

**United Nations**  
**Department of Peace Operations**  
**Ref. 2019.16.**



## **Guidelines**

**September 2019**

---

---

# **Combined Military and Police Coordination Mechanisms in Peace Operations**

---

---

Approved by: Jean-Pierre Lacroix, USG DPO  
Approval date: September 2019  
Contact: Office of the Military Adviser/ Office of the Police Adviser  
Review date: September 2021

---

---

---

**DPO Guidelines on**

**Combined Military and Police Coordination Mechanisms in Peace Operations**

---

**CONTENTS:**

- A. Purpose
- B. Scope
- C. Rationale
- D. Guidelines
- E. References
- F. Monitoring and Compliance
- G. Contact
- H. History

---

**ANNEXES**

- A. Generic Scenarios – Response Mechanism
  - B. Combined POC Actions in Generic Scenarios.
- 

**A. PURPOSE**

1. Provide guidance to military and police components in UN peace operations tasked with implementing mandates of reducing threats and protecting civilians.

---

**B. SCOPE**

- 2. These guidelines apply to all military and police personnel deployed in UN field missions with protection mandates, as well as staff members of the Departments of Peace Operations (DPO), United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ).
- 3. Key personnel of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs), including decision makers and planners shall use these guidelines as reference as they train and prepare contingents for a UN peace operation.
- 4. These guidelines focus on military and police coordination in a broad range of operational contexts involving security and public order situations as well as addressing protection<sup>1</sup> concerns in peace operations in differing operational contexts including the threats or acts of physical violence including but not limited to those perpetrated by non-state actors, including armed groups, and state actors whether acting individually or collectively at operational and tactical

---

<sup>1</sup> Protection in these guidelines means and includes protection of civilians; protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment (force protection); and ensuring the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel.

levels which require a combined military and police response. These guidelines provide planners and commanders with the flexibility to adapt the planning and execution of operations as the situation evolves.

---

### **C. RATIONALE**

5. The military and police components/and or guard units are the sole providers of physical protection provided by a UN peace operation, and thus their cooperation and coordination is critical. Military and police peacekeepers often conduct combined or joint activities, when preventing, deterring or pre-empting violence against civilians, including joint (high-visibility) patrols, information gathering, deploying to strategic locations, or even engaging perpetrators of violence. Although the modalities for cooperation between military and police are broadly outlined in the DPO/DOS Policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the respective guidelines on military and police command and operations, including provisions on the primacy of each actor in different broadly defined circumstances, each mission should develop specific combined operational guidelines, detailed communication and reporting lines, delineation of responsibilities and tasks, delegation of authority and transfer of operational command between the police and military contingents in peacekeeping. Where a peacekeeping operation has a mandate to protect civilians it applied regardless of the source of the threat. Physical threats to civilians may emanate from sources of non-state actors, including armed groups, criminal gangs, and state actors including military, paramilitary, criminal, political, ideological, and/or other nature. Where the scale and variety of crime and violence are regularly severe and host-state police and other law enforcement agencies (HSP) may be more militarized, less able to police crimes and violence, or in some instances, together with the host-State armed forces, may be the source of violations themselves. In some areas, elements in the security forces, serious and organized crime groups and violent extremists may use violence against civilians as a tactic. In certain contexts, such threats may be further aggravated by the blurring of lines and collaboration among transnational criminal networks, extremist groups, political actors, and/or some combination thereof.

6. These guidelines complement existing guidance and should be read together with the DPKO/DFS Policy on the Protection of Civilians (2019 forthcoming) and the OHCHR/DPKO/DPA/DFS policy on Human Rights in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Political Missions, Protection of Civilians Implementing Guidelines for Military Components of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Guidelines on the Role of United Nations Police in Protection of Civilians, and other relevant UN military and police guidance materials.

---

### **D. GUIDELINES**

#### **7. Protection in different operational contexts**

7.1. UN peace operations are deployed in a broad range of contexts including situations of armed conflict or post-conflict, characterised by the commission of mass atrocities, poor governance, and violent instability. As a result, the appropriate strategic approach to the protection varies between missions and will be decided according to the political context, the nature, source and motivation behind the threat to civilians and the capacity of the host state and other protection actors. In some missions, different layers and contexts within a

country as well as different geographic areas will require tailored approaches and strategies.

7.2. In situations where threats to civilian stem from politically motivated actions and actors, it is important to develop an in-depth analysis of the linkages between the potential perpetrator and the political process. While the mission should still be prepared to provide protection, a more durable solution should be sought within a broader strategy of early warning, political engagement, human rights monitoring, and investigation and reporting, mobilisation of regional and international actors, use of good offices, dialogue with potential perpetrators and their influencers and use of public statements and reporting.

7.3. Where threats to civilians come from non-state armed groups, the motivation for the threat can range from political, economic or entirely criminal objectives to a response to ethnic, religious or land-based disputes. A tailored approach to each specific armed or criminal group, which take into account the vulnerabilities of the population including specific risks faced by women and children, should be used to respond to the POC threat. Activities can range from support to the host state police and security forces to maintain or restore state authority, community-based activities, to the use of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and community violence reduction (CVR) programmes.

7.4. In response to inter-communal violence, the mission may prioritise community dialogue, mediation and reconciliation activities and engagement with political actors who may have influence at the local level. Support can be provided to host state authorities to ensure the maintenance of law and public order. Uniformed components can also act as a deterrent through their presence and high-visibility patrolling.

7.5. Where the mission is confronted with threats of, or ongoing physical violence by host-State police and security forces, the mission should use all possible avenues of dialogue and advocacy with the host state including training, human rights monitoring, investigations and reporting as well as engagement of other domestic and international actors. The mission can promote accountability for perpetrators and support for justice processes. Furthermore, missions with POC mandates have a clear responsibility and obligation to intervene and stop ongoing violence against civilians by state security actors and to provide physical protection to civilians at risk.

7.6. In situations where threats to civilians may stem from the actions of other non-UN international security forces and their operations, the mission can take joint mitigating action including through monitoring, investigation reporting, political engagement and advocacy, including through providing POC and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) support to planning processes. Particular efforts could be made to sensitise international security forces on the need to ensure transparency and public information for allegations of conduct and breaches of IHL. Support to international security forces should be in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to non-UN Security Forces (HRDDP).

7.7. Asymmetric threats may require a differentiated response by the mission, especially where peacekeepers themselves are specifically a target themselves and as such may then endanger civilians through their mere presence or through their interactions with them. In

such situations, the best approach to POC may involve working through partnerships to build and support local capacities to make communities more resilient to these threats.

7.8. Peace operations should also be aware of the potential risks to civilians caused by their own actions, including from the impact of military and police operations, as a result of mission deployment or as reprisals against those cooperating with the mission. Mission should ensure that these risks are addressed through appropriate risk mitigating measures and contingency planning which take into account civilian harm mitigation. When interacting with communities, missions should consider the possible risk of reprisals and follow a ‘do no harm’ approach. Investigations should be conducted in situations where a mission may have directly or indirectly put civilians at risk.

7.9. Peace operations are mandated to protect civilians within capabilities and areas of operations and there are some situations where missions may not be able to act to protect civilians, especially where preventative approaches have not managed to halt or mitigate threats to civilians. This might include situations where the level of violence or capacity of the perpetrator is beyond the capability of the mission to respond, for example where there are continuing or organised threats to civilians by host state forces or mass atrocity situations. In developing their protection strategies, missions should prioritise threats to civilians based on the likelihood, impact of the threat and its potential level of harm as well as the available capacities of the mission and the roles of other protection actors.

8. **Guiding Principles.** The following principles apply to all missions with Protection of Civilians mandates.

8.1. POC mandates are implemented in line with international law and complement and support the mission’s mandate to promote and protect human rights. Peacekeepers must abide by international law and the mission Rules of Engagement (ROE) and police components Directives on the Use of Force (DUF).

8.2. POC must be prioritized in decisions regarding the allocation and use of available capacity and resources. The mission must prioritize those situations or incidents of greatest concern and allocate its resources accordingly.

8.3. The primary responsibility of governments remains even when a peacekeeping mission with a POC mandate is deployed. The mission should support the host state’s protection efforts but can also act independently to protect civilians when the state is unable or unwilling to protect its own civilians, or where government forces themselves pose a threat to civilians. When the mission is providing support to non-UN security actors, the assistance must also be in line with the Human Rights “Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to non-UN Security Forces” (HRDDP).

8.4. Peacekeepers have the authority and the responsibility to provide protection within their capabilities and areas of deployment no matter the scale of the violence and irrespective of the source of the threat.

8.5. Protection is not only provided in reaction to an attack. Activities to protect civilians should be planned, deliberate and on-going, and the mission should constantly work to prevent, pre-empt and respond to violence against civilians. This should be done in a

coordinated way amongst mission components based on a threat assessment, mission POC strategy and concept of operations (CONOPS).

8.6. Under effective command and control: it is the responsibility of commanders of all contingents and units to ensure all those under their command understand and comply with the ROE and DUF. The Force Commander (FC) and the Head of Police Component (HoPC) are ultimately responsible for its enforcement. Failure to protect civilians as a result of weak command-and-control structures or insufficient levels of compliance may lead to the suffering and death of vulnerable individuals and can compromise the overall credibility and effectiveness of the peacekeeping operation in the country.

8.7. Adhere to the peacekeeping principles, to include maintaining consent of the host state, ensuring impartiality in implementing their mandate, and use force only in self-defence and as otherwise authorized by the Security Council, including for the POC.

8.8. Ensuring the POC requires concerted and coordinated action between uniformed and civilian components of a mission under the mission's POC strategy, which must inform and guide the planning and conduct of activities by the military and police<sup>2</sup> component.

8.9. Humanitarian UN agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) undertake a broad range of activities in support of the protection of civilians. Close and systematic coordination with these actors, through established mechanisms, including those required under the Integrated Assessment and Planning policy, is essential while assessing protection priorities and planning POC activities. Humanitarian actors rely upon their neutrality, impartiality and operational independence to discharge their mandates effectively and safely and it is therefore necessary to maintain a clear distinction between their role and that of political and military actors. The Protection Cluster (at both HQ and field levels) is the standard forum through which the humanitarian community coordinates protection activities and is a useful point of liaison with humanitarian actors through which to exchange information and analysis on protection.

8.10. Assessments of civilian risks should be conducted in consultation with women, men, girls and boys of the local community and with a view to empowering them and supporting the mechanisms and community-based organizations they have established to ensure their own protection, if any. Civilians are in the best place to understand the risks they face. Care must be taken not to expose people to risk or cause harm through their engagement.

8.11. Peacekeeping operations will ensure that child protection is addressed pursuant to all DPO and DOS child protection guidance and relevant Security Council resolutions on Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC).

8.12. As part of the peace operation or political mission's efforts to implement the protection of civilians' mandate, where mandated, the human rights component advises on immediate and longer-term strategies for the protection of civilians, sexual and gender-based violence, and on cases of individuals seeking protection, including human rights defenders.

---

<sup>2</sup> DPKO Manual on Mission-based Police Planning in Peace Operations (2017.13)

9. **An Approach to Implement Protection and Security.** United Nations peacekeeping operationalises the POC through a three-tiered approach. The POC is a key element of a mission’s strategy, attained through a combination of general and specific tasks **where military and police are working together or where the roles of the two components may overlap.** The Tiers are not hierarchical and are conducted simultaneously in accordance with the mission mandate, mission phase and in light of the circumstances on the ground.

9.1. **Tier-I. Protection through Dialogue and Engagement.** This tier’s activities include dialogue with or demarche of a perpetrator or potential perpetrator, conflict resolution and mediation between parties to the conflict, persuading the government and other relevant actors to intervene to protect civilians, and other initiatives that seek to protect civilians through dialogue and direct engagement. Combined tasks of military and police – Tier-I include:

- a. Participate in information collection and analysis.
- b. Liaise and advocate for POC and respect for human rights/IHL with host-State authorities, including HSP and armed forces, at all levels. This could include mainstreaming of POC into daily co-located activities with host-State police and military, such as provision of advice on appropriate host-State police and military response to threats to civilians.
- c. Leverage the HRDDP and persuade authorities to adopt risk mitigation measures such as excluding problematic units or commanders from operations or requiring pledges of good conduct.
- d. Support HSP engagement with local communities, for example, through participation in de-escalation and reconciliation efforts jointly with, e.g. civil affairs officers and civil society groups.
- e. Provide security-related public information and/or contribute to public awareness campaigns.
- f. Record and share allegations of violations of human rights and IHL with the human rights component for verification, investigation and follow-up, where feasible.
- g. Where appropriate and relevant, conduct joint investigations and joint advocacy while maintaining confidentiality.
- h. Contribute to early-warning mechanisms, analyse trends, and plan for contingencies, including with civilian components.
- i. Contribute to Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangements (MARA) on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) led by Women Protection Advisors (WPAs) and Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on Six Grave Violations led by Child Protection Advisors (CPAs), through information-sharing and supporting political advocacy with parties to the conflict.
- j. Strengthen community-oriented approaches and promote engagement with communities; particularly through the cornerstones of UN community-oriented policing<sup>3</sup>:
  - Consulting with communities (regular solicitation of input from communities about crime, disorder, and activities that generate fear);

---

<sup>3</sup> DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping operations and Special Political Missions (2015.15) p. 30, and p. DPKO/DFS Manual on Community-Oriented Policing in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2018.04) p. 10

- Responding to communities (willingness and ability to respond to the security needs of individuals and groups in communities and to give priority to these needs);
  - Mobilizing communities (helping the community organize itself in controlling crime); and
  - Solving recurring problems (police and communities working preventively to change conditions that lead to crime rather than responding over and over again to individual incidents)
- k. Support community-based early warning mechanisms and protection committees, activities and plans.

9.2. **Tier II. Provision of Physical Protection.** This Tier encompasses those activities by police and military components involving the show or use of force to prevent, deter, and respond to situations in which civilians are under the threat of physical violence. Those actions are informed by and implemented in close coordination with substantive civilian sections, which help guide the objectives and conduct of military and police operations through joint POC planning and coordination structures. MC and FPU must act swiftly and decisively when preventive mechanisms of the mission fail to protect civilians in compliance with ROE/DUF and using requisite force within capabilities and AOR. It is within this Tier that mission's principal means of implementing POC will be its military and police components and aims at prevention and assurance of robust intent to protect civilians. Supporting military and police tasks include:

- a. Monitor, gather and share information, analyse, maintain heightened situational awareness and report with a focus on early warning and response, including with the mission's civilian components.
- b. Conduct risk and threat assessments taking into account vulnerabilities of civilians, patterns of violence, displacement and coping strategies (in coordination with other civilian mission components).
- c. Carry out joint scenario-based exercises for contingency preparedness and civilian harm mitigation with civilian components.
- d. Identify high risk areas/ tension spots in conjunction with civilian components and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). Conduct targeted high-visibility mobile and dismounted (foot) patrols, either independently, with other mission components such as civil affairs, human rights or the POC, Child Protection (CP), or Women's Protection (WP) advisers or jointly with host-State police.
- e. Engage in robust and intensive mobile and foot patrols in areas with high threats to civilians, to deter spoilers from acts inimical to peace and security.
- f. Maintain an active presence at/ around refugee and/or internally displaced people (IDP) camps and/or team sites.
- g. Maintain a robust posture and/or high-profile presence in areas of potential threat and among vulnerable groups.
- h. Deploy proactively to strategic locations to deter attacks on civilians.
- i. Provide protective defensive rings/ positions around civilian settlements.
- j. Undertake joint proactive law enforcement operations, e.g. joint patrolling and/or implementation of joint fixed and/or mobile check-points, in compliance with the HRDDP.

- k. Conduct weapons searches and seizures (e.g., at POC sites).
- l. Establish mechanisms to ensure operational coordination with HSP, including operation and contingency planning, civilian harm mitigation mechanisms to minimise possible human rights violations of jointly planned and/or implemented operations as well as the conduct of after action reviews.
- m. Participate in mission-wide POC mechanisms, e.g., Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) or Joint Assessment Missions (JAMs).
- n. Participate in POC coordination mechanisms at Mission HQ and field office sector level.
- o. Maintain close contacts with the Protection Cluster on contingency planning and to exchange information.
- r. Establish buffer/weapons-free zones.
- s. Ensure freedom of movement and route security for civilians, including refugees/IDPs and supporting deployments of human rights staff to areas at risk of human rights violations.
- t. If civilians are under threat of physical violence a robust response may be required, including:
  - Show of force (as deterrence).
  - Force inter-positioning between potential perpetrators and civilians.
  - Direct military action against potential perpetrators with clear hostile intent to harm civilians.

**9.3. Tier III. Establishing a Protective Environment.** Environment building activities are frequently programmatic in nature and designed with committed resources for medium to long-term peacebuilding objectives. Sometimes presented as separate mandated tasks under country specific resolutions, these activities contribute to POC, and are generally planned independently of POC. This Tier would typically include the support to the political process, promotion and protection of human rights advocacy, fighting impunity, promoting justice and establishing rule of law, supporting compensation and rehabilitation of victims. The military and police play a crucial role in this Tier by providing support to the human rights and the rule of law mandates while contributing to (along with the host state, UN entities and mission components) establish security conditions to facilitate humanitarian efforts. Other potential supporting tasks in support of this Tier include:

- a. Assist HSP in the assessment of their functions and structure, and the development of a plan for enhancement of protection capacities.
- b. In coordination with the human rights component, train military, police and other law enforcement agencies on respecting national and international humanitarian and human rights law in the execution of their duties.
- c. Leverage the HRDDP by implementing mitigating measures, such as performing human rights background checks on host-state police set to receive support.
- d. Build the operational skills of the host-State police to provide protection through Humanitarian corridors to allow the safe passage of humanitarian goods and/or personnel from one point to another in an area of active fighting.
- e. Support the establishment of host-state accountability mechanisms for internal and external oversight and performance management.

- f. Assist and support the development and implementation of effective security strategies in order to counter serious crimes, especially those targeting IDPs and other vulnerable groups including women and children, and those leading to the destabilization of the country.
- g. Assist and support the development and implementation of effective strategies to enhance security and respect for the civilian nature of refugee/ IDP camps in coordination with humanitarian actors.
- h. Assist in the establishment of an effective intelligence capacity to collate, analyse and process information on criminal gangs, particularly individuals and armed groups capable of destabilizing peace and security.
- i. Carry out initiatives to facilitate voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return, local integration or resettlement of displaced persons, e.g. call centres or human rights training in cooperation with the human rights component.
- j. Work with human rights components on establishing protection mechanisms for witnesses and victims.
- k. Supporting other mission components in mandate implementation, including building rule of law and criminal justice system, security sector reform (SSR), DDR/CVR and mine action support activities.
- l. Contribute to public information, outreach campaigns on UN and HSP role in POC, in coordination with the wider mission effort.
- m. Identify human rights violations and record and share information with human rights components for their investigation and follow-up, including incidents of sexual and gender-based violence and violence against vulnerable groups and violations against children.


### **Tactical Decision and Response Model**

10. When considering POC at the operational and tactical level, the specific roles played by police and military are described in the four phases below. The phases are not sequential and may be undertaken simultaneously or independently, depending upon the nature or imminence of the threat. Beyond generic scenarios, police and military might face certain unique challenges and should develop specific guidance similar to the template at Annex A. Units may be required to use force to protect civilians against threats of violence in any or all of the four phases below. Determining on the appropriate level of force is based on a number of factors including threat intensity, the effect of action/inaction, actions by other protection actors and the availability of resources and assets to conduct operations that create a credible force posture. It must be based on the graduation of the use of force and in compliance with International Humanitarian Law, human rights law, Mission's Rules of Engagement and UN Police's Directives on the Use of Force.


- 10.1. Where threats of/or acts of violence exist against people and/or property exist, the appropriate lead agency must be identified as outlined the Generic Scenarios below. The lead agency will be responsible for conducting a Cumulative Situational Assessment (CSA) that will consider both the scale and intensity of any incident or situation to determine whether they retain or transfer operation primacy.

## Cumulative Situational Assessment (CSA)


10.2. The CSA includes three specific elements: (i) Threat, (ii) Exposure & (iii) Necessity. Those elements when applied to the Matrix of Scale and Intensity will inform your subjective assessment and continuous re-assessment of an incident. The CSA may escalate and/or de-escalate more than once during an incident.



Any response needs to be reasonable, timely and proportionate in direct correlation to the level of threat or act of violence.



10.3. The decision to escalate or de-escalate and the application of the appropriate tactical response(s), must be continuously reassessed using the Scale & Intensity matrix, so as the most reasonable options are selected, given the known circumstances.



10.4. **Assurance and Prevention:** Projecting mission presence, including military and police patrols and other Mission deployments, is one of the most visible and reassuring forms of security that can be provided to the local population. This demonstrates to

the local population the UN's (MC and/or UNPOL) intent to protect them from physical violence. Prevention includes activities undertaken when no specific POC threat has been identified (latent threat). Military and police can contribute by:

- a. Conducting routine tasks, such as check points, information gathering and analysis.
- b. Ensuring a visible presence and assuring the population of the mission's intent, commencing dialogue with communities that can support early warning by the communities, host-State and the UN.
- c. Mitigating community conflicts that could escalate into physical violence, e.g. in cooperation with Civil Affairs, Human Rights or Judicial Affairs working with formal and/or traditional justice mechanisms.
- d. Good communication, education and high-profile joint patrolling.
- e. Alerting the human rights component which can temporarily deploy human rights officers to at risk areas and advise on courses of action for emerging or ongoing threats.
- f. Supporting extension of state authority in adherence to the rule of law through monitoring, mentoring, and advising, in coordination with the civilian components.
- g. Ensuring that host-State police and other law enforcement agencies are sensitized to and have received adequate training in national and international human rights and humanitarian law standards, in coordination with the human rights component.
- h. Supporting the strengthening of the criminal justice chain, including investigations, as well as with other rule of law mission components on prosecution, adjudication, and detention/imprisonment, in coordination with the civilian components.
- i. Supporting development and functioning of accountability mechanisms for internal and external oversight, transparency and performance management of police and other law enforcement agencies, in coordination with the civilian components.

**10.5. Pre-emption.** Where measures in Phase-1 prove insufficient, or when heightened risks are detected, increased pre-emptive measures may be required including:

- a. Heightened situational awareness (intense information gathering);
- b. Increased high-profile patrolling including joint patrols with mission Human Rights and other civilian components. Such patrols should, where possible, interact with communities and should be targeted (by location and timing) based on inputs from partners, communities and other protection actors;
- c. Closer liaison with government/non-government armed actors and potential parties to the conflict;
- d. Advocating with, persuading, and providing advice and support (in line with the HRDDP) to host-State police and other law enforcement agencies to extend their presence and ensure rule of law and public order in areas under threat.
- e. Enhanced monitoring, reporting and advocacy on the security situation, including on human rights in close cooperation with the human rights component.
- f. Proactive engagement, advocacy with and support (in line with the HRDDP) to host-state law enforcement services whose elements have perpetrated violence against civilians, e.g., activities to support further sensitization and training, criminal accountability for violations, and reinforced monitoring, reporting, command/control and accountability mechanisms

- g. Pre-emption is pro-active; forces should intercept, neutralize or defuse situations before hostile acts can be carried out.
- h. The use of intervening forces and deployment of FPU, Quick Reaction Forces (QRF), Special Forces or Reserves at forward locations.

10.6. **Response.** If physical violence/coercion by actors/groups materialises and has escalated in either scale or intensity of harm beyond that which could reasonably be expected to be addressed by either host-State personnel and/or i) individual police officers; ii) formed police units, more forceful measures are necessary to deal with the situation. Direct military action, the deployment of inter-positional troops and the use of force are options that must be considered. Response should be rapid. Swift action through the speedy movement of forces such as attack helicopters, QRFs and reconnaissance can prevent, limit or stop harm to civilians. The level of response may need to escalate to the use of lethal force depending upon the threat, DUFs and ROE. All response should include harm mitigation measures and be followed up by after action reviews, where necessary in coordination with the civilian components.

10.7. Where mandated, UN Police can collect, register and preserve evidence of crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and other serious crimes including sexual violence and grave violations of human rights, for subsequent criminal investigation and prosecution of alleged perpetrators at national or international level.

10.8. **Consolidation.** This phase involves activities that address stabilization post-crisis. The aim is to assist the local population and host nation authorities to normalize the situation. Consolidation activities create the conditions in which a return to crisis is diminished. Follow-up remains crucial. After an attack or hostile act, the local population will require continued support, aid, protection and reassurance. Measures to be taken may include: immediate medical care, collection of evidence, notification of appropriate civilian experts including to conduct human rights investigations and promote accountability for violations as appropriate (Human Rights, POC Advisors, Child Protection, WPAs and Gender Advisors), assessment of remedial and preventive measures, drafting of formal reports for follow-up with relevant authorities, and establishing defensive positions. However, it must be ensured that MC/ UNPOL are adequately supported by the civilian component and efforts be made to disengage the MC at the earliest.

## **Responsibility to Respond**

11. The primary and supporting/backup responsibility to respond to incidents will vary from type of threat/ incidents culminating out of the threat. Types of police and military components responsibilities are appended below:

11.1. **Public Order Incidents.** HSP (primary), Individual Police Officer (IPO)/FPU and MC (on request) in that order.

11.2. **Situations of Public Disorder.**

a. **Non-Military Nature – “Blue Box”.**

- (1) **Command and Control:** HSP (Primary), IPO/FPU and MC (on request), in that order.
- (2) This generally refers to situations of public disorder including public order management, unrest and rioting where there is no sustained and large-scale/or wide-spread use of firearms or military-grade weaponry and that does not exceed HSP and/or UNPOL capability (FPU with SWAT/SIT team are able to manage unrest with armed perpetrators depending on the assessment of the UNPOL commander on the ground based on the level of threat and the capabilities and capacities of the FPU). Under these circumstances, IPO/FPU will cooperatively support the HSP (where applicable). The HoPC— or tasked delegates — may request MC to perform specific missions or tasks, as required. Under these conditions, the UNPOL Officer designated by the HoPC at the location of the incident will exercise tactical control and have overall command.

**b. Military Nature – “Green Box”.**

- (1) Command and Control: MC (Primary), IPO/ FPU and HSP, in that order.
- (2) This generally refers to situations of public disorder including public order management, unrest, or rioting where there is sustained and large-scale/or wide-spread use of firearms and/or military-grade weaponry and where the threat exceeds HSP/ and/or UNPOL capability. Under these circumstances, MC will cooperatively support relevant IPO/FPU and HSP, as applicable. The FC — or tasked delegates — may request IPO/FPU to perform specific missions or tasks, as required. Under these conditions, the senior Military Commander will exercise tactical control and have overall command.

c. Hostile acts on IDP Camps, urban areas, government assets and installations. HSP (primary), IPO/FPU, MC in that order.

d. Disaster. As per the Disaster Management Plan (HSP, IPO/FPU and MC in coordination).

## 12. Methodology

Involvement of MC in routine public safety incident and/or violent demonstrations/riots is based on an accurate assessment of the situation. Handover of command and control is not permanent and is subject to change with escalation and de-escalation of a given situation. In such situations, UNPOL and/or MC may have primacy in command and control but act in support of or in cooperation with.

### 12.1. Routine Public Safety Activities:

- a. **Public Safety.** The UNPOL will visibly demonstrate a strong presence in large population centres by actively patrolling around the clock to the extent conditions permit. Areas of potential danger and unrest will be identified and kept under close scrutiny. However, a situation may arise where an incident is taking place close to a MC location or patrolled area. In such a case, the Sectors/ Units will

take immediate action to stabilize/resolve the situation and inform UNPOL/HSP and immediately inform the Regional Joint Operations Centre (JOC), Sector HQs and FHQ.

- b. **Collection and Dissemination of Information.** The information gathering process will remain activated. UNPOL will take the lead in the collection of factual information through the HSP and other law enforcement, intelligence and state security agencies and its own resources. It will share this information with the MC (FHQ and Sector HQs and local Military units) and JOC/Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) or the UNPOL representative. UNMOs, due to their frequent interaction with civilian and government officials, are also well-placed to collect relevant information in advance and this must be immediately disseminated to all stake holders.
- c. **Joint Patrolling.** When deemed necessary and jointly agreed, UNPOL, UNMOs and MC Forces will conduct joint patrolling. Frequency of patrols will be determined as circumstances dictate. Routine armoured personnel carrier (APC) patrols by either or a combination of FPU and MC on paved roads will continue to be conducted. These will increase in frequency as needed.
- d. **Monitoring.** In order to ensure that the rule of law is fully established in the country, UNPOL and HSP will develop a mechanism to closely monitor all criminal and rule of law related activities, while the MC provides general security cover.

12.2. **Involvement of Military in Routine Public Safety Incidents/ Violations.** In the process, a situation may arise where individuals or groups are discovered by military patrols perpetrating activities which are contrary to rule of law or criminal in nature. In such cases, military may apprehend and detain such individuals/groups, then hand them over to the UNPOL as soon as possible, in accordance with UN detention procedures. The human rights component shall be promptly informed of all detentions by UN personnel and be granted unconditional access to detained persons held in UN premises at all times.

- a. MC are not authorized to make arrests and UNPOL only when the appropriately mandated, but in accordance with DPO authorized ROE/DuF, may detain persons temporarily in the absence of the HSP. Detainees are to be handed over to the HSP as soon as possible, since they are the only authority allowed to arrest suspects.
- b. UNPOL should take over individuals detained by MC military with information and reasons for detention, and handover to Host-State authorities as soon as possible; unless the detainee's safety would be in doubt.

12.3. **Peaceful Demonstrations.** Peaceful demonstrations and related activities should not be challenged when conducted in accordance with the law. They will, however, be monitored closely and, if the Host-State government imposes restrictions on large assemblies and gatherings, such activities may be addressed by the Host-State as illegal. In such cases, the HSP/UNPOL "will react and not act" and the response will be based on "actions of the crowd and not their declared intentions or designation by the Host-State".

HSP/UNPOL/JMAC/JOC/Government security agencies/MC will utilize resources and information to project the intensity and intention of the demonstration. MC and UNPOL will monitor and assess the situation in coordination with civilian components, including the human rights component, and be prepared to provide support as requested.

12.4. **Violent Demonstrations.** Violent demonstrations should be dealt with by the Host State Police (HSP) expeditiously. However, MC, if first at the scene, will monitor, act and contain the situation, until the arrival of HSP and/or UNPOL to take charge of the incident. The MC will then assist as requested.

- a. **Information Gathering and sharing.** HSP will have primacy for information gathering of the incident and share it with all stakeholders, including UNPOL and MC. UN patrols will take note of any abnormal activity within their AOR and pass the information to the Sector Headquarters (SHQ)/UNPOL/UNMO/JMAC/JOC immediately. Allegations received or observed that may amount to human rights violations shall be promptly recorded and shared with the human rights component for verification, investigation and follow-up.
- b. **Employment/Positioning of HSP / UN Individual Police Officers / UN Formed Police Unit.** If no early warning has been received, but a potentially violent demonstration is observed by either the HSP and/or UNPOL, those personnel will establish a Liaison Point (LP) close to the scene of the event. UNPOL at either FHQ or sector HQ will be in constant touch with the LP and dispatch reinforcements immediately from either the police and/or military components as assessed as necessary via an OP Order. The communication link between FHQ/JOC and the UNPOL HQ will remain open and staffed for the full duration of the incident.
- c. **Employment of FPUs.** FPUs will always be kept informed and tasked to move to a stand-by position close to the scene of the incident and when warranted, will be employed to stabilize the situation. The UNPOL Incident Commander will keep MC informed, and if requested the MC Force will move to the scene and position itself for providing assistance – including through “intervention”.
- d. **Employment of MC.** When the UNPOL Incident Commander assesses that the situation cannot be safely managed by police means alone, will then request for either MC assistance under his/her command or to hand over responsibility for the situation formally to MC. This will require the following pre and post actions:
  - (1) The UNPOL Incident Commander will brief the Military Tactical Commander (MTC) about the incident and the latest situation.
  - (2) A clear verbal agreement of the handover of primacy in command and control will be communicated to all personnel deployed to the incident as well as to the FHQ and/or Sector Headquarters and be recorded there formally. Depending on the specific circumstances of the incident, UNPOL may then be withdrawn or be tasked by the MTC to provide a supporting role and perform tasks as requested by the MTC

- (3) Apprehend the perpetrators as directed by the MTC and hand them over to the HSP/UNPOL.

The MC is not responsible ordinarily for the restoration of public order or to address crime or public safety issues, unless its personnel happen to be the first at the scene of the incident or are requested to do so by the FHQ and/or Sector Headquarters. However, prior to a decision being made to hand over primacy in command and control to the MC, the UNPOL Incident Commander will ensure that all appropriate efforts and resources to manage the situation from a policing perspective have been made and exhausted. MC will then do the following in preparation and in execution of its task.

- (1) On receipt of information, UNPOL, SHQ, FHQ, UNMO HQ, JMAC and JOC will cross check and confirm the information and disseminate the same to all concerned, including the Reserves, if constituted.
- (2) If the security situation is expected to deteriorate, forward deployment of troops will be made in order to shorten response times in case not done earlier. This force will be in contact with the Company HQ/ Battalions HQ /SHQ, and UNPOL. Upon being informed, the FHQ and JOC will disseminate the information to all relevant agencies and sectors.
- (3) While UNPOL is dealing with the situation, MC will be prepared to assume a robust posture by increasing the display of forces by patrolling in the general area, positioning patrols in critical areas and mounted manoeuvres in consultation with the UNPOL Incident Commander.
- (4) In the event the incident's scale (size) and/or intensity (level of harm) exceeds that which the HSP and/or UNPOL is trained and equipped to handle, the UNPOL Incident Commander at the scene will request military intervention/ assistance.
- (5) After a formal hander over of the primacy of command and control – as outlined above the MTC will:
  - (a) Obtain an up-to-date brief from UNPOL Incident Commander.
  - (b) Analyse the possible redeployment of UNPOL IPOs/FPU's and redeploy them accordingly in consultation with the UNPOL Incident Commander.
  - (c) Act to mitigate and stabilize the situation.
  - (d) Inform higher HQ on development of the situation.
  - (e) Seek guidance from HQ to transfer the primacy of command and control back to the UNPOL/HSP once the situation is stabilized.
- (6) Execute assigned tasks in liaison with designated UNPOL Incident Commander.

- e. Focal Point for Request of Military Assistance will be as follows depending on the situation given below:
  - (1) **Localized.** The Battalion HQ/Company HQ will be the focal point for MC assistance.
  - (2) **Widespread.** The Sector HQ/ Battalion HQ will be the focal point for MC assistance.
  - (3) **Countrywide.** The FHQ/ Sector HQs will be the focal point for MC assistance.

12.5. **Responsibility of Committing MC.** The responsibility to commit troops to respond to the incidents depending on the situations will be as follows:

- a. **Localized.** In a localized event, the local Company will commit first and subsequently be reinforced by the Battalion QRF.
- b. **Widespread.** In widespread event, the local Company and Battalion will commit first and subsequently be reinforced by the Sector QRF. Additionally, depending on the magnitude of the incident and if extra force is required, the FQRF will be deployed.
- c. **Countrywide.** All MC and UNPOL assets will be committed. This will include Sector Forces, FQRF, other Force Reserves if constituted and MC Mission resources.

12.7. **Employment of Force Reserves to Support Sectors.** FHQ may attach Force Reserves to a sector when deemed necessary. The defined tasks of Force Reserves in aid of the sectors are as in the Force Contingency and Evacuation Plan.

12.8. **Combined Military and Police Operations.** During crisis or emergency situations the Crisis Management Team (CMT) and its operational arm, the Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG), will be established to coordinate response. During crises, the JOC supports mission crisis management coordination mechanisms. Chief JOC is responsible for contributing to the development and implementation of crisis management training and exercises throughout the mission.

- a. **Crisis Management Team (CMT).** A leadership-level, cross-pillar decision-making body to serve as a CMT, chaired by a Crisis Manager. The lead coordinating entity/entities will (jointly) designate a Crisis Manager. The CMT will provide guidance to the Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG) and liaise with relevant HSP authorities. The CMT consists representatives from relevant UN entities, including political, security, military, police, humanitarian, human rights, development as well as relevant administrative, support and public information entities. Wide representation from the different pillars of the UN should be balanced against the need for streamlined and effective coordination<sup>4</sup>.

---

<sup>4</sup> Technical Adjustment to United Nations Crisis Management Policy- March 2018

b. **Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG).** Based on CMT decisions, the CMWG will implement measures towards the resolution of a crisis or emergency situation by:

- (1) Updating the CMT in coordination with Chief JOC.
- (2) Keeping the Designated Official fully informed at all times.
- (3) Liaising with relevant government authorities.
- (4) Maintaining full time communications.
- (5) Coordinating required resources.
- (6) Maintaining a log of all requests, actions and instructions either given or received.
- (7) Maintaining a backup team of equal level or representation for a long duration crisis.

12.9. **Situation.** Provision of security falls under the purview of host-State police and other law enforcement agencies. However, if MC are the first to observe an escalating breakdown of public safety and order, they must take decisive action to manage the situation until the arrival of UNPOL and/or HSP and remain in the area to assist further, as requested. The primacy of C2 of the situation may be with the MC, but only for as long as is necessary to regain control of the situation (command and control may be limited by time and space). In order to ensure a seamless transition of command and control (C2), situations warranting Combined Military and Police Operations are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

- a. The handover/takeover of the primacy of command and control in the field will be dually communicated by UNPOL and MC to the JOC and logged at the CMC. The Handover/Takeover Certificate (Annex ZZ) will be signed by applicable UNPOL and MC parties when practical.
- b. The respective UNPOL Incident Commander or MTC in-charge of the situation shall continue to consult their HSP, military and police counterparts throughout operations.

12.10. **Routine Police Operation.** In the event that a routine UN policing operation escalates beyond the capacity of the police to effectively respond (regardless of any UNPOL operational support), the MC may be requested to provide security assistance to prevent loss of life or property. Under these circumstances, specific tasks must be identified for the MC to undertake. UNPOL will not transfer primary responsibility for resolving criminal incidents to the MC unless the local threat reaches a level that is determined to be beyond UNPOL's capacity by the most senior UNPOL Officer or FPU Commander in the location.

12.11. **Public Disorder of Non-Military Nature.** In the event there is no sustained use of firearms or military weaponry, HSP/UNPOL is responsible and has overall command. Request for MC support is possible for specific missions or tasks through the FC or Sector/Battalion Commander. Even if there is only a single UNPOL officer present, he/she is still in charge and responsible at the scene of the event or incident.


12.11. **Public Disorder of Military Nature.** In events where sustained use of firearms or military-grade weaponry occurs, MC forces will be responsible and have overall responsibility. Assistance from UNPOL and particularly the FPU's can be requested for specific missions or tasks.

12.12. **Scenarios of Response to Public Disorder.** Different scenarios are attached as Annex A.

12.13. **Command and Control Arrangements.** Public disorder may occur on different fronts; localized, widespread or countrywide. These events may be dealt with accordingly as follows.

- a. **Localized.** In the event of a localized incident (single isolated), tactical command and control will be with the Company/ Battalions Commander/MTC or UNPOL Team Leader/ UNPOL Incident Commander and supervised by the Battalion Commander (BC)/ Sector Commander (SC) and/or UNPOL Regional Commander (RC). The MTC or UNPOL Incident Commander will handle the operation management of the situation. The SC will be consulted for guidance and direction and he will have the Operational Control. A JOC will be set up at the Sector HQ which will then report to the FHQ.
- b. **Widespread.** In the event of widespread incidents (multiple incidents within a specific area or county), the tactical command and control will be with the SC and supervised by the FHQ and/or UNPOL HQ. The FC and HoPC will be consulted and they will have the Operational Control. The FHQ and UNPOL Operation Coordinator/ JOC will be the point of contact to oversee the activities and situation at the operational level of command and control.
- c. **Countrywide.** In the event of incidents occurring simultaneously at multiple locations with the potential for spreading across the country, the FC and HoPC will take Operational Control of the situation with the Sector HQ and/or UNPOL Regional HQ retaining Tactical Control. The SC and RC will execute and manage the situation in their respective AOR. Planning and execution is vested with the FC and HoPC. CMC mechanism will be put into effect under the JOC. The FHQ (U3) and UNPOL Operations Coordinator are responsible for executing and translating the decisions and directives into instructions for implementation at tactical level.

## HANDOVER OF DELEGATED RESPONSIBILITY



### 13. Understanding of the Use of Force and ROE with respect to POC

In the field, the military and police Chain of Command should ensure that all military and police personnel correctly interpret their respective ROE or DuF. During pre- and post-deployment, the following aspects can be simulated/rehearsed to enhance the military and police components understanding of ROE/DuF in relation to POC:

- Possible POC scenarios in the mission context when force could be applied.
- Possible POC scenarios in the mission context when lethal force would be necessitated by the context and circumstances according to the RoE and/or the DuF.
- Potential groups to be covered/ prioritised in the mission area under the term “protection of civilians” (e.g. civilians in highly vulnerable areas, IDPs, refugees, protection sites)

13.1. **Adherence to ROE/DuF.** All uniformed personnel must be thoroughly acquainted with the guiding principles and rules for the use of force.

- Education. Uniformed personnel must be well briefed and tested on their knowledge of ROE/DuF. They must be encouraged to ask questions and know when they might take action themselves, and when they must seek guidance from higher authority.
- Practice. ROE/DuF training must be continuous and uniformed personnel should be put through scenarios and mission rehearsals on a regular basis to ensure that their responses fall within the rules. Weapons should be regularly test-fired.
- Pocket Cards. All uniformed personnel must carry a Pocket card with the necessary extracts of the mission ROE/DuF translated into his/her language and be regularly tested on its contents. The card must have basic warnings and commands translated into the local language(s).
- Empowerment. The chain of command must be entirely clear on the delegated authority for the use of force. All commanders and, most importantly, each individual police officer or soldier, must have explicit permission already set in place by higher authority to act independently and to use lethal force when necessary to protect civilians under threat of physical violence.
- All commanders should be encouraged to clarify areas not easily understood in the ROE/DuF and ensure all uniformed personnel under their command understand the use and application of force.

### **Implementation**

14. All Missions are to develop their own mission specific Standard Operating Procedures on Combined Military and Police operations as per DPKO/DFS Policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2008.4).

### **Training**

15. The Integrated Mission Training Cell (IMTC) (supported by the Force and police training entities) is responsible for providing training to all the mission's peacekeeping personnel. Experience has shown that training value and effect increase considerably when instruction is delivered with the involvement of human rights, protection actors (Human Rights component, POC advisor, WPA, etc) and police and military personnel who have practical, in-country experience in protecting civilians. The experience of these professionals is a major contribution to the continuous effort to build on lessons learned. It is important that mission POC training is streamlined with other mission training on Human Rights, CRSV and child protection and to use the training as a platform to build operational links. With regard to POC, including from sexual and other forms of physical violence, induction and in-mission training should include local cultural sensitivities, early warning indicators, gender dynamics, and referral arrangements in the specific mission area. This training should also include mission specific scenario-based simulation.

---

## **E. REFERENCES**

- United Nations Charter (1945)
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (United Nations 1948)

- International Humanitarian Law (Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols of 1977)
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations 1976)
- Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, A/67/775 (2013)
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping (2015.7, April 2015)
- DPKO/DFS Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (2014.01, February 2014)
- OHCHR/DPKO/DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Political Missions (2011)
- DPKO/DFS Policy (revised) on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2016.10, December 2016).
- United Nations Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (2013)
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2008.4)
- DPKO/DFS Interim Standard Operating Procedures on Detention in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2010.6)
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Joint Operations Centre (JOC), (2014.10, May 2014)
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC), (2015.03, March 2015).
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Gender Equality in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2010.25, July 2010)
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Mainstreaming the protection, rights and well-being of children affected by armed conflict within UN Peacekeeping Operations (2009.17, June 2009)
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Peacekeeping Intelligence (2017.07)

### **Related procedures or guidelines**

- DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping and Special Political Missions (2015.15, January 2016).
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Protection of Civilians: Implementing Guidelines for Military Components of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions (2015.02, February 2015).
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines on United Nations Police Support to the Provision of Security in Electoral Processes (2013.03, February 2013)
- Inter-Agency Standing Committee Policy on Protection in Humanitarian Action (2016)
- DPKO/DFS Civil Affairs Handbook (April 2012)
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC), (2015.04, March 2015)
- UN Force Headquarters Handbook (November 2014)
- Guidelines on the role of United Nations Police in Protection of Civilians (August 2017)
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines Police Command in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (2015.14)
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping operations and Special Political Missions (2015.15)
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines on the Role of United Nations Police in Protection of Civilians (2017.12):
- DPKO Manual on Mission-based Police Planning in Peace Operations (2017.13)

### **Other related references**

- United Nations Human Rights Up Front Action Plan (2014)
  - DPKO/DFS Comparative Study and Toolkit on Protection of Civilians – Coordination Mechanisms in UN Peacekeeping Missions (2013)
  - DPKO/DFS Protection of Civilians (POC) Resource and Capability Matrix for Implementation of UN Peacekeeping Operations with POC Mandates (2012)
  - DPKO/DFS Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations (2011)
  - Global Protection Cluster Diagnostic Tool and Guidance on the Interaction between field Protection Clusters and UN Missions (June 2013)
  - ICRC Professional Standards for Protection Work (2013)
  - United Nations Field Security Handbook (January 2006)
- 

### **F. MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE**

16. The Military and Police Advisers to the Department of Peace Operations, UNHQ shall monitor compliance with this document.

---

### **G. CONTACT**

17. Policy and Doctrine Team, Office of Military Affairs and Strategic Policy and Development Section, Police Division, Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peace Operations, UNHQ.

---

### **H. HISTORY**

18. This is the first edition of the Guidelines on “Combined Military and Police Joint Operations Coordination Mechanisms in Peace Operations”. It will be reviewed in 2021.

---

### **APPROVAL SIGNATURE :**



Jean-Pierre Lacroix  
Under-Secretary-General Department  
of Peace Operations

DATE OF APPROVAL: SEP 20 2019

Jean-Pierre Lacroix  
Under-Secretary-General Department  
of Peace Operations

**DATE OF APPROVAL:**

**Generic Scenarios – Response Mechanism**

1. **Sub-Scenario 1 — Presence of HSP Only.** In the absence of UNPOL IPO/FPU and MC, HSP will retain the responsibility of handling any untoward incident. However, if the situation worsens beyond HSP capabilities, assistance may be sought from the nearest deployed UNPOL or MC. In such an eventuality, both components should coordinate their response/actions while informing their respective HQs and JOC. The MC component should be on standby for any assistance to be extended to the UNPOL/ IPOFPU or even take over responsibilities if handed over by the UNPOL Incident Commander.

2. **Sub-Scenario 2 — Presence of HSP and UNPOL.** In such a scenario, the senior most UNPOL officer/UNPOL Incident Commander retains the responsibility of C2 and follows the same procedures/actions as mentioned above. Additionally, the senior-most UNPOL officer/UNPOL Incident Commander should also inform JOC in addition to informing the nearest MC and FPU.

3. **Sub-Scenario 3 — Presence of HSP, IPO/ FPU.** Once the situation grows beyond HSP capacity, the UNPOL officer/UNPOL Incident Commander will call in the FPU to deal with the situation. Simultaneously, the UNPOL Officer/UNPOL Incident Commander will inform the JOC of the prevailing situation that may warrant MC intervention so as to put them on standby/ready mode. The FPU will respond under command of the UNPOL Incident Commander. Once the nearest MC is called in for assistance, the UNPOL Incident Commander will inform them of their specific tasks. Until he considers the situational control/leadership to be out of his capability and informs the HoPC/JOC, the MC will remain under “situational control/leadership” of the UNPOL Incident Commander. When the situation is beyond UNPOL capabilities, “control of the situation/disturbance” will be transferred to the MTC. The MTC will hand over the “control of the situation/disturbance” to the most senior UNPOL officer/UNPOL incident officer soon after the disturbance/unrest subsides. Primacy of control will revert back when it is determined that the situation is within capacity.

4. **Sub-Scenario 4 — Presence of HSP, IPO and MC.** Sequence of actions and command responsibilities remain the same as mentioned in sub-paragraph 3 above except that FPU is absent and the senior most UNPOL officer/ UNPOL Incident Commander will request MC in situ to tackle the situation (once beyond HSP /UNPOL capacity) while simultaneously informing JOC of the situation. The MTC will inform its superior HQ, on the developing situation. The HSP and UNPOL will be employed on specific tasks as deemed appropriate by the MTC. The MTC will hand over the “incident control/leadership” to the most senior UNPOL Officer/UNPOL Incident Commander soon after the disturbance/unrest subsides.

5. **Sub-scenario 5 - Presence of HSP, IPO/FPU and MC.** Sequentially (corresponding to the developing situation), response/actions by HSP, and then UNPOL IPO/FPU components will be undertaken while the UNPOL Incident Commander retains the “incident control/leadership” throughout. Immediate intimation on the ground and developing situation to both the MTC and JOC will remain the responsibility of the UNPOL Incident Commander. He may also request the MC to perform specific tasks while remaining under his command from the JOC. However, once the situation escalates beyond UNPOL IPO/FPU capabilities, the UNPOL Incident Commander shall handover C2 to the MTC and notify the JOC. The UNPOL IPO/FPU capabilities will remain

under command of the MTC for specific tasks as deemed appropriate. The MTC will hand over the “incident control/leadership” to the UNPOL Incident Commander soon after the disturbance/unrest subsides. Primacy will revert back to HSP when it is determined that the situation unfolding is within the HSP’s capacity.

**6. Sub-Scenario 6 — Presence of HSP and MC.** In places where only the HSP and the MC are present, situations of public unrest will be immediately tackled by the HSP. However, the MC will maintain close liaison with the HSP officials. The most senior HSP officer in the location will determine whether the situation is beyond police capacity or not and may request the MTC to take over the primary responsibility. MTC will immediately notify the SHQ/JOC of the prevailing situation with an assessment. When the responsibility is shifted to MC, the HSP will be in a support role. MTC will notify the SHQ/JOC of the prevailing situation with an assessment. The SHQ/JOC will notify the UNPOL coordinating staff who in turn will inform PC. If deemed appropriate, employment of UNPOL may be requested during or after the situation calms down/unrest subsides. Primacy will revert back to HSP when it is determined that the situation unfolding is within HSP capacity.

**7. Sub-scenario 7 – Presence of IPO and/or FPU only.** In specific circumstances where only the UNPOL is present, situations of public disorder may appear. They will be first monitored and contained waiting to see if the situation escalates into unrest. If the HSP do not respond, or are incapable of responding, the UNPOL officer/UNPOL Incident Commander will inform the HoPC, SHQ/JOC of the prevailing situation that may warrant MC intervention so as to put the MC on standby/ready mode. The UNPOL IPO/FPU will respond under command of the UNPOL Incident Commander. The UNPOL will maintain close liaison with the HSP as well as MC. Primacy of control of the situation will revert back to HSP when it is determined that the situation unfolding is within their capabilities.

**88. Sub-scenario 8 — Presence of MC only.** In events when only MC is present and the HSP are unavailable, any public unrest situation shall be monitored closely by MC. MTC will notify the SHQ/JOC of the prevailing situation with an assessment. The SHQ/JOC will notify UNPOL coordinating staff who in turn will inform PC. MTC must be prepared to handover situation management to the HSP and/or UNPOL depending combined assessment. If the situation escalates, the MTC will act accordingly to handle the situation while concurrently keeping close liaison with the Battalion/Sector HQ and UNPOL coordinating staff for guidance. The MTC must mitigate any potential for engagement other than self-defence, and within MC ROE and as authorized by the mandate. Primacy of situation management will revert back to HSP when the HSP is on scene and when it is determined that the situation unfolding is within their capabilities.

**Note:** *keeping in mind the volatility of the situation, a clear demarcation of various scenarios may not always exist. Hence there is a need to have close liaison with all agencies involved.*

**Combined Actions in Generic Scenarios**

<b>Scenarios</b>	<b>Combined actions to be taken</b>
In all scenarios	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Always provide objective information to Mission Headquarters, MC and UNPOL on the security situation and potential threats to the civilian population. This should also include refugees and IDPs in assembly points.</li> <li>• Always exchange with the civilian population, and authorities when possible, information on the threats they are facing in a way that does not put them at further risk.</li> <li>• Always make sure that the measures communities may have in place to protect themselves are not undermined by your actions to protect them.</li> <li>• Ensure patrols visit areas of firewood/water/food collection, farms and markets at times agreed upon with the population. Always conduct foot patrols where possible.</li> <li>• Upon deployment, the uniformed commanders should familiarize themselves with the protection actors in or close to their base such as Human Rights Officers, Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs), local chiefs, etc.</li> <li>• Always intervene and, when necessary, engage with force against potential perpetrators threatening civilians as authorized by ROE/ DUF and in compliance with human rights/IHL. In doing so, ensure all measures are taken to prevent negative consequences for civilians.</li> <li>• Always record allegations (received or observed) that may amount to human rights violations and share them with the human rights component for verification, investigation and follow-up.</li> <li>• Comply with HRDDP</li> </ul>
If faced with civilians who are fleeing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Be aware of flight routes of civilians at risk.</li> <li>• Secure the safety of the fleeing population.</li> <li>• All armed elements present among the population must be identified, disarmed (per mandate/ROE) and separated/neutralized by relevant authorities and along DDR principles.</li> <li>• Secure the route or position the unit (MC) - within capabilities - between the armed elements and the civilian population and inform the population on measures taken.</li> <li>• Stop the advance of armed groups if necessary to protect civilians.</li> </ul>
If civilians gather around a UN base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish security arrangements in and around the site.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stop the advance of armed groups to the extent that it does not undermine the protection of the civilians who are gathered around the base.</li> <li>• Ensure that armed groups do not come into camps or IDP/refugee sites and do not pressure civilians to stay (or to leave).</li> <li>• Providing protected sites within capabilities supports the protection of civilians.</li> <li>• Disarm and separate combatants from civilians, in a manner that does not put civilians at further risk.</li> <li>• Request mission/sector HQ support for the identification of protection needs, including special needs of women, minors, elderly and people living with disabilities.</li> <li>• Identify alternative safe areas, in coordination with authorities and in consultation with protection actors and other relevant agencies.</li> <li>• Consider joint patrols with local security forces, in a manner that does not expose civilians to further risks.</li> <li>• Protected sites should be ordinarily outside, not inside, UN camps (for Command and Control (C2), security, operational efficiency reasons), but <i>in extreme</i> situations, civilians can be protected within UN bases.</li> </ul>
<p>Needed to secure IDP/refugee sites, camps and other settlements</p>	<p>With the support of relevant mission’s substantive sections and CLAs (where present) and HSP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordinate with IDP/refugee representatives and local security actors as well as UNHCR to establish security arrangements in and around the sites.</li> <li>• Establish an emergency communication system with IDP representatives and relevant protection actors.</li> <li>• Assess main physical security threats with IDP representatives (including women, minors and elders).</li> <li>• Provide area security patrols outside the IDP/refugee sites but intervene inside IDP/refugee sites only when civilians are under imminent threat and in the absence of an effective HSP presence.</li> <li>• Ensure that armed elements are separated from civilians and that they are not present in or in the vicinity of IDP/refugee sites.</li> <li>• Identify safe areas for displaced persons. Civilians must be consulted and be able to make an informed choice as well as the local authorities.</li> </ul>
<p>If faced with civilians on civilians (crowd on crowd) violence</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ideally intervene as a responder, if these are not present, use caution/care - within capabilities - in containing violence, engaging ring leaders, maintaining impartiality, conducting inter-positioning if necessary.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhance situational awareness to understand the dynamics.</li> <li>• Build up additional troops (reserves, etc.) as convenient.</li> <li>• Provide medical/first aid.</li> <li>• Provide safe corridors for civilians fleeing the area of confrontation.</li> <li>• If the situation has the potential to escalate to a threat to life, intervene with gradual response.</li> <li>• Verbal Commands should be utilized when a hostile person/group is not deterred by the physical presence of peacekeepers and may refuse to listen or take lawful instructions. The use of voice (in the language that can be understood by the crowd) either in providing direction or in appeasing the crowd should be considered.</li> <li>• Less-lethal approaches and equipment such as tear gas and other public order management measures can be used as deterrent techniques if the situation deteriorates.</li> <li>• Using less-lethal Hard Techniques - if there is a threat to life - such as weapon strikes and takedowns – when non-compliant subjects assault (short of killing or causing permanent injury) civilian population.</li> <li>• If the civilians attacked are within a protected zone, the area around POC site/ COB to be declared a no weapon zone; a safe distance should also be maintained between two different (ethnic/religious etc.) communities.</li> <li>• If crowd/demonstrators etc. ask to meet with the UNPOL/ MC representatives, a meeting should be coordinated (who, why, where, etc.), secure area must be identified, and visitors should be checked prior to entry. Such activities should be covered by a security detachment which can swiftly react in case of exchange of fire or sudden fighting.</li> <li>• Attackers must be dealt with sternly and pursued.</li> </ul>
<p>If crowds gather in front of UN bases or hinders peacekeepers freedom of movement</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Avoid confrontation</li> <li>• Widen the base perimeter</li> <li>• UNPOL to negotiate with the assistance of HSP, if appropriate</li> <li>• Use loud speakers to communicate with/appease crowd</li> <li>• Engage ring leaders to dissuade them from attacking UN personnel and premises or from obstructing movement</li> <li>• If the crowd resort to violence/throwing of stones or improvised incendiary devices (“Molotov cocktail” petrol bombs, etc.), use a gradual response, avoiding inflame/escalating the situation.</li> <li>• ROEs for self-defense remain applicable in all scenarios.</li> <li>• If freedom of movement is hindered, use alternative routes.</li> </ul>

<p>Protection measures in all scenarios</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Active patrolling:</b> patrolling market places, water/firewood collection points and other places frequented by women provides locals a greater sense of security. Including female peacekeepers enhances effective interaction and provides positive role-models for women and girls in local communities.</li> <li>• <b>Reporting:</b> In order to better prevent and respond to Human right violations, CRSV, information about threats and CRSV incidents should be recorded and shared swiftly along the chain of command, in consonance with the principle of “do no harm,” (maintaining confidentiality) according to the Mission’s established reporting procedures.</li> </ul>
<p>If a crime of sexual violence is being committed or about to be committed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Discerning CRSV:</b> it can be committed against women, men, girls or boys. CRSV incidents can occur in conflict or post-conflict settings or other situations of concern such as political strife.</li> <li>• Intervene and deter sexual violence from any armed actor.</li> <li>• Remind the attacker/perpetrator and those associated with the attacker/perpetrator that they are in breach of both national and international Law and of the consequences of the crime.</li> <li>• Document the event, and in the case, it involves defence or security forces personnel, document which military/police unit, or other elements are reported as perpetrators (Take photographs/videos but not of the victims).</li> <li>• Report immediately to chain of command, human rights component and WPA/sexual violence focal point.</li> <li>• Bring the survivor of the crime of sexual violence to safety and inform of referral system and assistance.</li> <li>• In many remote mission locations, military units are the first point of contact for a CRSV victim. The on-scene commander is required to take action in accordance with mission specific referral arrangements (to be checked with WPAs). Military units/commanders must: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Provide immediate support to CRSV victims (e.g., first aid, food, water, clothing, as well as safety and security),</li> <li>▪ Respect their privacy</li> <li>▪ Obtain informed consent of the victim with regard to whom to inform.</li> <li>▪ Ensure rape victims have access to post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) within 72 hours of the incident to prevent HIV infection.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

<p><i>At all times, prevent, respond, monitor and report on grave violations</i></p>	<p>In addition to physically protecting children, UNPOL and MC and commanders support children by contributing in preventing, responding, monitoring and reporting of <b>the six grave violations</b> (killing and maiming; rape and grave sexual violence; recruitment and use of children by armed groups; abductions; attacks on schools and hospitals; denial of humanitarian access).</p>
<p>Military or armed groups are seen/reported using children as fighters, labourers, sexual slaves</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intervene, seek release of recruited children, and deter child recruitment.</li> <li>• Report any information to Child Protection (CP)/ Human Rights Officers (HRO). Document the activity, i.e. which group/unit/commander, and treat evidence with confidentiality.</li> <li>• Remind military personnel and armed groups that the recruitment of child combatants and the use of children for forced labour and/or sexual services are illegal.</li> <li>• Patrol in communities exposed to threats of child recruitment.</li> <li>• Only house children in UN bases as a temporary protection measure, while waiting for the relevant Child Protection/Human Right actors or the DDR Section.</li> </ul>