UNITED NATIONS

IED Threat Mitigation Military and Police Handbook

December 2017

"*Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are killing and injuring thousands of civilians annually… These pernicious devices are hidden in homes and schools, terrorising local populations.*"

UN Secretary-General António Guterres, 2017.

Preface

The focus of this IED Threat Mitigation Military and Police Handbook is to elaborate on specific fundamental principles and military doctrine for effective prevention, protection, and response to IED threats throughout peacekeeping operations. It is an essential reference guide for commanders, Member States, and UN personnel deployed in peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Headquarters.

Over the past seventy years, UN peacekeeping has evolved significantly in its complexity. In this context, peacekeeping Missions are deployed into environments that are hostile and unstable, which perilously have the Missions confronting asymmetric conflicts and threats, including ad hoc military engagements with non-state armed groups over large swaths of territory. Despite these challenges, UN peacekeeping remains an irreplaceable tool for the international community to manage the multitude of complex crises that pose a threat to international peace and security. Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tool available to assist host countries channelize the difficult path from conflict to peace.

In today's multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations, missions are called upon to facilitate the political process through various rules of engagement, which define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which the use of force, or action may be implemented in the protection of civilians, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, assisting in the disarmament, assisting in restoring the rule of law, protection and promotion of human rights, and in other types of peacekeeping operations. For this reason, the number of military, police and civilian personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping has unprecedentedly increased, and their responsibility has been extended beyond simply monitoring case-fires.

In order to meet the challenges posed by the complexity and scale of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Threats, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS); in collaboration with the seminal work of experts from Member States, have produced this Handbook to enhance the IED Threat Mitigation in UN peacekeeping, which will contribute towards successful achievement of the mission's goals by providing guidance and recommendations to support the understanding, planning and execution of IED Threat Mitigation.

In the pursuit of peace, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support will continue to refine and update this Handbook ensuring its relevance in the ever-changing operational environment, because we have every expectation that this document, especially with the

concerted efforts of its intended readers, will contribute immensely to improving and enhancing our collective performance.

In recognition of the work previously published on United Nations Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Threat Mitigation, and in anticipation of creating additional works in the near future, we would like to express our sincere gratitude to the Member States who chaired the work groups to develop this guidance, Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Commonwealth of Australia, and the other Member States experts that volunteered and devoted their time, energy and expertise to this Handbook that consolidated the relevant dimensions of IED Threat Mitigation into a convenient reference guide.

Jean-Pierre Lacroix
Under-Secretary-General
Department of Peacekeeping Operations

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Under-Secretary-General
Department of Field Support

Scope

- This handbook provides UN missions, military and police commanders and their staff officers with a reference guide to support the understanding, planning and execution of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Threat Mitigation activities in UN peacekeeping missions.

- Application of the guidelines given in this handbook will vary within the mission environment based on the mandate, the mission's size, the composition and the resources available as well as on the threat mitigation response required. Missions are expected to develop internal Threat Mitigation Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) consistent with guidelines given in this handbook.

	UN HQ	Mission HQ	UN civilians	Civil population
		Governed by: UN IED Threat Mitigation Military and Police Handbook read in conjunction with UNIBAM, FHQ Handbook, 11 UNMUMs	**Governed by**: UN Security Management System Security Policy Manual Chap IV Sect 4 — Security and Policy Manual, Chapter IV, "Policy and Conceptual overview of the Security Risk Management Process"	**Governed by**: PoC - Implementing Guidelines for military components of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions
Strategic	DPKO-DFS UNDSS UNMAS	**UNHQ policy guidelines**		
Operational		**Provide guidelines for Force HQ and Sector HQ's command and staff (military and police) on planning and coordinating IED threat mitigation activities and employment of counter IED units**	**Provide general guidelines for UN civilians on IED threat mitigation measures**	**Refer to education and training of locals to support UN counter IED effort**
Tactical		SOPs on IED threat mitigation by Sector HQ and units Counter IED TTPs	Organizing awareness and training of UN civilians on IED threat mitigation	Information exchanges and cooperation on IED matters with locals by deployed UN military and police

- This handbook complies with and complements existing policies of United Nations Department of Security and Safety (UNDSS) on management of security threat posed by IEDs against UN personnel (military, police and civilian) as well as PoC[1].

- This handbook provides the basis for the future development of manuals, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and training materials related to IED Threat Mitigation.

- Focus is placed on UN Threat Mitigation activities related to force protection (FP), protection of civilians (PoC), mobility, and the safety and security of UN personnel.

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[1] Security Policy Manual issued by UN Security Management System, Chapter IV Section Y.

- Operational tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) are not addressed. The primary audience of this Handbook is UN field mission leadership, Military HQ and UN Police command and staff, subordinate headquarters and mission support headquarters.

- Troop Contributing Countries/ Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) along with UN Headquarters services will also benefit from the standardization this handbook provides.

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- Focus is placed on UN Threat Mitigation activities to force protection, protection of civilians and safety and security of UN personnel.

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
Rationale

IEDs are an increasingly common feature of conflicts around the world. They have become a weapon of choice for aggressors across the globe. Consequently, these pose a growing threat to humanitarian organizations operating in conflict environments[2]. IEDs along with other types of EO such as ERW including Mines pose hazards in conflict and post-conflict affected areas.

The safety and security of UN personnel, UN FP (both military and police) and the Protection of Civilians (PoC) against the IED threat is critical to creating a secure environment, which is essential for accomplishing peacekeeping and the stability mandate of UN in the host nation. Based on strategic and operational understanding of the threat, there is a need to address the challenge through well-orchestrated, effective and directed IED Threat Mitigation responses during all phases of the UN mission life cycle.

UN Member States noted the impact of IEDs during the 70th session of the General Assembly through the adoption of two resolutions. On 7 December 2015, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on countering the Threat Posed by IEDs (A/70/46)[3] whereby Member States expressed concern over IED attacks on UN personnel and the impact these attacks have on freedom of movement, and the ability to deliver on mandates. On 9 December 2015, the General Assembly adopted the resolution on Assistance in Mine Action (A/70/80)[4], which recognized the humanitarian threat posed by IEDs in post-conflict situations. Impact of IEDs and the urgent need to address this issue is also highlighted in the Report of the Secretary-General (A/71/187) of 25 July 2016 'Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices'[5].

The UN mitigates the threat of IEDs through activities designed to enhance the safety and security of personnel, assets and facilities and to enhance mobility of UN personnel, each of which, support the implementation of the mandate and are within the UN's right to self-defence. This handbook is a response to the increasing threat posed by IEDs to UN personnel and assets, to the need identified at mission level to develop an effective IED Threat Mitigation response, and to concerns expressed by Member States.

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[2] GAO Warfighter Report, DOD Needs Strategic Outcome-Related Goals and Visibility over Its Counter-IED Efforts, February 2012

[3] UNGA resolution on countering the Threat Posed by IEDs (A/70/46) dated 7 December 2015.

[4] UNGA resolution on Assistance in Mine Action (A/70/80) dated 9 December 2015.

[5] Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices. Report of the Secretary-General. A/71/187. Available at: https://disarmament-library.un.org/UNODA/Library.nsf/58dfc078552ad 7c985257 f5b006f7b34/6fff9a6 65f6681fc 852580260050b50d?OpenDocument

This handbook is not an instruction manual for working with IEDs and explosive hazards. Rather, it is designed to provide planning and coordination guidelines to UN command and staff personnel (military and police), for IED Threat Mitigation in mission, and to help them:

1. Identify the threat of IEDs and other EO, thus supporting prevention of IED attacks

2. Develop and organize IED TM capabilities to support protection from IEDs

Respond effectively by taking appropriate action in case of an IED incident. This handbook contains general guidelines for UN personnel (military and police) as well as UN civilians on IED Threat Mitigation responses applicable to a variety of situations. It is imperative that each mission HQ should develop country-specific IED threat analysis while formulating these responses.

Contents

Acronyms

Acronym	Term
AO	Area of Operation
ATO	Ammunition Technical Officer
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
COE	Contingent owned equipment
C-IED	Counter Improvised Explosive Device
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CWIED	Command wire operated IED
DFS	Department of Field Support
DMS	Director of Mission Support
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSS	Department of Safety and Security
ECM	Electronic Counter Measures
EDD	Explosive Detection Dogs
EH	Explosive hazards
EMS	Electromagnetic spectrum
EO	Explosive Ordnance
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERW	Explosive remnants of war
ES	Electronic support
ESI	Explosive Scene Investigation
FC	Force commander
FHQ	Force Headquarters
FP	Force Protection
FPECM	Force protection Electronic counter measures
FR	Force Requirement
HoM	Head of Mission
HOPC	Head of Police Contingent
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IAP	Integrated Analysis and Planning
ICP	Incident Control Point
IED	Improvised Explosive Device

IEDD	Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
IED-TM	Improvised Explosive Device Threat Mitigation
IMTC	Integrated Mission Training Centre
ISR	Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISTAR	Intelligence Surveillance Target acquisition and Reconnaissance
JOC	Joint Operation Centre
HOM	Head of Mission
KOA	Key operational activity
LoO	Lines of Operations
LO	Liaison officer
LVBIED	Large vehicle borne IED
MN EOD CC	Multinational EOD coordination cell
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRAP	Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
NPOC EOD	National point of contact EOD
PBIED	Person borne IED
PC	Police commander
PCC	Police contributing countries
PoC	Protection of Civilians
PSO	Peace support operations
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
RCIED	Radio controlled IED
RSP	Render Safe Procedure
SA	Strategic Assessment
STA	Surveillance target acquisition
SVBIED	Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
TCC	Troops contributing countries
TECHINT	Technical Intelligence
TF	Task force
TTP	Tactics Techniques and Procedures
UNCT	United Nation Country Team
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Security and Safety
UNHQ	United Nation Headquarters

UNMAS	United Nation Mine Action Service
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VBIED	Vehicle borne IED
VOIED	Victim operated IED
VP	Vulnerable Point
WET	Weapon Exploitation Team
WTI	Weapon Technical Intelligence

Important Terminologies

Aggressor

The person or group of person who first attacks or makes an aggression; he who begins hostility or a quarrel.

Ballistic Protection

Protection from projectiles such as sniper or small arms ammunition. In demining terms, it is protection against fragmentation and blast.

Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)

The process of moving a casualty from the site of an accident or an incident to medical facilities.

Clearance

Removal of all mines, UXOs, IEDs and other EOs from a site to a predefined standard.

Clearance Site

The site where clearance activity (the removal of mines or UXO or IEDs or other EOs) is being or has been conducted.

Counter IED (C-IED)

The comprehensive, strategic approach to responding to the threat and use of IEDs. It represents the collective efforts at strategic, operational and tactical levels to defeat the improvised explosive device network[6].

Disarming

The act of making an explosive device safe. The procedure normally involves removing one or more links from the firing chain.

Explosive

A chemical compound or chemical mixture that, under the influence of heat, shock or friction, undergoes a rapid chemical change (decomposition) without an outside supply of oxygen. The compound rapidly changes from a solid or liquid to a gaseous state releasing energy in the form of heat, light and high pressure gas.

Explosive Detection Dogs (EDD)

Dogs that are specially trained to detect the vapours emitted by explosives. Some dogs can also be trained to detect tripwires and non-explosive booby traps. The dogs are normally referred to as explosive or mine detection dogs.

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[6] *UNHQ Guidelines on Improvised Explosive Devices Threat Mitigation in UN Mission, 2016*

Explosive Ordnance (EO). Explosive Ordnance is defined as all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices; and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature[7].

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and disposal of explosive ordnance, including IEDs.

Explosive remnant of war (ERW)

Explosive munitions left behind after a conflict has ended. They include unexploded artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munitions.

Fuze

A fuze is a device with explosive components designed to provide safe separation between the ordnance and the emplacer and to initiate a sequence of events, or the detonation of ordnance.

Homemade explosives (HME)

HME mixtures are formed by combining a fuel and an oxidizer. Non-standard explosive mixtures or compounds, which have been formulated/synthesized from available ingredients. Most often utilized in the absence of commercial and military explosives. HME mixtures are often extremely volatile and can be

Bags of Home Made Explosive (HME)

particularly susceptible to initiation by shock, friction or heat. HME is the most likely main charge of an IED due to the low cost of production and the availability of the required explosive precursors.

IED

An explosive device fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals, and designed to kill, injure, damage, harass or distract. IEDs are often made from commercially available products and/or military munitions, ranging from simple to complex in design and are usually inexpensive and require little labour to produce.

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[7] Glossary of Mine Action, IMAS 04.10, 2nd Ed, 01 Jan 03 and 7 Aug 14.

IED components

Most IEDs use five components: a switch (activator), an initiator (fuze), a charge (explosive), a power source (battery) and a container (body).

Power Source
Initiator
Explosive Charge
Switch

Initiator

Power Supply

Switch

Explosive

IED container

Containers can be used to hold the main charge, the entire IED or any combination of components. While containers are used mainly to keep components together, they can also offer some protection from the environment, and are often used to conceal the IED. By using objects that are commonly used in the local area as containers, the chance that victim will notice and report the device before it can be detonated is reduced. Some containers are also chosen to amplify (for example fragmentation) or direct the effects of the blast (like EFP) or to hold additional enhancements (such as ball bearings).

IED Disposal (IEDD)

Locating, identifying, rendering safe and disposing of IEDs by qualified specialists using specialized IEDD procedures and equipment.

IED Threat Mitigation (IED-TM)

The comprehensive, approach applied to the physical, procedural and training measures, which reduce the impact of an IED incident.

Initiator

An initiator is the first item in the explosive chain and it is used to detonate the main or booster charge. It is also called a detonator. Most explosives need the application of an initiator to produce sufficient energy to trigger the main charge. Initiators also act as explosive devices. There are two main types of initiator: electric and non-electric. Initiators can be improvised from many common items (e.g. pens, light bulbs, homemade explosives and etcetera) though these tend to be more unstable and dangerous when handled.

Main Charge

Main charge is the bulk explosive component of an IED. It can be from military or commercial sources, HME or a combination of these.

Misfire

The failure of ammunition or an explosive charge to fire or explode as intended.

Neutralization

Neutralization is the action taken to prevent UXO/IED from functioning by disrupting its normal operation. The term is used during Render Safe Procedures (RSPs) conducted by military EOD technicians using specialized tools, publications, and techniques.

Person-borne IED (PBIED):

An IED worn, carried or housed by a person, either willingly or unwillingly, and triggered by the individual or remotely.

Power Source

IEDs with an electrical initiator need a power source. Commercial batteries are often used. Photoelectric cells (solar) or chemical mixtures may be used.

Radio-controlled IED (RCIED)

An IED fitted with the switch that can be initiated electronically by wireless means (consisting of a transmitter and receiver).

Render Safe Procedures (RSPs)

Render Safe Procedures are actions that enable the neutralization and/or disarming of mines and munitions to occur in a recognized and safe manner.

Soak Time

A period of time, when an explosive device is left undisturbed before any further predetermined action manually. Normally used when referring to IEDs or when a misfire has occurred.

Switch

A switch is an IED initiating mechanism and can be a complex electronic component or as simple as two intersecting loops of wire. There are many types of switches including anti-handling switches,

which are designed to activate when the IED is lifted, moved, opened or disturbed and time switches that delay the explosion by mechanical, digital, thermal, chemical or electro-chemical mechanisms.

Types of IEDs

IEDs are unique and their complexity depends upon the creativity of the builder, who improvises the system using available materials and means. Depending upon the method of initiation, IEDs can generally be categorized into three main types, including:

- **Timed IEDs**. These IEDs activate at a pre-set time set by the emplacer using a timed fuze, which can be electronic, mechanical or chemical.

- **Command IEDs**. These devices are activated at the discretion of the firer. The initiation of command IEDs can be through a physical link (e.g. wire, pull link and etcetera) or non-physical link (remote controlled or light for instance). Commonly used triggers include key fobs, mobile phones, garage door openers and Infra-Red (IR) devices.

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)

UXO is explosive ordnance that has been primed, fuzed, armed, or otherwise prepared for action; has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, buried, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations; and remains unexploded either by design or for any other cause.

Vehicle-borne IED (VBIED)

An IED delivered by or concealed in a ground-based vehicle.

Victim-operated IED (VOIED)

An IED with a switch that is activated by an unsuspecting individual. It relies on the intended target to carry out some form of action that will cause the IED to function.

"IEDS are increasingly becoming bigger threat to peacekeeping missions than landmines. In the recent past more UN peacekeepers casualties have been due to IEDs than mines".

Gombo Tchouli[8]

Chapter 1

IED Threat Mitigation Concept and Applicability

UN Vehicle damaged in IED blast at Mali (MINUSMA)

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[8] Gombo Tchouli, Political Coordinator of the Permanent Mission of Chad to the UN, said UNMAS had recorded 409 casualties from IEDs in Mali since January 2013, with 135 deaths and 274 injuries. Of those 409 casualties, 142 were peacekeepers deployed to the MINUSMA, 89 percent of the mission's 158 total peacekeeper casualties.

1.1   **IED Threat Mitigation versus Counter-IED**

For the purpose of this manual, the term IED Threat Mitigation (IED-TM) is used to denote the scope of activities undertaken by the United Nations in Missions where IEDs impact mandate delivery. This term is preferred to Counter-IED (C-IED) given the specificity of the military concept of the term which is not comprehensive enough to an UN approach. C-IED is generally accepted to be a whole of government approach which focuses on the three pillars of defeat the device, train the force and attack the network. IED-TM can be viewed as a whole of UN approach which focuses on the physical, procedural, or training responses which can collectively be applied to mitigate the threats posed by IEDs. The UN does not focus on the kinetic, offensive tactics associated with attacking IED networks which are the hallmark of military strategies.

1.2   **IED Threat**

The history of IED[9] use can be traced back to the nineteenth century; however it was not until the early twenty-first century that IEDs became a weapon of choice for aggressors, terrorists and non-state actors in conflicts. IEDs range from crude homemade devices to sophisticated military-grade weapons.

IEDs have had an unprecedented impact on UN peacekeeping. They have impacted upon human life, the economy and often the political situation where they have been used; IEDs seriously harm and claim the lives of too many civilians and UN personnel, increase the cost of delivering "peace", and hamper stabilization, extension of state authority, whilst potentially affect UN mandates and authority. Since 2012/2013, the IED threat to UN personnel and civilians of host nations has increased, posing a major challenge to peacekeepers trying to create a secure and peaceful environment. The UN Secretary General and the Head of the Department for Peacekeeping Operations have stressed the importance of addressing this challenge for "FP" as well as for the "PoC" in UN mandates[10] in an IED prone environment.

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[9] C-IED technology in UN Peacekeeping, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Sharland, L. (2015).
[10] United Nations Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action, Ms. Agnès Marcaillou, D. U, 2015

An IED will remain a weapon of choice for aggressors and non-state actors due to its low cost, the ability to manufacture it locally and the significant effects it has in terms of human and material losses.

Graph 1.1 Graph showing average monthly IED attacks during 2013-2015 in Somalia (UNMAS)

IEDs are becoming a bigger threat to peacekeeping missions than landmines[11]. In the recent past more UN peacekeeper casualties have been caused by IEDs rather than mines. As stated by Gombo Tchouli "IEDs undermine operational effectiveness and freedom of movement, stop peacekeepers moving outwards from camps, and prevent implementation of critical mission mandated tasks"[12].

EO/IED Incidents	2013	2014	2015	2016 (till October)
Explosions	11	58	95	85
Found and Cleared	22	20	25	33
Total	33	78	120	118

Table 1.1 Gradual increase in IED threat over four years in Mali (UNMAS).

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[11] Landmine Threats Down, IED Threats Rising, Butler, Sep 2016.

[12] Ibid 6.

In Mali, since the employment of UN mission, the IED threat is gradually increasing as indicated in Table 1.1. The data show two important lessons from IED threatened areas (Graph 1.2):

- Where the IED-TM Capabilities are insufficient, the threat to UN personnel will continue to rise.

- Where the IED-TM Capabilities are designed on pre-deployment threat level, then it will not be able to counter increase in threat level after deployment of forces (military/police).

Graph 1.2 IED explosions in Mali after the deployment of the UN mission

The level of threat caused by the use of IEDs has steadily increased and conventional anti-mine and EOD techniques have not been effective against it. It requires specialized IED Threat Mitigation capability to effectively reduce or minimize.

> *The only constraints facing those who manufacture IEDs are:*
> - *The availability of components*
> - *The creativity/ technical ability to construct the devices*

Usually, the target of aggressors and non-state actors are UN uniformed as well as non-uniformed personnel, defence forces of the host country and local tribes supporting the UN mandate. However, civilians are also victim of IEDs by being in the wrong place at the wrong time. IEDs have the potential to adversely affect the peacekeeping environment for UN personnel as well as for civilians.

1.3. **IED System**

The IED system adopted by aggressors or non-state actors may or may not be structured. It involves multiple actions from the collection and procurement of material for IED manufacturing to the placement of the IED at the point of attack. It can require elaborate planning and resources;

including personnel, technical expertise and IED making material. The actual IED attack is just one part of the whole system. A detailed understanding of an IED incident is given in the Lexicon[13].

IED systems are most effectively categorized according to three recurring phases: resource and plan; execute and analyse. These phases are sequential:

1.3.1. **Resource and Plan**

This involves obtaining financial and technical support, recruiting and training, material collection, and manufacturing of the IED. Usually, an IED is made at a remote location to prevent premature detection. After preparation of the IED, a specific plan for its placement is prepared and here local support is critical.

1.3.2. **Execute**

Prepared IEDs are transported near the anticipated target location. After carrying out reconnaissance of the targets, the precise attack plan is prepared (time and point of attack) and rehearsals are sometimes carried out. At a suitable time the IED is placed at the target location, usually at night or early in the morning to avoid detection. The placement of IEDs is usually guided by following principles:

- o Achieving maximum effects
- o Avoiding detection
- o Defying neutralization

The IED emplacer usually stays close to the target area and waits for the best time to detonate the IED in order to create maximum damage. After detonation, the emplacer usually attempts to escape and report to the planners. There is usually a lookout man to confirm the effects of a PBIED. VOIED may or may not be kept under watch.

1.3.3. **Analyze**

This phase involves two forms:

- o **Assessing Results**

  Success or failure of the IED attack is ascertained through observation. It is measured through its results, which may be in casualties, in the fear created within the general population, by the reaction of security forces or by the response at national and international levels. Observations of the attack and of the responses of victims and locals also provide

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
[13] UNMAS IED Lexicon, available at http://www.mineaction.org/improvised-explosive-device-lexicon

lessons learnt to the aggressors to overcome any mistake and to consider an increase in the lethality of future IED attacks.

o **Projecting Success**

IED attacks are important elements of the aggressor's information strategy. Images and other details of successful IED attacks are usually recorded and released to the targeted population, either directly or via the media. This is to boost support, to lower the morale of security forces and locals and to create an image of security failure.

1.4. Vulnerabilities (Direct and/or Indirect)

Aggressors are increasingly using IEDs against UN peacekeepers (military and police), government forces and civilians[14]. The general population is particularly vulnerable to IED incidents in conflict hit areas, often suffering greater casualties (death or injuries) than those targeted. In the absence of specialized IED Threat Mitigation support, UN personnel, their equipment and infrastructure are vulnerable to IEDs. Beside seriously limiting peacekeeping and peace support missions, the absence of this specialized support also affects political processes, the functioning of institutions, reconstruction efforts, the delivery of humanitarian and food assistance and the safe return of refugees and displaced populations[15].

During UN mission deployment, Military and Police personnel are directly exposed to IED threats in the field. The methods and techniques of IED attacks are changed frequently in order to avoid its detection and countering.

The safety of the local population in the UN peacekeeping environment is a high priority. Although the primary target of aggressors remains UN personnel and infrastructure, the civil population is often affected indirectly due to IEDs. Aggressors attack civilian targets in order to create an environment of insecurity and fear. Locals and officials are vulnerable to IED threats in these areas:

- During public meetings and political rallies.
- During the return of displaced persons.
- At government buildings, courts and community centers.
- Gathering places of security forces, especially recruitment locations.

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[14] Countering Improvised Explosive Devices. Research Notes, Survey, S. A. 2014
[15] United Nations Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action, Ms. Agnès Marcaillou, D. U, 2015

Figure 1.2 IED found by the Nigerien Peacekeepers, after receiving the Search and Detect training. MINUSMA. 2 August 2015

1.5.   Situational awareness – Understanding the IED threat environment

An understanding of the IED threat environment is governed by two main issues – knowing the current trends in IED manufacture and use, and through the threat assessment made for deployment of UN mission in preparation for the mission.

1.5.1. IED Trends

Current trends in IED attacks in various conflict areas are as follows:

- IEDs are usually planted on road sides and in middle of rough tracks. IEDs formed out of artillery projectiles, rockets and missiles are often used to create maximum destruction.

- The inexpensive nature of precursor materiel (containers, gun powder, homemade explosives, ball bearings, nails, wires, wooden pieces and etcetera) has made IEDs easy to manufacture. Information on how to make IEDs can be found and shared quickly via the internet. Technical knowledge of electronic circuit is also utilized for the preparation of remotely operated and timed IEDs.

- Vehicle-borne IEDs are used to attack UN convoys, buildings and infrastructure.

- Suicide bombers wearing suicide vests filled with explosives and metal shrapnel target check posts, community meetings, market places and congregations.

- Methods of IEDs activation include use of switches, remote detonation by cell phone and other wireless devices or activation through contact with a pressure plate[16].

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[16] No Tech Solution for Civilian IED Threat, Spectrum, 2014

- Currently, IEDs ranging from simple switches to those with complex circuits are employed. For instance, in Mali, IEDs have been found with:
  - o Simple (pressure plate) and high technical (electronic device) sensors.
  - o Home-made explosives and military explosives.
  - o Home-made shape charges and EOs.
- Complex attacks using a remote control device, a pressure plate with large amounts of explosives or multiple command and victim operated IEDs with large explosive charges, in conjunction with a direct fire small arms attack.
- Various types of IEDs, including PBIED, VBIED, CWIED, RCIED, VOIED and other un-categorized IEDs are confronting UN peacekeepers in mission areas.
- The IED threat is transitory in nature. Porous borders facilitate movement and transportation of IED precursors from one country to another such that the IED threat is similar in countries within a region. Similarities can be found in the TTPs of IED attacks.
- IED is an evolutionary threat. It retains its relevance through the use of ingenuity in manufacturing and deployment methods. Moreover, due to easy access to IED making methods (mainly through the internet), low tech IEDs can transcend into high-tech. The aggressor can modify TTPs to counter the C-IED capabilities of UN military and police personnel. In view of these trends, there is a need to ascertain the change in threat once the peacekeeping mission is deployed. Additionally, the IED threat against UN peacekeepers may increase whereas the threat to civilians of the host country may start to subside.

1.5.2. **IED Threat assessment for UN Mission**

In order to predict post mission-deployment IED environment, there is a need to carry out an assessment of pre-mission environment. The aim is to predict IED threat pattern on deployment of UN troops and police. The assessment should be based on following indicators:

- The local IED capability of aggressors or non-state actors in the host nation.
- The existing level of IED threat in the country, through intelligence collection, assessment and information management.
- The availability of IED making materiel in the host nation along with requisite IED making expertise.
- The existence of IED making capability in neighboring state(s) that can lead to transition of IED capability to the host nation after deployment of UN mission.
- The intensity of IED usage in the conflict situation, which may indicate employment of IEDs against UN personnel or assets after deployment.

The UN is increasingly proactive and structured in organizing a coherent response to the IED threat[17]. The UNSC has recognized IEDs as a major threat and a "proxy" weapon; UNSC resolutions have also mandated that the Monitoring Team assess IED threats posed by aggressors' groups and identify the illicit supply chain and target the facilitators.

1.6. Current IED Threat Mitigation Strategy

In line with the UN mandate of self defence, the ***current IED Threat Mitigation strategy*** of UN is managing the threat through ***prevention*** and ***mitigation***[18]. In the case of an IED threat to UN personnel, it is viewed through the Security Risk Management Process and appropriate risk management measures are adopted. An IED that poses a threat to UN Military / Police forces will be countered by the threatened force. UN field missions carry out the following IED threat mitigation measures in mission areas:

> *In line with the UN mandate of self defence, the current IED strategy of UN is managing the threat through prevention and mitigation*

1.6.1. Prevention

Prevention consists of measures and actions taken to lower the likelihood of an IED event occurring and affecting the UN and requires coordination across the Mission HQ. It involves:

- Information exchange and management. Reporting significant events which indicate an increase in the likelihood of an IED incident.
- Travel and route planning. IED incidents generally require reconnaissance and preparation of an often-used route, in order to effectively engage peacekeeping personnel and property.
- Protection measures for bases and work areas to deny vehicle and person-borne IED attacks.
- Security-awareness involving an all-encompassing approach to educate UN personnel and locals on IED threats and requisite protective measures.
- Assessing the prevailing local attitude towards UN personnel and the historical use of IEDs in the area.

1.6.2. Detection

- Detection of IEDs requires an array of detection techniques to avoid an incident.
- Close-range detection of IEDs which remains the specialty of "high risk" search teams.

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[17] Ibid 15

[18] Ibid 18. As discussed in Security and Policy Manual, Chapter IV, "Policy and Conceptual overview of the Security Risk Management Process"

- UN mine action teams, which while undertaking de-mining or EOD activity, may detect and locate IEDs[19].

- UN mine action teams which adopt appropriate procedures, such as marking, evacuation, cordoning and liaison with the IED-Disposal (IEDD) team when it arrives to undertake appropriate disposal.

1.7. Additional aspects of IED Threat Mitigation

1.7.1. IED Disposal

- IED Disposal is currently considered a component of EOD.

- IED Disposal operators are by extension EOD operators who have undergone specific selection and certified training to deal with the requirements of an IED Disposal task.

- It involves positive EOD actions against the IED or IED components once reported upon.

1.7.2. Minimizing IED effects

It consists of measures to lower the impact of IEDs near UN peacekeeping personnel and facilities. These are:

- Blast or ballistic protection and standoff distance.

- Deny access to UN bases or buildings by restricted entry techniques.

- Personnel protection such as protective gear and use of mine resistant ambush protected (MRAPs) vehicles.

1.7.3. Training

Training is the preparation of UN peacekeepers to conduct operations in an IED threat environment. Training in a UN peacekeeping context is focused on:

- The use of good information to predict what might happen next.

- Feeding this information into the training process so that IED attack patterns can be recognized.

- Identification of the areas or routes of highest risk.

- Minimizing the risk of personnel coming into contact with IEDs.

- Updating intelligence regularly.

- Avoiding set patterns in routes and timings.

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[19] United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual (August 2012)
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/UNIBAM.Vol.II.pdf

1.8. **IED Threat Mitigation Operational Framework**

1.8.1. **General Principles**

- Measures are needed to enhance the safety and security of UN personnel, assets and facilities and to enhance the mobility of UN personnel. These support mandate implementation and are within the Organization's right to self-defense[20].

- While planning for a new mission or review of an existing mission, the key inputs crucial to PoC are identified during the Integrated Assessment and Planning Process (IAP). While conducting the IAP, the planning team should ensure that PoC considerations are factored into the Strategic Assessment (SA)[21].

- All activities to mitigate the threat of IEDs should be fully integrated at the operational, and tactical levels within the mission.

- Mitigating the threat of IEDs within UN peace operations should not be confined to any single entity or implementation phase.

- A comprehensive response to IEDs must not be planned or executed in isolation: it is cross-functional and must be an integrated part of overall peacekeeping operations.

1.8.2. **IED Threat Mitigation Operational Concept**

Conceptualization of IED Threat Mitigation

UNSG has identified "Better protection against IEDs" among six critical necessities in UN peacekeeping[22]. On 19 Sep 2014, expressing outrage at the death of five Chadian peacekeepers during a roadside explosion at Mali, the SG remarked, "These continued assaults against the UN must cease immediately"[23].

In the context of the peacekeeping operation, IED threat mitigation

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[20] Ibid 6.
[21] UNPKO-DFS Protection of Civilians: Implementing Guidelines for Military Components of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, 2015.
[22] UN Secretary-General's remarks at Summit on UN Peacekeeping on 26 September 2014.
[23] UN News Centre report of 19 September 2014

needs to be conceptualized for all phases of the mission life cycle, including:

- Assessment and mission planning
- Mission start up
- Mandate implementation
- Transition or drawdown

> *UN Secretary General identifies "Better protection against IEDs" among six critical necessities that stand out at the present time*

1.9.   IED Threat Mitigation Objectives

In line with the UN mandate of peacekeeping and ensuring the creation of an overarching secure environment for UN FHQ (Military and Police) as well as civilians, the objectives set for IED threat mitigation for UN mission are:

- Force protection
- IED threat reduction
- PoC

IED-TM Objectives
(Secure Environment)

Force protection

Protection of civilians

IED threat reduction

1.10.   **Conceptual Contours of IED Threat Mitigation**

A whole-of-system or whole of UN approach should be developed to plan and organize capability in the UN mission setting. Adopting a systematic approach, incorporating all elements, including UN Military and Police, the host government and local resources provide direction towards achieving a minimum IED threat level in the host nation. Conceptual contours of IED Threat Mitigation in the UN mission setting and its cardinal aspects are elaborated as follows:

Figure 1.3 Elaboration of conceptual contours of IED Threat Mitigation in UN Missions.

1.11. Phases of IED Threat Mitigation

In order to effectively deal with the IED threat in the host nation with the aim of threat reduction, operations should be planned in phases. Prerequisites to all phases of IED Threat Mitigation are local and government support, integration of the PKO / IEDD forces / enablers and the resolve of leadership at all tiers of UN military and police force:

1.11.1. Phase I - Analyzing the IED threat

o Intelligence collection

o Threat assessment

1.11.2. Phase II – Reducing the threat level

o Defensive actions

o Exploitation activities

o Support of the UN proactive mitigation effort

1.11.3. Phase III - Containment of the threat

o Geographical confinement of IED threat

o Minimizing threat transition from neighbouring states

1.12. IED Threat Mitigation Capability Development

The existing EOD and limited IEDD capabilities in UN missions have not been able to effectively mitigate the IED threat. Most casualties have occurred from IEDs which have remained unfound or undetected until detonation. There are minimal casualties or hazards when IEDs are successfully detected. Searching and detecting IEDs is at present a capability gap which needs to be addressed to meet current and future IED challenges; UN missions faced with a high IED threat must possess and deploy a force (military and police) fully equipped and trained to carry out both Search and EOD tasks.

Figure 1.4 Elaboration of desired IED Threat Mitigation Capability

This capability development should have the following thrust lines:

- Effectiveness against existing levels of IED threat in the mission areas.

- The capacity to deal with future or projected IED threats.

An effective IED threat mitigation concept involves the creation of a core capability through the force generation of IED Threat Mitigation assets. This capability needs to be formed with a multi-tier approach. Key operational capabilities include: essential staff organization at FHQ' level (both military and police), establishing command and staff responsibilities in the IED Threat Mitigation domain, the availability of trained specialized IEDD units or teams in the mission areas, a strong interface between the IED-TM force (military and police) and the ISR component and a well-established liaison and coordination mechanism and media support. In addition, essential support structures need to be dovetailed according to the threat assessment to enhance the potential of the HQ for all phases of operations.

1.12.1. **Deployment of IED-TM Units (Search and EOD)**

In order to search and dispose of IEDs, which is the primary way to reduce or limit the IED threat, IED-TM units / sub-units need to be deployed in UN missions. IED-TM units should be assigned the tasks of search, disposal and evidence collection to effectively offset the IED threat to support FP and PoC.

These mission-capable units comprised of Search teams and EOD teams supported with EDD assets should be able to perform the following roles in the UN mission setting:

- Search and clearance of routes, areas and critical infrastructure / assets for IEDs.

- Safe disposal of IEDs.

- Explosive scene investigation (ESI).

- Support for UN mission T/PCCs in the disposal of other explosive hazards (as an additional responsibility if requested).

- **Search Teams**

  o In the UN mission setting the success of the IEDD effort is largely dependent on information based operations against IEDs and precursors. Specialized search teams comprised of trained searchers with an integral EDD component and equipped with precision search equipment and ECM, should be employed on basic search and high risk search to undertake following:

    ▪ Defensive search in and around UN facilities, areas and suspected IED placements.

    ▪ Proactive search of routes used by UN convoys (military and police) and security forces, vehicle search and the identification of potential IED prone areas.

- Supporting the intelligence effort of detecting and identifying IED hazards to UN personnel and civilians.

- **IEDD Teams**
  - o EOD teams are comprised of special technicians trained to carry out RSPs and the disposal of IEDs been detected by search teams.
  - o These teams carry out positive identification of an IED/ UXO, post blast investigation and crater analysis.

- **ESI**
  - o ESI and evidence collection are important facets of IED-TM operations. The EOD team is responsible for ESI collects, recovers, identifies and preserves IED precursors and physical components for further investigation.
  - o The objective of ESI is to identify the aggressor's TTPs and capabilities, to provide support to threat assessment and to improve own TTPs to ensure force protection and PoC.
  - o Support Level 2 and 3 exploitation where it exists.
  - o It must be considered that ESI is largely a police function, and careful consideration must be made to separating exploitation of biometrics for prosecutorial purposes and the technical exploitation of device components which will contribute to force protection measures. Technical exploitation of devices should always be encouraged, but exploitation of biometrics will be mission specific and dependant upon a number of factors such as the rule of law, capacity of police forces, etc.

1.12.2. **IED-TM Command and Control Organizations**

Where IED pose a threat to UN mission personnel, a mission level IED threat mitigation strategy should be developed by senior mission management in conjunction with stakeholders. Planning and implementation of operations in line with the FCs' policy require staff functions at the macro and micro levels. Being complex in nature, IED threat mitigation requires elaborate understanding, detailed planning and vertical and horizontal coordination.

Depending upon the size of mission, the level of IED threat and the geographical area, Force / Police Headquarters may establish a IED-TM command and control organization. The IED-TM staff structure within the Force (military and police) HQ from low to high threat levels is as follows:

- FHQ working group – from within the FHQ staff
- Dedicated IED advisor and a FHQ working group
- Dedicated IED advisor and IED-TM cells (with existing staff)
- IED advisor and IED-TM cells (with dedicated staff)

- Refer to the EOD Unit Manual for additional structure for integrating staff and advisors.

IED Advisor. The IED advisor (military and police) will form an important link pin in planning and implementation of IED threat mitigation measures in the mission area. IED advisor will advise and assist the FC and the working group in managing and directing IED-TM efforts.

1.13. **IED-Threat Mitigation Methodology - Internationally adopted**

1.13.1. **Key Operational Activities (KOAs). A** strategic-Level approach strives to isolate the aggressor's in-mission IED system from outside influences, finance, and supplies. Operational and tactical levels systematically apply KOAs against the complete enemy IED system.

In designing an IED-TM plan, six fundamental actions (i.e. Predict, Prevent, Detect, Neutralize, Mitigate, and Exploit) form the basis for developing an integrated, holistic approach to a IED-TM which incorporates intelligence, information, training, operations, materiel, technology, tactics, policy, and resourcing solutions.

The output from these six activities provides the capability needed by the Mission to predict the aggressor's actions, prevent the aggressor from executing plans, detect IED material and devices, neutralize emplaced devices, mitigate the effects of an IED event, and exploit IEDs and/or IED events[24]. The full spectrum of activities is intended to be informative and not proscriptive – the capacity to execute the six actions may be beyond the scope of a Mission's mandate or beyond the capabilities resident therein.

Predict

'Predict' comprises the analytical actions necessary to develop and maintain a comprehensive understanding of the operational IED environment. It exploits intelligence, and in so doing, contributes to a more concise understanding of the aggressor's cell structures, systems, networks, training, equipment, infrastructure, TTPs, support mechanisms (e.g., IED materiel), and other actions which forecast the IED operations.

Prevent

'Prevent' is comprised of proactive actions associated with the degradation the aggressor's capability through detection of IED and precursors prior to emplacement, in order to prevent an attack. Prevent includes:

- Neutralizing or capturing bomb makers and their supporting subsystems
- Disrupting the IED chain of events prior to emplacement
- Deterring public support for the aggressor's use of IEDs.

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[24] Canadian Forces Joint Publication 3-15 Countering Improvised Devices, 2012.

- Actions, both overt and covert, that target, interdict, and eliminate key aggressor personnel, infrastructure, logistic capabilities, and aggressor combat operations involving IEDs, when used on their own or as part of a complex attack.

Detect

'Detect' occurs after an IED has been emplaced and is a crucial C-IED element. It includes activities designed to identify and locate personnel, activities, explosive devices (and their component parts), equipment, caches of IED components, weapons and infrastructure.

Dispose

To prevent uncontrolled detonation, IEDs must be disposed of safely through a deliberate detonation, disruption or neutralization. Disposal enables peacekeepers and the local populace to operate safely in and around the emplacement site.

Minimize

In the event that Predict, Prevent, and Detect fail, minimizing the effects of an IED event is an important follow-up activity.

Exploit

Exploit is the process through which event and associated physical materials are recorded and analyzed. The objective is to understand the aggressor's methods of operation and relationships, and the device's capabilities. Exploitation takes place at any stage within the IED system, though every effort must be made to conduct exploitation as early as possible to restrict the aggressor's IED activities.

1.13.2. **IED-TM** elements (military and police) should serve as the focal point for all IED-TM activities in the mission area, from the pre-deployment preparatory stage to the transition / drawdown stage. These actions may either be *Direct* (focused on the IED system) or *Indirect* (focused on locals or the host nation). Important actions are summarized in tabulated form in Figure

Figure 1.5 Breadth of Possible IED-TM actions in a typical mission area

All friendly forces have a collective role in increasing both FP and IED-TM effectiveness by collecting and sharing vital information on the IED threat

Chapter 2

IED Threat Mitigation Tasks

The use of IEDs perpetuate a climate of terror and insecurity

2.1 **IED-TM Plan / Campaign Approach**

The principles to be considered when developing a comprehensive plan/ campaign, are built around the KoAs covered in Chapter 1 as follows:

2.1.1. **Threat and risk**. The planning process needs to be guided by the IED threat and risk assessment, including an assessment of key vulnerabilities. This assessment must be ongoing due to the evolving nature of the threat.

2.1.2. **Operational constraints and limitations**. The plan needs to take account of the constraints and limitations it may impose on the ability of Peacekeeping Forces to execute the mandate in IED threat environment.

2.1.3. **Intelligence**. Critical to a successful IED-TM strategy is the provision of timely, accurate, and relevant information to commanders at all levels. Other mandatory considerations include:

- o Intelligence, which guides the deployment and allocation of IEDD resources, the modification or development of IED capabilities, the revision of plans and TTP, and proactive actions.

- o The decentralized, asymmetrical, and covert nature of aggressor's operations, combined with the potentially strategic implications of a single IED event suggest the need for a much greater focus on intelligence collection, at a local level, with human intelligence (HUMINT) playing a central role.

- o To defeat the aggressor's IED strategy, operational and tactical commanders require greater access to, and potentially the control of, the full range of UN mission intelligence-collection assets.

2.1.4. **Information Management**. Current and predictive intelligence is the key to defeating or mitigating the use of IEDs. Critical to the intelligence process is the establishment of an "all-informed" IED information architecture that enables the commander and staff involved by rapidly sharing IED information provided by all levels, from Tactical to Strategic.

> *Critical to the intelligence process is the establishment of an "all-informed" IED information architecture that enables the commander and staff involved by rapidly sharing IED information provided by all levels, from Tactical to Strategic*

2.1.5. **Situational Awareness**. At the tactical level, situational awareness, supported by robust TTPs and the adoption of mitigation measures significantly reduces the IED risk. Personnel (at all levels) must develop a thorough understanding of their environment - the people and the topography.

Personnel must be able to identify changes in the environment (e.g., physical changes or a change in mood or behaviour among the local population).

2.1.6. **Force Protection (FP)**. FP measures, materials, and TTPs are directed at reducing the effect of IED attacks and providing peace keeping forces the freedom to conduct their normal operations. FP planning may also need to consider protective measures for the local population and infrastructure, including controls on movement.

2.1.7. **Proactive Action**. A complete IED-TM plan is one that supports exploitation of key vulnerabilities in the IED system. Mandated by the UN's right of self-defence, such proactive actions are intended to restrict the aggressor's freedom of action, capability, and initiative while promoting UN influence.

2.1.8. **Influence activities**. UN support of the civilian population is seen as an influence activity and a key enabling activity. Influence activities should be incorporated into the plan to gain the population's support and to negate the aggressor's propaganda activities. Activities may include diplomatic and economic efforts at the national level (host nation), and/or conduct of information, psychological and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) operations at the regional and local levels.

2.1.9. **Training**. Effective training is fundamental to successful operations in an IED environment both during pre-deployment phases and in Mission IED training should incorporate the latest IED trends and lessons learned.

2.1.10. **Cooperation**. In the UN peacekeeping context, effective IED-TM cannot be undertaken without cooperation with civilians, political elements and local law enforcement agencies.

2.1.11. **Integration**. IED TM is not an independent activity. It is implemented as a part of the overall UN mandate and mission plan. FP and PoC may require the IED threat mitigation plan to be part of all UN activities in the mission area. The Force (military/ police).

2.1.12. **Agility**. The asymmetrical nature of the IED threat, combined with the aggressor's ability to rapidly modify their TTPs, requires peacekeeping forces to develop an agile plan that can be rapidly modified.

2.2 Information collection, sharing and the IED threat assessment context

IED threat mitigation is achieved through the combination of interrelated tasks performed at strategic, operational and tactical levels. All friendly forces have a collective role in increasing FP by collecting and sharing vital information on the IED threat. During the conduct of a Strategic Assessment[25], the possible threat of IEDs, and other explosive hazards should be taken into account. Accordingly, assessment and planning processes should integrate expertise on explosive threat

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[25] See UN Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP).

mitigation, when and where warranted. This information contributes to the generation of more accurate assessments, and guides capability requirements and further actions. It has the ultimate objective of mitigating the effects of IEDs on the mission and the local population. As with all intelligence products, IED threat assessments must be subject to continuous reviews in order to reflect developments in the tactical, operational and strategic situations.

2.2.1. **Pre-deployment threat analysis**. T/PCCs should be informed of IED threats within the mission area before and during reconnaissance visits, in line with the DPKO Policy on Contributing Country Reconnaissance Visits[26]. Information on existing IED threats can aid T/PCCs in their ability to prepare threat mitigation measures. The process of assessing IED threat mitigation preparedness should also be continuous. UNHQ should ascertain the T/PCCs preparedness during pre-deployment visits in advance of each contingent's induction - in line with the Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement Policy[27]. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) currently maintains the technical expertise required to assess the threat and potential impact of IEDs and other explosive hazards. Until the UN develops a dedicated IED threat mitigation organisation (military and police), this expertise is available at UN headquarters and to field missions and should be called upon to participate, support, or advise during the assessment and planning processes. This may include the conduct of an assessment mission and/or technical survey.

> *Information on existing IED threats can aid T/PCCs in their ability to prepare threat mitigation measures*

2.2.2. **In-mission information sharing and coordination**

UN missions should be supported by an intelligence cell responsible for enhancing situational awareness for all forces in the area of operations. The cell coordinates intelligence support to site-exploitation operations and responds to requests for information/ intelligence. It uses information collection assets in accordance with the commander's priorities and supports the IED-TM campaign with persistent surveillance to support cueing of focused reconnaissance response forces, post incident exploitation, and the collection of geospatial information to support planning and current operations.

Successful Peace Support Operations (PSO) are built on mutual trust and respect, and must rely on coordination of the IED-TM capabilities from T/PCCs, including intelligence, surveillance, weapon technical intelligence (WTI), search and EOD. PSO partners are also a source of knowledge on IED

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[26] DPKO Policy on Contributing Country Reconnaissance Visits, 2005.6.
[27] Operational Readiness Assurance (ORA) Policy ref.2015.16/UN DPKO/DFS/01 Jan 2016.

threat, the sharing of which is critical for intelligence support to the IED-TM effort. TTPs and equipment, including devices emitting electromagnetic signals should be coordinated and integrated across the mission. Coordination with the UN Country Team (UNCT) representatives (military and police) is advisable in terms of information-sharing, particularly where the mission supports humanitarian actors in delivering their mandates.

2.3   Identification of uniformed capabilities

Resolution 70/46 adopted by the UN General Assembly on 7 December 2015[28], on *Countering the threat posed by IEDs* encouraged states to respond appropriately to the threat environment involving IEDs within peacekeeping operations. This resolution specifically calls for the provision of "the appropriate training, capabilities, information and knowledge management and technology that is required to counter IEDs". The identification of uniformed (military and police) capabilities will follow the UN military standards as outlined in the UNMUM series, specifically the EOD unit manual.

Capability requirements for peacekeeping will vary from mission to mission depending on such factors as the mandate, the security environment, geography, population distribution, and even the climate. Although the spectrum of UN deployments does employ some common capabilities, the military force and police requirements of each mission are planned with specific capabilities to achieve the desired effect based on the respective mandates. With the proliferation of IED in areas where the UN is expected to deploy, capabilities that can mitigate this type of threat will be of primary importance.

Consideration should be given throughout all mission planning processes to the identification of specific resources (e.g. materiel, personnel and etcetera) required for effective IED threat mitigation measures. Findings related to threats posed by IEDs noted in the strategic, operational or other assessments should lead to development of the overall mission concept. These findings should be incorporated as part of the budget development processes, as well as the military, police and support concepts and plans. Material and equipment needs should be addressed through the Chief of Mission Support (CMS) and/or Director of Mission Support (DMS) in relation to budget preparation.

IED mitigation requirements should also be noted in the Statement of Unit Requirement (SUR)/Force Requirement (FR) documents to include advice on what areas of IED threat mitigation are required by a particular unit.[29] Planning for budgeting and the acquisition of equipment and services required for mitigating the IED threat should be undertaken in a realistic and timely manner.

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[28] Ibid 3

[29] Ibid 6.

2.3.1. **Factors determining the IED-TM Force structure**

The following factors should be considered when determining uniformed capabilities required to reinforce IED threat mitigation activities:

- **Manpower.** The mission must have an adequate number of trained Search and EOD teams / operators to carry out the IED threat mitigation mission mandate and tasks.

- **Expertise.** IEDD unit personnel must have an adequate level of IEDD qualification, training and experience to enable success in operations.

- **Equipment.** The mission must own or the T/PCC should have sufficient materiel, equipment, and technology to execute C-IED tasks efficiently.

- **Information.** The availability of intelligence sources and communications systems must be sufficient for IED threat information collection and management that supports the UN mission.

- **Support.** Dedicated support resources and mechanisms must be available to sustain IEDD operations.

2.3.2. **Components of IED-TM Units**

The table below provides examples of IED threat mitigation capabilities (military and police) that can be requested by mission planners as part of mission planning and concept of operation development. This list is not exhaustive and the capacity to fulfill each function may vary and should be tailored according to the mission's needs.

IED threat mitigation Capability	Function
Search Teams	Specialized search teams used in the application of systematic procedures and appropriate equipment to locate specified targets in support of military and police operations (i.e. detection of IEDs).
Route Clearance Teams (RCT)	Specially equipped teams with the equipment designed to aid in identifying IEDs and explosives hazards along routes of travel and to within the mission area.
EDD	Consists of the handler and dog specifically trained in the detection of explosives.
IEDD Teams	Specialized teams trained in the detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery and disposal of IEDs.

ESI trained personnel	For post incident investigation and collect forensic data
Electronic Counter Measures (ECM)	Equipment designed for use against the threat of RCIED.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities	Specialized equipment and techniques for increasing the mission's situational awareness

2.4   Planning and coordinating IED threat mitigation in the UN mission

FHQ (military and police) are required to carry out a detailed assessment of the IED threat in the mission area through intelligence collection efforts and from this identification of uniformed capability requirements for undertaking the IED-TM effort. A plan is then outlined for the deployment of capabilities in the mission area. This will include planning and coordinating IED threat mitigation activities in conjunction with relevant stake holders and the development of a sustainable and flexible mitigation structure at Force and Police Headquarters. The plans should incorporate information about the overall peacekeeping mandate and an aggressor's TTPs and should be updated regularly.

Towards this end and considering factors like the size of the UN mission, the level of IED threat (from low to high) and the geographical area, the FC is to organize IED threat mitigation effort in following manner:

> *FHQ is required to carry out detailed assessment of the IED threat in the mission area through intelligence collection effort and identification of uniformed capability requirements for undertaking the IED mitigation effort*

2.4.1. **Minimum threat level – IED-TM WG**. When the level of IED threat is low, the FC will establish a working group comprising of senior mission management to develop an IED mitigation strategy to accord with the mission mandate and will use this to direct, focus and manage IED threat mitigation efforts within the mission. The WG should gather inputs for assessment, develop IED threat mitigation outputs, and submit recommendations for decision to the Mission Leadership. On approval, the recommendations should be disseminated and implemented across the mission. The composition of the WG may vary depending on the mission size, available resources and level of threat within the mission environment.

Figure 2-1 Functioning of IED Threat Mitigation WG

2.4.2. **Low threat level IED-TM advisor and WG**. In the case of a low IED threat level, requiring continuous monitoring of the situation and response, the FC (military and Police) is to authorize a IED advisor in F/PHQ. The IED advisor will advise and assist the FC in critical decision making. IED Advisor is to be supported by existing operational, intelligence, training and CIMIC staff officers to plan and coordinate IED threat mitigation activities.

2.4.3. **Medium threat level –IED advisor and IED-TM cells**. As the IED level threat rises in the mission area, a dedicated IED-TM organization may be developed. This should comprise of the IED Advisor and a IED-TM Cell manned by existing HQ staff (U2, U3, U5, U6, U7 and U8).

2.4.4. **High threat level IED advisor and dedicated staff for IED-TM cells**. As the IED threat to UN personnel increases and IED incidents increase, the FHQ (military and police) are required to create a dedicated nucleus IED-TM staff organisation under the supervision of the IED advisor. It will include various cells including operations, intelligence, training and CIMIC cells to effectively plan and coordinate operations in mission area.

2.5   **IED-TM command and control organization, staff functions and tasks**

Key tasks (within a mission military and police HQ) include action that must be undertaken to support a fully integrated approach, in an IED threat environment. Suggested tasks of staff at Force or Police HQ are given below.

2.5.1.   **IED advisor**. FHQ (military and police) will each have a IED Advisor with additional staff depending upon the strength of the UN mission, the level of threat and geographical area. Tasks of the C-IED Advisor in the FHQ (military and police) are:

- Advise and assist military/police commander on all C-IED matters.

- Control and coordinate IEDD operations in the mission area.

- Advise on IED training to units, including on the provision of specialist training.

- Update the IED and explosives hazard information.

- Assist commanders of other headquarters in the mission area in IED threat mitigation planning on as required basis.

- Advise on FPECM matters.

2.5.2.   **The establishment of IED-TM cells**

To enable Military and Police Headquarters to handle IED-TM efforts effectively, various cells may be created to plan, organize and coordinate IEDD operations. Close liaison and integration amongst these cells is essential for the successful conduct of IEDD operations. Detailed tasks of each cell / organization are covered in the following sections:

2.5.2.1.   **Intelligence Cell**. This cell is responsible for collection, analysis and dissemination of information on IED system for IEDD operations in the mission area. The main tasks of the Intelligence cell (U-2) are:

- Assess the IED threat.

- Develop and disseminate IED information to the common operating picture.

- Identify intelligence requirements and operational gaps to optimise IEDD operations within the area of operation.

- Recommend FP measures.

2.5.2.2.   **Operations Cell.** Planning and coordination for the conduct of IEDD operations, capacity building and support measures will be managed by this cell. The cell will also act as the focal point for all stake holders and will prepare advice on IED response for the HOM or Working Group under the supervision of the IED Advisor. Tasks of this cell (U-3, U-5, U-6 & U-8) are:

- Synchronize and plan IED activities.

- Track and log developments in the IED threat.

- Coordinate C-IED activities with HQs (military or police) and host government agencies.
- Plan exploitation operations.
- Establish IEDD capacity-building requirements.

2.5.2.3. **CIMIC and Information Management Cell.** All source intelligence gathering and information management are key to successful implementation of IED-TM strategy in mission and non-mission settings. This cell will keep mission personnel (military, police and civilians) updated about the IED threat, aim to reduce or prevent an aggressor's influence and extend the peacekeeping influence on locals using physical and psychological means. Tasks of this cell (U-9) are:

- Carry out coordination with civil departments, NGOs and locals for development of the IED information picture.
- Plan and conduct influence activities.
- Plan and conduct the IED awareness and information campaign if mandated.

2.5.2.4. **Training and Evaluation Cell.** The U-7 manages the in-mission training, evaluation and lessons-learned process. This process should incorporate TTPs, equipment, and other related change proposals to include reach-back capabilities that form the mission prepare-the-force initiatives. Chapter 5 of this handbook further defines qualifications and provides training guidelines. The cell will have a critical role to play in determining training standards and the level of expertise required by IEDD forces to meet the threat level. It will interact with the Intelligence and Operation cells to analyze and identify capability gaps in order to plan in-mission training and update training standards. Tasks of U-7 will:

- Prepare training plans, guidelines and organization of IED training.
- Provide guidance and support to Sector HQ and IED-TM units in development of training packages and up gradation of TTPs.
- Carry out in mission IEDD training evaluation.
- Carry out evaluation of the IEDD force operational readiness.

2.5.2.5. **Liaison**. Regardless of the command structure and arrangements, effective liaison will be vital. Liaison officers (LOs) foster knowledge-sharing and understanding, and enhance mutual trust and team work. Depending upon the level of the IED threat, consideration should be given to establishing explosives hazards LOs within key organizations including:

- Mission partner, national C-IED organizations
- Military and police HQ
- Mission component HQs
- T/PCCs HQs

- Host nation security forces

2.5.2.6. **Embedded staff**. Embedding of staff in FHQ and units has proved a very successful mechanism for nations with a small military commitment to quickly access IED information and knowledge and gain specialist skills. These arrangements can provide benefit through timely warning of a major change in the IED threat or development of new IED countermeasures.

2.6 IED-TM Units - Search and EOD teams employment

For effective IED threat mitigation in the mission area, defensive as well as proactive operations/ activities will need to be conducted by (Military/ Police) Units/ Teams in the field. Understanding of operational employment and capabilities of the IED-TM force is essential for Command and staff officers at FHQ. This will assist the Commander in situating the efforts, planning effects-based employment of the IED-TM force, and taking appropriate and timely decisions to mitigate the IED threat in the mission area.

2.6.1. IED-TM Unit structure

Identification of a uniform capability to comprehensively mitigate the IED threat in the mission area is the key task during the mission planning stage. The structure of IED-TM Unit and teams will vary according to the mission mandate, the mission size and the IED threat environment. Factors determining the size of the force and its major components are discussed in section 2.3.

2.6.2. **Employment of IED Units/ sub-Units**. Based on the threat assessment and mission planning, the commander of the IEDD Unit / Subunit will be the focal point to plan, coordinate and execute IED-TM operations / activities in support of the FC intent. Detailed tasks of the IED-TM unit are given in **Annex A.** Units/ Teams in the mission area will:

- Conduct IED-TM operations as per the FHQ (military and police) FP plan.
- Conduct search and disposal tasks to include (but not limited to) the following:
  - o Route clearance
  - o Urban area clearance
  - o Area clearance
  - o Entry point search (vehicle/ personnel)
  - o Disposal of explosive ordnance finds
- Conduct Level 1technical exploitation (ESI).
- Respond to bomb calls on authorization by FHQ.
- Support FHQ in IED awareness in the mission area.
- Share IED information including threat warnings on behalf of FHQ.
- Ensure the availability of relevant equipment to address the latest threat in the mission area.

- Update TTPs for FP and PoC according to the latest threat in the mission area.

2.6.3. **Capabilities of IED-TM units/ subunits**. Military FHQ and UN police staff must be acquainted themselves with capabilities and TTPs of units/ subunits so that their employment is best utilized in reducing the IED threat level in mission area. IED-TM units/ subunits will:

- Assess IED threats in the mission area.

- Advise FHQ on the planning of IED operations in high, medium and low threat zones.

- Search and dispose of all kinds of IEDs, including complex IEDs.

- Search and dispose of all kinds of UXO, except NBC munitions.

- Provide search cover to UN convoys, installations and dignitaries.

- Carry out ESI of IED incidents and advise FHQ (military and police) on preventive measures to avert future IED attacks.

- Contribute to IED awareness programs in the mission area, if required.

2.7 **Mechanism of monitoring and reporting**

The uninterrupted flow of information is essential for the conduct of safe and effective operations. Staffs, troops and units under an IED threat need to communicate quickly, clearly, and concisely so that IED-TMs missions can be planned and executed successfully. Standardized report and message formats enable easier interpretation and efficient exchange of information. Standardized specimens of the following IED/ EO reporting forms are attached at **Annex B**

- IED / EO reporting form.

- Suggested layout of IED/UXO demolition/neutralization certificate.

- Suggested layout of investigation report on captured/recovered IED/UXO held under the custody of law enforcing agencies.

- Suggested layout of IED/UXO incident report.

- Suggested layout of post blast investigation report.

The standardisation of forms is particularly important in combined operations as they reduce the impact of different operating languages and ease the collation and transmission of complex

> *Standardized report and message formats enable easier interpretation and efficient exchange of information particularly in combined operations as they reduce the impact of different operating languages and ease the collation and transmission of complex information*

information.

The IEDD report is the authoritative technical record of an IED event that is used to develop technical intelligence, to confirm adversary / friendly TTPs, to share information with allies, and to

assist in aggressor's trend analysis. Timeliness and accurate reporting is the key to ensuring a well-informed community and is invaluable in analysing trends and formulating future RSP.

The reporting system facilitates information flow and development of an overall picture covering the following aspects:

- The threat and hazard situation.
- The locations of IEDs and explosive ordnance.
- Reporting of IEDs found during routine missions.
- The explosive ordnance type, quantity and incident site.
- Residual risk.
- IED Intelligence.
- The workload of IED forces (type, duration and number of operations).
- Collection and submission of archival information (reports, photographs, drawings of incident site / disposal procedure /result).

Missions should ensure the use of a standardized process for recording, collecting, analyzing and disseminating IED incident data. Data collection processes should be tailored according to mission requirements for potential use by, where relevant, the IED-TM units along with FHQ staff.

Collection, amalgamation and filing of contemporary data from IED reports is essential for monitoring IED activity within the area of operations. Sharing information with key stakeholders within the mission and UN HQ will directly assist with investigations, intelligence threat assessments, identification of recurring patterns and methods of attack, vulnerabilities and any remaining or new capability gaps. The information sharing can also enhance cooperation with local military and police security forces, who will ultimately inherit the C-IED responsibility.

2.8 Guidelines for Operating under IED Threat

It is important for UN forces operating under an IED threat to seriously consider its impact when planning and executing operations and tasks. Information about IED indicators and signs are given at **Annex C** and general awareness about IEDs are given at **Annex D**.

2.8.1. Preventive actions

During the conduct of operations, UN forces (military and police) can mitigate the IED threat by applying the following preventive actions:

- Avoid routine behaviour.
- Vary routes and timing.
- Maintain a high level of alertness.

- Plan the establishment of check posts and patrolling activities keeping in mind threat assessments such as hotspot areas, infiltration routes adopted by the aggressor (IED emplacers), timing of IED placement (before sunrise or after sunset), patterns of earlier incidents, possible targets and etcetera.

- Conduct training on procedures for action on identification of threat, on IED find and on IED attack.

- Maintain a quick response capability in the event of IED attacks and rehearse procedures – prepare for the unexpected.

- Be vigilant about out of the ordinary behaviour and IED-linked indicators.

- Take notes and report any suspicious activity.

- Assume that all attacks with IEDs are followed up with ambushes or further IEDs.

- Keep a safe distance between vehicles in convoys.

- Adjust the speed and distance between the vehicles in a convoy according to the situation and threat assessment.

- Be aware of canalizing terrain and conduct the appropriate drills.

- In areas of high risk/exposure, consider modifying vehicles to provide additional protection from blast and debris from an explosion.

- Emphasize the importance of maintaining an offensive posture, conducting security patrols, establishing over-watch on likely attack positions, and always being ready to approach and/or engage the local population.

2.8.2. **Render safe procedure (RSP) guidelines.** The following guiding IED-TM principles are to be adhered to in all IEDD operations:

- Remote means will be the primary RSP.

- Manual RSP actions shall be carried out only as a last resort.

- The operator shall be exposed to the device for the minimum period of time.

- Mandatory soak times shall be observed before any manual approach.

- The operator shall revert to remote means whenever possible.

- Destruction in situ (or blow in place) is the safest method to dispose of an IED. The course of action selected will depend upon the FC's policy which will be based upon the level of expertise possessed by IEDD units and teams, the threat to installation/ personnel, the mission mandate and the local commander's recommendations.

It is important to balance proactive, reactive and enabling activities based on an assessment of critical IED system vulnerabilities and an assessment of the Force and UNPOL capability to degrade those vulnerabilities

Chapter 3

Functions Contributing to IED Threat Mitigation

3.1   **Operational assessment considerations**

The purpose of an operational assessment is to bring the UN political, security, development, humanitarian and human rights entities together to develop a shared understanding of the IED threat in conflict or post-conflict situations. The assessment includes the roles of stakeholders and core peace consolidation priorities and proposes options for UN in-mission IED-TM efforts on the basis of an assessment of risks and opportunities. Whether as part of mission start-up planning or during the life-cycle, the operational assessment provides a basis for the development of recommendations on IED threat mitigation approaches. It includes the commitment of effort (military and police) along with integrated support from stake holders for the consideration of the FC and if appropriate, the HOM.

During the conduct of the operational assessment the possible threat of IEDs or other explosive hazards, in and around the host country should be taken into account. As part of these considerations it should be recognised that of the activities conducted by any aggressor's organization, generating local support and support from similar organizations often has the greatest impact on its long-term effectiveness. For example:

- **Technical**. Expertise of a technical nature may be moved within a host nation between one region and another or from one organization to another allowing the aggressors to gain from one another's experience.

- **Financial**. Money or material may pass unencumbered from cities to towns even over borders.

- **Transportation**. This may include providing safe passage through check posts or borders.

3.2   **Operational planning considerations**

IEDs are but one operational threat facing a Commander. As such, planning to counter IEDs is done as part of the normal operational planning processes that address all threats faced by the Force. This ensures comprehensive FP measures are employed and that the IED-TM activities are coordinated as part of the risk management process and operation plan.

3.3   **IED Threat Mitigation Activities**

Due to the robust nature of most IED systems, mitigation measures taken against only one node of the system are unlikely to impact decisively on the use of IEDs by an aggressor. However, IED systems are vulnerable to comprehensive mitigation measures which may involve diplomatic, economic or security forces actions. Accordingly, the strategy for responding to an IED threat is to view the threat comprehensively and conduct mitigation activities across the IED system. IED-Activities are based on a thorough analysis of IED system vulnerabilities and are:

- Intelligence-led and proactive, aiming to degrade the aggressor's development and adaptive capability through effective interdiction and superior countermeasures.

- Applied simultaneously by civil, military and police elements against the IED system's critical vulnerabilities.

- Proactive, defensive and enabling and underpinned by comprehensive information activities including civil-military cooperation.

3.4   IED Threat Mitigation Plan

3.4.1. In developing the operation plan it is important to understand the capability and time matrix:

- Activities undertaken close to the point of an IED attack will achieve more immediate effects, such as ensuring FP by defeating a specific IED.

- Activities conducted before the point of attack will have substantial medium term effects, such as preventing the emplacement of an IED or by denying movement of IED precursors and/or the emplacers.

- Activities undertaken to achieve effects even earlier, such as information gathering activities or the removal of financial and material support from the aggressor, may have a longer lasting effect on an IED system, but may require more resources and take much longer to achieve.

3.4.2. It is important to balance proactive, reactive and enabling IED-TM activities based on an assessment of critical IED system vulnerabilities and an assessment of the military and police capability to degrade those vulnerabilities.

> *It is important to balance proactive, reactive and enabling IED-TM activities*

3.4.3. As outlined in the preceding paragraphs, preventing the emplacement of an IED through proactive measures will have substantial medium term effects. These activities could include identifying the personnel and sources involved in the IED material supply chain through intelligence and investigative efforts.

3.5   Exploitation

Valuable technical intelligence to support IED-TM can be derived from the exploitation of captured information and materiel. Exploitation in-mission is coordinated by U2 (see Chapter 2) and may be limited by the mission mandate, resources or expertise available. IED related exploitation is managed as part of the overall exploitation effort. It includes:

- Examination, analysis and archiving of documents, photographs, computers and other information storage media.

- Examination, analysis and archiving of weapons and equipment, including IEDs and components.

3.5.1. **Exploitation considerations**

IED-TM exploitation may also include collection and analysis of forensic evidence and biometric data.

Key exploitation considerations include the following:

- **Technical intelligence**. Critical information is provided by the timely recovery of IEDs (pre or post-initiation), device-making equipment and forensic evidence, including biometric data. Establishing and deploying teams to recover, exploit and transport IED material and forensic evidence is highly desirable.

- **Biometric data**. Biometric data provides an ability to identify individuals who have been

> *Intelligence gained from exploitation can predict aggressor actions, support degradation of an IED system and assist the detection and neutralisation of IEDs*

involved in IED activities. Biometric data must be collected in accordance with Mission mandate and should be utilized solely to facilitate

Intelligence gained from exploitation can predict aggressor actions, support degradation of an IED system and assist the detection and neutralisation of IEDs. It also enhances mitigation efforts by supporting the development of FP measures, including TTPs, and the following:

- **Evaluation**. FP measures need to evolve as the threat changes and when the aggressor's TTPs change in response to friendly force actions. The capability of responsive evaluation based on lessons learned supports:
  o Timely review and dissemination of revised FP measures.
  o Training upgrades.
  o Capability development.
  o Equipment acquisition.

- **Maintenance of capability effectiveness**. Countering an evolving IED threat requires constant redevelop and validation of countermeasures and techniques. This is focused by FP priorities and includes ensuring that intelligence gained through exploitation is used to maintain and improve the effectiveness of the FPECM capability.

- **Information activities**. After an IED incident, information activities may be directed at countering and undermining aggressor efforts to legitimise IED use, focusing on the negative impacts of IED use.

3.5.2. **Exploitation activities**

Exploitation activities are classified by level according to the assets available and the amount of potential data that can be exploited. The exploitation levels are:

Level 1 (**field exploitation**). This captures the IED incident context (scene and events) and preserves, recovers and identifies physical artefacts. That is normally conducted by specialists such as EOD teams, 'high-risk' search teams or 'sensitive-site exploitation' teams. It may include an immediate assessment of aggressor TTPs and capabilities and provide support to FP vulnerability assessment. Level 1exploitation reports should focus on FP and be disseminated to tactical elements to enhance FP.

Level 2.   If available, Level 2 exploitation is conducted by specialists and scientists in either a UN deployed laboratory or one provided by host nation capabilities within the mission area. This level focuses on the detailed technical and forensic examination of evidence to determine the source of components and the nature of IED construction and to identify the individuals associated with it. That in turn further informs FP, intelligence analysis and efforts to degrade the aggressor's network.

Level 3.   Out-of-Mission area exploitation is conducted by 'national-level' laboratories of Member States using reach back capabilities. The analysis often feeds back into the strategic arena, focusing on degrading the strategic and operational elements of the aggressor's network.

Biometric data is identified using technologies that measure and analyse human body characteristics such as fingerprints, eye retinas and irises, voice patterns, facial patterns, and hand measurements for identification purposes. Biometric data is distinctive for each person. Aggregated biometric signature collection and exploitation provides an unprecedented capability to identify and track persons of intelligence and security interest.

3.6 **Threat Mitigation assets management**

3.6.1. **Mitigation Overview**

Military and Police Forces need to minimise the potential physical, psychological and operational effects of an IED incident. The primary focus of mitigation activities is on FP and PoC using a combination of material solutions and TTPs. FP measures and TTPs are directed at reducing the effect of IED attacks thus providing UN mission elements (military and police) the freedom to conduct their operations. Protection planning may also need to consider protective measures for the

local population and infrastructure, including possible controls on movement. Generalized mitigation activities include:

- Disrupting or redirecting blast energy or fragmentation.
- Providing blast and fragmentation protection for key infrastructure, platforms, structures and personnel.
- Ensuring development of effective TTPs. That will include:
  - IED event, ambush and medical evacuation drills, which reduce potential target exposure in terms of time and space during an IED incident.
  - Detailed route planning and avoiding established patterns and predictable forms of behaviour.
  - Establishing a disciplined approach to pre-mission procedures, including rehearsals and equipment inspections.
  - Risk management treatments identified during pre-operation planning.
  - Using risk management procedures, balancing the IED risks against the impact of IED Threat Mitigation measures on the conduct of operations.

3.6.2. **Mitigation activities**

Mitigation includes technical, tactical, and information activities undertaken to minimise the effects of an IED event as follows:

- **Technical**. Technical mitigation is concerned with the disruption or redirection of blast energy and fragments to reduce damage to the target. Armour and similar devices are the most common technical solutions to this requirement.
- **Tactical**. Tactical considerations play an important part in reducing the effects of an IED's blast. They include issues such as the use of spacing and the considered positioning of troops (military and police) to reduce the number of elements of a force directly exposed to the potential effects of an explosion. Lessons learned and TTPs are fundamental elements of tactical mitigation.
- **TTPs.** TTPs are critical in enabling UN agencies the freedom to carry out their normal tasks, within an IED threat environment. A disciplined approach to TTPs at all levels and within all environments, collective and individual, cannot be over emphasised. TTPs must be regularly evaluated and reviewed as a result of lessons learned and of new intelligence on the evolving threat.

3.6.3. **Threat mitigation considerations**

- **Commander's policy to clear, bypass, breach or exploit**. To effectively manage threats in an IED environment, commanders must provide guidance when a threat is to be cleared, bypassed,

secured or exploited. This guidance will empower junior commanders to make decisions on whether to search for IEDs, whether to mark and bypass the IED, to isolate the area for follow-on IEDD neutralization, remotely destroy the device, or to hold the ground and to exploit the device.

- **Risk Management**. Mitigation measures should be applied based on a risk-management approach. Commanders must balance the IED risks against the impact of IED threat mitigation particularly FP and PoC measures, on the conduct of operations and achievement of the commander's desired end state. In particular, the ability of the military and police force to conduct the tasks required to facilitate the implementation of the mission mandate must be considered. Commanders should ensure risk management is fully integrated into planning processes, and must be supported by a responsive and ongoing threat-assessment process.

- **Medical Treatment**. Medical capability and training must consider the nature and types of physical and psychological injuries that result from IEDs.

3.6.4. **Mitigation assets**

There are a range of mitigation assets available within a Mission setting. Some assets provide direct mitigation whereas others are indirect. Unity of effort is a key prerequisite for success, given the complexity and potential for friction within this area or operational activities. Scarce assets should be:

- *Commanded at the highest practical level*. With access to integrated intelligence. This is likely to be at the Mission or FHQ level. However, highly specialist capabilities of Member States (e.g. bomb-data analysis) will be controlled at the national level.

- *Controlled at the lowest practical level*. This can be at the subunit level, dependent on the threat, operation, and availability of IEDD resources, and local conditions.

3.6.4.1. **Search & IEDD assets.** Search and EOD units are deployed to reduce the IED threat in the mission area. Configuration of Search and EOD assets will depend on the mandate and the IED threat and may include high risk search teams, EDDs and route search Teams. The following issues need to be considered while deploying these assets:

- Specialized Search teams are employed for IED search and positive IED identification.

- IEDD teams are employed to render safe and dispose of IEDs and perform post-blast investigation.

- Search and EOD teams must be provided with dedicated security.

- Better information flow mechanism assures timely response to IEDs.

- Search and EOD teams need to be adequately equipped with threat specific search, disposal, Level 1 exploitation equipment and EDDs to enable the safest possible conduct of their duties.

- For a more comprehensive understanding of EOD units, please refer to the EOD Manual.

> *Configuration of Search and EOD assets will depend on the mandate and IED threat within the mission area*

3.6.4.2.   **Level 1 exploitation.** As indicated previously, exploitation assets are grouped by the level of capability they provide. The most common in-mission capability will be Level 1, which includes EOD teams and Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) Teams.

3.6.4.3.   **Civil-Military coordination (CIMIC).** The Head of Military Component/FCs and Police Headquarters are responsible for conducting outreach and engagement with the local population. Interaction with local leaders, influential actors in civil society and vulnerable sections of the population is part of the overall Force and Mission communications strategy. Securing local and host nation support is an essential element of Force and Mission success and is a key strength of the UN in mitigating the IED threat. CIMIC also requires interaction with UN civilian partners, UN agencies, non-governmental organizations.

- Effective CIMIC systems will enhance FP. CIMIC is necessary to develop a robust interface with the local population and develop trust and respect for the military force. This interface with the local population will assist in the generation of a safer environment for the military force.

- Many TCCs will have their own national CIMIC-related activities that also require coordination with other Mission actors to ensure the UN presents a coherent posture. All CIMIC activities must be conducted in close coordination with the Mission's civilian leadership to ensure consistency with the Mission's political and operational strategy.

3.6.4.4.   **ISR**. It continues to play a critical role in the IED detection and neutralization activity. Experience suggests that timely reporting of emplacement of IEDs can be achieved using all source information provided from the All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) if one is established.

3.6.4.5.   **FPECM Assets.** Force Protection Electronic Counter Measures (FPECM) uses the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) for FP. Many IED initiators are electronic, such as cell phones and car alarm systems, and such IEDs are collectively known as RCIEDs. FPECM interrupts signals used to initiate RCIEDs. Key FPECM considerations are as follows:

- FPECM can affect friendly use of the EMS and so requires dedicated EMS focal point to de-conflict with other EMS users (managed by U6 staff, where applicable).

- Linkages between EMS and FPECM are important to the development and deployment of new software to counter emerging threats.

- The IED threat is usually based on commercial off-the-shelf technology and as such the frequencies and communications technologies used can change rapidly. To counter this agility, FPECM equipment uses programmable software, for which configuration management of FPECM software is critical.

- Critical friendly force frequencies are programmed into FPECM equipment so that they can be detected, identified and not jammed by FPECM, or protected by other technical means.

- If the TCC/PCC are unable to bring an FPECM capability as part of their COE then consideration should be given for UN DFS to provide FPECM as UNOE.

> *Any IED Awareness campaign should ensure that it covers all of the in-mission agencies, including NGOs and civilians within the mission area*

3.7   IED awareness

3.7.1. Aim of IED awareness effort

It is important that IED safety awareness be included in threat mitigation efforts. The primary agency for the conduct of this within UN Missions is UNMAS. At FHQ (military and police) level, U2 and U-9 are responsible for planning IED awareness. The efforts should aim to raise awareness and provide basic safety information concerning the threat of landmines, ERW, EO and IEDs to organizations and individuals working in affected areas, and to help them to:

- Establish appropriate safety procedures.

- Avoid contact with mines, ERW, EO and IEDs.

- Take appropriate action in emergency situations.

3.7.2. **Contents of IED awareness campaigns**. IED awareness contributes immensely to overall mitigation efforts. Any IED awareness campaign should ensure that it covers all the in-mission agencies, including NGOs and civilians within the mission area. The content of any IED Awareness campaign should also include other explosive threats such as mines and ERW and EO. Possible content could include the following:

- Collecting detailed information on the IED / mine / ERW/ EO threat in the area of operations, and updating this information regularly. Consideration should be given to keeping a visual brief available (a map or spread sheet identifying dangerous areas).

- Establishing IED safety procedures, in particular by establishing a '*vehicle and travel*' reporting system. All personnel must be educated and updated on IEDs, awareness guidelines are included at **Annex D**.

- Maintaining updated and verified contact details of IED response centres, UN security officers, the Multinational EOD Coordination Cell (MN EOD CC), Mission Contingents, local police and medical facilities.

- Providing IED-related information to UN military and police staff in a convenient format, including information on safe routes and dangerous areas in areas of operation, as well as emergency contact information.

- Ensuring that all staff who may be at risk (including drivers, interpreters and guides) receive IED awareness training and are familiar with IED safety procedures.

- Understanding that levels of alertness to the IED threat will decrease over time; and safety refresher training may be required.

- Ensuring that staff receives first-aid training, with special focus on trauma care, and that vehicles are equipped with first-aid and trauma-care kits.

- Equipping vehicles and staff with effective communication equipment and maps, and providing training in their use.

- In areas of high risk and high exposure, consider modifying vehicles to provide additional protection from an explosion.

- Regular conduct of IED briefs and distribution of reports to ensure all personnel are aware of current and changing IED threats.

- Working with communities to identify 'triggers and tripwires' buzzwords for indicators of activity during the development stage of the attack. This would include setting up processes to identify.

Kenyan engineer inspects for IED in Kismayo, southern Somalia. AMISOM 2012

IED threat mitigation is a process that must be integrated fully into staff and training functions at UN level

Chapter 4

IED Threat Mitigation Roles and Responsibilities within Military and Police HQs

4.1 **HQs in context**:

In the context of the developing IED threat worldwide, there is a strong likelihood that many future UN deployments will experience an IED threat. This threat whilst possessing characteristics common across missions will also have aspects that are unique to a specific mission area.

This chapter does not seek to redefine the traditional staff functions or structures of missions. Rather it utilizes and augments capabilities within the existing mission framework. It does this by providing planning processes and IED threat mitigation measures that the FC through the HQ can tailor within the environmental and operational realities. This will take place in the 'Mission Space' the size and makeup of which is determined by the governing mandate, the available resources and the particular ROEs that come with the mission type.

IED threat mitigation is a process that must be integrated fully into staff and training functions at the UN level. An understanding of the IED threat is however vital due to the nature of the threat to FHQs, which concern themselves with the mission generally, and to the operational arms and police components, which are concerned with achieving the mission. As such, IED-TM must be integrated across all mission areas and encompass military, police and civil actors. This is of course recognized by the UN 'DPKO-DFS Guidelines[30].

4.2 **HQs and the need for a systemic response**

Figure 4.1 Systematic IED response structure at Military and Police HQ

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
[30] DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Threat Mitigation in Mission Settings. http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/387428?show=full

IEDs are a systemic problem requiring action at strategic, operational and tactical levels (figure 4.1). The IED-TM approach will vary and will be dependent on the mission mandate, however, activities will remain predominantly defensive consisting of search operations (to include ISR), and aimed at preventing a successful IED attack in the first instance. ECM, EOD and WTI teams will then be utilized on finds/strikes to defeat and exploit devices. The UN's 'Use of Force' policy will clearly mandate the limits of the employment of force to defeat the IED network.

4.3   IED Threat Mitigation activities

4.3.1.   At the **operational levels**, the IED activity for military/police staff primarily revolves around understanding the threat (U-2, U-6, U-9), and pursuing and preventing it (U-3, U-5, U-7).

- o **Understanding**. Understanding the IED threat and mitigation tasks underpins all actions at all levels. It involves creating a picture of the IED system in the mission area and addressees how that system interacts with the human, physical and information environments. It is undertaken at operational and tactical levels.

- o **Pursuing**. This involves the full spectrum of actions in support of peacekeeping efforts inside and outside the mission area in order to degrade the aggressor's IED capabilities and capacities.

- o **Preventing**. These activities both inside and outside the mission area involve influencing aggressors to reject involvement in the IED network.

- At the **tactical level**, staff has the responsibility for protecting (U-3, U-5,U-6, U-8) and preparing the force (U-7).

- o **Protecting**. This is ensured by tactical measures to provide freedom of movement to the force and the locals.

- o **Preparing**. This involves building the capabilities of the force according to the IED threat environment and is, necessary to carry out the mission's mandate.

4.4   Organization of IED Threat Mitigation activities by FHQ (military and police) staff

As per the task assigned to the FHQ by the office of SRSG or the office of UNHQ, FHQ staff must appreciate and incorporate IED threat mitigation in planning for mandate. There are various mission types including support to Peacekeeping and political negotiations, providing a secure environment, observation and monitoring, preventive employment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), assist in restoration of law and order etc.

4.4.1. FHQ (military and police) is responsible for operational readiness, performance improvement and evaluation of deployed units in the mission areas. Additionally, FHQ (military and police) is

MS/TCC/PCC/UNHQ

Shaping
Personnel and units
Equipment
Doctrine and Policy

TCC/PCC/UNHQ/FHQ

Learning
Personnel and units
Equipment
Doctrine and Policy

TCC/PCC/UNHQ/FHQ

Preparation
Personnel and units
Equipment
Doctrine and Policy

FHQ

Delivery
Personnel and units
Equipment
Doctrine and Policy

Figure 4.2 Operational readiness assurance and performance improvement cycle

also invited to provide input and monitor the operational readiness preparation of the units to be deployed in UN missions. Towards this end, staff at FHQ provides input, guidelines and directions to T/PCCs during various stages of the performance improvement cycle (figure 4.2) which occurs before deployment and in-mission. Detailed responsibilities of FHQ staff are given in DFS's Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement Policy 2015. Regarding C-IED capability development, FHQ staff should be able to provide detailed input to C-IED units on the following aspects:

4.4.1.1.   **Pre-mission deployment**. Guidelines for IED-TM unit's capabilities:

o   Prepare documents and doctrines concerning the contemporary peacekeeping environment

o   Assess the IED threat in the intended mission area.

o   Assess training standards and equipment required by units and individuals before deployment to the IED affected environment.

o   Assess ballistic protection requirement for vehicles and personnel.

o   Prepare IEDs and explosive awareness training requirements for UN personnel.

o   Prepare SOPs on the movement of convoys, patrols and UN personnel in the mission area.

o   Plan submission of reports and returns on IED and ERW found or incident.

o   Plan IED threat perception, information operations and feedback mechanism.

o   Advise on specialized IED equipment and training requirements.

o   Plan the extent of exploitation and the requirement for appropriate facilities.

4.4.1.2.   **On deployment to the UN mission**

o   Arrange the Operational Readiness Assurance program and the evaluation program for vetting of incoming IEDD units.

o   Share lessons learnt in terms of personnel, equipment, procedures, plans for updating SOPs and up-grading of training standards.

o   Provide detailed information analysis on the IED threat.

o   Organize reconnaissance and briefings for familiarization with the IED threat environment including updating of SOPs for conducting operations.

o   Provide required IED equipment.

4.4.1.3.   **During UN mission deployment**

o   Conduct periodic operational evaluation of units.

o   Organize refresher training for units on IED threat mitigation measures and specialized search and EOD team training.

o   Assign IED-TM tasks to maintain operational fitness of units.

o   Provide regular updates on aggressor's TTPs and share analysis reports with HQs and units.

o   Organize IED threat management workshops for senior and junior leadership.

o   Coordinate the establishment of support structures such as an exploitation facility or training center.

4.4.2. **Battle Rhythm Integration**: Within the FHQ, the IED Advisor directs policy in the macro and micro sense in accordance with overarching policy of the FC. However, it is the existing or specially designated staff in various cells (operation, intelligence, training and CIMIC) that will

continuously monitor the aggressor's network and TTPs, consider and implement TTPs and plan and manage operations. The IED Advisor must ensure that any IED-TM activities are made part of the battle rhythm of the HQ. Co-ordination between the staff functions is key and this is depicted in figure 4.3:

Figure 4.3 Coordination of staff functions – Battle Rhythm

4.4.3. **Innovations**

Military and police HQ's staff should plan and implement their assigned tasks. Innovations within HQs that will support the integration of efforts are:

- o Commanders and Staff must *identify* which tasks are relevant, suitable and mandated within the operating framework.
- o Responsibility for the chosen tasks must be *assigned* to a specific staff or person.
- o Tasks should be subject to rigorous analysis so as to highlight *resource and information gaps*.
- o Staff must coordinate actions and avoid operating in isolation. IED-TM actions require an *integrated approach* horizontally and vertically amongst the staff and a multitude of stake holders in the mission space.

4.5 **Responsibilities of military and police HQ to direct and implement threat mitigation efforts**

The FHQ (military/ police) has a critical role in organizing an effect based effort in the mission area. Responsibilities of FHQ command and staff are shown below. Detailed responsibilities of various staff appointments are tabulated in **Annex E**.

Military/ Police HQ has a critical role in organizing an effect-based effort in the mission area

4.5.1. **FC/PC**. The FC/PC is responsible for the overall IED-TM effort in the mission area. In line with the strategic direction of UNHQ, the FC/PC will organize the IED threat mitigation activities in order to achieve a secure peacekeeping environment for UN personnel, civilians and locals. He will take measures to build capacity ensuring availability of resources and support structures. He will clearly state the IED disposal policy.

4.5.2. **The IED Advisor**. The IED Advisor will enable, oversee and lead the C-IED effort at Force HQ. He will:

- o Serve as the focal point for the FC/PC and will advise on planning and conduct of IED threat mitigation activities.
- o Coordinate the actions and capabilities of the various branches of staff against the IED network.
- o Maintain continuous liaison on IED threat-related matters with the office of SRSG and DPKO for strategic input and lateral coordination with the HOPC and the Police IED Advisor (as applicable) on operational employment of IED assets.
- o Monitor the battle rhythm of the aggressor for timely response actions.
- o Provide specialist advice to U2 staff in assessing and monitoring the IED threat, and conducting IED-related Intelligence operations.
- o Advise U3, U6, U7 for FP measures (military and police) in accordance with the IED threat balancing the need to protect the force (military and police) while not inhibiting the commander's freedom of action and campaign end state.
- o Issue threat warnings to Sector HQs and units and periodic information analysis reports.
- o Analyze the aggressor's TTPs and identify in-mission capacity building requirements.
- o For additional information on the IED Advisor, consult the EOD Unit Manual.

4.5.3. **Intelligence Cell**. The U2 is responsible for intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE), engineer intelligence, and the IED threat profile. In supporting the development of the IED-TM plan, the U2 ensures that the following are included in the IPOE process:

- o Detailed threat analysis within the mission area in order to create an IED threat picture including levels of threat in geographical zones.
- o Updating of intelligence maps to identify safe and threatened routes, and friendly and hostile territories for planning of operations.

o Coordinating and fusing all IED-related intelligence/information originating from mission area of operations.

o Supporting the planning of IED technical intelligence collection operations.

o Providing timely information on the evolving IED threat, including FP measures and PoC, for the information of staff involved in developing plans.

o Exploiting information and technical intelligence gathered from IED incidents, or from captured devices to proactively support IED-TM objectives.

o Initiating threat assessment reports and regular updates of the IED threat mosaic.

4.5.4. **Operations Cell**. U-3, U-5, U-6 and U-8 will:

o Plan and conduct IED threat mitigation activities.

o Plan and coordinate the disposal of explosive based hazardous material.

o Prepare plans for FP and PoC.

o Plan and coordinate threat mitigation measures and the control of IED transportation within the host country.

o Implement tactical SOPs for the prevention of IED emplacement by the aggressor.

o Manage internal and external coordination of IED operations within the UN peacekeeping setups and with the host government's agencies.

o Plan the development of support facilities such as exploitation and training areas.

o Plan and acquire equipment and services required for IED threat mitigation.

o Initiate reports and returns on IEDD operations.

o Evaluate the aggressor's IED TTPs and provides technical expertise to actively counter IED threats in the mission area.

o Provide ECM management support. Also provide FPECM focal if there is no dedicated ECM advisor.

o Provide support in the developing and updating of TTPs to counter the IED threat.

o Provide technical support for planning and conducting operations.

o Coordinate exploitation activities for IEDs and ERW in the mission area.

o Identify new equipment requirements in support of operations.

o Initiate updates on IED trends and technical analysis reports.

4.5.5. **Training & Evaluation Cell**. U-7 is responsible for:

o Plan and organize in mission training of the force.

o Prepare training standards and update in the light of in-mission evaluation and lesson-learnt processes.

- o Prepare training evaluation reports to improve the capability of Police and Military personnel.
- o Organize refresher training for Search and EOD units or teams in concert with U-8.
- o Formulate pre-mission training evaluation guidelines.
- o Conduct in-mission operational evaluation of the IED force.
- o Identify uniformed capabilities to deal with the IED threat and propose areas of improvement for IED units.

4.5.6. **CIMIC and Information Management Cell**. Responsibilities of U-9 are to:

- o Develop an information databank and regularly interact with intelligence and civil points of contacts to keep the IED information picture updated.
- o Prepare and implement the IED awareness module in line with the operational environment.
- o Monitor IED threat related disinformation by aggressors and develop themes to negate their influence on UN mission personnel as well as on civilians.
- o Plan and conduct community services for training of local police and civilians.
- o Undertake community policing information activities.

4.5.7. **Coordination mechanism:** Mutually agreed processes must be designed to achieve synergy among the stakeholders. This requires a fluid exchange of information among the HQs, JOCs, and branches within the HQ, the host government and its forces, and other external agencies. Information exchange processes will be shaped by the mandate, the assessed threat, the resources available and the HoM's direction. In this sense the processes outlined are scalable. The co-ordination of the processes will not be a responsibility of any one individual; rather all involved are expected to respond proactively.

> *Mutually agreed processes must be designed to achieve synergy among the stakeholders*

4.5.8. **Threat evaluation**. Information from a variety of sources is key to detecting the IED threat. HUMINT retains a priority for the UN but aerial systems both manned and unmanned will play an ever greater role in detecting the threat. No system alone will provide the required clarity to fully understand a threat. An evaluation of the threat can only occur with the fusion of the various information sources at all staff levels.

4.5.9. **IED reporting.** Accurate and timely reporting is essential at the strategic and the tactical levels. Timely reporting helps identify threats quickly. HQs need to standardize reporting across their mission areas as a priority. Specimen reporting forms are discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.7) and given at Annex B.

4.6   **Responsibilities of Sector the HQ (military and police)**

Detailed guidelines and SOPs will come from military or police HQ. Guidelines on the identification of responsibilities and purposes are tabulated in Annex E. Some of the responsibilities of sector HQ staff are given below.

4.6.1. **Sector commander**

- o Control the IED-TM effort in the sector.
- o Nominate a focal point to coordinate IED activities in support of FP/PC's intent.
- o Make recommendations to the FC/PC for use in IED threat mitigation planning.

4.6.2. **Sector HQ staff**

- o Synchronize and coordinate the IED-TM effort in the sector under the IED focal person.
- o Plan and control the employment of the IEDD unit or teams against the IED threat.
- o Analyse the IED threat in the area and provide input to the F/PHQ.
- o Disseminate IED threat reports and alerts to under command-units and the Police component.
- o Organize training of units and teams and facilitate training evaluation by the F/PHQ.
- o Coordinate evidence collection and its secure transportation for exploitation.
- o Plan and organize IED awareness training for all under command units and UN personnel in the sector.
- o Initiate regular intelligence and operational reports and returns.

4.7   **Guidelines for deployed UN personnel on IEDs**

Being informed about the IED threat, being prepared for all eventualities and strictly following protocols while dealing with IEDs, mines, ERW and UXOs can go a long way towards ensuring the safety of personnel, equipment and civilians. Individual and event-specific guidelines will be covered in unit manuals and SOPs issued by the respective HQs. These should be detailed guidelines and must include:

- o Actions on the IED find
- o Actions on the IED explosion
- o Policy on disposal (demolish, disruption, neutralization, exploitation)

Establishment of common minimum training standards ensure that deploying forces possess the basic knowledge and skills to successfully conduct operations in an IED environment

Chapter 5
Training

5.1 **Context**

Due to the increase in the IED threat to UN personnel both in-mission and outside mission areas, general IED awareness is part of mandatory pre-deployment training, whether the mission is facing an IED threat or not. In this respect, two IED awareness training modules are available for United Nations staff; the Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE) training provided by the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and the Online Safety Training on Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War[31] provided by UNMAS. Reference should also be made to Introduction to UN Peacekeeping Pre Deployment Training Standards, Specialized Training Modules for Military Experts on Mission 1st edition 2010.

This Chapter is intended to assist F/PHQ and Sector HQ commands and staffs (military and police) to achieve training and operational readiness of IED-TM units in particular and deployed units in general, to conduct operations to mitigation the threat of IEDs. It discusses the broader aspects of IED training. Enforcement of common minimum training standards ensures that forces to be deployed possess the basic knowledge and skills necessary to successfully conduct operations in an IED environment. Then while deployed, continuation training and updated IED threat briefs maintain personal situational awareness on the IED threat and enemy TTPs at an acceptable level. The chapter also identifies training responsibilities of the Force (military/ police) Commander emphasising force development and maintenance of training standards throughout the mission's tenure. Development of host-nation IED-TM capability is also included as part of the training strategy.

5.2   **Fundamental training requirements**

Training requirements for peacekeeping mission deployment in the IED domain are in addition to standard training requirements for each type of unit in a particular mission. It is mandatory for all personnel to undertake IED awareness training prior to entering a mission area that has an IED threat. For the IED-TM unit the fundamental training requirements[32] are:

- Force protection (FP).
- Protection of civilians (PoC).
- Intimate knowledge of the mission-specific geographic and IED threat environment.
- In accordance with the FC's training directives (IED specific elements), pre-deployment guidelines and DPKO's Integrated Training Services (ITS) for each specific mission.

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[31] Handbook is available in English - http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/Handbook_English.pdf), French - http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/Handbook_French.pdf, and Arabic - http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/Handbook_Arabic.pdf
[32] UNHQ, UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Engineer Unit Manual, 2015

- Training lessons learnt from previous deployments.
- Awareness training on IEDs.

5.3 **Command and Staff training responsibilities**

Responsibilities for ensuring troops are adequately trained and qualified before their deployment and during their employment on any UN peacekeeping mission are shared between command and staff. Effective training is fundamental to successful operations in an IED threat environment. It must be reinforced by strong leadership, and a disciplined approach to develop a professional mindset.

5.3.1. **Command responsibilities.** Command has the overall responsibility to maintain the force's operational readiness so that they are capable of fulfilling their tasks in support of the mission mandate. Operational readiness is the ability to provide a timely and appropriate military response to any threat. Sufficient number of troops along with adequate equipment to mitigate the IED threat is a valid requirement for any mission. However, proper individual and collective training are the most important aspect in effectively achieving enduring IED threat mitigation.

> *While training is but one component of operational readiness, it is the most critical*

Training and education are the aspects of the IED operations that are concerned with ensuring that all individuals and units in the force have a thorough understanding of, and are appropriately prepared in IED-TM doctrine and procedures to the level required by their operational role. Such preparation should include IED threat familiarization, cultural awareness (as this is often vital when conducting operations in IED environments) and training personnel to employ the correct TTPs—developed as the output of the lessons-learned process. Commander's responsibilities include:

- Ensuring that intelligence on enemy IED TTPs is passed quickly to manoeuvre forces in order that friendly TTP can be modified to be as up-to-date, appropriate and effective as possible.
- Giving special attention to training of IEDD units for their effect based and threat based employment to achieve IED threat management and reduction in the mission area.
- Ensuring all manoeuvre forces are familiar with the appropriate TTPs for detecting IEDs, as well as with the capabilities of units that are available to support them.
- Quickly addressing any deficiencies through the provision of additional resources, and/or by adapting training to the needs of the mission, in response to the evolving threat.

5.3.2. **Staff responsibilities.** Military and Police staff of a UN mission HQ directly support the FC/PC's intent and vision to deal with IED threats. Their actions are guided by the operational requirements of FP and PoC needed, to fulfill the mission mandate, in line with the Commander's priorities. To ensure maintenance of operational readiness of the, staff from the training cell supported by intelligence and operations cells bear important responsibilities related to training

which are listed below. Specific tasks for relevant staff officers to assist the training cell are listed in **Annex E**.

- **Training cell.**   The U7 section plays a critical role within the FHQ in implementing the Commander's directions and intent. Working closely with the Operations and Intelligence cells, it is responsible for:
  - o Preparation of IED training parameters for pre-deployment training.
  - o Organizing IED-TM train-the-trainers courses for induction training conducted under contingent arrangements.
  - o Defining and updating in-mission IED training standards based on results from the lessons learned process and from the threat assessment.
  - o Preparation of training evaluation reports of IED units to provide feedback to FC on the level of training achieved by units and identifies shortfalls.
  - o Identification of capability gaps for mitigating the IED threat and recommendation of corrective actions to fulfill the requirements.

- **Support from intelligence and operations cells.**
  - o **Intelligence Cell (U-2)**. This cell must be able to provide valuable and timely information and technical intelligence from exploitation tasks following IED incidents. This information should also be fed into the lessons-learned process and used to define any adjustment to training requirements in order to maintain unit readiness and minimize risks to the force.
  - o **Operations Cell (U-3, U-5, U-6 & U-8).** Support of the operations cell is vital to training needs for effective FP and PoC. The cell will:
    - ▪ Provide input to the training cell on operational needs to determine areas of focus for IED training.
    - ▪ Plan the resources required for IED training specific to the mission mandate, without adversely affecting operational readiness.
    - ▪ Coordinate training facilities, ranges, ammunition and equipment management, and other resources used to deliver in-mission training.
    - ▪ Provide input on tactical and technical aspects of IED TTPs.
    - ▪ Coordinate FPECM aspects.

5.4 **IED-TM training qualification – All types of Unit, Sub-Unit and Individual Level**

5.4.1. **IED Threat Mitigation training for individuals**. All UN staff, including civilian and individual military and police personnel of T/PCC should undertake basic IED threat mitigation training before or when deploying in UN missions which face an IED threat. The UN can conduct

and support limited training to P/TCCs that need it. IED training should be planned on the following lines:

- o General awareness about IED the threat environment in the mission area.
- o IED familiarization including information about IED components and mechanism.
- o IED prevention measures including standoff, ballistic protection, protection of vehicle and building against the IED threat.
- o Monitoring and reporting.
- o First aid.

> *All UN staff, including civilian and individual military and police personnel of T/PCC should undertake basic IED threat mitigation training before or when deploying to UN missions which face an IED threat*

- o *Dos* and *Don'ts*.

5.4.2. **Basic IED-TM training of units and subunits**. T/PCCs deploying uniformed personnel to peacekeeping operations bear responsibility for ensuring that military and police operating in high-risk environments are properly prepared before deployment, have the appropriate equipment, and are qualified in the use of TTPs. Basic training should be imparted to all units and subunits earmarked for deployment in the UN mission. This should encompass all the measures that prepare units to operate in an IED threat environment. These include detailed IED awareness training, preparation of documentation such as IED recognition handbooks, coordinated SOPs to direct what actions to take in an IED environment and dissemination of lessons learned. The following points should be kept in mind by T/PCCs while planning the training of units and subunits:

- o Awareness about the prevailing IED threat environment in the mission area, understanding of road signs indicating IED placement, knowledge of IED precursors, local behaviours etc.
- o Training in a UN peacekeeping context must focus on prediction and prevention; that is the ability to use good information to predict what might happen next. This should be added into the training process so that IED attack patterns can be recognized, areas or routes of highest risk identified and the risk of personnel coming into contact with IEDs reduced.[33]
- o Consideration should be given to the use of simulation systems and mock exercises to enhance realism for post IED scenarios and to expose personnel to realistic training whilst still in a safe and controlled environment.
- o Drills and procedures, including protection measures during convoy moves, movement of vehicles and interaction with locals during public meetings.

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[33] (UNHQ, UNIBAM Vol II, Anx J, 2012).

o Training must be information-driven and operations-driven. It should include regular updating of routine drills and procedures on the basis of contemporary IED threat information.

o Training on post-IED attack actions is critical to assisting in minimizing the effects of attacks. Crisis action planning consists of post IED-attack actions e.g. medical response, personnel evacuation, and other immediate actions. Preparation of the force in these actions prior to an IED attack will limit the impact of an IED incident on UN peacekeeping personnel.

o Training measures also incorporate rehearsals of drills and IED crisis action plans. Organizing regular rehearsals promote confidence and the ability of deployed units and UN personnel to respond to the IED threat.

5.5   Specialized training requirements of IED-TM Units

IED-TM units and teams deployed to the mission area are expected to operate in a high-risk environment and perform tasks that demand them to be professionally sound, both tactically and technically. It is the responsibility of T/PCCs to develop and maintain the highest level of operational skill by providing fully equipped outfits. In line with the UN peacekeeping training system, these units will undergo various phases such as pre-deployment training, induction training, ongoing or in-mission training (a command responsibility vital to ensure maintenance of operational readiness) and on-the-job training.

5.5.1. Pre-deployment training

In accordance with the DPKO/DFS Policy on training for all UN peacekeeping personnel, and under General Assembly resolution A/49/37, member states bear the responsibility for the pre-deployment training of all military and police contingents provided to UN PKO. Member states should include IED awareness modules as part of pre-deployment training for all personnel.

Common training standards, applied before deployments, will ensure personnel have the knowledge and the skills necessary to successfully perform search and EOD tasks and conduct joint IED threat mitigation operations in the IED threat environment. Basic and advanced training and advanced

education are national responsibilities and should meet or exceed UN standards. IED-TM training standards must be achieved prior to deployment.

Pre-deployment training and education should be designed to ensure that:

- The correct structures are in place to conduct IED-TM tasks, in accordance with prevailing IED threat and that the plan is understood at all levels.

- All commanders and key staff are able to monitor and identify current and emerging threats.

- All commanders and key staff are thoroughly aware of the capabilities and limitations of their IED SME in areas of advanced search, EOD/IEDD, and exploitation to enable them to:
  - o Develop timely procedures and TTPs (employing reach-back if required).
  - o Disseminate new procedures and TTPs in a timely manner.Support cordon and search operations.
  - o Command and support search, EOD and IEDD operations.

- All Search and EOD team members deploying to the mission should be able to undergo pre-deployment training on the following:
  - o IEDs and their threats and methods of attack.
  - o Ground sign awareness.
  - o Operation of common and special IED equipment including proficiency in specialist vehicles.
  - o Basic search techniques.
  - o Conduct of vital point/vital area drills (VP/VA check drill).
  - o Conduct of route search, vehicle search, building search drills and procedures.
  - o Apply physical FP measures.
  - o Apply reporting responsibility[34].
  - o Understanding and conducting forensics and exploitation.
  - o Conduct "actions-on" drills (action on IED strike/ Incident management e.g., contact explosion, casualty).
  - o Employment of handlers and EDD.
  - o Understanding and employing ECM.

5.5.2. **Induction training**

The requirement for and skills of professionally qualified searchers, EOD operators and WTIs has increased significantly to effectively counter IED threat in-mission and non-mission settings.

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[34] General procedures for SITREP writing and submission given in Section 4.1, UN SOPs for Reporting (P-10), Introduction to UN Peacekeeping Pre Deployment Training Standards, Specialized Training Modules for Military Experts on Mission 1st edition 2010.

T/PCCs should plan and organize training of units/ search and EOD teams for deployment. Required training standards should be targeted to achieve sound IED awareness and specialised training[35]. Areas of expertise to be developed during in-mission induction training include:

- In-mission IED threat familiarization (aggressor's TTPs) and threat management.
- IED search procedures (route search, area search, building search) incorporating geographical limitations.
- Protective measures for the UN installations.
- VBIED detection on check points and entry points.
- Identification of IED precursors.
- Explosive scene investigation.
- Evidence collection and exploitation.
- A high standard of expertise in operation of entire range of the equipment.
- Emergency actions (first aid, casualty evacuation).
- Recording and reporting.

5.5.3. **Ongoing or in-mission training**

The FHQ and the sector HQs (military and police) are responsible for monitoring the evolving IED threat, reporting any changes to its subordinate commands and directing appropriate responses for countering the new IED threat. In-mission training of IED-TM units is the responsibility of commander of the EOD unit[36]. Upgrading of TTPs should be organised periodically (six monthly) in order to counter an aggressor's evolving TTPs. At the same time it is also important to improve upon the operational skill of searchers, EOD technicians and WTIs to adapt to new techniques and equipment. Updating on IEDs, UXOs and ERW threat in the mission area should be a regular feature. The commander and key staff officers should keep themselves abreast with information analysis and IED threat assessment reports and ECM updates issued by FHQ.

5.6 **Integrated training (in-mission or designated T/PCC)**

5.6.1. **Pre-deployment**. The UN must be capable of operating safely and effectively in environments where asymmetric tactics, such as IEDs, are employed. Regardless of the threat environment, it is very important that individuals, units and HQs are appropriately trained in IED-TM concepts and procedures to the level required by their operational role, so that they can operate as effectively and safely as possible. This is the P/TCC's responsibility. It is equally important that the training standards adopted by T/PCCs are uniform, to ensure a common understanding and

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[35] US Department of Homeland Security, 2013
[36] Training may be organized for Search and EOD teams on the lines of Training and Qualifications (NTSG – Chapter 13)

interoperability among multinational forces. As far as possible, standards used for pre-deployment training should remain consistent with those applied during deployment in order to avoid confusion and the adding of risks to the mission.

5.6.2. **In-mission training**

- In mission, threat-specific training for IEDs is a continuation of pre-deployment training. It should begin as early as possible after arrival in mission area as part of the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration processes.

- Despite units being trained and qualified before deploying on a peacekeeping mission, working in such a multinational context may demand troops to operate or become familiar with new equipment in support of the plan. Capability integration may then be necessary to align all units. The FC may delegate this responsibility to one or more T/PCCs to conduct the required training once deployed.

- In long mission deployments and performance of routine tasks, the units may develop complacency resulting in lowering of their guards. It may also lead to reduced expertise of technicians and operators of sophisticated equipment which is less frequently employed such that their ability to respond to complex situations is affected.

- If the staff and operators are not constantly exposed to the IED threat or when tasks are not conducted on a regular basis, their skills and their ability to adequately react, and developed capacity for response and following of procedures may decline to a point where remedial training becomes a necessity.

- It is highly recommended that in-mission force level training on IED mitigation should bring together all stakeholders who bear a responsibility.

- In addition to the UN military and police units, training shall include participation from host nation military and security forces, if mandated.

5.6.3. **Integrated support by the host nation security forces** for IED training (if mandated) is targeted to:

- Develop a capability within the host nation security force and prepare it to take on IED threats as part of military capacity building.

- Compensate for the lack of technological experience through host nation knowledge of the aggressor's TTPs, their abettors, facilitators and financiers, an understanding of the pattern of life and an innate awareness of the AO.

- Ensure that host-nation forces gain experience and confidence from conducting operations alongside the deployed forces and ensure that they are left an enduring means to train themselves.

- Anticipate and plan from the outset, within operational security constraints, the training and education of the host nation security forces. This capacity building will be achieved initially through mentoring, followed by partnering until the host-nation force can operate independently.

5.7   **Lessons-learned process**

The lessons-learned process is especially relevant to IED-TM. This will require formal and informal reporting methods, the submission of detailed after-action reports, their widest dissemination and staff visits to operational areas of responsibilities. Formal links between lessons-learned staffs, doctrine writers, training authorities, and trainers need to be established and exploited. Furthermore, commanders in the field must be forthcoming and candid in the acknowledgement of errors so others may learn, missions may be better accomplished and injury and loss of life avoided. IED training is to be kept current by incorporating the operational evaluation and lessons learned processes. Consideration should be given to:

- Establishing in-mission training centres and programs.

- Developing a reach-back capability to operational and strategic assets to ensure that C-IED training incorporates the latest IED information and material including lessons-learned, TTPs and equipment.

> *Commanders in the field must be forthcoming and candid in the acknowledgement of errors so others may learn, missions may be better accomplished and unnecessary loss of life avoided*

5.8   **Integrated mission training cell (IMTC)**

The IMTC comprises integrated civilian, military and police training cells under a civilian chief to develop mission training plans, conduct mission-specific and scenario-based induction training, undertake specific and advanced training and develop training solutions to identified gaps and lessons learnt. Based on the mission and the training plan prepared by the training cell, each component will develop component specific training directives. The IMTC should serve as a resource and coordinating office for additional mission-specific training for contingents as requirements arise. Where T/PCCs are deployed in mission settings with an IED threat, they should ensure coordination with the IMTCs for necessary additional training requirements.

UN vehicle blown up by an IED - MINUSMA.

Due to the hazardous nature of the tasks, performance evaluation of IED Units is an extremely important responsibility of command and staff at Force HQ

Chapter 6
Evaluation

Chapter 6 –*Evaluation*

6.1 **Context**

Because of the hazardous nature of the tasks performed by IED-TM units, their performance evaluation is an extremely important responsibility of command and staff at Force HQ. Evaluation will assist in maintenance of the highest standards of skill, alertness and up-to-date drills and procedures. Evaluation of the IED threat mitigation capabilities of T/PCC forces before deployment and when in-mission should be conducted diligently in order to meet FP standards and maintain operational readiness to support the mandate. Evaluations conducted according to the UN's, OMA and DPKO policies, SOPs and Guidelines are extremely useful to T/PCCs, their contingent commanders, UN planners and in-mission leadership. They help in the organization, training, equipping, deploying and employing of military and police personnel in operations. Evaluations assess and monitor the state of individual and collective training standards, and assist in improving the performance of HQs and deployed units. Above all, the purpose of the capability evaluation is to assist T/PCCs and military contingents in meeting national and UN standards of performance and interoperability[37].

6.2 **The aim of evaluation**

Evaluations:

- Provide commander with the knowledge of capabilities of IED-TM assets before and after deployment.

- Examine and grade designated forces against UN prescribed or required standards.

- Identify major and minor shortfalls in national or unit resources or performance.

- Provide recommendations to commanders for the in-mission improvement of operational standards and capabilities linked with the in-mission lessons learned.

6.3 **Evaluation principles**

The evaluation process examine the military and police operational readiness and capability of staffs, units and force components with regard to their resources and proficiency, in order to determine if they can effectively and efficiently conduct missions and tasks. The following principles apply:

> *The evaluation process examines the military and police operational readiness and capability of staffs, units and force components with regard to their resources and proficiency*

- Evaluation of HQs staff will normally be responsibility of the military or police commander.

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[37] UNPKO-OMA Standing Operating Procedures Force and Sector Commander's Evaluation of Subordinate Military Entities in Peacekeeping Operations, January 2016

- Evaluation of T/PCC operational capabilities and performance standards of units will be carried out by national entities before deployment.

- Evaluation will be carried out prior to deployment and in-mission on a regular basis.

6.4   Evaluation guidelines

Evaluation guidelines are covered in DPKO DFS Policy on Operational Readiness Assurance, and Performance Improvement - 2015, UN Military Engineer Unit Manual – 2016, DPKO OMA SOPs Force and Sector Commander's Evaluation of Subordinate Military Entities in PKO – 2016, DPKO UNIBAM Vol I & II - 2016. Additionally:

- Self-evaluation is a continuous process. It is the responsibility of T/PCCs to evaluate before deployment to a UN mission. Once deployed, commanders of respective units are responsible to for regularly carrying out operational evaluations of their respective units.

- Periodic evaluation of HQ and under-command units is the responsibilities of the respective HQ. DPKO is responsible for evaluation of FHQ.

- The primary purpose of field mission evaluations is to strengthen the ability of DPKO, DFS and missions to accumulate and utilize experience, thus enhancing the efficiency of peacekeeping operations.

6.5   **Evaluation cycle**. The diagram below (figure 6.1) describes the sequence of activities which precede and follow the evaluation activity and how the results fit into the learning cycle of the HQ.

Figure 6.1 The sequence of evaluation activities

6.5.1. **FHQ (military and police) evaluation process**

- Force or sector commander defines the process of evaluation of HQ staff.

- The evaluation process involves a force and sector HQ team visiting each unit and then submitting the evaluation report to force and sector commanders and to the commander of the evaluated unit.

- The F/PC issues the evaluation directive which includes tasks for the evaluation team.

- The F/PC defines an evaluation team based on specific requirements of evaluation. An SME (from inside or outside the mission's military/police component) may be part of the evaluation team[38].

- The F/PC are to submit, once a quarter, a summarized and consolidated report of Force and Sector evaluations and findings to OMA at DPKO for UNHQ information and action as appropriate.

- Evaluation reports are shared by the OMA with relevant T/PCCs to assist in the improvement of performance standards for future deployments.

- Accepted recommendations of evaluation teams are thereafter implemented by the force or sector commander and the evaluated unit.

- Generic lessons from these reports are entered into DPKOs division for policy, evaluation and training input.

- The evaluated unit is responsible for best implementation of recommendations and for feeding progress to the FHQ (military and police) through the sector HQ.

6.5.2. **Police evaluation process** (in addition to paragraph 6.5.1)

- The HOPC will establish an internal evaluation unit for inspection and analysis of the police component, in accordance with the DPKO-DFS Policy[39].

- In case of integrated mission, the 'best practice officer' or 'focal point' will work in coordination with evaluated unit staff and ensure that police unit is linked to best practice unit[40].

- Detailed evaluation responsibilities are covered in UN Department of Field Support Guidelines Police Command in UN PKO and Special Political Missions.

6.6 **IED-TM specific evaluation criteria**

- As highlighted in previous chapters, the entire UN mission including HQs, deployed units (military and police), UN personnel (military and civilians) are the target of IED systems.

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[38] Ibid
[39] DPKO-DFS Policy on internal evaluation and best practices, 2014
[40] DPKO-DFS, Guidelines on Design, Delivery and Evaluation of Training, 2014

Accordingly the counter measures against this threat, in general, suggest certain actions at all levels (understanding the threat, protecting, preventing, preparing and pursuing).

- It is the responsibility of T/PCCs, FHQ, sector HQs and commanders of deployed units to ensure that the deployed force fully understands the IED threat, are fully equipped according to the MOU of the mission, trained and motivated at all times to undertake assigned tasks.

- Evaluation criteria will vary with the operational responsibilities and the degree of threat to which the units are exposed. IED-TM units deployed in mission have the responsibility of undertaking IED operations (search, detection and disposal of IEDs) in a high threat environment. Field units on the other hand are responsible for maintaining the highest degree of alertness to prevent IED incidents and for supporting units in search and EOD operations.

- In the IED domain, the operational readiness of the UN mission will, therefore, be evaluated as a tandem approach, involving operational and training evaluation of the IED-TM units and maneuver elements against a singular IED threat.

- IED evaluation will be based on the mission requirements of maneuver elements to determine if:
  - o Organizational structures support the performance of assigned tasks.
  - o Operational standards are achieved.
  - o Capability to perform mission essential tasks is attained.
  - o Requisite standards are achieved in training.
  - o Administrative and logistics capacity is sufficient to support the mission.

6.7   Conduct of evaluations

- Evaluation should be based on measurable and quantifiable standards that are specific, achievable, realistic and time-bound in nature.

- Evaluations may be conducted in a graduated manner by level (from individual soldiers to commanders); activity (team, platoon, company or battalion); and in a task-oriented manner to systematically build expertise and integrate capabilities for collective application.

- In addition to national training standards, further guidance on conducting evaluations is available in the evaluation checklist at Annex F, and UN policies, directives, SOPs and guidelines as indicated at the start of this chapter.

6.7.1. Pre-deployment evaluations

T/PCCs are responsible for conducting independent evaluations and self-evaluation of (deploying) forces units, sub-units and individuals. In an IED threat environment, a military contingent is expected to be appropriately familiarized with the threat, well trained and qualified in basic military skills and conventional military tactics, techniques and procedures. In addition, IED-TM units are

specially trained to undertake tasks in accomplishing the mission mandate. It is T/PCC's responsibility to ensure that personnel and units are operationally ready to deploy and implement mandated tasks. However, evaluation by the T/PCC can be supported by assessments by DPKO through organized pre-deployment visits (PDV) by an advisory team of DPKO/OMA, PD and UNMAS, DFS, ITS and representatives from the mission FHQ prior to a contingent's deployment to the mission area[41]. Additionally, UN can arrange limited training and evaluation in a third country prior to deployment at the cost of the T/PCC.

6.7.1.1.   The **purpose** of pre-deployment evaluation is to:

> *T/PCCs are responsible to conduct independent evaluations and self-evaluation of (deploying) forces units, sub-units and individuals*

- Develop confidence in all stake holders including T/PCC, UNHQ and FHQ in the capabilities of units to undertake assigned tasks in IED threat environment.

- Determine the level of pre-deployment training proficiency attained by IED-TM units in basic TTPs and other military components in IED mitigation capability in line with training standards referenced in Chapter 5.

- Improve interoperability with other UN national contingents in individual and collective tasks.

- Identify shortcomings and take corrective measures for capability enhancement before deployment.

6.7.1.2.   Prior to evaluation and UN DPKO's PDV, in order to meet specific to requirements of UN mission, T/PCCs may undertake the following **activities**:

- Raising and establishing the unit in accordance with the mission-specific UN Statement of Unit Requirement.

- Training and equipping in accordance with the standard IED-TM Unit tasks and expected operational demands.

- Developing mission-specific, task-oriented, individual and collective expertise and capabilities.

- Identifying shortcomings and taking remedial action to improve capabilities.

- Making timely adjustments and mid-course corrections.

- Utilizing experienced trainers from other units to train those awaiting deployment.

- Final pre-deployment inspection and evaluation by national peacekeeping experts.

6.7.2. **In-mission evaluations**

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[41] Ibid 29.

Unit commanders undertake self-evaluation of their units and subunits to understand the fitness of their troops for the tasks likely to be allotted to them within the mandate. In-mission evaluations of units for IED-TM operational requirements should include:

- Conducting the first in-mission evaluation of all units within two to three months of deployment to validate and match the standards achieved prior to deployment. This must be followed by quarterly/half yearly evaluations in accordance with mission norms. The following capabilities should be evaluated:
  - o Understanding the IED threat and the aggressor's TTPs.
  - o Force protection requirements.
  - o IED search and EOD TTPs.
  - o ESI and evidence collection.
  - o Exploitation activities (Related staff).
  - o Crisis actions.
  - o EDD accreditation (until specific accreditation for 'arms and explosive search (AES) dogs' are developed, 'mine detection dogs' (MDD) accreditation (Annex A Chapter 9 of UN Mine Action NTSG 8) may be utilized).

- At all levels commanders are responsible for continuously and simultaneously monitoring and reviewing in-mission operational performance.

- Instituting periodic selective evaluations will identify weak areas to administer corrective actions.

- Reassessing capabilities and skills based on Information analysis reports and operational assessments on IED threat meriting changes in mission's operational situation, or when there is a gap between requirements and performance.

6.8   Evaluation support

6.8.1.   Independent evaluation support

- T/PCCs shall authoritatively determine how well their personnel, units and equipment are prepared to undertake tasks or perform peacekeeping duties to mitigate IEDs in an IED threat environment. This is achieved by conducting independent evaluations using SMEs, from training centres (if available), national training centres and officers who have previous command or staff experience in IED threat mitigation tasks during their tenure in UN missions.

- Adequate resources in terms of an IED display room, training facility, training areas, classrooms and IEDD equipment will significantly improve preparation and evaluation exercises.

- T/PCCs should incorporate UNPKO-OMA guidelines and recommendations in the evaluation reports to ensure the operational preparedness of units is suitable for the intended UN mission environment.

- Additionally, the UN FHQ (military and police) through established evaluation mechanisms (force and sector HQ) conducts its own assessment of units after deployment. In this way, multiple evaluations contribute to higher states of operational readiness and performance.

6.8.2. **Mission leadership assistance**

The mission leadership supports evaluation by coordinating and providing the following assistance:

- Providing T/PCCs with expected performance goals for all IED-TM Units, pre-deployment preparation requirements and mission-oriented task requirements.

- Providing IED threat assessment reports and information analysis reports to T/PCCs before deployment and Sector HQ / units on regular basis to facilitate all time operational readiness.

- Ensuring that all military component units are aware of the evaluation process[42].

- Carrying out in-mission operational performance and capability evaluation of the contingent as and when required. Provides and coordinates the required resources and staff to conduct evaluations and centralized, technical on-the-job training to strengthen evaluated shortfalls.

- Guiding and supporting T/PCCs to improve shortfalls, adopt midcourse corrections and take action with the mission command and staff on evaluation findings.

- Developing a mission-specific IED mitigation training plan and monitoring the required training.

- Providing Performance Evaluation Forms (PEFs) for commanders.

6.8.3. **UNHQ assistance**

DPKO/DFS plays a key role in guiding and facilitating T/PCC in achievement of evaluation and operational readiness. In addition to this handbook, numerous references offer guidelines and standards by which UN T/PCCs can evaluate their operational readiness. UN assistance includes:

- Guiding, assisting, facilitating or supplementing T/PCC efforts in evaluation.

- Providing evaluation advice through the Integrated Training Service[43].

- Providing an Operational Advisory Team from DPKO/DFS to guide and assist emerging T/PCCs (assistance on request for other T/PCCs).

- In the IED-TM context, DPKO / DFS may provide the mission and T/PCC with strategic guidance and oversight by:

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[42] Ibid 39.
[43] http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community/Training

o Conducting a pre-deployment assessment to determine that the contingent is ready for deployment in IED threat environment.

o Guiding and assisting emerging T/PCCs (and other T/PCCs on request), focusing on meeting the force requirements and capacity building.

- The work of the evaluation team is guided by the principles of transparency, independence, consultation, and relevance. The evaluation team also works in close partnership with the Inspection and Evaluation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services as well as the Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership Office of DPKO.

6.8.4. **Collective responsibilities**

T/PCCs are encouraged to modify and formalize the evaluation methodology, criteria and procedures presented in this handbook to suit their needs in conducting their evaluations. For T/PCC contingents deploying to UN missions, the development and use of detailed standards and checklists, focusing on peacekeeping and IED mitigation preparedness, will yield great benefits in terms of operational readiness and early identification of unit capabilities that need improvement. Early identification allows performance or equipment shortfalls to be addressed before they start to cause problems. T/PCCs that lack the financial or the technical ability to support their deploying units with the resources needed to meet minimum national and UN standards should immediately seek to discuss their needs with DPKO/DFS at UNHQ.

> *T/PCCs that lack the financial or the technical ability to support their deploying units with the resources needed to meet minimum national and UN standards should immediately seek to discuss their needs with DPKO/DFS at UNHQ*

6.9 **Use of check lists**. Checklists are considered to be helpful tools in the evaluation process and can be used as a baseline for each type of evaluation. Specimen checklists are at **Annex F to K.** It is up to evaluators to fine-tune these checklists for their individual purposes.

6.10 **Mission Capability Rating (McR).** Following completion of the evaluation, the comments for each of the IED-TM related Military Requirements and Capabilities will be examined to determine if any areas are graded as "unsatisfactory", which when combined, prevent or significantly affect the accomplishment of the overall task or mission.

- Should such areas be identified within a criterion, then that criterion is to be noted in the Final Evaluation Report as a "major shortfall".

- Any other criterion that contains areas graded as "marginal", but which do not significantly affect the overall evaluation of the criteria as "satisfactory" are to be noted simply as "minor

shortfall". The overall MCR indicates the degree to which the Unit/HQ's ability to perform sustained operations in executing its assigned mission.

- The following definitions apply:

  o **IED-TM Mission Capable (MC).** The Unit/HQ meets the UN requirements in all areas, performs sustained IED-TM operations and executes its assigned mission in a competent or superior manner. No major shortfalls exist.

  o **IED-TM MC but minor corrections required.** The Unit/HQ generally meets the UN requirements, performs sustained IED-TM operations and executes its assigned mission. However, some elements of the mission execution or its sustainability are limited by one or more shortfalls.

  o **IED-TM MC but major corrections required.** The Unit/HQ meets the UN requirements, performs sustained IED-TM operations and executes its assigned mission. However, many elements of the mission execution or its sustainability are limited by shortfalls.

  o **C-IED Not Yet Mission Capable minor corrections required.** The number or the seriousness of one or more shortfalls would most likely prevent the unit from executing its assigned mission effectively. In this case a re-evaluation must be scheduled before that unit/HQ is considered available for UN employment.

  o **IED-TM Not Yet Mission Capable major corrections required.** The number or the seriousness of many shortfalls would most likely prevent the unit from executing its assigned mission effectively. In this case a re-evaluation must be scheduled before that unit/HQ is considered available for UN employment.

  o **IED-TM Not Mission Capable (NMC).** The number or the seriousness of shortfalls would prevent the unit from executing its assigned mission**.** In this case a re-evaluation must be scheduled before that unit/HQ is considered available for UN employment.

6.11 **Suspension or exception to policy.** Some elements may not be evaluated. Occasionally, a Unit/HQ may be prevented from sufficiently demonstrating the capability to perform a specific requirement due to circumstances beyond its control, e.g. weather, unavailability of a range or target resources, etc. In this case, two options will be available. Based on the monitoring of Units/HQ plans, reports and procedures, it will be possible either:

- To attempt to determine if there is sufficient equipment, skill and expertise available that the criteria could be met if the opportunity or situation were encountered; or

- To use the comment **"Not Evaluated" (NE)** and explain the reason that prevented the evaluation.

Contact

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IED-TM Units - Search and EOD teams tasks

1.1   IED-TM units deployed on UN missions must ensure that personnel qualifications are current and that pre-deployment training relates to threat assessments specific to the mission. Identified critical capability gaps should be addressed and fully implemented within the organization before the deployment, in order to maximize IED Threat Mitigation once deployed.

The IED-TM Unit/ Team is a specialist resource that should not be employed in general UXO search activities. IED-TM Teams (Search and EOD) should always be provided with local protection during employment.

1.2   **Search Teams.** A typical search team may be comprised of ten members as follows:

- Team Leader
- Second in Command (2IC)
- Four Searchers
- Two handlers with EDDs
- ECM operator
- Vehicle driver

1.2.1   **Search Team Leader**

- Monitor the fitness and alertness state of search team and EDDs.
- Conduct a primary survey of the area / route / building and establish Incident Control Point (ICP).
- Brief searchers and EDD handlers on the task.
- Conduct the search by using standard procedures.
- Ensure protection of the team and an uninterrupted search.
- Mark and report suspicious items / IEDs to the EOD team leader.
- Continually re-evaluate the efficiency of the searchers throughout the operation.

1.2.2   **Handler of EDD**

Provide support to search teams. The main responsibilities of the EDD handler are to:

- Ensure and monitor the fitness of the EDD before and during its employment.

- Evaluate the EDD before employment for search duties on daily basis.
- Employ the EDD on searches as per standard drills.
- Ensure duration of employment of the EDD is within its capability.
- Keep the EDD hydrated.
- Deploy the EDD intelligently to check each suspected area.
- Informs the team leader when the EDD shows interest or gives indication.

1.3   **EOD Team.** Typical EOD Team configuration is:

- Operator 1 (Team leader)
- Operator 2 (Equipment handler)
- ECM operator
- ESI operator

1.3.1   **Responsibilities of EOD Team Leader**

- Plan and synchronize EOD activities.
- Maintain constant contact with search team leader.
- Carry out the disposal of IED after confirmation by search team leader,.
- Confirm safe disposal of IED / suspicious item.
- Collect evidence (ESI) for forensic analysis.
- Process the disposal report as per the **specimen attached at Annex B,** as appropriate.

1.3.2   **ESI.** ESI (Level 1 exploitation) is the responsibility of the EOD team. The team will collect samples and carry out on-the-spot analysis. Samples of IED precursors will also be collected and dispatched for Level 2 exploitation. Responsibilities with regard to ESI are:

- Conduct an overall scene evaluation.
- Use standardised drills and procedures for the collection of samples.
- Collect both visible and invisible samples using standard drills.
- Avoid handling of the sample by more than one ESI operator.
- Ensuring samples are not left unsecured or unattended.
- To wrap and tag the samples for further exploitation as per ESI procedures.
- Take photographs or videos of the scene and collected samples.
- Process the investigation report as per **specimen attached as Annex B**.

1.3.3   **Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO).**   The duties of the ATO are to:

- Provide technical assistance to the IED-TM Unit (EOD teams).
- Provide assistance to identify the explosive contents of IEDs.

- Provide technical advice for RSPs in the case of UXO disposal.
- Evaluate investigative information and recovered materials from a technical perspective.
- Advise on demolition techniques.

1.4 **Intelligence Officer of a IED-TM Unit.** He will:

- Coordinate with local police or UNPOL field component, as applicable.
- Analyze the situation and determine the reasons for the incidents.
- Take a video and still photos of the incident point and surrounding if not already done by search or EOD teams.

1.5 **Render Safe Procedures (RSPs)**

RSPs and disposal techniques for IEDs and UXOs will largely depend on the threat, the on-site assessment by the disposal team, and the T/PCC established TTPs. Since TTPs cannot realistically be developed for every eventuality, the team must formulate the best approach. IEDD TTPs will evolve in line with a changing threat and emerging technologies. Safety must remain the most important consideration in designing RSPs and disposal techniques.

In order of priority, the IEDD philosophy for RSPs includes:

- **Preservation of life**. The safeguarding of human life takes precedence over all other concerns.
- **Preservation of property**. The protection of property and equipment may have a significant importance in some mission areas.
- **Preservation and collection of forensic evidence**. Forensic evidence should be collected and preserved commensurate with the restraints of the tactical situation.
- **Return to normality**. All RSPs must restore the situation to normality as soon as possible, commensurate with safety.

RSPs and disposal specialists require a secure immediate environment with no / minimum interference while performing their tasks. Search & EOD teams, if employed independently, require local protection while carrying out tasks. Teams can respond in a timely manner when dedicated security is provided by the supported force.

Annex B

<table>
<tr><td colspan="5">IED / EO Reporting Form</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="5">Inform Your Superiors Through Your Chain Of Command</td></tr>
<tr><td>A</td><td>Priority of requesting unit</td><td></td><td colspan="2">Immediate ___ urgent ___ routine ____ no threat ____</td></tr>
<tr><td>B</td><td>Incident reported by</td><td>1</td><td>Rank or position</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>2</td><td>Contact name</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>3</td><td>Unit identification / Call sign</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>4</td><td>Contact method</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>C</td><td>Name of other force present</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>D</td><td>POC for further information</td><td>1</td><td>Rank or position</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>2</td><td>Contact name</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>3</td><td>Unit identification/ Call sign</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>4</td><td>Contact method</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>5</td><td>Rendezvous location for Search & EOD / IEDD Team</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>E</td><td>DTG for IED/EO discovery</td><td></td><td>IED/EO was discovered</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>F</td><td>Location / area of IED/EO</td><td>1</td><td>Grid reference</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>2</td><td>Additional location information</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>3</td><td>Under water</td><td>Yes___ No____</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>4</td><td>Buried</td><td>Yes___ No____</td></tr>
<tr><td>G</td><td>Photograph taken and sent to</td><td></td><td>Email addresss ……………..@.........</td><td>Yes___ No____</td></tr>
<tr><td>G</td><td>IED/EO identification estimate</td><td></td><td>What? How many? (Use ID Guide codes)</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>G</td><td>Safety measures undertaken</td><td>1</td><td>Evacuation distance in meters</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>2</td><td>Other protective measures taken</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>H</td><td>Effect on operation</td><td></td><td colspan="2">Totally disrupted major____ Minor____ nil____</td></tr>
<tr><td>I</td><td>Other significant information</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
</table>

NEVER

- TOUCH, MOVE OR DISTURB THE IED / EO
- USE MOBILE PHONE OR RADIO WITHIN 50 M OF THE IED / EO
- ALLOW ANYONE TO RE-ENTER THE CORDON
- GIVE INFORMATION TO CIVILIANS OR TO THE MEDIA

Suggested Layout of IED/UXO Demolition/Neutralization Certificate

1.   We the undersigned at _____ District _____ area _____ on (date) - _____ time _____, inspected/examined the under mentioned Improvised Explosive Device/Unexploded Ordnance thoroughly, mutually agreed and carried out neutralization/demolition of the Improvised Explosive Device/Unexploded Ordnance "In-situation"/taking at _____ area after obtaining permission from Judge/Magistrate:

a. (IED/UXO1)

b. (IED/UXO2)

2.   We mutually agreed that the recovered/captured Improvised Explosive Device/ Unexploded Ordnance is/are

a.   required/not required to be kept as evidence and so handed over to police authority after collection of following evidences (finger print, picture and video footage etc):

    1.

    2.

b. not required/not required to be kept as evidence and so carried out demolition of IED/UXO at site

    1.

    2.

(Sign of Police Representative)   (Sign of Search and EOD Team Leader)

Number: Number/ATO Number:

Rank and Name: Rank and Name:

Appointment: Appointment:

Unit: Unit:

Place: Place:

Date: Date:

Suggested Layout of Investigation Report on Captured/Recovered IED/UXO Held Under the Custody of Law Enforcing Agencies

Place: _____

Date of Inspection: _____

Ser	Nomenclature of IED /UXO	General Description	Description of Ammunition			Place of Explosion		Description of Action	Investigated Opinion
			Number/ Quantity	Serviceable	Unserviceable	In Situ	Transported Place		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)

Sign of ATO

Name with Rank:

ATO Number:

Unit:

Date:

Signature of Search & EOD Team Leader

Name with Rank:

Unit:

Date:

Suggested Layout of IED/UXO Incident Report

Improvised Explosive Device Incident Report (File Number)	1. Formation and Search & EOD Team Number	2. Control Number	3. Unusual ☐
			4. Routine ☐

SECTION A: INITIAL INFORMATION		
5. Date/Time Reported	9. Incident Location	11. Item(s) Reported
6. Reported By		
7. Phone Number		
8. Address	10. Whom to Contact (including telephone number)	

SECTION B: ACTION BY EOD OPERATOR			
12. Personnel Dispatched	13. Date/Time	14. Travel Data	15. Man Hours
	13.1. Departure	14.1 Air-Flying Time	15.1. Travel
	13.2. Arrival	14.2 Vehicle-Mileage	15.2. Incident
	13.3 Completion		

16. Confirmed Identification/Nomenclature	17. Disposition

18. Incident Narrative (Include all Significant Details and Problems) Separate page may be attached.

19. Authentication		
19.1 IEDD Team Leader	19.2. Telephone Number.	19.3. Date

Suggested Layout of Post Blast Investigation Report

1.   **Who has Informed and What was the Information Given**.

2.   **Date, Time, Place and Location of IED/UXO Incident**. Be specific as to where the IED/bomb is planted, i.e. cargo hold of an aircraft, dickey trunk of vehicle, toilet or any other place etc.

3.   **Type of incident**. Incendiary bombing, attempted bombing, recovery of IED, stolen explosive, recovered explosive or any other etc.

4.   **Delivery Method**. In what manner the bombing has been done; human bombing/ driven into/ rocket attack/ mailed/ placed, thrown or any other.

5.   **Suspect or Group Description**. Whether advance notice was received or claimed after the explosion. Whether suspects are known for blast activities or any other.

6.   **Target**. National leader, politician, UN convoy, sensitive installation, general mass etc.

7.   **Probable Reasons**. Sabotage, public harassment, extortion, or any other etc.

8.   **Description of Explosive Devices**.

8.1   **Explosive**. Type, weight, colour, country of origin, homemade etc.

8.2   **Container**. Standard or improvised, suitcase, car, pipe, carton, transistor (Explain make and type).

8.3   **Fillers Marking**. If any.

8.4   **Manufacturer**. Name of the company that produced the item.

8.5   **Size**. Exact size and dimension.

8.6   **Booster**. If the explosive charge contained the booster to improve the detonation.

8.7   **Lot Number and Batch Number**. Lot No and Batch No of explosive, container, fuze body etc with name of the manufacturer.

8.8.   **Detonator and Initiating Mechanism**.

8.8.1   **Detonator Details**. Electric or non electric (Safety Fuze). If it is electrical whether booby trap was used, insulation, colour, diameter, closing plug etc.

8.8.2   **Type of Battery Used**. Details of battery, size, trade name, voltage, local or outside.

8.8.3   **Non Electric**. Type of detonator and safety fuze, length of safety fuze.

8.8.4   **Command Detonated**. Radio control, Command wire, Walkie-Talkie, FM or any other.

8.8.5   **Chemical**. When device is initiated by reaction of substance (Time pencil), Sulphuric acid on Potassium chlorate, WP on action in air, colour band etc.

8.8.6   **Other Components**. Components not listed above such as closing plug, fuze body, base plate, rocket motor etc.

9.   **Pre-incident Information**. What happened prior to the incident warning? Attempt, threat to the target, security measures adopted any function, meeting, transport stolen or acquired, explosive stolen from military or commercial organizations.

10.   **Incident**. Circumstance of explosion, damage pattern, whether explosion was followed by fire etc.

11.   **Height of Fireball Noticed**.

12.   **Type of Sound Heard**.

13.   **Colour of Fireball**.

14.   **Number of People Killed**.

15.   **Number of People Injured**.

16.   **Extent of Damage Caused.**

17.   **Evidence Details**.   Show exhibit separately as applicable.

17.1   Who collected the residual components and where were they sent.

17.2   **Spot Test Result (If done)**.   Type of reagent used and result.

17.3   **Forensic Report (If done)**.   Method and equipment used for analysis. (Detailed report to be attached as exhibit)

20.   **Deduction**:

20.1   Probable Causes.

20.2   Most Probable Cause.

21.   **Recommendations**:

21.1.

21.2.

21.3

22.   **Sketch of the Explosion Site with Photograph**.   To be attached as annex.

23.   Any other information.

Signature of Team Leader

IED indicators and signs

1.1 Context

Having numerous means of detection can increase the prospects of locating IEDs during the conduct of a mission. Significant information can be drawn from maintaining persistent awareness of the operational surroundings and contribute to intelligence efforts. This often represents the best means of detection that can be achieved by any force member while in garrison, during a patrol, or any other activity supporting the mission mandate, including interactions with the local population. The following indicators should be looked for by UN personnel during implementation of an IED threat mitigation campaign:

1.1.1 **Changes in patterns of life**. A sudden absence of playing children, people, normal traffic or other daily activity may indicate an impending IED attack.

Figure Absence of People and Normal Traffic may Indicate IED

1.1.2 **Colour**. Look for contrasting colours, freshly disturbed earth or concrete that does not match the surrounding areas.

1.1.3 **Discard-able**. Discarded materiel unwittingly or unknowingly left on the scene by the aggressor provide important clues such as exposed detonating cord, adhesive tape or other parts of the IED.

1.1.4 **Markers**. Markers are used to trigger the IED at the right time. Look for prominent objects that might be used as a marker and watch for indicators by the side of the road such as tires, rock piles, ribbon or tape that may identify an IED location, or serve as an aiming reference.

Figure: Disturbed earth and exposed cord may indicate

1.1.5 **Shapes.** Take note of object outlines and unknown devices that seem out of place for the environment that you are in.

1.1.6 **Graffiti.** Be aware of symbols or writing on buildings and walls that might serve as a warning to locals (interpreters will usually be needed).

6.8.5. **Signs.** Pay attention to newly erected placards and signs that seem out of place or might serve as warning to locals and messages to aggressors.

1.1.7 **Unusual or suspicious individuals.** Repeated, prolonged presence of unknown individuals, personnel on overpasses or in a clearly marked restricted area, deliberate observation or picture taking, video recording (of ordinary activities, military movements, buildings, landmarks, friendly forces, security practices, etc), map sketching, or testing of security measures.

1.1.8 **Suspicious behaviour.** The following may indicate the enemy intent to use IEDs:
o Questions about security, force capabilities and strength, etc.
o Choreographed or timed movements of individual(s) or vehicles.
o Unusual requests for public documents: blueprints, schedules, maps, routes, etc.
o Theft or loss of uniforms, military equipment, ID cards, official vehicles, license plates, explosives or precursors.
o Obvious martial / combat type training occurring in secret. (Bombs are often only a component of an attack, and have been used in combination with guns and other weapons and tactics)

1.1.9 **Unusual or suspicious vehicles.** Vehicles following or ahead of your convoy for a long distance and then pulling off to the side of the road. Cars parked on the side of the road with flashing lights are indications that something is wrong.

Vehicle quickly overtaking convoy

Figure
Abnormal vehicle behaviour may indicate an imminent IED attack

1.1.10 Other Visible IED Indicators.
o Wires lay out in plain sight.
o Dead animals along the roadways.
o Freshly dug holes or pavement patching on or along the road that may serve as possible IED emplacement sites.
o Obstacles and craters in the roadway used to channel the convoy.

o   Signals with flare or city lights (switched off/on) as the convoy approaches.

Figure: Various IED Indicators IED attack

1.2   **Characteristics of an IED attack site along route**

- Regular patterns set by military and police forces during move.

- Channelization effect.

- Slow go terrain / choke points.

- Site where IED can be easily placed and hidden.

- Aiming marker / clear line of sight.

- Key terrain that supports follow-on ambush.

1.3   **Probable IED Location**

IEDs may be placed anywhere. Common areas of IED emplacement include, but are not limited to:

- By the shoulder or buried under the surface of the road.

- Inside the culverts or concealed in the walls of culverts.

- On the trees astride the road.

- Potholes in paved roads – additionally, the aggressors may make their own 'potholes' to emplace IEDs.

- Unpaved roads – in tire ruts of likely movement areas.

- In areas with built-up and/ or restrictive terrain that provide ample cover and concealment.

- Inside, beside or buried under heaps of any type of material or packaging.

- Concealed in cars, trucks, motorcycles, bicycles, dead animals and human carcasses.

- As secondary IEDs near the main IED, especially designed to target first responders.

- Placement in a manner that directs the blast into the kill zone (i.e. placed along road side or against rock piles, sand/ dirt piles, etc)

- Areas that slow, stop, or canalize vehicles of military and police within the IED's blast radius.

- Where they can be combined with follow on small-arms and RPG fire.

- In previously used IED sites, i.e. potholes that are covered with dirt or sand. Frequently multiple IEDs can be daisy-chained together.

- Abandoned huts for placement of VOIEDs.

IED Awareness

2.1 Context

It is important that IED safety awareness to be included in any threat mitigation efforts. The primary agency for the conduct of this within the UN Mission is UNMAS. UNMAS aims to raise awareness and provide basic safety information concerning the threat of landmines, ERW and IEDs to organizations and individuals working in affected areas, and to help them to:

- Establish appropriate safety procedures.

- Avoid contact with mines, ERW and IEDs and;

- Take appropriate action in emergency situations.

2.2 Contents of IED awareness

Any IED awareness campaign should ensure that it covers all the mission agencies, including NGOs and civilians within the mission area. The content of any IED awareness campaign should also incorporate other explosive threats such as mines and ERW. Possible content could include the following:

- Collecting detailed information on the IED/mine/ERW threat in the area of operations, and updating this information regularly. Consider keeping a visual brief available (a map or spread sheet identifying dangerous areas).

- Establishing IED/mine/ERW safety procedures in accordance with endorsed (UNMAS) procedures. In particular, establish a vehicle and travel reporting system.

- Maintaining updated and verified contact details of mine action centres and agencies, UN security officers, Multinational EOD Coordination Cell (MN EOD CC) and National Point of Contact EOD (NPOC EOD) of peacekeeping, local police and medical facilities.

- Request IED related information from the mission HQ.

- Providing IED/mine/ERW related information to staff, including information on safe routes and dangerous areas in areas of operation, as well as emergency contact information.

- Understanding that levels of alertness to the IED threat may decrease over time; and safety refresher training may be required.

- Ensuring that staff receives first-aid training, with special focus on trauma care, and that vehicles are equipped with first-aid and trauma-care kits.

- Equipping vehicles and staff with effective communication equipment, ECM and maps, and providing training in their use.

- In areas of high risk and high exposure, special (MRAP, blast proof) vehicles should be provided for additional protection from an explosion.

IED Threat Mitigation Responsibilities

Tasks are intended as a guide and are listed to assist HQ staff in developing an IED-TM Capability. These tasks need to be scaled as per the level of the HQ, its mandate, threat environment and availability of IED-TM assets. Likely tasks of HQ staff to plan and organize C-IED effort in mission setting are:

	Staff functions contributing to C-IED	Specified task	Purpose	IED-TM activity output (KOA)	Comments
1.	All Staff	Specialist input for briefing HOM and FC (military and police)	Support strategic level decision making	Understanding Preventing Protecting Preparing	
Intelligence Cell in Lead (U2)					
2.	Information exchange and management (U-2, U-3, U-6 and U-9)	Create and manage a mission IED-TM database to collate IED incidents	Provides operational picture of AOR to support pattern analysis (increases situational awareness). Helps identify IED networks	Understanding Preparing	This will include IED locations/ timings, type, target, and aggressor's TTP.
3.	Information Exchange and Management (U-2, U-3, U-6)	Create common reporting terminology	Consistency in reporting. Helps accuracy in operational assessments	Understanding Preventing Preparing	
4.	Threat Assessment (U-2)	Analyze IED Threat and identify threat zones (high to low)	Identify areas of focus for operational planning	Understanding Preparing	
5.	Information Analysis (U-2,U-5)	Predict and identify IED network activities and behavior (financing, training, recruitment, construction)	Understand the IED network	Understanding Preventing Preparing	War gaming, pattern analysis

	Staff functions contributing to C-IED	**Specified task**	**Purpose**	**IED-TM activity output (KOA)**	**Comments**
6..	Information analysis (U-2,U-5) also information operations (U-2, U-9)	Identify IED supporting infrastructure. Materials provider supply lines. Communications facilities	Understand the IED network	Understanding Preventing Preparing	Exploitation is key. Also SIGINT
7.	Information Analysis (U-2,U-5, U-8)	Study aggressor's TTPs - IED emplacement and targeting	Inform all in-mission HQs about aggressor's TTPs. Helps understanding of aggressor's IED capabilities	Understanding Pursuing Protecting Preparing	
8.	Information Analysis (U-2,U-5) also IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8)	Make recommendations as to how/ where IED threats might develop.	Identify where FP might have to be developed (e.g. additional ECM)	Understanding Preventing Preparing	Include aggressor's future intentions.
Operations Cell in Lead (U3, U5, U6)					
9.	Operations and Plans (U-3, U-5)	Provide lead, direction and coordination for IED-TM related activities	Ensure IED-TM employment is effect based and focused	Preventing Preparing Pursuing Protecting	
10.	Operations and plans (U-3, U-5) also information exchange and management (U-2,U-3, U-6)	Include IED related input into routine SITREPs	Ensure commanders and staff retains IED-TM situational awareness.	Understanding Preparing	
11.	Operations and plans (U-3, U-5) also training (incl lessons learned) (U-7)	Assess in-mission force FP capabilities	Assist in validation TTPs for force protection	Preventing Preparing	

	Staff functions contributing to C-IED	Specified task	Purpose	IED-TM activity output (KOA)	Comments
12.	Operations and plans (U-3, U-5), Engineer (U-8) and communication (U-6)	Plan search and EOD operations	Reduce IED network effectiveness	Preventing Pursuing Protecting	
13.	Operations and plans (U-3, U-5) also intelligence (U-2) and CIMIC (U-9)	Provide general direction for the prioritization of IED-TM information gathering opportunities against tactical operations	Ensure exploitation and information gathering opportunities are used without inappropriate impact on operations.	Understanding Preventing Pursuing	
14.	Co-ordination (U-3)	Co-ord all IED-TM activities within the Mil/Pol staff and among higher/lower HQs, other units and agencies	Defeat aggressor's IED system	Understanding Preventing Protecting Preparing	IED advisor to lead. Role of U-3 as they represent the core IED-TM functional area.
15.	Operations and plans (U-3, U-5)	Coordinate IED-TM contributions to operational planning	Ensure coordinated IED-TM support to all operations for FP	Understanding Preventing Preparing Protecting	
16.	FP (U-3, U-2)	Prediction and dissemination of likely IED targets and locations	Support forces in defeating IED ensuring FP	Understanding Preventing Preparing Protecting	
17.	FP (U-3, U-7) also IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8) and Communication officer (U-6)	Monitor and evaluate friendly forces protection capabilities monitor the RCIED threat frequency list	Manage ECM capabilities throughout the battle space	Understanding Preparing Protecting	

	Staff functions contributing to C-IED	**Specified task**	**Purpose**	**IED-TM activity output (KOA)**	**Comments**
18.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8) FP (U-3, U-7) communication (U-6)	Monitor the RCIED threat frequency list	Inform all owners of ECM FP equipment on RCIED threats	Understanding Preparing Protecting	
19.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8) FP (U-3, U-7), communication (U-6)	Identify ECM FP characteristics for national, UN and civilian EW systems.	Contribute to ECM throughout the battle space	Understanding Preventing Preparing Protecting	
20.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8) FP (U-3, U-7) and communication (U-6)	Monitor and evaluate EW force protection equipment and TTPs effectiveness in relation to the threat	Confirm that equipment, procedures and threat fills covers threat spectrum	Understanding Preventing Preparing	
21.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8) FP and PoC (U-3, U-7) communication (U-6)	Issue and maintain the policy on EW pre-detonation of IEDs	Ensure FP TTPs are consistent with security of civilian personnel.	Understanding Preventing Protecting	
Training Cell (U7 in lead)					
22.	Training standards formulation (U-7) and intelligence (U-2)	Prepare search and EOD training standards to defeat IED and precursors based on information analysis	Standardization of search and EOD capability to defeat aggressors TTPs	Preparing Protecting	
23.	Training (U-7), FP (U-3, U-7) and IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8)	Develop and conduct exploitation awareness training as part of IED-TM training	Ensure value of exploitation is understood (enables levels 2 to be undertaken)	Preventing Protecting Preparing	
24.	Training (including Lessons learned) (U-7), IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8) and CIMIC (U-9)	Develop and manage IED, EO and UXO awareness training programmers and educate within UN personnel and local populace	Fulfill force protection requirements. Mitigate explosive hazards to civilian personnel. Prevent civilians supplying ERW / EO to IED	Preventing Preparing Protecting	

	Staff functions contributing to C-IED	**Specified task**	**Purpose**	**IED-TM activity output (KOA)**	**Comments**
			system.		
CIMIC and information management Cell (U9 in the lead)					
25.	Information operations (U-2, U-9) also CIMIC (U-9) Military Public Information Office (MPIO/INFO Ops)	Co-ord passing of IED information to UN establishments and other external agencies as appropriate	Enables all partner/ stakeholders to ensure requisite protection measures	Understanding Preventing Protecting Preparing	To include NGOs and host nation forces
26.	ISR (U-2, U-3) and U-9	Plan ISR usage in support of IED-TM operations	Focus on IED system elements that led themselves to detection	Pursuing Preventing Protecting	
27.	CIMIC (U-9), HUMINT and ISR (U-2, U-3)	Develop information based picture of IED system	Ensures IED-TM related information is gathered and the results are analyzed	Understanding	
28.	Information Operations (U-2, U-9) and IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8	Write and disseminate IED threats awareness reports	Ensure timely issue of IED threat warning to forces	Understanding Preventing Protecting Preparing	
29.	Information Operations (U-2, U-9)	Coordinate IED-TM contribution to information operations	Create awareness of IEDs among locals to discourage support to aggressor.	Understanding Preventing Preparing	
30.	Information Operations (U-9)	Influencing local populace to support IED-TM efforts	Awareness and trust gaining		
Engineer (U8 in the lead)					

	Staff functions contributing to C-IED	**Specified task**	**Purpose**	**IED-TM activity output (KOA)**	**Comments**
31.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8)	Develop search parameters for IEDs detection	Analyze IED emplacement pattern and TTPs of aggressor and indicate types of IEDs and precursors	Understanding Preparing Preventing	
32.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8) also operations (U-3)	Force protection and organize search operations	Prepare and organize plans for route search, vehicle search and building search	Preventing Protecting Preparing	
33.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8)	Issue policy for exploitation at levels 1-3 including WIT	This capability is needed to fully exploit the IED threat	Understanding Pursuing Preventing Protecting Preparing	
34.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8)	Create a level 2 exploitation capability	Provides timely and operationally focused information and evidence that ensures correct search TTPs and FP measures	Understanding Preventing Protecting Pursuing	Necessary Labs equipment will be resourced at FHQ level
35.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8)	Create level 1 (WTI) SOPs	Common standards leads to understand exploitation of material	Understanding Pursuing Preventing	
36.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8) also information exchange and management (U-2,U-3, U-6)	Monitor IED activity in other missions	With a view to understanding threat migration possibilities	Understanding Preventing Preparing	
37.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8) also information	Provide feedback (positive) to tactical level of successes from	Encourages continued support to exploitation	Understanding	

	Staff functions contributing to C-IED	Specified task	Purpose	IED-TM activity output (KOA)	Comments
	exchange and management (U-2,U-3, U-6) also military public information office (MPIO/INFO Ops)	exploitation	efforts by those at the tactical level		
38.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8) also information operations (U-2, U-9)	Fuse and analyze exploitation reports to identify sources of components	Ensure that intelligence information is integrated	Understanding Preparing	
39.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8) also Operations and Plans (U-3, U-5)	Contribute to targeting process and prioritization of IED network personnel	Deny IED network ability to conduct operations, to mount operations against IED network personnel. Ensure wider intelligence gathering is not unduly affected by personnel targeting	Understanding Preventing Preparing Pursuing	
40.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8)	Establish and maintain situational awareness of ERW locations, demining and clearance operation within the AO	Predict possible explosive source for IED networks, to improve situational awareness of security force. Gain information of explosives hazards and ensure EO disposal operations get priority. Identify the legitimate uses/ storage and transit of explosive within AOR. Be	Understanding Preventing	Mines, EO, UXOs

	Staff functions contributing to C-IED	**Specified task**	**Purpose**	**IED-TM activity output (KOA)**	**Comments**
			able to identify legitimate explosives should they enter the IED network.		
41.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8)	Ensure ERW / EO data is incorporated into the IED-TM database.	Improve situational awareness for security forces.	Preparing	
42.	IEDD/EOD/WTI (U-8)	Issue and manage EOD policy and identify EOD capability	Ensure standard practice, understanding of EOD operations and develop EOD capability to neutralize the threat	Preparing	
43.	EDD/EOD/WTI (U-8)	Direct force lay-down of EOD/IEDD assets within AOR	Make best use of IEDD/EOD resources.	Preparing	
44.	EDD/EOD/WTI (U-8)	Issue tasking and recovery policy for EOD/IEDD assets within AOR.	Make best use of IEDD/EOD resources.	Preparing	
45.	EDD/EOD/WTI (U-8) also Information Analysis (U-2,U-5)	Monitor EOD reports and maintain EOD map and register.	Assist/support host nation on EOD tasks.	Understanding Preparing	
46.	EDD/EOD/WTI (U-8) also Information Analysis (U-2,U-5)	Monitor IEDD reports and storyboards to evaluate IEDD TTPs in relation to threats	Identify equipment or TTPs gaps within IEDD capability	Understanding Preparing	TTPs will remain responsibility of contributing country

Pre-Deployment Evaluation Checklist

Serial	Evaluation Criteria	unsatisfactory to excellent (0-5)	Remarks
A	**Generic peacekeeping skills**. Are all personnel trained on and sensitized to the generic UN policy guidelines and directives for conducting peacekeeping operations? Do they demonstrate a clear understanding of these guidelines and directives?		
B	**Mission-specific peacekeeping skills.** Are all personnel trained, equipped and organized to perform mission essential tasks as per peacekeeping norms? Is the unit capable of performing in line with mission mandate(s)?		
C	**Basic/conventional skills.** Is the unit trained in basic infantry skills like firing personal weapons and minor tactics in accordance with national standards?		
D	**Physical and mental robustness.** Is the Unit physically and mentally robust enough to be deployed to the harsh conditions of the field mission?		
E	**Core-specific capabilities**. Is the Unit able to perform core tasks based on unit organization, tasks assigned and type of Mission?		
F	**Mine, EOD and IED-awareness and mitigation.** Is the Unit aware of minefield, explosive ordnance and IED hazards? Are the basic protective measures known and trained?		
G	**Leadership**. Is the unit chain of command capable, responsive and accountable for delivering in a peacekeeping environment?		
H	**Command and Staff**. Is the unit command and staff integrated, trained and capable of planning, organizing,		

	coordinating and directing the multifaceted operational and administrative tasks in the peacekeeping environment?		
I	**Training**. Has the Unit undertaken peacekeeping-oriented and Mission-specific training? Has it achieved the requisite standards?		
J	**Resources**. Is the unit carrying or in possession of the required number of personnel, arms, ammunition, equipment, accessories, spares, unit stores and expendables as per MOU and Mission requirements?		
K	**Equipment maintenance/management**. Does the unit maintain a minimum serviceability state of 90 percent and does it have the capability to organize preventive maintenance and repair/recovery in situ?		
L	**Weapons, instruments and vehicles.** Are all weapons zeroed, instruments calibrated, vehicles maintained and inspected and certified for correctness and functionality as per required standards.		
M	**Logistics**. In case of deployment at more than one location, are the forward deployed elements configured for independent and self-sustained logistics capability (food, water, accommodation, hygiene and sanitation, transport, and medical), or do they receive this support from the hosting headquarters?		
N	**Medical**. Do all personnel meet the requisite medical standards? Have they been inoculated as per Mission requirements and have they cleared the periodic medical examination? Does the unit have access to a fully operational medical facility (Medical Level 1) in accordance with the MOU?		
O	**Integrity**. Are all unit personnel aware of applicable UN rules, regulations and code of conduct, and have they demonstrated high standards of professionalism and integrity?		

P	**Welfare**. Does the unit maintain high standards of personnel welfare as per national standards and Mission requirements?		
Q	**Legal**. Do unit personnel and commanders clearly understand the responsibility to adhere to, promote and protect the legal framework for UN peacekeeping operations with specific reference to SOFA/SOMA, ROE, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, other relevant international legal statutes and the host nation law?		
R	**Evaluation**. Has the unit carried out a formal evaluation? Have shortcomings been rectified? Have TCC authorities certified the unit to be fit for deployment to the Mission on time?		

Evaluation Grading
- 0 - Not mission capable
- 1 - Not yet mission capable, major corrections required
- 2 - Not yet mission capable, minor corrections required
- 3 - Mission capable, major corrections required
- 4 - Mission capable, minor correction required
- 5 - Fully mission capable

Pre-Deployment IED Threat Mitigation Training – Collective Evaluation

Ser	Operational activity	Evaluation of the ability to:	Unsatisfactory to excellent (0-5)	Name of evaluator
1	Prevent	Conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) in an IED environment		
		Plan and employ organic and external intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to identify element of the IED system		
		Plan and employ the intelligence cycle to defeat the IED system		
		Fuse exploitation products with other intelligence sources		
		Analyze adversary IED TTPs		
		Plan and conduct information activities to defeat the IED system		
2.	Predict	Plan and conduct operations to disrupt adversary IED operations and their logistic support		
		Plan and conduct operations to neutralise local support to adversary IED activities		
		Plan and conduct operations to neutralise identified IEDs and caches		
		Plan ECM operations against the IED system		
		Plan and conduct information activities to defeat the IED system		
		Plan and conduct military search operations		
		Identify friendly and own unit TTP patterns		
		Plan and conduct route clearance operations		
3	Detect	Conduct IPB in an IED environment		

		Analyze adversary IED TTPs		
		Plan and conduct information activities to defeat the IED system		
		Plan and conduct military search operations		
		Plan and conduct route clearance operations		
4	Neutralize	Plan and conduct operations with ECM		
		Plan and conduct IEDD operations		
		Complete appropriate IED reports and returns		
5	Mitigate	Conduct mission planning in an IED environment		
		Conduct convoy drills in an IED environment		
		Conduct dismounted drills in an IED environment		
		Conduct drills for a vulnerable point crossing		
		React to IED attack		
		Conduct IED incident management		
		Conduct individual and unit IED-TM training		
6	Exploit	Use exploitation products to support prevent and predict activities		
		Plan and control the employment of exploitation assets in support of the mission-wide exploitation system		
		Complete appropriate IED reports and returns		

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Pre-Deployment IED Threat Mitigation Training - Evaluation of Individuals

Ser	Operational Activity	Evaluation of the ability to:	Unsatisfactory to excellent (0-5)	Name of evaluator
1	Prevent	Describe the IED System		
		Describe the individual's role in defeating the IED system		
		Describe the local cultures and influences as it applies to defeating the IED system		
2	Predict	Describe the IED system		
		Describe the individual's role in defeating the IED system		
		Describe the impact of operations on the IED system		
		Identify friendly and own unit (TTP) patterns		
		Identify aggressor IED attack TTPs		
		Identify aggressor complex attack TTPs		
		Conduct military search		
		Describe local cultures and influences as it applies to defeating the IED system		
3	Detect	Identify the main parts of an IED		
		Describe and identify the different IED types		
		Identify the components commonly used to construct each of the types of IED		
		Conduct basic military search		
		Describe route clearance operations		
		Identify aggressor complex attack TTPs		
		Identify possible IED indicators		
		Identify possible suicide attack indicators		
		Conduct the 5 and 20/25 meter drills		
		Identify vulnerable points		
		Conduct drills for a vulnerable point crossing		
		Conduct check point drills		
4	Neutralize	Operate Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) equipment		
		Conduct ECM TTPs		
		Conduct the 4 C's (Confirm, Clear, Cordon, Control)		

		Use appropriate IED reporting procedures		
		Describe IED Disposal responders and their roles		
		Conduct IEDD responder call out procedures		
5	Mitigate	Conduct convoy drills in an IED environment		
		Conduct dismounted drills in an IED environment		
		Conduct drills for a vulnerable point crossing		
		Conduct check point drills		
		React to IED attack		
6	Exploit	Describe the purpose of exploitation		
		Recognize / identify areas and material of forensic value		
		Describe the principles of site preservation and material handling		
		Conduct technical and forensic material preservation		
		Conduct technical and forensic material collection (in extremis only)		
		Complete appropriate CIED reports		
		Describe IED exploitation responders and their roles		
		Recognize the exploitation process and its support to the intelligence cycle and future operations		

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HQ IED Threat Mitigation Evaluation Check List Category 1 – Standard Unit

Standard to be met:
- Capable of providing an appropriate level of IED Threat Mitigation

Elements	Unsatisfactory to excellent (0-5)	N/A	N/E
1. Is the command / staff aware of the different types of IED's?			
2. Does the command / staff know the difference between C-IED and EOD?			
3. Does the command /staff know how to act after an IED incident?			
4. Does the command / staff understand options available on IED Find?			
5. Does the command / staff knows about ECM management and FP measures?			
6. Are the unit individuals aware of commander's policy on IED threat mitigation?			
7. Were the C-IED individual training requirements met (UN standards)			
8. Are the C-IED collective training requirements met (UN standards)			

Note: For evaluation of specialized units (C-IED teams) refer to the EOD-IEDD manual, Engineer Handbook and other UNMUM manuals

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HQ IED Threat Mitigation Evaluation Check List Category 2 – Senior staff (SS) of HQ

Standard to be met:
- Capable of providing an appropriate level of FP for the group
- Staff must have conducted general (IED-TM) training
- Staff must know and apply a basic IED-TM procedure
- Staff must be able to adapt activity inside the AO taking into account IED threat

Was the SS trained and able to carry out IED-TM TTPs in order to maintain freedom of maneuver and to minimise the risk of death or injury from IEDs.

Elements	Unsatisfactory to excellent (0-5)	N/A	N/E
1. Does the SS have an effective group FP organization?			
2. Does the SS have develop a FP plan, in accordance with HQ FP policy, that incorporates or at least considers the following: • Security Alert States in accordance with HQ alert states? • Measures for different Security Alert State are known by units and in accordance with HQ Alert state? • Additional FP measures taken when necessary? (if applicable) • In absence of ROEs, SS has promulgated standard self-defence response for any incident?			
3. Is the SS aware of force security responsibilities over the entire chain of command?			
4. Is the security plan included, but not limited to, anti-aggressor measures in the following situations: • Security plan include briefings, information, security measures, etc.? • Active/Passive Defense? • Recuperation from the effects of an IED attack?			
5. Were security plans took into account of guards, patrols, orders, IEDs, emergency evacuation, contingency planning, communications systems, etc. (if applicable)?			
6. Is the FP Planning Instructions include, but not limited to: • C-IED: Threat, risk, measures, etc.?			

• SS orders to carry out checks of security without previous notice to units?			
7. Is the SS prepared to cope with and recover from the effects of attack through the restoration of essential services and the conduct of operations with minimum disruption?			
8. Does the SS know the difference between search and EOD?			
9. Does the SS know how to act after an IED incident?			
10. Are the C-IED individual training requirements met?			
11. Are the C-IED collective training requirements met?			
12. Has all members of the SS received appropriate general and mission specific countering improvised explosive devices (IED-TM) training?			
13. Is the SS able to achieve continual sharing of relevant IED information with HQs, adjacent SSs and units?			
14. Is the SS aware of ECM management?			
15. Do they understand RCIED threat and requirement of ECM?			

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<div align="right">**Annex K**</div>

HQ IED Threat Mitigation Evaluation Check List Category 3 – Military and Police HQ Staff

Standard to be met:
- Capable to coordinate the establishment of detailed plans and arrangements covering search, EOD and IEDD including military and police means and in relationships with local civilian authorities.
- All staff members must have conducted general and mission specific IED-TM training.
- Staff must know and apply a IED-TM doctrine and facilitate for IED-TM concept of operations and IED threat mitigation framework.
- Staff must be able to influence activity inside and outside the AO to deter involvement in the IED System and reject IEDs as an aggressor's tactic.
- Staff must facilitate building capability within own forces to conduct large spectrum IED Threat Mitigation with an emphasis on search activities within an IED threat environment.
- Staff must be able to develop a comprehensive picture of the IED system and its interaction with the human, physical and information environments.
- Staff must be able to plan and conduct operations inside and outside the AO in relationships with local civilian authorities in order to degrade an adversary IED capability.

Elements	Unsatisfactory To Excellent (0-5)	N/A	N/E
Is the HQ staff aware of the different types of IED's? Is the HQ staff aware of the difference between IED-TM and EOD? Has all members of the HQ staff received appropriate general and mission specific IED-TM training? Do the staff know : • The different levels of exploitation? • Who collects evidences after an IED incident? • The role of a IED exploitation Laboratory?			
2. Did the HQ have a C-IED cell? Did the HQ IED-TM cell know: • What an IED network is? • What an IED system is? • The different levels of exploitation? • Who collects evidences after an IED incident? • What is the role of a IED exploitation Laboratory? • What are RSPs and what is FHQ policy on RSPs?			

Is the HQ capable to plan and prepare IED-TM operations? Is the HQ able to support IED-TM operations?			
4. Is the HQ staff able to achieve continual sharing of relevant IED information with Higher HQs, adjacent SCs and units?			
5. Has the IED-TM activities and measures been coordinated with higher HQ, civilian authorities and subordinate units?			
6. Do the HQ make full use of unit's IED-TM capabilities?			
8. Do the HQ conduct full spectrum IED threat mitigation activities including both reactive and proactive actions?			
9. Is the HQ prepared to cope with and recover from the effects of IED attack through the restoration of essential services and the conduct of peace keeping activities with minimum disruption?			
10. Has the HQ adequate resources (i.e. ISR, prudent planning, assets capacity etc.) to influence and deter the use of IED?			
11. Is the HQ staff aware of the enablers in a maritime IED-TM environment (if applicable)? Is the staff aware, which role maritime enablers are playing in support of IED-TM operations (if applicable)?			
12. Has the HQ implemented a robust FP including IED protection measures inside and outside the AO? Does the HQ staff have develop a FP plan, in accordance with both UN policy and the FP policy of the participating and host nations, that incorporates or at least considers the following: • Staff Security Officer named for security and FP, with IED-TM experience and knowledge in the matter? • HQ instructions include IED-TM coordination with host nation, local authorities in accordance with different parent nations? • HQ definition of Security Alert States? • IED Measures for different Security Alert State known by units and in accordance with Alert state in force? • Additional FP measures taken when necessary? (if applicable.) • Staff carried out periodic checks? • In absence of ROEs, HQ staff had promulgated standard			

self-defence response for any IED incident? Is the HQ staff aware of force security responsibilities over the entire chain of command? Is a Security Inspection Programme established? 5. Is the security plan included, but not limited to, measures in the following situations: • IED attacks with divers (if applicable)? • IED attacks by small boats (if applicable)? • Security plan include briefings, information, security • measures, etc.? • Active/Passive Defense? • Recuperation from the effects of major IED attack? Are IED security plans taken into account of guards, patrols, orders, emergency evacuation, contingency planning, communications systems, etc. (if applicable)? Is HQ IED threat mitigation policy considered the execution of training exercises/ tactical serials or drills? Is the FP Planning Instructions include, but not limited to: • IED Intelligence info/ assessment and threat reporting system instructions? • Command and Control: Authority, ROE, plans, preplans, etc.? • Defence and Security: Warning/alert state, alert/warning system, risk, etc.? • IED-TM: Threat, risk, measures, etc.? • HQ orders to carry out checks of security without previous notice to units?			

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- 3 - Mission capable, major corrections required
- 4 - Mission capable, minor correction required
- 5 - Fully mission capable

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