and immunities that protect them in their work, while also being aware of the legal framework to ensure their accountability, good conduct and discipline.

UN Peace Operation-Specific Legal Framework

Slide 1



Let us now look at the mission-specific legal framework.


Slide 2

Learning Objectives

- Describe the legal framework and UN policies for UN Missions
- Explain essential privileges and immunities and the legal framework to ensure their accountability, good conduct and discipline

Here are the learning objectives for this lesson 2.2.

Slide 3



Building on the discussion of the UN Charter, international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law in module 2.1, this lecture 2.2 focuses on the peacekeeping-specific legal framework, including relevant aspects of the following:

- Security Council Mandate
- Status of Forces/Mission Agreement (SOFA/SOMA)
- Agreement or Memorandum of Understanding of the United Nations with Troop and Police Contributors (TCC/PCC MOU)
- UN Peacekeeping Policies
- Mission Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Directive on the Use of Force (DUF)

Slide 4

Security Council Mandate

- Security Council Resolution:
highest legal basis for the mission
- Outlines tasks
and responsibilities
- What the Security
Council expects
Mission to accomplish



Every peacekeeping operation begins with the Security Council adopting a resolution that establishes the mission. The Council seeks to establish a mission with the consent of the Host State. Depending on the mission's mandate and role, it will want the consent of the parties to the conflict.

The Security Council resolution sets out the mandate of the mission, i.e. the tasks assigned to it, including any explicit authorisation to use force. Mandates, or tasks, differ from mission to mission. The range of mandated tasks differs between peace operations based on the conflict environment, challenges on the ground and other factors. Security Council mandates may also set cross-cutting thematic tasks for all missions, e.g. the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence.

Resolutions that authorises the deployment of a peace operation also establishes the maximum strength of the uniformed components (military and police). The Security Council mandate is typically established for a fixed period (usually one year) after which the Council may renew it. At this stage, the Council will review the authorised strength and adjust as deemed necessary.

Almost always, before establishing a peacekeeping operation, the Security Council requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report setting out the functions, tasks and parameters of the proposed operation. The Security Council then considers the Secretary-General's report before it adopts a resolution.

 **The UN Photo shows a session of the UN Security Council at UNHQ in New York.**

Slide 5



Multidimensional peacekeeping missions are regularly assigned protection mandates. Specialised civilian staff work on these mandates including human rights officers, protection of civilians advisers, child protection advisers and women protection advisers. However, these mandates remain whole-of-mission responsibilities to which the military component must contribute. Notably, you must identify, record and share information on violations with their civilian colleagues in the mission.

Protection mandates may overlap, as they complement and reinforce each other:

- The human rights mandate seeks to protect the entire population and the full range of human rights. The mission will use peaceful means such as reporting and other advocacy or capacity-building measures to advance this mandate.
- The protection of civilians mandate is narrower in that it is only concerned about physical violence and protects civilians only (as opposed to, e.g. detained fighters). However, it goes deeper than the human rights mandate because it authorises the mission to use force where necessary to protect civilians.
- Child protection is focused on the six grave violations against children in conflict (see module 2.1).
- Conflict-related sexual violence requires a nexus between sexual violence and the conflict (e.g. domestic violence would typically not be covered).



Provide examples on how protection mandates overlap or differ, e.g.:

- *If state authorities ordered the closure of a newspaper for criticising the government, this violates the human rights to freedoms of expression, media and information. However, in the absence of physical violence, the POC mandate is not triggered. However, if rogue state agents proceed to assault the journalists physically, the mission may intervene under its POC mandate, including by using force where necessary.*
- *If an armed group traffics underage girls for purposes of sexual exploitation, this amounts to abuse under the human rights mandate. The mission must exercise its POC mandate to protect the girls. Such sexual violence against children is of concern to both the children protection and CRSV mandate.*

Slide 6

Host State Agreements (SOMA/SOFA)

- Legal doc signed by UN and host state
- Privileges and immunities for UN mission / personnel
- Example: freedom of movement, customs exemptions, visa requirements
- Supplemented by special agreements
(example-handover of persons detained by mission)

Before the deployment of a peace operation, the UN and the host Government sign a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) (for peacekeeping missions) or Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) (for special political missions). These establish the legal framework that regulates the status of the mission and its members in the Host State, including privileges and immunities for UN personnel (see above).

Notwithstanding their privileges and immunities, the peacekeeping operation and its members remain under an obligation to respect local laws and regulations. Peacekeepers respect and follow the national laws of the host country. Failure to abide by host state laws will have consequences to the individual, the T/PCC and the mission's standing.

SOFA/SOMAs usually guarantee that:

- UN premises in the host country are inviolable and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the UN, which controls access to all its premises.
- UN equipment and vehicles are immune from search and seizure.
- The UN has the right to UN-restricted communication throughout the host country.
- The UN may disseminate information on its mandate to the public, which is under its exclusive control and cannot be the subject of any form of censorship.
- Mission personnel have functional immunity for official acts (see below).
- Mission personnel enjoy the freedom of movement in the country (see below).

The mission may conclude additional agreements with the host country. Example: In accordance with the SOP on Detention by Peacekeepers, a mission that detains persons under its mandate and wants to hand them over to the host state, must first conclude a legal agreement guaranteeing that the host state treats such persons humanely and provides the mission with access to follow up their situation.

Slide 7

Learning Activity: Roadblock

A UN force protection platoon, is conducting a patrol to implement the mission's mandate to verify reports of ceasefire violations

An armed group set up a roadblock and refuses to let the peacekeepers pass. The group argues that peacekeepers did not get prior authorization to access the area under its control



Ask participants to discuss this case study in groups before debriefing in plenary.

The following issues should emerge from the discussion:

- The armed group impedes the freedom of movement throughout the country, which is guaranteed under the SOFA/SOMA. Missions do not have to seek prior authorisation before moving around the country as this would undermine their capacity to conduct observation tasks in the mission area effectively.
- In principle, the host government has a duty under the SOFA/SOMA to ensure the mission's safety, security and freedom of movement in the country. The mission might, therefore, insist that it takes measures to dislodge the armed group and remove the illegal roadblock.
- However, the host government may be unable or unwilling to remove the roadblock. Under its authority to use force in defence of its mandate, the mission is legally entitled to use all necessary means to force its way through the checkpoint. In case the armed group fighters use force against mission personnel, the Force Protection platoon can rely on its authority to use force in self-defence to protect itself.
- While the preceding indicates what the mission is legally entitled to do under its mandate, there are strategic and political implications of pursuing a course of action involving the use of force against one of the conflict parties. The mission's

rules of engagement should, therefore, provide clear guidance on how mission personnel should react where their freedom of movement is denied. In cases of doubt, further guidance should be sought from the chain of command if reasonably possible under the circumstances.

Slide 8

Freedom of Movement (FOM)

- SOFA/SOMA provides FOM through host-state
- No prior authorization or notification needed
- Exception- air traffic control
- Government ensures safety, security, FOM
- Government responsible to clear roadblocks
- UN authority to assert under defence of mandate

SOFA/SOMAs provide that peacekeeping operations shall enjoy the freedom of movement throughout the territory of host-state. Such freedom is essential for implementing mission mandates, for instance, regarding free and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance.

While the language slightly varies between SOFAs/SOMAs, the UN will not accept requirements of prior authorisation or notification for its movements. However, there may be reasonable exceptions, e.g., for movement by aircraft for air traffic control purposes.

In many situations, armed groups pose the greatest threats to the mission's freedom of movement. The SOFA/SOMA legally requires the host state authorities to ensure safety, security and freedom of movement, notably by clearing illegal roadblocks and checkpoints.

The mission may also assert freedom of movement under its authority to use force in defence of the mandate. This legal authority exists regardless of whether armed groups or rogue government officials deny freedom of movement.

Slide 9

Military Rules of Engagement (ROE) Police Directive on Use of Force (UOF)

- Guidance - authority and limits use of force
- Bases for accountability
- Covers kinetic force
- Covers detention, search, seizure
- Must abide by human rights
- Engaged in hostilities, must comply with IHL



Guidance as to when and how the mission may use force can be found in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) that apply to the military component and the Directives on the Force (DUF) for the police component. ROE and DUF provide mission-specific guidance that builds on the mission's Security Council mandate, international human rights and humanitarian law as well as DPO policy guidelines on the use of force. ROE/DUFs not only cover force in the narrow sense of the word (i.e. kinetic force) but also forcible measures such as detention or searches and seizures of materials.


ROE commonly include:

- Use of force (Rule 1)
- Use of weapons systems (Rule 2)
- Authority to carry weapons (Rule 3)
- Authority to detain, search, disarm (Rule 4)
- Reactions to civil actions or unrest (Rule 5)

The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping approves the ROE and DUF. The Force Commander and Police Commissioner are responsible for making sure that all personnel under their command understand and follow the ROE and DUF.

T/PCCs are not permitted to modify ROE or DUF according to national interpretation(s). They are not allowed to impose any caveats on the authorisations to use force that is contained in the ROE or DUF, without formal consultation with UNHQ and the express written agreement of DPO. T/PCCs must prepare and train personnel on ROE/DUFs.

Slide 10




ROE/DUF set out when the mission has the authority to use force. This authority includes the use of force in self-defence. The use of force beyond self-defence depends on the mandate. Multidimensional missions may be authorised to use force in defence of the mandate, including to assert their freedom of movement. Furthermore, they regularly are mandated to use all necessary means to protect civilians against physical violence. In some cases, the mandate may further expand the authority to use force. For instance, MONUSCO has the mandate and authority to use force to neutralise armed groups in support of the host state.

ROE/DUF also establish limits on the use of force. Police components must always use force within the limits of international law enforcement and human rights standards. Similarly, ROE for the military component usually restrains the use of force. However, the military may engage in combat-level military force where necessary to effectively implement mandates involving the use of force authority. In such situations, military peacekeepers are bound primarily by the rules of IHL on the conduct of hostilities.

The Mission has a responsibility to make full use of authority to use force to the extent appropriate and necessary to implement its mandate effectively. UN military or police personnel that refuses to comply with a lawful order to use force may be held accountable for insubordination. At the same, UN uniformed components may be held accountable if they use excessive force beyond what international human rights or humanitarian law permit. Findings of excessive force have rarely if ever been made against military peacekeepers. (see next slide for more)

Side 11



In principle, the military component may apply combat-level force whenever it has the authority to use force, and such combat-level force becomes necessary. Examples:

- The military component uses mortars and grenade launchers to defend itself against a large-scale, sustained attack by an armed group
- The military component deploys helicopter gunships to protect civilians living in a city, which is being attacked by an armed group
- To defend its mandate and assert freedom of movement, UN forces launch a military assault to dismantle an armed group's illegal roadblocks

The Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law recognises UN military remain bound by IHL rules and principles forces if they actively engage as combatants in armed conflict, they. As discussed in module 2.1, these principles include:

- The distinction between civilians and military targets
- Precaution to minimise the risk of military operations for civilians
- Proportionality between the anticipated military gain and the incidental harm to civilians or civilian objects

As a matter of policy, the United Nations Forces must further limit their use of force (restrained force as the default). This is done to prevent an escalation of violence, minimise harm to civilians the UN wants to protect, and avoid UN troops becoming combatants so that they lose their protected status under IHL. According to the

Guidelines on the Use of Force by Military Components in UN Peacekeeping Missions, the military component should, wherever possible:

- Resolve a potentially hostile confrontation by means other than the use of force (e.g. negotiation or de-escalation strategies using communication)
- Use of force gradually beginning with an authoritative physical presence, progressing to non-deadly force and the use of deadly force to protect life

Please note that UN Police (e.g. Formed Police Units) will only use a restrained level of force and must never be used for operations requiring military force.

Slide 12

Peacekeeping Policy Framework

- **Relevant Secretary-General Policies and Bulletins (examples):**
 - Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse
 - Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law
 - Human Rights Screening Policy
 - Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to non-UN Security Forces
- **Relevant DPO-DOS Policies, Guidelines and SOPs (examples):**
 - Military Observers in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions
 - Use of Force by Military Components
 - Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in Field Missions
 - Detention by United Nations Peacekeepers
 - Human Rights in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions
 - Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations

Compliance with UN policy is mandatory for all peacekeepers

The Secretary-General has promulgated policies and regulations that bind the entire organisation, including all peace operations. Compliance with these policies is mandatory for all peacekeepers. Examples include:

- In accordance with the SG Bulletin on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, UN personnel are prohibited from having any sexual activity with children under 18 years or any exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex;
- Under its Human Rights Screening Policy, the United Nations will not select or deploy for service any individual who has been involved in violations of international human rights or humanitarian law;
- As discussed above, military peacekeepers must abide by IHL as long as they are engaged as combatants in armed conflict;
- For the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy see the following slides

The United Nations Department of Peace Operations has adopted several policies and guidelines that regulate in a legally binding manner the functioning of peace operations and define the roles and responsibilities of personnel. Policies set out, for instance, what peacekeeping operations and individual personnel must do to protect human rights and civilians. Other policies establish detailed rules governing sensitive areas such as detention, the use of force, or accountability for conduct and discipline.

Familiarity and compliance with these U.N. policies are mandatory for all peacekeepers. Peacekeepers must also familiarise themselves with policies and guidance documents relevant to their work.

Slides 13

Human Rights Due Diligence Policy

UN Support to non-UN Security Forces

UN support to non-UN Forces cannot be provided:

- *Risk of entities committing **grave violations** of Int. humanitarian, human rights or refugee law*
- *relevant authorities fail to take necessary **corrective or mitigating measures***

Prevents legal liability for aiding violations and protects U.N. reputation and impartiality



The Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) is binding for the entire United Nations (not just peacekeepers). It was established by the Secretary-General, and the Security Council has repeatedly endorsed it.

According to the HRDDP, support to non-UN security forces cannot be provided

- Where there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of the receiving entities committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law,
- Where the relevant authorities fail to take the necessary corrective or mitigating measures."

All UN entities that plan to or are already providing support to non-UN security forces must, therefore, conduct a risk assessment that involves providing or not providing such support. This assessment needs to consider the risk of the recipient entity committing grave violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law or refugee law. Furthermore, the UN must consider whether any mitigation measures can reduce the risk of violations (e.g. by increasing training or excluding problematic units from support)

It serves to ensure that the UN does not support or collaborate with host state elements that are involved in grave violations of human rights, IHL or refugee law. The policy serves to protect the United Nations from aiding legal liability for inadvertently aiding violations committed by others. Distancing the U.N. from state forces involved in grave violations also protects the U.N.'s reputation and perceived impartiality.

UN Photo shows MONUC providing transport to national army units in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. When the United Nations found that some national army units who received UN support were violating human rights, the Security Council made further MONUC support conditional on compliance with human rights. The HRDDP was established against the backdrop of MONUC's conditionality policy.

Slide 14

- ✓ Applies to all types to support
- ✓ Exceptions for human rights & mediation work
- ✓ Includes support to states, regional organizations
- ✓ Must initiate risk assessment & monitor compliance
- ✓ Risk mitigation & engagement, not blunt conditionality
- ✓ Suspension or withdrawal of support- last resort

Application of the HRDDP

Any support provided by the UN to non-UN security forces must follow the HRDDP. Relevant support provided by peace operations includes the conduct of joint operations, planning support, sharing of intelligence, training, capacity building, mentoring, technical cooperation, and financial support. Certain areas are exempted: Training and engagement on IHL and human rights, Mediation-related support (e.g. transporting officers to peace negotiations), Medical evacuation.

The HRDDP also covers support provided to regional organisations, for instance, support to African Union peace and security operations such as AMISOM.

Your unit or you may often contribute to HRDDP implementation:

- Information about the conduct of state security forces will help inform the initial risk assessment prepared by a military component wishing to support national forces
- Information in the design of mitigatory measures may have identified specific national units or commanders as being particularly prone to engage in violations, leading the UN to insist these units and commanders are excluded from support
- Where the military component ends up providing support, it must ensure that the conduct of the supported national forces is carefully monitored and if the mission

finds that grave violations persist, the mission may temporarily suspend or entirely withdraw the support provided



The UN Photo shows a UN police officer providing training to the Haitian National Police.

Slide 15

Lesson 2.2 Take Away

- You must understand the mission mandate and your responsibilities
- SOFA / SOMA protects freedom of movement
- ROE establishes limits on the use of force
- Secretary-General and DPO policies set rules that all peacekeepers must know and abide by HL /IHL

Questions?

15

Summary

Key takeaways regarding the Peacekeeping Specific Legal Framework include:

- You must understand the mission's mandate
- SOFA/SOMA protects freedom of movement
- Rules of engagement establish limits on the use of force. ROE for peacekeeping missions are usually more restrained than ROE for other types of military operations in conflict zones
- The Secretary-General and DPO-DOS adopt policies, which contain binding rules that all peacekeeping personnel must know and abide by

Additional Learning Activity

2.2

Slide 16

Learning Activity: Group Discussion

The Mission's mandate authorises it to take '**all necessary measures to protect civilians from physical violence**, within capabilities and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host state to protect its population'

A local community captured three 16-year olds whom they accuse of being fighters for an armed group involved in crimes against humanity, including extrajudicial killings and rape

The town's mayor fears that riots may break out and the three teenagers will be lynched. He wants the mission to send UN forces to detain the three and put them on trial

What is the mission legally allowed to do under its protection of civilians mandate? What is it not legally entitled to do?



This optional learning activity aims to reinforce the lessons learned. Participants should discuss the scenario first in smaller groups before a debriefing in plenary. Participants should discuss whether this situation and the proposed course of action are covered under the mission's protection of civilians mandate.

The following points should emerge from the discussions:

Civilians: The population of the town are civilians not participating in hostilities. If they are indeed armed fighters, the 16-year olds are not civilians (although they are children under 18 years). However, they could be wrongly accused of being armed group fighters, so that the mission should try to protect them in any case.

The threat of physical violence: The local community faces a clear threat of physical violence involving crimes against humanity, IHL violations and human rights abuses such as extrajudicial killings and rape. Note that the threat does not have to be imminent. The captured 16-year teenagers also face a risk of violence (summary execution).

Protection without prejudice to the responsibility of the host state: The mission should assess whether the local police can manage the situation. However, likely, the police cannot deploy with the necessary strength and urgency so that the mission must react.

All necessary measures: Under its CPOC mandate, the mission can use force to protect civilians. Using graduated force, it would first seek to show an authoritative physical presence to contain the situation. The mission may also apprehend and temporarily

detain the teenagers (including to protect them). However, the CPOC mandate does not give the mission prosecutorial or judicial powers. These remain the sovereign prerogative of the host state. Instead, the mission would seek to promptly handover the teenagers to the local justice authorities provided the latter can guarantee to treat them humanely (the revised Standard Operating Procedures on Detention by UN Peacekeepers set a time limit of 96 hours to implement a risk assessment and the subsequent handover)

Module 2



Legal Framework

Take away from Module 2 include:

- International and national humanitarian legal frameworks impact and guide peacekeeping in the field
- Bodies of international law provide special protection for those members of most vulnerable communities; women, children, refugees
- Peacekeepers must monitor and report violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
- Peacekeepers can ask their command, Legal Officers, Human Rights, CPOC Officers and representatives for assistance
- Legal frameworks govern human rights, IHL and peacekeeping generally
- Peacekeepers must comply with IHRL and IHL themselves, and monitor/report abuses by others. Peacekeepers will be held accountable for individual actions. Turn to command or legal advisors for help

Module 3



Operational Framework

Module 3 at a Glance

Aim

The objective of this module is for peacekeepers to understand the key operational framework for MILEOD operating in UN peacekeeping operations.

Learning Objectives

The learning objectives for Module 3 are based on being able to now understand how to apply the fundamentals of the first two modules into the operational framework for the MILEOD:

- Understand how to employ, integrate, and support, the MILEOD organization for operations in a UN PKO.
- Be able to explain the MILEOD operational framework

Overview

Module 3 provides an overview of the operational framework related to MILEOD, as well as, a general understanding of how the MILEOD contributes to the protection of civilians and force protection in UN peacekeeping.

While this module focuses on the tactical level employment of MILEOD, it also provides a general overview how EOD is used to assist the Mission leadership in the accomplishment of their overall tasks and in support of the UN mandate.

Introduction

Slide 1



The Module 3 lessons will help us understand the operational framework that includes MILEOD integration in the UN Mission, employment, tasks, and support structure.



Note to instructor –

It is recommended that Instructors read the document, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines" (also known as the Capstone Doctrine).

Introduction

Slide 2

Module 3 Content

- 3.1 MILEOD Integration into UN HQ Structures
- 3.2 MILEOD Employment
- 3.3 MILEOD Tasks
- 3.4 MILEOD Common Activities
- 3.5 MILEOD Support
- 3.6 MILEOD Coordination
- 3.7 MILEOD Capability Requirements

2

Module 3 contains these lessons.

Lesson

3.1



Integration into the United Nations Headquarters Structures

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson



Recommend providing examples of UN CONOPS from UN Peace Operations where a MILEOD has been committed. Select samples that show specific tasks assigned to MILEOD in recent UN PKOs. Pass these examples to the students to allow the instructor to facilitate a discussion.



Instructor Notes: Recommend reminding participants of the following UN Force HQs and Sector HQs staff positions:

- U1 Personnel
- U2 Intelligence
- U3 Operations
- U4 Logistics
- U5 Future Plans
- U6 Communications
- U7 Training
- U8 Engineer
- U9 Civil-military Affairs


Slide 3



Key Message: There is a need for clear and well understood C2 relationships between all entities employing and working alongside MILEOD in a UN Peacekeeping operation. There should always be an EOD focal point in the Mission. The MILEOD contributes to a safe and secure environment in the Mission area.

This lesson seeks to outline three models that contribute to effective MILEOD integration in a UN Force HQ structure.

Slide 4



Each UN Mission is unique, and the relationship that a MILEOD may have with a Mission will be codified in the SOFA, UN Mission and Component CONOPs, Statement of Unit Requirement (SUR), and in some cases, the DPO / TCC MOU. There are three generic models of how a MILEOD can be integrated into UN Force HQ structures. By understanding these models, a decision-maker can identify the most appropriate structure for a given mission to ensure a MILEOD is effective and efficient.

This lesson seeks to give an overview of possibilities that exist for integrating MILEOD into the UN Force Headquarters (FHQ). The following three examples (model A, B and C) are possible structures that may be used as a guide to help integrate the MILEOD that best suits the mission requirements. Whichever structure is adopted, it is necessary to designate what element of the structure will perform the role of the EODCC for EOD tasking purposes and the relationship this cell has with the associated U3 branch of the FHQ.

Slide 5


Learning Outcomes Lesson 3.1

- Explain the key requirements for C2 of EOD Assets
- Explain how EOD command and control can be integrated with Force HQ
- Describe the three different models which can be used to integrate the MILEOD into the mission.

5

Let us review the learning outcomes of this lesson. At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on the slide. Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This slide may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects of the lesson.

Slide 6



Once the unit arrives in a mission, they must integrate into a complex UN Peacekeeping operational and political structure, typically made up of thousands of personnel and many military units from multiple countries. The unit's TCC, Head of Mission (HoM), the Force Commander (FC), the Senior MILEOD Advisor and Director of Mission Support (DMS) all have a role in supporting the MILEOD. Operations cannot be accomplished without logistics support and logistics readiness. Both the Operations System and the Support System must be in synch for the mission to succeed.

This slide shows a generic UN Mission structure. You learned about this structure in a previous module. Notice that three lines are touching the MILEOD.

Firstly, the red line shows that the MILEOD command relationship with the Force Commander. The command relationship is defined in the MOU for the MILEOD and may be, for example, operational control (OPCON). The Force Commander's intent/tasking is usually coordinated through the Senior EOD Advisor.

The Force Commander receives their guidance from the HoM or Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). As we learned in Module 1, the HoM or SRSG leads the mission and bears the overall responsibility for the implementation of the mandate.

There is a line indicating the relationship with the Director or Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS). The DMS/CMS is responsible for coordinating support across the entire UN Mission through contracted support, military logistics units (MLUs), and support from the HN. If special support arrangements have been agreed to in the SUR, MOU, or LOA,

then the DMS / CMS will likely coordinate that support. (Examples: catering, bulk fuel, bulk water, contract vehicle maintenance)

Note: By UN policy, the DMS/CMS has tasking authority over the support enabling units for day-to-day routine tasking. This includes MILEOD; however, it is very uncommon that the DMS would exercise this authority over a MILEOD. The DMS could, however, make changes to the daily tasks of other support units that may impact on EOD missions. Close and continuous coordination with the FHQs staff and DMS staffs is essential.

The pale blue dotted line indicates a coordination/support relationship with a National Support Element (NSE) of the MILEOD unit (if present). This relationship exists in the situation where the TCC providing the MILEOD has elected to establish an NSE to enhance the sustainment of units. Support provided by the NSE is coordinated directly with national authorities and not through the DMS/CMS.

A TCC may elect to provide support through an NSE MILEOD due to their specialised technical equipment. The composition of the NSE is at the discretion of the TCC based on their specific needs. The MILEOD will typically be required to deploy with a MILEOD Support Cell, which is designed to provide all technical support to the MILEOD. We will discuss this cell in greater detail in the next section.


You can imagine that it would be easy for a small MILEOD to be overlooked in such a massive operation unless there is careful coordination of logistics arrangements. Arrangements for logistic support are provided in the UN's Generic Guidelines for TCCs for Deploying Military Units to the UN Peacekeeping Mission, in the UN's Contingent Owned Equipment Manual, and in the DPO Policy on Authority, Command and Control.

At the component level, the Mission Support Plan is published under the authority of the DMS / CMS. The Mission Support Plan is the authoritative basis for the planning and management of logistics support in the UN Mission. The MILEOD will receive sustainment beyond national logistics capabilities through the DMS. The MILEOD Commander must understand the capabilities it is required to deliver, and the ways it is required to be self-sufficient, as defined in the COE Manual, and the relevant Statement of Unit Requirements. Any exceptions to this must be explicitly addressed in the MOU.

Unit sustainment is generally a national responsibility, through the TCC's National Supply System, especially for low density, highly specialised MILEOD equipment and supplies. However, like all military units, it will inevitably require some logistical, administrative and training support beyond its inherent capabilities. The DMS/CMS will provide standard support to the mission and units based on the Mission Support Plan and MOUs with the TCCs.

Note that all the organisations and structures you will see in this lesson are models. Moreover, it can be tailored to the mission and following the force requirements.


Slide 7



This model is for a complete and independent EOD branch that sits within Force HQ. This model requires a large number of personnel positions which can be demanding on human resources. The organogram shown here is illustrative of an example of an independent branch organisation. The model is scalable so that each cell may have one person or several individuals. Alternatively, several positions may be combined into one. Such structures are scalable and modular, depending on the EOD requirements and resources available.

* The Liaison Officer (LO) indication denotes that all LOs in a MILEOD organisation need to be EOD qualified and experienced.


Slide 8



This slide provides information on the potential relationships that an EOD focal point may have in this type of an independent EOD branch within the FHQ organisation. An EOD Focal Point can act as an advisor in a UN Mission / Sector / Unit HQ. Depending on the Mission / Sector / Unit size, the Focal Point might be one of the following:

- A stand-alone position
- The 2IC/EO
- MILEOD Unit Commander

Slide 9




This slide provides information about the relationships that a liaison officer (LO) has with the U2/3/5. Additionally, the diagram shows how LO is linked to an Analysis Cell. The Analysis Cell can be a single individual or several analysts. The Analysis Cell processes the technical and tactical information related to explosive ordnance and weapons. The cell can compile both pattern and trend analysis.

The LOs need to work intimately with the U2 / U3 staffs to assist in the dissemination of information to help improve the COP / situational awareness within the Mission Area of Operations.

The LO to U2/3/5 can be one or more persons. In smaller Missions/Sectors, one person can fill both roles of the LO to the Analysis Cell, as well as, the LO to U2/3/5. In larger Missions/ Sectors when more than one person fills the Analysis Cell role, there needs to be a very close relationship between the Analysis Cell LO and the LO to U2/3/5 to ensure a clear threat picture is developed, maintained, sustained and disseminated.


Slide 10



This slide provides information on the potential relationships between the LO to U2/3/5 and the LO to U7 in a Model A structure (i.e. a complete and independent EOD branch within the FHQ).

While situational awareness is essential, training is equally important. In this regard, the LO to the U2/3/5 has to work closely with U7 LO. The U7 can be instrumental in ensuring that development of training materials/packages meant for various parts of the Force includes EO and IED threats that are current and relevant.

Slide 11




This slide provides information on the potential relationships that an Analysis Cell has with the LO to the U9 for a complete and independent EOD branch within the mission FHQ.

The LO to U9 is required to work closely with the Analysis Cell to ensure the appropriate risk mitigation information is provided to the local populace. These education programs result in the fostering of the conditions for a permissive operational environment. As such, if mandated, the LO may be involved in the following:

- Advocacy and victim assistance
- Weapon and ammunition management (WAM)
- Physical Stockpile Security Management (PSSM) initiatives
- Broader security sector reform (SSR) initiatives


Slide 12



This slide provides a graphical depiction of all the potential relationships that the various elements in a complete and independent EOD branch within force HQ that need to be considered:

- EOD focal point, the 2IC/EO and unit commander
- LO to U2/3/5 with the Analysis Cell
- LO to U2/3/5 with the LO to U7
- Analysis Cell with the LO to U9

Slide 13



This is Model B. In this option; existing HQ branches support a smaller EOD element. This model is more appropriate when manning is limited. The structure shown here denotes individual positions included or combined as required.


All personnel must be appropriately qualified and experienced in EOD. Where such a reduced EOD C2 element resides within the FHQ, the best practice for the EOD HQ element is as a cross-functional element within several HQ branches. It is best practice to establish an EOD fusion and coordination cell to facilitate cross-talk and C2.

An EOD fusion and coordination cell would operate between the U2, U3, U5, U7 and U9 branches. Alternatively, a reduced EOD HQ element can be situated within the U3/U5 branch. In this reduced EOD HQ element, all combinations of senior positions are possible, including:

- Separate EOD Focal Point, SO IED Threat Mitigation (IEDTM) and SO EOD
- Separate EOD Focal Point and combined SO IEDTM and EOD
- Combined EOD Focal Point and SO IEDTM with a separate SO EOD
- Combined EOD Focal Point and SO EOD with a separate SO IEDTM
- Combined EOD Focal Point, SO IEDTM and SO EOD

The requirements for the named Staff Assistants (SA) will be mission dependent and can be combined and/or the duty of the SO. Within such a reduced EOD HQ element, a LO is needed for the U2, U3/U5, U7, U9 branches. Staff Assistant is a generic term for any person who facilitates the work of their designated staff officer.

Slide 14



Here is another variation. In Model C, EOD capabilities fall under the engineer function. This model can be designed so that at each level of command, a senior military engineer officer will serve as the EOD focal point and advisor to the FC.

In this model, both technical and tactical commanders share a collective responsibility for EOD planning and execution.

Commanders and tactical leaders at all levels should be integrated via cross-functional teams and should participate in the appropriate EOD planning cycle. The senior military engineer officer should ensure that EOD assets and capabilities are recognised and adequately employed. From U-engineering, there is an option of model A or B or a hybrid of both as best suits the EOD requirements.

Slide 15

Lesson 3.1 Take Away

The need for clear and well understood C2 relationship between all entities employing and working along side MILEOD along with an EOD focal point

Each UN Mission is unique and the relationship that a MILEOD has with the Mission will be codified in CONOPs, Force Requirements, TCC MOU and SOFA, there are three C2 generic models for the MILEOD to be integrated into a UN HQ structure.

15

Summary

It is important to emphasize the need for clear and well understood command, control, and coordination relationships between all entities employing and working alongside MILEOD in a UN PKO. It is important to understand the value of an EOD focal point.

It is very important for the operational effectiveness and efficiency of MILEOD to have the proper mix and integration of EOD C2, staffs, intelligence cells and EOD LOs within the UN HQ structure.

While each UN Mission is unique (as is the relationship that an MILEOD will have with a Mission), there are three generic models describing how MILEOD can be integrated into UN HQ structure. The correct model is the one most appropriate to the resourcing of the mission and unit, and which supports the EOD requirements, personnel availability and threats in the AO.

Reference Slide

Abbreviations

- AO: Area of Operation
- EO: Explosive Ordnance
- EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal
- EODCC: Explosive Ordnance Coordination Centre
- FHQ: Force Headquarters
- IED: Improvised Explosive Device
- IEDD: Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
- IED TM: Improvised Explosive Device Threat Mitigation
- SA: Staff Assistants
- 2IC: Second in Command
- SO: Staff Officer
- TCC: Troop Contributing Country
- U2/3/5/7/9: Universal designation of Intelligence/Operations/Planning/Training/Civil Affairs Branches
- UN FHQ: United Nations Force Headquarters
- UN HQ: United Nations Headquarters
- UN HQ: United Nations Headquarters
- UNMAS: United Nations Mine Action Service

Learning Activity

3.1

RESOURCES

N/A

TIME

3-5 minutes

PREPARATION

Ask the participants to answer the following questions.

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Reinforce the learning outcomes and assess the knowledge of the group and individuals.

Questions:

1. Who has OPCON over MILEOD?
2. When and why would you use different models?
3. What do you think is the most important aspect of C2 for integrating MILEOD in the mission?

Lesson 3.2



Employment

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson



Recommend providing copies of a UN CONOPS, operations orders, or FRAGO where a MILEOD has been committed. Select samples that show specific tasks assigned to MILEOD in a UN PKOs. These samples will be passed out to the students and the instructor facilitates the discussion.

Slide 1



Lesson 3.2
UN Military MILEOD
(MILEOD) Employment

1

Slide 2

Lesson 3.2 Content

- Decision to deploy MILEOD
- Tasking authority for MILEOD

2

Here is the lesson content.

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes Lesson 3.2

- List and discuss the reasons to deploy UN EOD assets
- Outline the tasking authority for MILEOD
- Explain the considerations in MILEOD tasking procedures

3

MILEOD is an enabling asset which provides the Force Commander with force protection, a capability for the protection of civilians, and supporting force mobility. Military decision makers, staff officers, and unit leaders at all levels who, during their UN deployment, may be required to employ or work with MILEOD should be educated and trained to understand how MILEOD may be best employed to enhance and support operations. MILEOD capabilities facilitate and assist the commander in providing a safe and secure environment that will benefit all UN components, the international community, the HN government, and the local populace. As a good training practice, let us review the learning outcomes of this lesson:

- List the typical reasons to deploy MILEOD assets
- Outline the tasking authority for MILEOD assets
- Explain the considerations of Tasking Procedures

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on the slide. Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects of the lesson.

Slide 4

MILEOD Employment

- Based on threat to life of UN personnel and UN installations
- Threat to civilians
- Accomplishment of current or future UN tasks
- FoM of UN personnel
- As directed by higher command

The decision to deploy MILEOD assets are typically based on, but not limited to, the following conditions:

- There is a direct and imminent threat to the life of UN personnel or UN installations
- There is a direct and imminent threat to civilians and local infrastructure
- The threat may hinder the accomplishment of any current or future UN tasks
- The threat may limit the Freedom of Movement (FoM)of UN personnel
- As directed by the tasking authorities

Slide 5

Explosive Ordnance Coordination Centre (EODCC)

- MILEOD is OPCON to FC
- DMS/CMS tasking authority for routine tasks
- EODCC executes taskings
- Directs, controls & coordinates MILEOD teams
- Coordinates Host Nation support
- Receives notification of EOD incidents
- Schedules and plans
- Receives completed incident reports
- Identifies lessons learned

The UN military Force Explosive Ordnance Coordination Centre or EODCC is a centre that supports the execution and coordination of EOD tasks:

- MILEOD is OPCON to FC.
- DMS/CMS has routine tasking authority.
- FC delegates EODCC to provide operational control, planning, and administrative services related to EOD operations for assigned MILEOD in a designated geographical AO.
- The EODCC serves as a principal authority directing, controlling and coordinating tasks to MILEOD teams
- The EODCC receives the notification of an EOD incident and completed incident reports from subordinate units and provides scheduling and control of disposal operations
- Location and relationship between the EODCC and U3 branch may vary depending on mission structure, and need to be determined as part of the mission planning

Slide 6

Tasking Authority- EODCC

- Operates as a distinct force component
- Coordinates with U3/U5 branches
- Ideally co-located in mission operations centre
- U3 branch active in coordinating tasks
- U2 provide threat, tactical and technical info
- FC intent and priorities followed

**EOD capabilities controlled
at highest level &
coordinated at lowest level**

An EODCC may be integrated as a branch within the UN mission headquarters, be constituent within one of the UN units (e.g. combat engineers) or operate as a distinct force. Whether the coordination cell is a branch within the mission HQ, the FHQs, a cross-functional coordination/fusion cell, an element of an Engineer unit, it is a military force asset that needs to link-in with the other FHQ functions.

The EODCC should ideally be co-located with the operations centre. In any case, the operations branch (U3) should have an active role with the EODCC in coordinating the management of EOD tasks and integrating intelligence with the U2. All authorities are within and following the Force Commander's intent and stated priorities. Capabilities must be controlled at the highest level and coordinated at the lowest practical level. The initiative is encouraged at every level to create and maintain an EOD capability that can quickly adapt to the threat situation and can deter aggressors.

Formal taskings to the MILEOD may originate from any UN Mission component. Also, if the UN mandate or SOFA authorises, national and local authorities may submit their requests for EOD assistance. The chain of command is responsible for ensuring that EOD teams are tasked in accordance with UN mission SOPs and the legal framework. Operations should be reassessed if the required tactical support is unavailable or cannot be provided.

Slide 7

Tasking Procedure

- FC responsible for tasks within SOP
- Requests from force components or host nation
- Requests prioritized by EODCC
- Operations reassessed, delayed if support unavailable or not in timely manner

This slide explains the standard tasking procedure for the MILEOD in a UN Mission.

The Force Commander, through the chain of command, is responsible for ensuring that EOD teams are tasked following UN Mission SOPs, which will be developed mission by mission.

Requests for EOD supports may come from the Military, Police or Civilian components, or may come from local authorities/host nation depending on the UN Mission and its mandate. Note, however, that depending on the mission, the EODCC may be integrated within the mission HQ (i.e. independent from Force HQ). Depending on the local situation, this may be informed by an EO / IED Threat Mitigation Working Group (if established).

The EODCC is responsible for prioritising these requests, and provides operational control, planning, and coordinating of tasks (including scheduling). EOD tasks should be informed by Intelligence (U2) and be directed under the Force Commander's intent and priorities.

If EOD support is not available or not provided promptly, another critical military, police or civilian operations may be delayed or require re-assessment.

Slide 8

Lesson 3.2 Take Away

Decision to deploy MILEOD assets:

- Threat to life of UN personnel or UN installations
- Threat to civilians
- Accomplishment of UN tasks, FoM
- As directed by FC

EODCC:

- Integrated branch within UN mission HQ
- Operationalises EOD taskings
- Constituent within one of the Force units
- Linked with other functions - CCW relevant mission elements

Tasking Procedure – Chain of Command in line with SOPs

8

Summary

It is important to understand the tasking procedures to employ the MILEOD. The EODCC is an important C2 element that provides operational control, planning, and administrative services related to EOD operations in a designated area of responsibility.

The decision to deploy MILEOD assets includes the accomplishment of the protection of civilians and UN personnel, FoM and the FC's priority tasks.

Reference Slide

Abbreviations

- CCW: Close Cooperation With
- CIMIC: Civil-Military Cooperation
- CMD: Conventional Munitions Disposal
- CREW: Counter RCIED Electronic Warfare
- DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation
- DFFC: Directional Focused Fragmentation Charge
- DPKO: Department of Peace-Keeping Office
- ECM: Electronic Counter Measures
- EDD: Explosive Detection Dog
- EFP: Explosively Formed Projectile
- EO: Explosive Ordnance
- EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal
- EODCC: Explosive Ordnance Coordination Centre
- FoM: Freedom of Movement
- POC: Protection of Civilians
- SOP: Standard Operating Procedures
- TTPs: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
- U2/3/5/7/9: Universal designation for Intelligence/operations/Planning/Training/Civil Affairs Branches
- UN HQ: United Nations Headquarters

Learning Activity**3.2**

RESOURCES

N/A

TIME

3-5 minutes

PREPARATION

Ask the participants to answer the following questions.

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Reinforce the learning outcomes and assess the knowledge of the group and individuals.

Questions:

1. The decision to deploy MILEOD asset is typically based on what conditions?

Answer: Based on a threat to the life of UN personnel, UN installations, in the protection of civilians.

2. Where should the EODCC be located?

Answer: Ideally, be co-located with the operations centre.

Lesson 3.3



Tasks

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Slide 1



Lesson 3.3 MILEOD Tasks

1

Slide 2

Lesson 3.3 Content

- Introduction
- EOD Capabilities Spectrum Tool (EODCST)
- Task considerations for commanders
- Security & support considerations
- General tasks

2

Here is the content of lesson 3.3. It has previously been emphasised that MILEOD capabilities generated and employed should be aligned to the assessed threat, CONOPs, and UN DPO Force Requirements. Typically, there are differences in what TCCs considered to be EOD capabilities. An EOD capabilities spectrum tool has been developed to allow for TCC and the UN to assess what is the required EOD capability for a given PKO. Other considerations include tasks, task organisation, security, and support requirements. Personnel involved in planning for and responding to CBRN EO threats must be aware that MILEOD is a specialised capability.

This lesson will explain the significance and use of the EOD capabilities spectrum tool. The lesson will also explain the considerations that must be considered when generating, maintaining or sustaining EOD capabilities. All these efforts must be in accordance with the MILEOD's capabilities, mission objectives and Force Commanders intent.

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes - Lesson 3.3

- Describe the significance and use of the EOD spectrum tool
- Outline the tasks that MILEOD can undertake
- Explain planning, security and support considerations when MILEOD are tasked
- Describe potential CBRN EO threats and the required specialized capabilities

3

EOD refers to a vast number of capabilities and specialised activities related to the disposal of EO items. This broad definition of EO and the vast types of EO capabilities that exist, some many activities and competencies come under the heading of EOD.


As the EOD assets are limited, expensive to develop, maintain and sustain, the appropriate employment of the correct EOD assets is essential to ensure operational effectiveness and efficiency. For this reason, it is necessary to align EOD capabilities to assessed EO threats. This is achieved using the EOD spectrum tool.

As a training practice, let us review the learning outcomes of this lesson:

- Describe how to use the EOD spectrum tool
- Explain planning, security and support considerations when MILEO is employed
- Outline the many tasks that MILEOD can undertake
- Know that CBRN EO threats require specialised responses

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on the slide. Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4



Let us recall the complexity of EOD activities with up to nine separate specialised procedures involved in any task, as shown in the graphic above. The nine procedures that can be involved in an EOD task include Detection, Location Access, Identification, Evaluation, Hazard Mitigation, Render-Safe Procedures (RSP), Recording, Recovery Procedures, and Final Disposal Procedures.

According to UN EOD doctrine, EOD capabilities refer to the measure of the ability of a force, unit, team or person to achieve EOD objectives (the nine procedures). This is especially concerning the overall mission. The lack of common use of the terms in the EOD community such as CMD and IEDD can prove problematic on multinational missions. TCCs have different definitions and understanding as to what a given term references.

This lack of a common operating terminology can be particularly problematic when determining the level of capability required for a given EOD task. For this reason, it is often best practice to determine the EO threat that needs to be mitigated, the nature of the EOD activity (e.g. IED neutralisation or CMD) and use of the EOD activities spectrum to define the EOD capability required.

👉 Instructor / facilitator note. It is recommended to use the pictures of the flow diagram to describe the nine procedures to help convey your message,

Slide 5

EOD

Capability Spectrum Tool


- The EODCST assists EODCC staff to determine the level of capability to be deployed to meet a given EO threat

- Equipment specialization
- Knowledge, skill, competencies of operators
- Risk involved

- Capabilities not rigid and viewed as a spectrum
- Overlap at times due to requirements, threat faced and tactical requirements

The EODCST provides a quick method to assist in planning, force generation, maintenance and sustainment of the most appropriate capability to mitigate the known or perceived EO threats.

Slide 6



Key Message: The EOD spectrum tool is one method that can assist in planning, force generation, maintenance and sustenance of the most appropriate EO threat aligned with the EOD capability for a given AO. Other methods can be used.

Shown here in this chart is an example of an EOD capability spectrum. If you read it from left to right, each box is related to the items near it. The Associated Activities box and the boxes beneath it refer to activities that are not directly EOD tasks but activities that MILEOD are often required to support. For the sake of completeness, CBRN EOD and Nuclear Weapons Disposal (NWD) are included but are not part of this STM nor included in the EOD capabilities we will reference.

Note the following on the slide:

- Equipment Specialization
- Knowledge, skill and competencies of the operators required
- Risk involved

The spectral nature of this tool is emphasised, as stated in the darker blue box at the bottom of the slide.

Slide 7

MILEOD Commanders Considerations

- OPCON to FC where appropriate
- Contributing to FoM and FP
- To support, advise on EO threat related matters
- A limited resource to be tasked appropriately and op tempo carefully monitored and managed
- Control and prioritization
- Direct support to military operations
- Identification and collation of lessons learned

Key Message: Leaders and staffs should be aware of how best to use MILEOD and understand their operational benefits and limitations.

EOD is an operational enabler that contributes to Freedom of Movement (FoM) and Force Protection (FP). In order to, support and advise the commander on EOD related matters (including the rendering safe of IEDs), the MILEOD will be integral to the force structure. EOD elements are in demand, and often there is a shortage of EOD personnel.

There is a high level of risk to EOD personnel, and their op-tempo must be carefully monitored and managed. Consequently, they usually are controlled directly (and prioritised) by the FHQ. Whether the MILEOD is employed as a separate team or as an element within a unit, or if they are in direct support of military operations, the MILEOD come under the direct tasking authority of the force commander.


Slide 8

Security & Support Considerations

EOD deploy on short or immediate notice in semi/non-permissive environments

EOD units need earmarked support for

- Force Protection (FP)
- Communication via VHF & HF
- Logistical & Medical support



May be provided by

- Dedicated organic elements providing support
- Parent unit charged with provision for duration of mission

Key Message: MILEOD requires additional enablers and support assets to deploy and require FP, Logistical, medical, and communications support.

MILEOD require the capability to deploy military personnel and equipment on short notice to hostile, semi- and non-permissive environments. Two types of operational environments are of concern when deploying MILEOD:

- Semi-permissive. This refers to operations in a potentially hostile environment where the support from the local population cannot be depended upon
- Non-Permissive. This refers to a hostile environment where both adversaries and unsupportive local population pose a continuous threat

Because EOD units require the capability to deploy at short notice, MILEOD must have dedicated Force Protection (FP) allocated to support their operations, which must have the use of personal and crew-served weapons. The provision of FP capabilities must be determined in the planning phase. There are two options for the provision of this FP capability, a dedicated organic FP element or there can be a named parent unit charged with the provision of this FP.

MILEOD must have the capability to communicate via VHF and HF communications and have logistical and medical support provided to them once deployed. These provisions of support, communications, logistics and medical capabilities need to be

determined in the planning phase of a mission. Further consideration on support for UN military MILEOD is provided in Chapter 4 of the UN PK Missions MILEOD Manual.

Slide 9

MILEOD Tasks

- Reconnaissance, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of EO threats
- Support FoM
- EO recording, collection, investigations
- Post-blast analysis
- Situational Awareness
- EOD equipment maintenance
- Lessons learned/identified reported to CoC

On this slide, we display the MILEOD general task list:


- Holding, maintaining and operating EOD equipment
- Carrying out reconnaissance, identification, field evaluation, rendering safe, neutralisation, recovery and disposal of explosive ordnance including IEDs
- Respond to, identify, render safe and dispose of EO that threaten or impede FoM
- Destroying captured EO and disposal of unserviceable EO. This hazardous operation must be carefully considered during the mission planning phase
- Supporting the recording and collection of EO components in support of EO accident, incident investigations, support Explosive Site Investigation
- Improving situational awareness and identifying lessons learned

Slide 10

MILEOD Tasks Cont.

- Preparing EOD reports
 - Provide technical advice and assistance
 - Support mortuary services
 - Exchange and evaluate information
 - Education and Host Nation capacity building
 - Conduct and/or support EO accident investigations
-
- Providing immediate EOD reports to EODCC after a completed operation or task, and preparing a complete report including pictures/sketches and location
 - Provide technical advice and assistance for route clearance, military search, deliberate area clearance Assist commanders with FP planning and execution; reviewing FP plans and EO threat / military search procedures, assist in facility site surveys; and develop/implement emergency response and FP plans
 - Support mortuary services activities in planning and conducting recovery and processing of remains contaminated by EO
 - Provide, exchange and evaluate information between agencies, in line with the mission mandate, involved in mitigating the threat posed by EO
 - Minefield activities involving a known / probable threat of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO) & mines
 - Educate UN personnel on EO identification, hazards, and protective measures; military search; IED threats, hazards, and response procedures; and explosive hazard marking, reporting and evacuation as part of Pre-Deployment Training
 - Conducting explosive hazard education, in support of the local population, if authorised by the Mission and force leadership

Slide 11



CBRN EO Threat Planning

Identified early in mission planning phase

Where such a threat is suspected either in the form of conventional or improvised, the OPCW should be consulted for advice on the requirements for the assessed threat

The graphic features a diamond-shaped icon divided into four quadrants, each containing a different hazard symbol: a biohazard symbol in the top-left, a radiation symbol in the top-right, a chemical symbol in the bottom-left, and a skull and crossbones symbol in the bottom-right. To the right of this icon is the title 'CBRN EO Threat Planning' in blue. Below the title is an orange box with the text 'Identified early in mission planning phase'. At the bottom is a yellow box with italicized text advising consultation with the OPCW.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) EOD is a highly specialised capability that is not covered in this Specialised Training Material packet. CBRN EOD requires specialised planning and reference to the UN Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for guidance. Conventional and improvised CBRN requirements and capabilities need to be identified early in mission planning.

OPCW conferred with as to identify the required capability requirements. Where such a threat is suspected, either as in the form of conventional or improvised CB, the OPCW should be consulted for advice on the requirements to mitigate the assessed threats.

Slide 12

Lesson 3.3 Take Away

- EODCST assists in identifying EOD capabilities needed
- Commander should understand MILEOD employment considering FP, Comms, medical, logistical support
- Many Tasks can be allotted but must be prioritized appropriately
- CBRN threats require special planning / responses

12

Summary

EOD refers to a vast number of capabilities and specialist activities related to the disposal of EO items. As the EOD assets are limited and expensive to develop, maintain and sustain, the appropriate employment of the correct EOD assets is essential to ensure operational effectiveness and efficiency. For this reason, it is necessary to align EOD capabilities to the assessed EO threats in the area of operations. The most appropriate EOD capabilities must factor in FP, Comms, medical and logistical support requirements when operating in potentially a semi or non-permissive environment.

Reference Slide

Abbreviations

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CB: Chemical Biological • CBRN: Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear • CMD: Conventional Munitions Disposal • EO: Explosive Ordnance • EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal • EODCST: EOD Capability Spectrum Tool • FC: Force Commander • FoM: Freedom of Movement • FP: Force Protection • HF: High Frequency • HoMC: Head of Mission Component 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IED: Improvised Explosive Device • IEDD: Improvised Explosive Device Disposal • MEODU: Military EOD Units • OPCW: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons • PDT: Pre-Deployment Training • PK: Peace Keeping • TCC: Troop Contributing Country • UN: United Nations • UNMAS: United Nations Mine Action Service • VHF: Very High Frequency
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14

Learning Activity**3.3****RESOURCES**

N/A

TIME

3-5 minutes

PREPARATION

Ask the participants to answer the following questions.

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Reinforce the learning outcomes and assess the knowledge of the group and individuals.

Questions:**1. What is the EOD Capability Spectrum Tool used for?**

Answer: It assists EODCC staff to determine the level of capability to be deployed to meet a given EO threat.

2. What are the core capabilities of a MILEOD?

Answer: Holding, maintaining and operating EOD equipment, reconnaissance, identification, field evaluation, rendering safe, neutralisation, recovery, disposal of explosive ordnance including IEDs, respond to, identify, render safe and dispose of EO that threaten or impede FoM, destroying captured EO and disposal of unserviceable EO, support the recording and collection of EO components for investigations, support Explosive Site Investigation, and Improving situational awareness (advice/education).

Lesson 3.4



Common Activities

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Slide 1



Lesson 3.4 MILEOD Common Activities

1

Slide 2

Lesson 3.4 Content

- Component recording & recovery
- Reporting procedures
- EO / IED Threat Mitigation Working Groups

2

Here is the lesson content for 3.4 addressing the Common Activities for the UN Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units (MILEOD)

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes Lesson 3.4

- Explain the importance of component recording and recovery with subsequent reporting
- Outline the functions and structure of EO / IED Threat Mitigation Working Groups

3

MILEOD is an enabling unit that provides the Force Commander (FC) with force protection, protection of civilians (POC) and mobility enabling asset. Students should understand and consider EOD as a unique asset with specific capabilities and characteristics to help them accomplish specific tasks that contribute to the success of the overall mission.

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on the slide. Take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4

Component Recording & Recovery

- Clearance of IEDs require reports
- Tactical and technical construction
- Collection of evidence
- Policy regarding ownership of components
- Report and logs maintained

Following the clearance of IEDs or an IED post-blast investigation, there is a requirement for reports to help gain information on the tactical and technical construction of IEDs or contribute to an investigation of an IED incident. There should also be a requirement for the collection of evidence, either for technical situational awareness or to aid investigations. Clear policies should exist between local security services regarding the ownership of evidence collected from IED sites. In this process, the UN should maintain impartiality, keep within the spirit and construct of the UN mandate, and can collect technical evidence. Evidence collected should be recorded in the report, and evidential logs maintained

Slide 5

Reporting Procedures

- Key EOD activity
- Understanding of IED / EO threats
- Final phase in an EOD operation
- Initial report can be generated
- IED incident recovering components for examination and exploitation
- Intelligence

Reporting is one of the critical EOD post-task activities and is vital in the efforts to achieve an accurate understanding of the IED EO threat in an area of operations. Reporting is typically done in the final phase of any EOD task or operation; however, initial EOD reports can be generated before all the information concerning an EOD task being assembled. A good case example is of an IED incident which involved the recovery of components that will undergo examination and exploitation for technical intelligence. Such exploitation usually takes time to complete; however, the dissemination of any information should not be delayed as this information could be used to facilitate efforts to protect, EOD operators, the force and civilians.

Slide 6

Reporting Procedures

- Procedure, generation, validation, distribution
- Agreed at FHQ
- Widest and secure dissemination of info
- OPSEC is always a consideration
- Appropriate action taken
- Lessons learned cycle

The procedure and process under which EOD reports are generated, validated and distributed require SOPs and agreement at FHQ. Also, the procedures should be reinforced and implemented across the UN Mission to ensure the appropriate and secure dissemination of information to all components and personnel in need of such information. While operational security is always a consideration with these types of reports, EOD reports must be given the broadest possible circulation. This ensures that appropriate action is taken regarding lessons identified and that training, equipment and procedures are developed to adjust to the current EO threats.

Slide 7

Reporting Procedures

- Comprehensive, clear reports aid future EO operations
- Technical and tactical assessments
- Quality imagery
- Designed to be concise, accurate, systematic
- Lessons for UN units


Comprehensive and clear reports much help in the clearance and approval of future EO Operations. These reports should include the EOD operator assessments of technical, tactical details and quality imagery; such as photographs, x-rays, sketch diagrams and basic circuitry diagrams. Use of the words 'possible' and 'probably' are encouraged to provide context for the assessments generated where there are unknowns. EOD reporting should be clear, concise, accurate and systematic to allow capturing good practices to be disseminated across all UN PK Missions.

Slide 8

EOD / IED Report

Standardized format:

- Conformity in info collected
- Allow for collation
- Data from which trend and pattern analysis is possible



Format should not be restrictive; allow EOD operators to provide as much relevant information as possible

The format of an EOD report should be standardised across a UN mission. This standardisation will achieve conformity in information being collected and allow for subsequent analysis of data (trend and pattern analysis). At the same time, the format of the EOD report should not be restrictive. An EOD operator must have the flexibility to provide as much relevant information as possible. An example of an IED/UXO report is shown on this slide.

Slide 9

EO / IED Threat Mitigation Working Groups (WG)

WG mandate is to address EO threat, friendly capabilities and challenges, lessons learned both technical and tactical from incidents, and any other explosive device related issues that may impact operations, the mission mandate execution, or the security of UN personnel and civilians

The next two slides will address the EO / IED Threat Mitigation Working Group. Depending on the situation, threat and force composition, the Force Commander may decide to establish an EO/IED Threat Mitigation Working Group. The working group may include the following representatives: EODCC, headquarters branches (operations, intelligence, engineer, support), and special advisors (legal, political, police). If considered relevant or as the situation requires, it may also include external representatives such as Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF) and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs).

The mandate of this working group is to address the explosive ordnance threat, friendly capabilities and challenges, lessons learned both technical and tactical from EO incidents and any other explosive device-related issues that may impact on operations. The working group meetings enable the free exchange of information and recommendations that may impact on mission priorities and future actions.

Slide 10

EO/IED Threat Mitigation Working Group

- FC establishes situation, threat, force composition
- Info exchange, generate recommendations
- Priorities and future actions reviewed
- Representatives from:
 - EODCC
 - Operations, intelligence, engineer, logistics
 - Legal, political, police
 - External- HNSF and NGOs

Slide 11

Lesson 3.4 Take Away

Component Recording & Recovery

- Reports gain information on construction of IEDs and supports investigations
- Also requirement component collection
- Policy should exist regarding ownership of components collected
- Incident report and logs

EOD Reports

- Achieve accurate understanding of IED / EO threats
- Generation, validation and distribution agreed to
- Concise, accurate, systematic, and not restrictive, allowing operators to provide information for lessons learned
- Widest possible circulation with appropriate OPSEC

EO / IED TM WG

- Address EO threat, friendly capabilities-technical/tactical lessons learned, mission execution, security
- Info exchange, recommendations for priorities and future actions
- Composition should be Mission specific

11

Summary

Let us take a few minutes to review this slide.

Reference Slide

Abbreviations

- AO: Area of Operation
- EO: Explosive Ordnance
- EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal
- EODCC: Explosive Ordnance Coordination Centre
- FHQ: Force Headquarters
- HNSF: Host Nation Security Forces
- IED: Improvised Explosive Device
- IED TM: Improvised Explosive Device Threat Mitigation
- NGOs: Non-Governmental Organization
- OPSEC: Operational Security
- PBI: Post-Blast Investigation
- U2/3/5/7/9: Universal designation for Intelligence/operations/Planning/Training/Civil Affairs Branches
- UN: United Nations
- UN FHQ: United Nations Force Headquarters
- UN HQ: United Nations Headquarters
- UN HQ: United Nations Headquarters
- UNMAS: United Nations Mine Action Service
- UXO: Unexploded Ordnance
- WG: Working Group

13

Learning Activity**3.4****RESOURCES**

N/A

TIME

3-5 minutes

PREPARATION

Ask the participants to answer the following questions.

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Reinforce the learning outcomes and assess the knowledge of the group and individuals.

Questions:

1. Once the evidence has been collected, where should it be recorded?

Answer: Evidence collected should be recorded in the report and evidential logs

2. Why is it essential that EOD reports are given the broadest possible circulation?

Answer: It ensures that appropriate action is taken regarding lessons identified and that training, equipment and procedures are developed to adjust to the EO threat faced.

Lesson 3.5



Sustainment

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Slide 1



Key Message: MILEOD must understand what support the UN Mission expects the MILEOD and TCC to provide for themselves and what support the UN Mission will provide.

The MILEOD must request additional enabling support. Some aspects of support are uniquely challenging for MILEOD, given their size and technical nature of their equipment. This lesson describes the UN Mission Logistical Framework and its consequences on the MILEOD.

Slide 2

Lesson Content Lesson 3.5

- TCC Roles and Responsibilities in Support
- Designated EOD Sustainment Coordinator
- UN Logistical Framework
- UN Support Process
- National/External Support Considerations (details in Lesson 3.6)

2

Key Message: The UN mission logistical framework is defined in several UN policy and guidance documents.

This lecture successively describes the baseline expectation of the TCC and unit within a UN Mission and how the logistical framework can support a MILEOD as codified in written agreements. We discuss the roles of key personnel throughout this UN support process, the TCC, and the role of a designated EOD Sustainment Coordinator. The EOD Sustainment Coordinator is the designated person with the primary responsibility for the sustainment of MILEOD that include both logistical and administrative support. Such sustainment of the MILEOD may be organic (internal) or external. This lesson builds on what you have learned in Modules 1 and 2. These are general support considerations.

Slide 3

Learning Outcomes Lesson 3.5

- Explain the responsibilities of the logistics support in a UN mission
- List key positions and organizations in the UN support system
- Describe key documents in the support system
- Understand how and when to request external support

3

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to perform the actions described on the slide. Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects of the lesson.

Slide 4

Sustainment Coordinator

- Maintains accounting of personnel and equipment
- Maintains required on-hand supplies
- Forecasts requirements
- Equipment, vehicles, tentage is maintained
- Communicates unit readiness and requirements
- Request logistical and administrative support to National Logistics System, UN DMS/CMS

4

Let us begin with the TCC and the MILEOD itself. The most critical aspect to ensuring that the MILEOD is ready to safely and effectively contribute to the Mission's mandate is sound, effective communications. The TCC is ultimately responsible for preparing and certifying that the MILEOD is fully prepared for the UN Mission. The expectation is that the TCC is providing a complete capability unit. This process begins well before the deployment of the unit, and will continue throughout their deployment in the Mission, and ends with the completed redeployment and accountability of resources.

TCCs are responsible throughout the EOD Sustainment Coordinator for ensuring that the unit is logistically and administratively supported to conduct their assigned tasks successfully. This begins with a full accounting of the unit's personnel and equipment. The unit must understand what personnel, equipment, and supplies they are expected to deploy with and sustain throughout the deployment.

A detailed review of these requirements before deployment should identify any shortages early in the process to give DPO, TCC, Unit, and the Mission time to assist or mitigate discrepancies. The unit missing equipment and supplies place the Mission at a higher risk. Supply chains in mission areas are often limited, and obtaining unexpected replacement parts and equipment can often take longer than expected. This is especially true with many of the unique equipment and supplies required by a MILEOD not readily available in the HN. Communicating expectations and shortfalls clearly and as early as possible reduces risk to the unit and the mission. Understanding the roles

and expectations of the various players in the process will aid in resolving problems early. Let us review some of those actors.

Slide 5

Self-Sustainment


- Self sustainment requirements:
 - Statement of Unit Requirement
 - UN-TCC Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
 - Contingent Owned Equipment (COE)
- Initial self sustainment period:
 - Rations, water, petrol, oil, shelter
 - First 30 to 90 days
 - Defined in MOU or LOA
- Primary support provided through national sources

5

First, let us look at the unit itself. This is a critical portion of the support concept. The MILEOD is expected to deploy self-sufficient for a minimum of 30 to 90 days.

Follow-on logistical and admin support will be coordinated IAW with the agreed MOU. In most cases, certain standard classes of supplies will be provided by the Mission and reimbursed by the TCC. Examples of this include bulk fuel and water. The unit should always deploy with the ability to self-sustain upon arrival.


MILEOD specialist equipment and supplies will almost always be a TCC responsibility, and the unit should plan accordingly.

 **Note to Instructor.** Additional information on required equipment and supplies can be found in the UN Peacekeeping Missions Military EOD Unit Manual, Annex D (MILEOD Unit Critical Equipment Requirements)

The Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR) is a starting point for analysing Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) and logistical support. Different TCCs may fill a Mission requirement, and each comes with their equipment. The UN-TCC Memorandum of Understand (MOU) should capture any additional required support needs for the unit. If there is a requirement that is not captured in the SUR or MOU, the TCC should submit a

The bottom line is that MILEOD should arrive prepared to conduct EOD operations and sustain those operations.

Slide 6



This slide shows a generic UN Mission structure. Some of which has been discussed in previous modules. Notice that three lines are touching the MILEOD.

First, there is an operational line that leads back to the Force Commander. It is essential to understand that the MILEOD, like other enabling units, are OPCON to the Force Commander for Military Missions and usually employed by the Senior EOD Advisor. The Force Commander receives his guidance from the Head of Mission/Special Representative of the Secretary-General (HOM/SRSB). As we learned in Module 1, The HOM/SRSB leads the UN Mission and bears overall responsibility for the implementation of the mandate.

Second, there is a line to the National Support Element (NSE). In some cases, the troop-contributing nation may elect to establish a NSE to enhance the sustainment of their sector's units supporting the mission. Support provided by the national NSE is coordinated directly with the NSE and not through the Director of Mission Support / Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS). This may apply to the MILEOD due to specialised technical equipment. The composition of the NSE is up to the TCC based on their needs assessment. The MILEOD Support Cell is designed to provide all technical support to the EOD unit. We will discuss this cell in greater detail in the next section.


Third, there is a line to the Director or Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS). The DMS/CMS is responsible for coordinating support across the entire UN Mission of thousands of personnel mainly through contracted support, military logistics units (MLUs), and support from the HN. If special support arrangements have been agreed to in the MOU, or LOA, then the DMS/CMS will likely be coordinating that support.

(Examples: Catering on large bases, bulk fuel, bulk water, contract vehicle maintenance, etc.) Note: According to the N DPO Policy on Authority, Command and Control, the DMS/CMS has tasking authority overall “support units” for routine day-to-day tasking. This includes MILEOD; however, it is **very uncommon** that the DMS would exercise this authority over a MILEOD. The DMS could, however, make changes to the daily tasks of other support units that could impact your EOD mission. Close and continuous coordination with FC staff and DMS staff is essential.

You can imagine that it would be easy for a small MILEOD to be overlooked in such a massive operation unless there is careful coordination of logistics arrangements. Arrangements for logistics support are provided in the UN's Generic Guidelines for TCCs for Deploying Military Units to the UN Peacekeeping Mission, and in the UN's Contingent Owned Equipment Manual. At the component level, the Mission Support Plan is published under the authority of the DMS/CMS. The Mission Support Plan is the authoritative basis for the planning and management of logistics support in the UN Mission. The MILEOD will receive sustainment beyond national logistics capabilities through the DMS. The MILEOD CDR must understand what capabilities their unit is expected to be self-sufficient following the TCC handbook. Exceptions to this must be explicitly addressed before deployment.

To review, the MILEOD should expect to be almost entirely self-sufficient for up to first 90 days. When the unit is not capable of being self-sufficient, they will likely receive support through the National Supply System, especially for low density, highly specialised MILEOD equipment and supplies. Lastly, the DMS/CMS will provide standard support to the mission and unit based on the Mission Support Plan and MOUs with the TCC.

Slide 7



In Module 1, we discussed the conceptual framework for the organisation and employment of MILEOD. These particular units will not typically be task-organized with organic communications, medical and other logistical support beyond the tactical level. Higher levels of such support must be provided by appropriate parent units or mission support elements.

Similarly, the requirement for other functional support when undertaking MILEOD operations must be considered and identified in the mission planning phase, and the tasking and C2 relationship between the MILEOD, Force Commander and the DMS must be well understood. Each UN Mission will have a unique composition and organisation depending on its mandate, the environment, and the TCC unit composition. MILEOD Commanders must understand the structures and processes of the organisation in order to ensure adequate support is available to meet mission requirements.

The MILEOD Support Cell provides suitably qualified technicians responsible for all technical support required in terms of maintenance, repair, and upgrade of hardware, firmware, software and equipment to sustain the MILEOD capabilities. The cell is broadly broken down into two branches, Technical Maintenance and Counter RCIED Electronic Warfare (CREW). In the case that the CREW assets are available, the support cell will provide a suitably qualified technician who will also act as a liaison to the U6 branch.

Slide 8

Additional Support Terms

- **Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)**
 - HN to UN Mission agreement
- **Wet Lease**
 - Contingent is responsible for maintaining own equipment or through another contingent
- **Dry Lease**
 - Contingent deploys with equipment but UN sources the maintenance / support

There are some additional sustainment terms that you may see or hear in a UN Mission that may not be common in your national logistics system.

First, let us discuss the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). This high-level agreement between the HN and the UN defines the legal parameters on which the UN mission and units are operating. It will contain rules by which each party will operate and may define support that the HN will provide to the UN. This could include provisions that impact the employment of MILEOD (Example: Airports). The SOFA might also define requirements for the involvement of local law enforcement and the handling of IED components for intelligence and evidence.

Next, we will discuss more operational terms within support agreements to include Wet and Dry Lease. The term “Wet Lease” refers to a support agreement in which the TCC is responsible for its maintenance. The TCC could deploy its maintenance units, coordinate with another contingent to use their maintenance on a reimbursable basis, or establish a contracted maintenance agreement. A “Dry Lease” means that the contingent deploys with its equipment (contingent owned equipment), but the UN provides the maintenance. These terms are most often used to refer to vehicle maintenance and not specialised EOD detection or CREW equipment.

Slide 9

Lesson 3.5 Take Away

- The TCC is ultimately responsible for readiness and sustainment of the MILEOD
- MILEOD generally expected to deploy self-sufficient for up to 90 days in accordance with SOR and MOU
- MILEOD Staff Technical Advisor coordination critical for external support for the unit
- The DMS/CMS is responsible for support to the missions and routine tasking authority for enabling units (Rarely Exercised for MILEOD)

9

Summary

Let us review some of our key lessons learned:

- It is a TCC responsibility for ensuring that the unit is fully, trained, equipped, and sustainable for the duration of the mission
- Deploying a unit that is not fully trained, equipped, and sustainable can place both the unit and the Mission at risk
- A deploying MILEO faces additional challenges due to the small size and technical nature of their equipment
- TCC's must ensure that sustainment capabilities are planned
- Due to the specialized, low density, and highly sensitive equipment required for the MILEOD missions it is critical that the unit deploy with enough spares, and expendables to sustain operations
- It is critical that the MILEOD understand the logistics agreements with the UN prior to deployment

Learning Activity

Lesson 3.5

RESOURCES:

N/A

TIME:

5-8 minutes

PREPARATION:

N/A

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

The slide below is intended to be an answer sheet. Put the slide up for all to see; Read each question below one at a time and then select a student to answer. Continue to ask the questions and select students. Reinforce topics or discuss as needed.

1. Who is the Senior Representative of the UN responsible for the overall mission?

Answer: Head of Mission (HOM) or Senior Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)

2. Who has Operational Control (OPCON) of all forces assigned to the mission?

Answer: Force Commander.

3. Who has day to day tasking authority overall support units in order to provide all necessary support to the overall mission following agreements?

Answer: DMS/CMS

4. What may national organisation be established by a TCC that is not included within the UN Mission authority or structure that enhances the national support to their units?

Answer: National Support Element

5. What is the name of a high-level agreement between the Host Nation and the UN Mission, which defines rules and authorities?

Answer: Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)

6. What is the document signed between the UN Mission and the TCC defining capabilities, logistics, and requirements for the deploying unit?

Answer: Memorandum of Understanding

7. What letter does a troop-contributing country need to submit to the UN Mission if it needs specific assistance meeting its obligations defined in the TCC Handbook?

Answer: Letter of Assistance

8. A vehicle maintenance arrangement where the TCC maintains its own vehicles.

Answer: Wet Lease

9. A vehicle maintenance arrangement where the UN Mission provides consolidated maintenance for mission provided vehicles and contingent owned equipment.

Answer: Dry Lease

10. What is the name of the cell that provides dedicated support to the MILEOD and the EOD mission, including technical repair of equipment, CREW, and communications support?

Answer: EOD Support Cell

Learning Activity Lesson 3.5

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| • Head of Mission (HOM) | • Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) |
| • Senior Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) | • Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) |
| • Force Commander (FC) | • Letter of Assistance (LOA) |
| • Director/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) | • Wet Lease |
| • National Support Element (NSE) | • Dry Lease |
| | • EOD Support Cell |

Note: This slide can be obtained in the PowerPoint Presentation for Lesson 3.5; Slide number 11 after the “Questions” slide.

Lesson 3.6



Operational Support

The Lesson



Starting the Lesson

Before beginning this lesson have the students break down into a few smaller groups. Ask the groups to write down on a white board five external support requirements that a MILEOD may require in an operation. Give the groups five minutes to come up with their list and then have each group brief the class.

Slide 1



Lesson 3.6
MILEOD Operational
Support

1

Slide 2

Lesson 3.6 Content

- Introduction
- Staff organization
- Support considerations and coordination
- Summary

2

These are the topics we will cover during this lesson. First, we will review the UN Staff organisation, which you should already be familiar with in some degree. Then, we will look at the coordination between the EOD Coordination Cell and the HQ staff. We will discuss common support requests and then review four essential support requirements in more detail.

Slide 3


Learning Outcomes Lesson 3.6

- Understand typical staff organization
- Explain Common Operational Support Requirements
- Explain the planning considerations for medical support
- List the planning considerations for security
- Explain the planning considerations for Engineering and transportation

3


Let us review the Learning Outcomes for this lesson. By the end of this lesson, you should recognise the standard external support requirements for a MILEOD. You should understand the basic structure and functions of the UN Staff offices and how they can assist in the support coordinating efforts. You will have a better understanding of some of the most critical support requirements after this lesson.

Slide 4



It is understood that logistics is generally a national responsibility. Once established, the UN logistics support group provides continuing support through a system of lead nations, civilian contracts, force logistical support group or a combination of the three. MILEOD units will not typically be task-organised with communications, medical, and other support. As such, these must be provided by clearly defined parent units or other mission elements that will provide this support. Similarly, the requirement for support during EOD operations must be coordinated, and the C2 relationships established. This functional support will often be coordinated with the Force HQ and in some cases with the DMS/CMS logistic staffs.

Slide 5



Outside of the EOD Support Cell and National Support Element, the Force HQ is where much of your mission specific external support will be. Let us review the primary Force HQ staff organisations and their functions.


[Highlight the staff elements outlined in gold]

U1	Personnel Services
U2	Information
U3	Operations
U4	Logistics
U5	Plans
U6	Communications
U7	Training
U8	Engineering
U9	CIMIC

To ensure mission success is crucial to know which staff section within the Force HQ to coordinate the external support is essential in ensuring mission success. It is also essential to understand that staff coordination does not require equal mission support. Just because you have coordinated with a staff officer, it does NOT mean that the resources have been allocated or tasked to support the MILEOD requirement. It is essential to follow up to ensure that the official tasking order has been published by the Force Commander or the Director / Chief of Mission Support.

Once a tasking order has been issued, then further coordination should be conducted directly with the supporting unit. In some cases, this may only be possible through an LO or phone/email but more effectively done in person when possible. Remember to coordinate for an interpreter when the support comes from a unit that may not speak the same language.

Slide 6



We discussed earlier the various options for the configuration of the MILEOD within the Force Command. Depending on the organisation used, the staff coordination methods will vary, but the fundamentals will remain the same. The senior EOD representative must ensure that the methods for coordination for external support are understood within the current mission Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). The organisation of the Mission will change over time; therefore, reviewing and revising SOPs and the Points of Contact (POC) must be a continuous process. Next, we will look at some common examples of the external support that requires prior coordination.

Slide 7

Common Requests for Support

- Security Forces / Recce
- Search
- Transportation
- Use of Heavy Engineer Assets / MHE
- Communications
- CREW
- Interpreter
- Liaison with Emergency Services

Here are some of the most common support requirements that need coordination. Let us have a detailed look at some of these requirements.

Slide 8

CASEVAC Support

- Casualty Evacuation vs Medical Evacuation
- UN Standards for CASEVAC
- 10/1/2 Guidelines
- Methods

Air CASEVAC planning ref: UNMUMAVN at <http://research.un.org/stm>

8

This is one of the most critical external support requirements. This support will hopefully not be used often, but due to the unique nature of the MILEOD mission, the likelihood of severe injuries is high. It is essential to differentiate between the terms Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) and Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC).

MEDEVAC is the evacuation of mission personnel due to any number of illnesses or injuries. This could be a broken leg on the camp or an illness requiring long term care. CASEVAC, on the other hand, is an immediate requirement for the evacuation of severely injured personnel from the point of injury to definitive care.

The planning factors and standards for CASEVAC vary by TCC and mission. The general planning figures in UN missions are 10 minutes for self/buddy care. An hour to get to care by medically trained personnel, and 2 hours to arrive at definitive care. MILEOD personnel and support staff need to keep these factors in mind during mission planning.

The MILEOD team will not have the internal assets to accomplish this CASEVAC. They will require support through a general support plan or directly through the supported force. In some cases, the standards of the TCC might be more stringent, and the national support element may have additional support assets to commit to this effort.

MILEOD elements must understand what the CASEVAC plan is for a given mission and what the primary and alternative methods are for executing that CASEVAC by air and by ground.

While the primary threat to the EOD operator is the device itself, there are undoubtedly secondary threats which can attack the EOD operator directly or distract the operator from following established standards. Maintaining security reduces the risk to the EOD operator and the mission. Let us look at how to achieve that security.

Slide 9

Coordination for Security

- Operational Cordon
 - Controlled by Security Force Commander
- EOD Cordon
 - Includes the Incident Control Point (ICP)
 - Determined and controlled by the EOD Team Leader
- Route Security
 - To and from EOD Scene-of-Action
- Coordination with Host Nation
 - Security Forces, local authorities
 - Infrastructure management
 - Supporting/Inter-Sector UN Forces

9

Security reduces the risk to the MILEOD operator and the risk to the mission. During mission planning, local security must be coordinated to ensure the MILEOD operator can focus on the threat device and not worry about bystanders or threat actors. The local security must understand the requirements of the MILEOD operator.

In some cases, the element of the supported unit now becomes the local supporting unit to the MILEOD element. They must understand the local threat, as well as the requirements of the EOD team. These include EOD / Operational Cordon distances, safe wait times, CREW, and communications procedures. Area security may also require preventing external actors from exploiting the time required to complete EOD events.

The UN air and ground elements are to be considered. Area security could also include host nation security forces. When a MILEOD element responds to an explosive hazard from a remote location, transportation and route security are required. This could include both UN elements, as well as the Host Nations (HN) security forces.

HN security forces can be instrumental in reducing the time required to respond and in controlling the local populace. Also, HN elements can aid in obtaining information about the device. Coordinating for interpreter and liaison officers with the host nation security forces requires prior coordination to ensure timely and effective support.

Slide 10

Engineering Support

- Route Recce
- Route Clearance
- Vulnerable Point / Area threat mitigation
- General Engineering for Force Protection
- Heavy Engineer Equipment

Engineer planning refer to UN MUM EN at
<http://research.un.org/stm>

10

Engineers can provide multiple capabilities that enhance the effectiveness of the EOD element and the overall mission. Very often, the first area of interest when generating a temporary or dedicated route clearance capability is a recon of the routes.

Engineers can conduct this recon using their heavy equipment at the vulnerable points and areas to reduce the threat's ability to emplace IEDs. Engineers execute point and area searches to identify and isolate explosive ordnance.

During a response, heavy engineer and Material-Handling Equipment (MHE) can be used to remove rubble and debris to improve access to an explosive hazard. This will allow the use of a remote approach. Due to the complementary missions of MILEOD and engineer units, often these units are organizationally aligned to enhance support coordination.

Slide 11

Communications Support

- **Communications Equipment**
 - UN Force / Inter-Sector Communications
 - Communications with HN Security Forces
- **CREW (ECM)**
 - Employment
 - Frequency spectrum management

11

The UN provides the equipment for communications between the mission, force or sector HQs and the MILEOD as UN-Owned Equipment (UNOE). This ensures that the UN military EOD unit has secure, standardised military-grade communications within the force and mission's communications network.

The MILEOD internal communications are a TCC responsibility. A contingent's internal communications and information systems include all line and radio communications from a contingent's highest headquarters down to its lowest subordinate element. The MILEOD support cell should ensure that frequencies are de-conflicted with the Force U6.

In some instances, when communication support is needed between the MILEOD and the host nation security forces, the MILEOD requests this communications support through the CMS. Often this communication's support link is provided by a liaison officer with the host nation's network.

An example is the HN police positioning a vehicle near the Incident Control Point (ICP) in order to maintain communications with local police, airport security, medical, or fire services. If the MILEOD has CREW as part of contingent owned or UN provided equipment, frequency management is coordinated with the Force U6.

Slide 12

Take Away

- Understand the UN Mission organization
- Coordinate early
- LOs can be a key enabler
- Continuous process

12

Summary

We should understand UN HQs and staff elements that facilitate and coordinate the MILEOD support requirements. Early coordination for support reduces risk to both the EOD element and their missions. Liaison officers are key facilitators to help assist in this coordination and communication. Staff coordination with the MILEOD is a continuous process. The situation on the ground is dynamic and therefore, planning and supporting for MILEOD operations are constantly in flux requiring constant coordination.

Reference Slides

Abbreviations

- | | |
|--|--|
| • Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) | • Force Commander (FC) |
| • Counter Radio-controlled Electronic Warfare (CREW) | • Head of Mission (HOM) |
| • Director/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) | • Incident Control Point (ICP) |
| • Explosive Ordnance Disposal Coordination Center – (EODCC) | • Liaison Officer (LO) |
| | • Material Handling Equipment (MHE) |
| | • Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) |

Abbreviations

- | | |
|--|---|
| • Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) | • Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) |
| • MILEOD – Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal | • Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) |
| • National Support Element (NSE) | • Troop Contributing Country (TCC) |
| • Point of Contact (POC) | • UN-Owned Equipment (UNOE) |
| • Senior Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) | |

Reference Slides Continued

Abbreviations

- **U1 -Personnel Services**
- **U2 - Information**
- **U3 - Operations**
- **U4 - Logistics**
- **U5 - Plans**
- **U6 - Communications**
- **U7 - Training**
- **U8 - Engineering**
- **U9 - CIMIC**

Learning Activity**3.6****RESOURCES**

N/A

TIME

3-5 minutes

PREPARATION

Ask the participants to answer the following questions.

NOTES TO INSTRUCTORS:

Reinforce the learning outcomes and assess the knowledge of the group and individuals.

Questions:

1. What capabilities can an Engineering unit provide to support MILEOD operations?

Answer: Route Recce; Route Clearance; Vulnerable Point / Area threat mitigation; General Engineering for Force Protection; Heavy Engineer Equipment.

2. Who supplies equipment for communications between the mission, force or sector HQs and the MILEOD?

Answer: The UN provides it as UN-Owned Equipment (UNOE).

3. What important EOD role can female military personnel in a MILEOD perform that may be more of a challenge for male personnel?

Answer: Female EOD personnel have an advantage when in contact with the local population. Specifically, when questioning the female population and juvenile witnesses to an incident and in mission areas where cultural sensitivities are present.

Module 3



Operational Framework Wrap Up

At the conclusion of Module 3, some key elements should become clearer:

- A general understanding of the critical operational framework covering a MILEOD operating in UN peacekeeping operation
- The main capabilities, tasks, and organisation for MILEOD operating in UN PKOs
- The TTX will give you a better understanding of the MILEOD support to a UN PKO along with the essential planning parameters, roles and tasks performed
- The MILEOD is an enabling unit; we can gain a general understanding of how to use their capabilities in tactical scenarios properly
- The TTX provides you with some tools to apply in your decision-making process when employing the MILEOD and while working with other units/actors when it comes to their use and how they might be able to support POC tasks in UN Missions
- A focus on the tactical level employment of a MILEOD and a general overview of the operational level concepts to help leaders understand how a MILEOD can contribute to the accomplishment of the UN mandate



For Module 3, Learning Activity (LA) go to Annex B -STM Learning Activities-TTX

The following annexes and references can be found in separate folders to aid in the delivery of the modules:

- **Annex A:** PowerPoint Slide Presentations
- **Annex B:** Learning Activity- Scenario-Based Tabletop (TTX) Exercise
- **Annex C:** Training Guidance / Pre-Deployment Training Models
- **Annex D:** UNMAS Lessons and training materials
- **Annex E:** Other references and background material

Special Note for Annex D - UNMAS prepared the lessons in Annex D as an introductory overview of more substantial technical courses (92) of instruction for Peace Keeping forces. The lessons in Annex D can be used as supplemental or reinforcing training materials for Military EOD unit. The lessons cover Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD) and IED Disposal (IEDD) competencies for dedicated Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and IEDD forces deploying in a peacekeeping operation.

The CMD and IEDD lessons are designed to train forces from zero knowledge to IEDD level 4, providing forces a qualified CMD and IEDD capability in line with International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) certification levels. The second half of the courses cover IED-Threat Mitigation (IED-TM) and Explosive Hazard Awareness Training (EHAT) for all deploying Peace Keeping staff and missions forces. IED-TM and EHAT provide staff officers and ground forces with the necessary knowledge to properly employ CMD and IEDD forces and to recognise explosive hazards present in mission environments.

Lastly, there is a Train the Trainer block that can be provided to interested TCCs that provides CMD and IEDD experts the necessary tools to take the UNMAS curriculum and implement the package within their nation to increase their training capability to the UN training standard.

[End of document]