



disarmament | demobilization | reintegration

DDR Programme Management Toolkit

United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section



The introduction of the Toolkit for DDR Programme Management is a timely initiative. The Toolkit includes the Standard Operating Procedures for monitoring and evaluation, a “how-to” guide for the benchmarking of DDR programmes and a risk management planning framework. These guidance materials have been developed in recent years, and their availability in one volume in both English and French aims to make them more user-friendly. The goal of this Toolkit is to assist colleagues to fully incorporate monitoring and evaluation as well as risk management in the implementation of DDR programmes.

—**Alain Le Roy**

Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations

(excerpt from the Foreword)



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Credits

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
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Foreword

As peacekeeping operations have evolved over the last 20 years, so has the role of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), which has become an integral element of many of our Missions. Given the increasing complexity of today's conflicts, effective management of DDR programmes is even more pressing, as they are sometimes not anchored in strong peace agreements or linked to other post-conflict processes.

At the same time, DDR has been widely recognized as a key tool for post-conflict peacebuilding, stabilization and consolidation. With a current caseload reaching half a million ex-combatants and with a considerable global track record, DDR has become a key activity of this Organization. This is reflected in the 2005 decision by the General Assembly to provide assessed contributions to support the disarmament and demobilization phases of DDR conducted by peacekeeping operations. It is essential therefore that all DDR practitioners ensure that their programmes are managed effectively and properly. There can be no credible DDR programme without accountability. While many external factors determine the ultimate success of such a programme, the United Nations performance should not leave room to be questioned.

The introduction of the Toolkit for DDR Programme Management is a timely initiative. The Toolkit includes the Standard Operating Procedures for monitoring and evaluation, a "how-to" guide for the benchmarking of DDR programmes and a risk management planning framework. These guidance materials have been developed in recent years, and their availability in one volume in both English and French aims to make them more user-friendly. The goal of this Toolkit is to assist colleagues to fully incorporate monitoring and evaluation as well as risk management in the implementation of DDR programmes.



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SOP on M&E for DDR

SOP on M&E for DDR

A. Purpose

The Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) provides DPKO staff with guidance on how to plan and run a Monitoring and Evaluation System for DDR in the broader context of peacekeeping. It provides a standardized, comprehensive and systematic approach to monitoring and evaluating both progress and results of DDR.

B. Scope

The Standard Operating Procedure on Monitoring and Evaluation for DDR applies to DDR planners (Chapter 1 of 'Procedures', in particular) and to DDR M&E staff (for whom Chapter 2 will be most significant).

C. Rationale

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) is a crucial tool for effective DDR programme planning and implementation. It offers the means through which stakeholders can¹:

- keep track of what has (or has not) been achieved to date;
- make immediate adjustments to the DDR programme if necessary;
- ensure accountability for the effective and efficient use of funds;
- credible and timely reporting to stakeholders and donors;
- manage, communicate and discuss information on progress;
- objectively verify the outcomes and impact of the DDR programme;
- build an institutional memory and learn and share lessons that can be fed into future programmes and policies.

In crisis and post-conflict situations, where the most urgent priorities are to get implementation up and running, M&E may be overlooked or under-prioritized. M&E has been one of the weakest areas of DDR programme management. It has been recognized that, while DDR sections in peacekeeping operations have tried several approaches to M&E, there has been little guidance on this subject, nor has a single approach been developed across peacekeeping operations.

¹ A listing of definitions/explanations of technical terms is provided towards the end of this SOP, section E.

D. Procedures

Overview

Programme managers and DDR M&E staff shall be **responsible** for key M&E activities:

- During the *planning phase*, the **DDR Section of the Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions** shall ensure that an adequate M&E strategy is included in the DDR programme plan and provide technical backstopping for defining indicators and a DDR M&E plan. During *implementation*, the Section shall monitor performance and process indicators, provide technical backstopping for M&E and serve as a central repository for M&E information.
- During the *planning phase*, the **Head of Component** shall establish an M&E mechanism and identify performance indicators. During *implementation*, the Head of Component shall oversee M&E of the DDR programme and clearly define rules, responsibilities and tasks for M&E staff.
- **DDR M&E staff** shall run the DDR M&E system throughout programme *implementation*, adjusting it, as required, on a regular basis.²

When planning a DDR programme through an **Integrated Missions Planning Process** (IMPP) with a UN Country Team (UNCT) presence, the tasks related to

Position	Key responsibilities	
	Before implementation	During implementation
○ Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Section of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ensure that an adequate monitoring and evaluation strategy is included in the DDR programme plan ○ provide technical backstopping for defining indicators and a DDR Monitoring and Evaluation Plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ monitor performance and process indicators during implementation of the programme plan ○ provide technical backstopping for monitoring and evaluations ○ serve as central repository for all M&E information
○ Head of DDR Component	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ establish mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the implementation of DDR programmes ○ identify performance and process indicators and targets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ oversee monitoring and evaluations of the DDR programme ○ clearly define the roles, responsibilities and tasks for M&E units and M&E staff
○ DDR M&E unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>typically not yet established</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ run the DDR M&E system ○ adjust the M&E system as and when required

² In addition, DDR M&E staff shall provide feedback to DDR programme managers in HQ in order to improve the standardized mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating DDR programmes.

M&E before implementation shall be the responsibility of the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) and the UNCT planning team.

The steps entailed in setting up and managing an effective M&E system in the DDR context will be considered in two groups:

- **before** implementation, 7 steps (primarily the responsibility of the DDR planners in HQ and field operations)
- **during implementation**, 5 steps (primarily the responsibility of DDR management and M&E staff in field operations)


Steps to be taken **before** implementation

The design of a **Monitoring and Evaluation system for DDR** is an essential element in planning a DDR programme.

DDR planners in headquarters and field operations shall ensure that the DDR M&E system is **planned** in detail, **incorporated in the DDR planning document** and sufficiently **funded**.

The **DDR Section** shall provide technical backstopping to DDR planners to define indicators and draw up a DDR Monitoring and Evaluation Plan.

To do that, programme planners shall follow **seven steps**:




The planning process for M&E shall result in a **comprehensive ‘DDR Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) Plan’**, which shall be an **integral part** of the overall DDR programme plan.

Each of these steps are explained and discussed in more detail below, and together will form the **basis for effective M&E activities over the course of the DDR Programme Cycle**.

STEP 1 Be clear about DDR results chain

A logically connected **chain of results** is the **basis for monitoring and evaluating DDR programmes** in the peacekeeping context. All stakeholders should have a clear and shared understanding of the chain. To this end, planners shall ensure that the Results Chain is SMART³ and laid out clearly in the DDR programme plan.

A basic Results Chain is defined in the **Results-Based Budgeting (RBB) Framework** for the entire mission. The RBB Framework includes a number of specific, often numeric, planned **outputs** which should lead to an **expected accomplishment** (or ‘outcome’) for the DDR programme. Taken together, the expected accomplishments of a mission contribute jointly to an **overall objective** (as defined by the Security Council).



In addition, more detailed **planning documents** for the DDR component may exist. These can take the form of a DDR programme document.

All expected accomplishments and outputs of the RBB framework and the DDR programme plan – including the respective indicators – shall form the **basis for DDR monitoring and evaluations**. If the results chain is not sufficiently detailed for effective monitoring, DDR planners (or M&E staff where planners failed to do this) shall **expand** it to a sufficient level of detail.

STEP 2 Determine performance indicators

In order to effectively monitor and evaluate DDR, each output and every expected accomplishment shall have a set of **performance indicators**. Output indicators help to track whether a DDR programme delivers what was planned

³ SMART: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound; see ‘Terms and Definitions’ (section E).

and if it was done on time. Indicators for expected accomplishments track medium-term progress, for example in the reintegration of ex-combatants.⁴

DDR planners should consider the following requirements when seeking to identify or refine meaningful performance indicators:

- An indicator shall be a *single unit of information* measured over time that helps show changes in a specific condition (poorly defined indicator: 'Number and level of ex-combatants economically active' could be better expressed as two distinct indicators: 'No. of ex-combatants economically active' and '% of economically active ex-combatants').
- A set of indicators for a specific output or an expected accomplishment should comprise a mix of **quantitative** aspects of DDR (directly observable, e.g. '% of ex-combatants who found employment') with **qualitative** aspects of DDR (incorporating judgments or perceptions, e.g. '% of ex-combatants satisfied with the transition package').
- Indicators should be **numeric** (e.g. a number, percentage, ratio, etc.). Numeric indicators tend to be more sensitive to change over time and are typically less subjective than yes/no indicators (e.g. 'All ex-combatants successfully reintegrated'). Numeric indicators can capture quantitative (e.g. '% of ex-combatants who receive reintegration package') as well as qualitative aspects of DDR (e.g. '% of ex-combatants who say their lives have improved after demobilization').
- Each output or expected accomplishment should have a **set of three to five indicators**. Fewer than this, and it is difficult to capture all key dimensions of a result. To use more than five indicators is cumbersome, reduces the value of indicators and increases the workload for monitoring.
- General indicators should be complemented by additional **disaggregated** indicators which show a specific subgroup. For example, the indicator '% of ex-combatants that are economically active' may be complemented by an additional indicator on '% of disabled ex-combatants that are economically active'.
- Key **cross-cutting issues** should be reflected through additional, disaggregated performance indicators, to highlight and track a specific aspect of DDR.⁵
- To the extent possible, indicators should be disaggregated by **gender** to capture the different needs of female and male DDR programme participants.
- **Key partners** such as national authorities and civil society should be involved in the process of selecting indicators, as this will serve to foster broader national ownership and support for DDR, and can help clarify the expected accomplishments and outputs of the planned DDR programme.

4 The Result-Based Budgeting Framework for a mission includes indicators on the level of expected accomplishments, but no indicators for the level of outputs (although it uses 'quantities'). Performance indicators for a DDR programme should include *all* RBB indicators and additional, DDR-specific indicators for detailed monitoring and evaluations.

5 Cross-cutting issues in the context of DDR in peacekeeping typically include children, youth, health, HIV/AIDS, human rights or cross-border population movements.

Every indicator in a DDR programme should have an **indicator baseline** stating the pre-intervention status on a given date, and an **indicator target** specifying the result to be achieved by a certain date. Targets should be realistic, and should be agreed upon by key partners and national authorities. Intermediary targets (also called 'milestones') for specific dates within the programme period are recommended, to facilitate ease of monitoring.⁶

STEP 3 Determine process indicators

Performance indicators capture what has been achieved by the DDR programme. However, **how a DDR programme operates** can materially affect the quality of its outputs and the likelihood of reaching its expected accomplishment.

It is through the use of **process indicators** that DDR programme managers can track key information on the way the programme is implemented.

At the planning stage, DDR planners shall identify a **limited set of process indicators** which are subsequently tracked by DDR M&E staff during implementation.

While process indicators largely depend on the local context and the type of DDR, they often relate to key aspects of the **budget** (e.g. '% of administrative overhead costs compared to overall expenditure', '% of funds mobilized which are spent'), **human resources** (e.g. '% of human resource budget spent on international staff', '% of DDR positions which are not filled', '% of DDR programme staff that completed gender training') or **public information** activities for DDR (e.g. 'hours of radio programmes on DDR per quarter').

STEP 4 Develop an indicator framework

DDR planners shall summarize performance indicators and process indicators in an **indicator framework**.

This framework shall be based on the DDR results chain. It defines a **set of indicators for each output and the expected accomplishment**.

The DDR indicator framework shall specify in full detail every indicator with its **baseline** and **target**. Baselines and targets shall be each expressed as a single number, percentage or word. In addition, the indicator framework shall specify the month and year for baseline and targets in brackets. For example: '% of 350 targeted communities with at least one DDR-funded reintegration project', baseline 0% (01/2010), target 90% (12/2014).

⁶ In the typically volatile and uncertain context of peacekeeping missions, it is possible that an indicator baseline can only be collected after the DDR programme starts operating. In such cases, clear plans to collect the missing baseline data shall be made at the planning stage. By the end of the first year of operations at the latest, all indicators shall have a complete baseline and a target.

The indicator framework shall also clearly specify the **portfolio of evidence** (often called 'means of verification') for every indicator (i.e. where the data is coming from, what source or how determined) and the **frequency** of data collection for the indicator (how often it will be collected).

Template for DDR indicator framework⁷

DDR results chain	Indicators	Baseline (month/year)	Target (month/year)	Portfolio of evidence	Frequency of data collection

STEP 5 Plan surveys, studies, evaluations

When drawing up a DDR M&E plan, planners shall provide for in-depth assessments of progress and success to be carried out, in addition to continuous monitoring. The key tools for such substantial assessments of DDR are:

- sample surveys;
- studies; and
- evaluations.

These assessments should be planned before the DDR programme begins. This allows a **strategic approach** to be adopted to collect information when needed rather than using an ad-hoc approach. Naturally, needs will change during the course of the programme, and provision should be made for the conducting of alternative or additional studies and surveys in response to specific issues or problems which may arise during the course of implementation.

DDR programmes should commission an **evaluation** of the DDR programme during the second year of implementation, and every second year after that. Different types of small **sample surveys** should ideally be conducted annually, but at least every second year. **Studies** should be conducted when the need for more in-depth information on a particular issue arises.

The **approach, timing and scope** of surveys, studies and evaluations will depend on the level of field access expected in the area where the DDR programme plans to operate.

⁷ See annex 1 for an example of a DDR Indicator Framework.

Sample survey

A **survey** is a system for collecting information from, or about, people, to describe, compare, or explain their knowledge, attitudes and behaviour. A **sample** survey enables a general conclusion to be reached on the basis of a (statistically significant) sample of a group, population or process. Such surveys can capture different kinds of information, for example, the level of satisfaction of ex-combatants within the DDR process, or assessing the success and sustainability of their reintegration. Even **small sample surveys** of DDR programme participants can yield **sound statistically valid data** for the entire group of programme participants at **reasonable cost**. Without the use of sample surveys by DDR programmes, it is difficult to credibly and objectively establish if planned accomplishments are met or not.

Evaluations

Evaluations may be conducted internally by DDR or UN staff, or by external evaluators. An **internal evaluation** may be undertaken by the DDR programme or a sub-programme ('programme-led evaluation'), or by the DPKO/DFS evaluation team in the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, or the Office of Internal Oversight Services ('evaluation-led evaluation'). An **external evaluation** is conducted by entities free from control or influence of those responsible for the design and implementation of the DDR programme. If the purpose of an evaluation is to assess accomplishments as credibly and as objectively as possible, DDR planners shall choose an external evaluation.

Studies

To the extent possible, DDR planners may consider specific studies to carry out in-depth investigations on certain **issues, problems or perspectives** which may arise during the implementation of a DDR programme. For example, DDR planners might include a study on the success of reintegration of ex-combatants with special needs in year 2 of DDR implementation in order to adjust the specific support to that group. While the need for most studies will only emerge during the implementation of a DDR programme, provision for studies shall be made prior to the programme's start.

A certain degree of **flexibility** should be accommodated in the plan, as changes in field access may trigger a revision of the planned mix of surveys, studies and evaluations to be carried out.

The DDR **Surveys, Studies and Evaluations** Plan shall **summarize** the surveys, studies and evaluations to be carried out before, during and after the DDR implementation, including those that are carried out jointly with other organizations.

The Surveys, Studies and Evaluations Plan shall specify the following elements for each planned activity: a) the **focus** that surveys, studies and evaluations seek to address, b) the **type** of activity, c) the tentative **timing** and d) the anticipated **costs** of conducting the activity.

Template for DDR survey, studies and evaluations plan⁸

	Focus	Type	Timing	Costs
Surveys				
Studies				
Evaluation				

STEP 6 Define capacities required for M&E

As the DDR M&E Plan nears completion, programme planners shall define:

- the **human resources** needed to effectively carry out M&E
- the **budget** required for M&E

Given the variety of tasks and its central role in DDR management, a DDR programme shall have a dedicated **M&E unit**.

The head of the M&E unit shall **report directly** to the DDR Head of Component. A direct reporting line is paramount for M&E staff to provide DDR managers with accurate and frank information on progress and challenges, and to avoid a conflict of interest.

A DDR M&E unit should consist of at least **four staff**: a **unit head** (preferably an internationally recruited expert to provide safeguards against potential bias) and **three M&E officers** (preferably nationally recruited, due to their local knowledge, and to encourage skills development locally in M&E). For large DDR programmes, the M&E unit should be staffed with three international staff⁹ and six (preferably nationally recruited) M&E officers.

To enhance efficiency and increase the chances for sustainable DDR, planners may consider a **combination of permanent DDR M&E staff with external, part-time M&E expertise**. This may be done through a retainer agreement with external consultancy firms or individuals which can be called upon at any time.

⁸ For an example of a DDR Survey, Studies and Evaluation Plan see Annex 3.

⁹ The number of international staff should be reduced once nationally recruited M&E staff is able to take over more responsibilities. The head of the M&E unit, however, should remain an international staff to safeguard against potential bias and to ensure frank reporting.

To ensure that the DDR programme has sufficient capacities to carry out M&E activities, the DDR planning document shall contain **separate budget line(s)** for M&E activities and M&E staff.¹⁰

Typically, the costs for M&E staff and for carrying out the activities in a DDR M&E plan depends on **three factors**: a) the number and level of dedicated M&E staff, b) the number and type of evaluations and studies and c) the number and type of primary data collections, such as sample surveys.

An M&E budget of **no less than 3%** of overall DDR budget shall be allocated. Depending on the DDR operation and other local factors, the budget for M&E should normally be between 3% and 7% of the overall DDR budget.

DDR planners should **include funding provision** in the budget for surveys, evaluations or studies which cannot be foreseen at the time of planning, but where a need for such assessments may arise during the implementation stage.

STEP 7 Summarize it in a DDR M&E Plan

Based on steps one to six, DDR planners shall draw up a **DDR Monitoring and Evaluation Plan**, which shall be an **integral part of the DDR planning document**.

The DDR Monitoring and Evaluation Plan shall include an **appropriate mix** of activities to collect and analyse **quantitative and qualitative information** on DDR. While quantitative information (e.g. ‘% of ex-combatants who receive reintegration support’) is important to objectively track progress and success of DDR, it is often insufficient to capture the complexity and progress towards the expected accomplishment of a DDR programme.

- **Quantitative information** is usually procured from direct observation, assessment or measurement. Typically, it is less subjective and therefore more credible than qualitative information.

In DDR programmes, quantitative information typically refers to the output level of the result chain (e.g. ‘No. of arms destroyed’, ‘% of child soldiers supported’).

- **Qualitative information** typically describes people’s opinions, knowledge, attitudes or behaviours. Qualitative tools are more effective in building up understanding on the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of aspects, perceptions, relationships and trends in the DDR process.

In DDR programmes, qualitative information is typically collected through studies, evaluations, reviews, field visits, focus groups and the monitoring of implementing partners. Qualitative information can be text-based or – when collated – expressed as a number (‘% of female members of armed groups who say that their economic situation has improved after demobilization’).

¹⁰ If a DDR programme is planned through an Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), separate budget lines for M&E should be included in the Mission Budget Report.

If a DDR programme is planned through an **Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP)**, the DDR Monitoring and Evaluation Plan shall be part of the integrated mission plan.

The DDR M&E Plan in the DDR planning document shall not exceed 2 pages and shall consist of **three components**:¹¹

- The **narrative component** shall describe how the DDR Programme is to be monitored and evaluated. It shall address as a minimum, but not be limited to, all the issues (steps 1 to 6) discussed above. It shall specify who will take what action, and when. It should also outline how the DDR programme will engage with national partners to strengthen their M&E capacities. The narrative component shall describe how information on DDR progress and success is to be obtained, through a careful mix of quantitative and qualitative methods.
- The **indicator framework** shall summarize the performance and process indicators, their baselines and their targets, the portfolio of evidence and the frequency of data updates. The indicator framework shall take the form of a table as described in step four.
- The **surveys, studies and evaluations plan** within the M&E Plan shall specify the name, focus, type, timing and cost for each planned activity. It shall take the form of a table as described in step five. The DDR Section programme manager shall assure its quality and approve the plan.

Steps to be taken **during** implementation


During the implementation of a DDR programme, monitoring and evaluation entails a **cyclical process** of seeking, obtaining, collating, organizing, analysing, interpreting, packaging and distributing data and information throughout the duration of the DDR programme period.

DDR M&E staff shall have overall responsibility for managing or carrying out all M&E activities planned in the **DDR Monitoring & Evaluation Plan**, including the DDR surveys, studies and evaluations plan.

In addition, M&E staff shall carry out **additional M&E activities**, obtain and store data and information in a **DDR Information System**, **analyse** the information, **report** on it and **adjust** the M&E system.

Running the Monitoring and Evaluation System for a DDR programme is a continuous process, in many aspects a cyclical one (of observe, assess, advise, adjust, observe, assess, advise, adjust), and for simplicity's sake can be broken down to an **initial task**, **five reiterating steps** and a **final task**:

¹¹ For an simplified example of a DDR M&E plan see annex 3.



As a minimum, DDR M&E staff shall carry out steps 1 to 5 at least **quarterly**. This allows DDR M&E staff to provide updated information on quarterly reports. It also ensures that sufficient updated information and analysis is available for the mission's annual performance report.

Throughout the DDR programme implementation, the DDR M&E unit shall provide **training** in basic M&E to programme staff and partners.

The **DDR Section** shall provide technical backstopping to the DDR M&E staff throughout the DDR programme cycle and serve as a central repository for all information related to monitoring and evaluating of DDR.

While the **management of risks** to the DDR programme is not part of monitoring and evaluation, the DDR M&E section shall provide information on changes in risks and assumptions to the Risk Management Officer or focal point of the mission.¹²

INITIAL TASK Set up and establish the M&E unit

At the beginning of DDR implementation, DDR management should **set up and establish an M&E unit**, based on the budget and the DDR M&E plan included in the DDR planning documents.

Most DDR programmes routinely use one or more databases when processing the disarmament and demobilization of combatants.¹³ DDR programmes may use DREAM¹⁴ or a purpose-made database to meet the needs of the DDR programme. When **selecting a database system**, attention should be given to its M&E capability. DDR managers and M&E staff shall ensure that the database contains a **reporting module** which is capable of producing continuous, meaningful reports.¹⁵

To systematically plan its activities during implementation, DDR M&E staff shall draft a **rolling two-year work plan**. The work plan shall include details about planned activities on a monthly basis for the first twelve-month period, and tentative activities for the subsequent twelve months. The work plan shall be based on the DDR M&E Plan drafted during the planning phase. DDR M&E staff shall update the work plan at least quarterly or when required by changed circumstances.

¹² For details on risk management see the DPKO/DFS Policy and Guidelines on Risk Management.

¹³ The database typically includes socio-economic information on the ex-combatants, their disarmament process and weapons, the demobilization package and the reintegration support provided.

¹⁴ The DREAM database (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and SALW Control) database is a generic DDR software provided by UNDP.

¹⁵ If this is not done at the design stage, the reporting shall be customized once the database is already functional.

STEP 1 Obtain information and data

Information is key to the M&E process, and there are two sources.

Existing data is the information already available, ready for collection. Being readily available, it will be less expensive or even free to procure, but may be less relevant.

New data is the information actively obtained by DDR M&E staff or jointly with partners. New data collected for the DDR process is specifically tailored to the needs of the programme, but it will likely incur costs (time and/or funds) to procure.

Before investing significant funds in data collection, DDR M&E staff should **assess the use and quality** of the full range of data and information **already available**.

Obtain existing data

DDR M&E staff shall systematically and completely obtain existing ('secondary') data from a wide range of sources:

- DDR M&E staff shall obtain secondary data from the **reporting module of the DDR database** at least on a quarterly basis.¹⁶ In collated form, the DDR database typically provides ample data for a range of indicators at the output level.
- M&E staff shall obtain, organize and store data and information produced by **implementing partners**. This may include detailed data on their operations, studies and surveys conducted by implementing partners, and reports over and above those contractually required of them by the DDR programme.
- M&E staff shall make full use of the information, including performance data, readily available from colleagues within the DDR office. Typically, **operational data** can be obtained from DDR Human Resource staff, Finance staff, Public Information staff and Programme staff who work directly with implementing partners.
- Further, M&E staff shall seek to obtain relevant data and information from **outside the DDR programme**. Useful sources will include studies, surveys, articles, statistics or indices published by other UN agencies, the government, by other national or international development or humanitarian organizations, by universities, research organizations and national and international media. M&E staff shall seek not only text information, but also relevant visual information (pictures, maps and videos).
- If the DDR programme is implemented through an **Integrated Mission**, M&E staff shall ensure to cooperate and coordinate, to obtain and make full use of data collections carried out by the UN Country Team, UN agencies and other partners.


¹⁶ If the need arises for new information based on raw data in the DDR database, DDR M&E staff shall work closely with the technical staff responsible for operating the database to make the changes needed in the reporting module.

Acquire new data

In the volatile environment typically encountered in DDR, relevant or reliable data is often not readily available. To acquire new ('primary') data, DDR M&E staff shall carry out or manage a mix of data collection activities as suited to the specific DDR programme. This mix may include a) monitoring of implementing partners, b) sample surveys, c) field visits, d) programme reviews, e) studies, f) focus groups and g) evaluations. Each element of this mix is discussed in more detail over the following pages.

If the DDR programme is implemented through an **Integrated Mission**, DDR M&E staff shall – to the extent possible – collect new data jointly or in close collaboration with the UNCT or UN agencies.

M&E activities suitable for collecting primary data on DDR



Monitor the implementing partners

Typically, social and economic reintegration support to ex-combatants is provided through partner organizations. **Implementing partners** are normally local or international NGOs, bilateral or multilateral organizations, the private sector or community organizations.

As part of overall DDR monitoring, DDR M&E staff shall closely **track the work** of implementing partners primarily based on their reporting and field visits. As a minimum, the DDR M&E staff shall monitor compliance of implementing partners making sure their **contractual reporting obligations** are on time and of good quality.

To keep track of submission compliance, DDR M&E staff should use a **spreadsheet** with at least the following fields:

- date the implementation report is due
- status of the report (not due, received, delayed)
- date the report is received, delay in days
- hyperlink to the report stored on the DDR Information System (see step two)

DDR M&E staff shall **aggregate** data from tracking reports of implementing partners to obtain an overall picture of progress. Aggregated data may also be used to calculate key output indicators and to track their overall reporting compliance over time. The following indicators may be used for that purpose:

- % of reports from implementing partners received on time (before the deadline stipulated in the contractual agreements)
- % of reports delayed (disaggregated by regions and implementing partners)
- average no. of days that reports are delayed

In addition to tracking reporting compliance, the DDR programme shall, on a regular basis (minimum quarterly), **analyse and summarize** the information and findings from implementing partners. Using a qualitative approach, the DDR unit shall identify frequent or serious concerns or challenges, collect lessons learned and look for opportunities where the experience and expertise of an implementing partner can help another partner.

Manage or conduct sample surveys

Due to the need for rapid information in a fast-changing environment, DDR programmes should make extensive use of **rapid, small-scale sample surveys with random sampling**. Typically, these surveys will operate on random sampling (also called ‘probability sampling’), and will entail asking a few key questions to a small random sample of target respondents, e.g. ex-combatants, their dependents or community leaders. Such small-scale surveys are significantly more cost-effective than large-scale, technically complex and time-consuming surveys that may be more appropriate for academic research or special studies.¹⁷

If random sampling is impractical, DDR programmes may rely instead on small-scale surveys (also called ‘mini-surveys’) based on **non-random sampling** (also called ‘purposive sampling’) to produce relevant numeric data.

The socio-economic information entered in the **DDR database** should provide the information required in the identification of random and non-random samples for surveys.

¹⁷ DDR programmes may consider three instruments for sample surveys: i) interviews, ii) structured record reviews and iii) structured observations. A fourth instrument for sample surveys, self-administered questionnaires, should not be used, as bias may arise if any ex-combatants are illiterate.

Since DDR programmes may not have the technical expertise and experience to design a credible sample survey and to calculate the sample size, **external survey specialists** should be hired to advise on the design of the survey during the planning stage of sample surveys.

Ideally, DDR field staff or other individuals linked to the DDR programme should not **collect survey data** themselves.¹⁸ However, using outside staff for data collection might not be feasible due to limited national capacity or security concerns. In these cases, DDR programmes may make use of DDR programme or M&E staff as long as they do not collect data from individuals they previously had contact with or in geographic areas in which they previously worked.

Conduct field visits

Field visits serve to **validate reported progress and results** through **observation** and **interviews**. DDR staff and partners shall conduct frequent visits to observe DDR implementation, to meet with implementation partners at their work site, and to interview and observe communities involved in reintegration and regional DDR offices.

DDR staff should conduct **routine field visits** (conducted systematically based on a planned schedule) and **ad-hoc field visits** (conducted to investigate a specific problem or a conflict).

Overall coordination for field visits shall be the responsibility of the DDR M&E staff. It is usually more effective to have a team of two or three people conducting a field visit. Joint field visits that include government and donor representatives are especially useful, since they can capture different perspectives of DDR stakeholders.

The results of a field visit shall be documented in **After Action Reviews**¹⁹ and shared with relevant DDR management, staff and other stakeholders.

Conduct reviews

Reviews are **internal, informal assessments** of the implementation and progress of a programme or sub-programme. They are normally conducted by DDR staff, M&E staff or a combination of both.

Reviews are conducted to assist programme management in **improving** the DDR programme. DDR programme managers may initiate an ad-hoc review for the following reasons:

¹⁸ Enumerators should have no vested interest in the results of a sample survey, since this might compromise its credibility. In some cases, DDR programmes might be able to outsource sample surveys to local private companies, NGOs or research institutions with experience in sample surveys.

¹⁹ For details on After Action Reviews see Programme Management Guidelines, DPKO/DFS.

- to identify and explore key issues or problems in the DDR programme
- when lessons learned need to be analysed to help formulate changes in the DDR programme's plan
- to ensure the DDR programme is progressing in the intended direction²⁰

If the DDR programme is part of an **Integrated Mission**, reviews should be conducted jointly by the mission, DPKO, and UNCT and relevant agencies, depending on the requirement.

Conduct or manage studies

To conduct **studies on specific issues** related to DDR, DDR M&E staff shall follow the steps involved in commissioning an external evaluation (if the study is to be conducted by external specialists) or the steps for conducting an internal evaluation (if the study is to be conducted by DDR or UN staff).²¹

A particularly appropriate tool for DDR programmes are **case studies**. M&E staff may use a case study approach to gather comprehensive, in-depth information about a particular case. They are useful for DDR M&E to better understand (i) a particular group (e.g. female ex-combatants, child soldiers, community leaders), (ii) a particular problem related to the DDR process or (iii) mechanisms at work in a particular aspect of DDR activities (e.g. the processes and challenges involved in reintegrating ex-combatants). Case studies are a valid tool to complement quantitative DDR monitoring or as part of an evaluation or a study.

Conduct or manage focus groups

DDR M&E staff may use focus groups to solicit **views, perceptions, experiences, insights and recommendations** of DDR programme participants and communities on the DDR process. A focus group is rapid and low-cost, and is usually moderated by an expert, using carefully structured but open-ended discussions in small groups. Focus group discussions complement quantitative monitoring, and are a valued tool for field visits, internal reviews, studies or for DDR evaluations.

Conduct or manage evaluations

Conducting internal evaluations and **commissioning external evaluations** require fundamentally different approaches. To conduct an internal evaluation, DDR M&E staff need to have the expertise required to yield judgements based on solid evidence. To commission an external evaluation, DDR M&E staff need to properly plan, support and monitor the quality of the evaluation.²²

²⁰ For details on how to conduct a review see Programme Management Guidelines, DPKO/DFS.

²¹ For detailed steps on how to conduct evaluation see DPKO/DFS Programme Management Guidelines.

²² For detailed steps on how to conduct an internal evaluation see DPKO/DFS Programme Management Guidelines.

In some cases, DDR planners, management or M&E staff may consider a **mixed evaluation**, where DDR staff or UN staff work together with external evaluators. The advantage of a mixed team is that it combines UN-specific knowledge with an external, objective analysis of progress. The disadvantage of using a mixed team is that objectivity can be reduced, and subsequently credibility may be compromised.

STEP 2 Review, collate and organize data and information

M&E staff shall review, collate and organize relevant data and information obtained in a **DDR Information System**, and shall track progress in respect of DDR outputs and expected accomplishments through the use of an '**indicator tracking sheet**'.

Maintain a DDR Information System

DDR M&E staff shall **review, organize, collate and store**, as required, all information relevant from different data sources in a DDR Information System regularly, diligently and on an ongoing basis. Given the wealth of material that will accumulate during the course of the programme, it is essential that careful consideration is given as to how and where information is to be filed, who is to have access to it (or to parts of it) and how it is to be accessed.

DDR management may consider co-hosting the DDR Information System – or parts of it, if DDR data is sensitive – together with national DDR authorities (for example the National Commission for DDR). This approach will enhance ownership and facilitate the hand-over of the DDR M&E system after the programme has closed.

The DDR Information System shall serve as a **one-stop shop** for key information on the DDR process and for preparing reports and public relations work, and shall serve as the **institutional memory** of the DDR programme, a key resource for new or temporary personnel in the event of staff absence or turnover.

The DDR Information System shall be responsive, reliable, accountable and accessible. M&E staff shall determine the most appropriate form and format of the information system, taking into account the location, number and computer-competency of those expected to access the system, as well as security and back-up concerns. Amongst options to be considered are a common **computer directory**, a simple **intranet** (for limited access) and/or an **internet website** (for public access).

All M&E related data and information shall also be stored and available in a **hard-copy filing system** for easy reference and as a back-up for the electronic system.

Update indicator tracking sheet

The **indicator tracking sheet** is an effective means by which progress with respect to planned outputs and expected accomplishments can be recorded and monitored. In essence, it is nothing more than a list of all planned outputs and expected accomplishments, the indicators being used to indicate progress, the (pre-programme) baseline status, the (end-of-programme) target, and, to be updated regularly, the current status against each of these indicators.

The indicator tracking sheet for DDR shall contain the information defined in the **indicator framework** at the planning stage: outputs and expected accomplishment, the indicators for each output and for each expected accomplishment, and the baseline and target for each indicator. To track progress on indicators over time, the indicator tracking sheet shall include – as a minimum – **columns for every quarter** of the DDR programme cycle. If more frequent entries are required, the indicator tracking sheet may include columns for every month of the duration of the DDR programme.

DDR M&E staff shall update the indicator tracking sheet at least **quarterly**. If DDR management requires more frequent updates, DDR M&E staff may update the sheet every month.²³

Because indicators should only capture the most relevant perspectives on DDR, M&E staff should keep the indicators tracking sheet simple. A standard **text-processing** or **spreadsheet software** is usually sufficient to design and update the indicator tracking sheet.

The indicator tracking sheet shall have the following **format**:

Template for DDR indicator tracking sheet²⁴

DDR results chain	Indicators	Baseline (month/year)	1 st quarter 1 st year	2 nd quarter 1 st year	3 rd quarter 1 st year	etc.	Target (month/year)
Expected accomplishment 1							
Output 1.1							
Output 1.2							
Process indicators							

²³ To update indicators *more* often may be inefficient, as changes within a typical month are likely to be trivial. To update indicators *less* frequently may result in outdated information being used in the making of key decisions, a constant risk in the volatile and fast-changing environments faced by many DDR programmes.

²⁴ Find an example of a DDR indicator tracking sheet in Annex 2.

STEP 3 Analyse data and information

DDR M&E staff shall analyse and interpret existing data on DDR **systematically** and on a **regular basis**. To do this, M&E staff shall draw on data and information collected in the **DDR Information System** and in the **indicator tracking sheet**.

For a credible analysis of DDR monitoring data, DDR M&E staff shall carry out a **combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses**.²⁵ The two approaches are complementary and provide a more credible interpretation of information on progress and success of DDR.

Where possible, DDR M&E staff should use **triangulation** to enhance the credibility and accuracy of data analysis. Triangulation reduces bias that can arise from relying on a single source or type of information, a major risk in volatile and complex environments typical for DDR. For example, DDR M&E staff can use information from focus groups and anecdotal findings from field visits to verify data from a satisfaction survey of ex-combatants.

Where possible, DDR M&E staff should **engage relevant staff or stakeholders** in the process of analysis. This has the advantage of enhancing the sense of ownership for the findings that emerge from the analysis, and may also serve to enhance the capacities of non-M&E staff in the processes involved in M&E.

STEP 4 Report on progress

DDR M&E staff shall report their summary findings from data collection and analysis **systematically** and **frequently**.

M&E staff should get the **right information to the right user in time**. For effective reporting on progress, M&E staff shall take into consideration the information needs of each target group, and in what form they require the information. Reports based on M&E shall be tailored in length, presentation, frequency, etc. to the information needs of its users.

DDR M&E staff shall produce a **quarterly progress report** for the DDR Head of component.

If the DDR programme is part of an **Integrated Mission**, DDR M&E staff shall also report quarterly to the Integrated Mission Planning Team and the UNCT.

DDR M&E staff may also produce, or collaborate in publishing, **additional** reports to support DDR management and staff in improving the performance of the DDR programme.

²⁵ Quantitative data analysis is objective and robust, and requires a sound understanding of statistical methods. Qualitative data analysis is based on subjective, rich and in-depth information, typically including the interpretation of narrative reports, field visit reports, focal groups, case studies, anecdotal evidence, etc.

DDR M&E staff shall provide the DDR Head of component with **data and information** for all **mandatory** reports of the DDR programme. For DDR programmes, the following reports are mandatory: reporting on the peacekeeping support account budget, regular budget, voluntary contributions, programme/sub-programme plans, performance assessments against the USG/ASG Compacts at Headquarters and HOM/DHOM compacts in field operations.

If the DDR programme has dedicated **staff for reporting**, M&E staff shall provide substantive data and information on progress to the reporting staff and work closely with them.

M&E staff shall base the **narrative part** of reports on key DDR indicators tracked through the indicator tracking sheet, interpreting, and making frequent reference to them.

DDR M&E and reporting staff shall be careful in reports to distinguish between attribution and contribution. A claim of **attribution** is a claim that progress towards an expected accomplishment of DDR is *caused* by DDR outputs and activities, and shall be supported with solid, credible evidence. To claim **contribution** is to claim nothing more than that DDR outputs or activities were contributory, amongst others, to an observed change with respect to the expected accomplishment.

STEP 5 Adjust the DDR M&E system and the DDR programme

Because the need for information may change over the course of the DDR programme cycle, the **DDR M&E system** and the set of tools used for M&E shall be **adjusted** to accommodate the changing needs of DDR M&E staff, DDR management and DDR stakeholders.

DDR M&E staff shall review the effectiveness of the DDR M&E system and make adjustments at least **every six months**. More frequent ad-hoc adjustments may be done if required, for example where field access for monitoring has improved or deteriorated.

The DDR Head of Component and DDR managers shall use the information provided through the DDR monitoring and evaluation system as a basis for making decisions on **revising and adjusting the DDR programme**.

FINAL TASK Closure and handover of the M&E system

When a DDR programme is nearing completion and closure, M&E staff shall liaise with DDR management to prepare for **closing** and **handing over** the M&E system, and to plan for evaluations after programme operations have stopped (**‘ex-post evaluations’**).

Closing the M&E system

Twelve months before the anticipated closing of a DDR programme, DDR M&E staff should plan for a **final evaluation**. The final DDR evaluation should take place in the **last half year** of full operations.

Second, DDR M&E staff shall **plan** for an orderly and systematic closing of the M&E system **six months before** the ceasing of operations, and reflect these activities in the DDR M&E work plans.

Third, DDR M&E staff shall ensure that the DDR M&E system is **complete** and all relevant data and information is **updated**.

Fourth, during the last six months of DDR operations, M&E staff shall focus on **documenting lessons learned** before and during the implementation of the programme. Lessons learned should be based on the information produced by the DDR M&E system over the course of the programme. In addition, DDR M&E staff may consider conducting 'End of Assignment Reports'²⁶ with key staff.

Fifth, DDR M&E staff shall hand over all documentation of the M&E system to the **DDR Section** of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which serves as central repository for all DDR M&E data.

Handing over the M&E system

If DDR or components of it are to continue in some form under the authority of **national institutions** or as part of subsequent **UN recovery, reintegration or development programmes**, the M&E unit shall hand over relevant and non-confidential data and information to these units.

Plan for ex-post evaluations

In a typical DDR programme, the **expected accomplishment** will only be achieved *after* the programme has stopped operating. For example, credible judgements about the sustainability of the reintegration of all programme participants can only be made after the reintegration support has stopped.

In the last six months of operations, the DDR Head of Component shall – with the technical expertise of the M&E unit – plan for **at least one ex-post evaluation**.

The DDR Head of Component should, in close coordination with the DDR Section, determine the **timing** and **funding** for the ex-post evaluation.

Ex-post evaluations should focus on the success and sustainability of the **reintegration** aspect of DDR, be **external** and carried out **between 12 and 24 months after** the DDR programme has stopped operating.

²⁶ For details on End of Assignment Reports see Programme Management Guidelines, DPKO/DFS.

E. Terms and definitions

The following monitoring and evaluation terms and definitions are referred to in these guidelines. The terms are, whenever available, in line with the DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Programme Management and the official terms and definitions of the Secretariat, DPKO and DFS (indicated by an asterisk (*)).

Accountability*

Accountability is the process whereby public service organizations and individuals within them are held responsible for their decisions and actions, through a clearly specified and enforced system of rewards and sanction.²⁷

Activity*

Action taken to transform inputs into outputs.²⁸

Attribution

A claim that progress towards an expected accomplishment of DDR is caused by DDR outputs.

Baseline*

Data that describe the situation to be addressed by a programme, sub-programme or project and that serve as the starting point for measuring performance.²⁹

Baseline study

An analysis describing the situation prior to the commencement of the programme or project or the situation following initial commencement of the DDR programme, to determine baselines and to serve as a basis for future analyses.

Budget*

The collective cost of programme or sub-programme resources needed to perform the specific activities through a defined time cycle.

Contribution

A claim that DDR outputs were contributory, amongst others, to an observed change with respect to the expected accomplishment.

Deliverables*

Products produced by the programme/sub-programme.

Disaggregation

The separation of aggregate data into its component parts.

²⁷ Department of Management.

²⁸ ST/SGB/2000/8 Secretary-General's bulletin: Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (PPBME).

²⁹ Ibid.

Effectiveness

The extent to which expected accomplishments are achieved.

Efficiency*

Measure of how well inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to outputs.³⁰

Evaluation*

A systematic and objective process seeking to determine the relevance, effectiveness and impact of a programme/sub-programme related to its goals and objectives. Evaluation is often undertaken selectively to answer specific questions to guide decision-makers and/or programme managers, and to provide information on whether underlying theories and assumptions used in programme development were valid, what worked and what did not work and why.³¹

Expected accomplishments*

A desired outcome or result of the DDR programme/sub-programme, involving benefits to end-users. Accomplishments are the direct consequence or effect of the delivery of outputs and lead to the fulfilment of the envisaged objective.³²

External evaluation

An evaluation that is conducted by entities free from control or influence of those responsible for the design and implementation of the DDR programme.

Evaluation-led evaluation*

Evaluation undertaken directly by the DPKO/DFS Evaluation Unit (Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET)).³³

Impact*

An expression of the changes produced in a situation as the result of an activity that has been undertaken.³⁴ Impact is the longer-term or ultimate effect attributable to a programme, sub-programme or project, in contrast to an expected accomplishment and output, which are geared to the timeframe of a plan.³⁵

Implement*

To carry out or put into effect – according to, or by means of – a definite work plan or procedure.

Implementing partner

In the context of DDR, a partner organization which is contracted by the DDR programme to carry out specific reintegration activities.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² ST/SGB/2000/8 (PPBME).

³³ Policy Directive on DPKO/DFS Headquarters Self-Evaluation.

³⁴ ST/SGB/2000/8 (PPBME).

³⁵ UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.

Indicator*

A measure, preferably numeric, of a variable that provides a reasonably simple and reliable basis for assessing accomplishment, change or performance. It is a unit of information measured over time that can help show changes in a specific condition.³⁶

Indicator baseline

The measurement of an indicator before a DDR programme starts operating, expressed as a single number or word.

Indicator target

The expected measurement of an indicator at the end of a DDR programme, expressed as a single number or word.

Indicator framework

A summary in a single table of the indicators for outputs, for the expected accomplishment and for the overall objectives, along with indicator baselines and targets, the portfolio of evidence, the frequency of data collection and the estimated costs.

Indicator tracking sheet

A table which is updated frequently with the current status with respect to each indicator defined in the Indicator Framework.

Input*

Funds, personnel and other resources necessary for producing outputs.³⁷

Internal evaluation

An internal evaluation is conducted by staff within the DDR programme or by related UN staff. It may be undertaken by the DDR programme or a sub-programme (*'programme-led evaluation'*), or by the DPKO/DFS evaluation team in the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET) or the Office of Internal Oversight Services (*'evaluation-led evaluation'*).³⁸

Lessons learned*

The knowledge gained from the process of planning and executing a programme/sub-programme. A lesson learned is a generalization derived from evaluation experiences with programmes, sub-programmes or policies that is applicable to a generic situation rather than to a specific circumstance and has the potential to improve future actions.³⁹

Logical framework (Logframe)*

Management tool used to identify strategic elements of a programme or sub-programme (objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of accomplish-

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Programme Management Guidelines, DPKO/DFS.

³⁹ UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.

ment, outputs and inputs) and their causal relationships, as well as the assumptions and external factors that may influence success and failure. It facilitates planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of a programme or sub-programme.⁴⁰

Mission concept*

Provides political and operational direction, timelines and lead/supporting roles for priority activities to achieve the mission's mandate as provided by the Security Council, including the mission's priority tasks and related organizational and deployment structure.⁴¹

Monitoring*

An assessment by programme managers, team members, M&E staff and audit bodies, of the progress in achieving the expected accomplishments and delivering the final outputs in comparison with the commitments set out in the programme/sub-programme budget as approved by the General Assembly. It provides assurance that the implementation of a programme/sub-programme is proceeding as planned.⁴²

Monitoring and evaluation*

The combination of monitoring and evaluation together provide the knowledge required for effective programme management as well as for reporting and accountability responsibilities.⁴³

Objective*

An objective refers to an overall desired achievement involving a process of change that is aimed at meeting certain needs of identified end-users within a given period of time.⁴⁴ A good objective supports the accomplishment of a goal and meets the criteria of being impact-oriented, measurable, time-limited, specific and practical.

Outcome*

In the United Nations Secretariat, "outcome" is used as a synonym of an accomplishment or a result.⁴⁵

Output*

The final product or deliverables by a programme/sub-programme to stakeholders, which an activity is expected to produce in order to achieve its objectives. Outputs may include reports, publications, training, meetings, security services, etc.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ IMPP Guidelines: Role of the Headquarters Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ ST/SGB/2000/8 (PPBME).

⁴⁵ UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.

⁴⁶ ST/SGB/2000/8.

Output indicator

An indicator which tracks the extent to which a planned DDR output has been delivered.

Peacekeeping support account budget*

Established to provide a flexible mechanism to fund Headquarters' capacity to plan, establish and direct field operations.

Performance indicator*

A measure that provides a reliable basis for assessing performance within a programme/sub-programme.

Primary data

Data which is collected by DDR M&E staff, or where the data collection is funded and managed by the DDR M&E staff.

Planning*

The process of developing strategies, objectives and work plans to achieve programme/sub-programme success.

Process indicator

A measure that tracks key aspects of how a DDR programme operates. While a performance indicator tracks outputs and outcomes, a process indicator typically refers to crucial issues of the budget, human resources or public information activities of a DDR programme.

Programme*

A programme consists of the activities undertaken by a department or office together with a coherent set of objectives, expected accomplishments and outputs intended to contribute to one or more organizational goals established by Member States. The programme is guided by the mandates entrusted to a department/office by the General Assembly or the Security Council.⁴⁷

Programme-led evaluation*

Evaluation undertaken by the programme/sub-programme with the support of the DPKO Evaluation Unit in the DPET.⁴⁸

Programme manager*

A programme manager is the official responsible for the formulation and implementation of a programme/sub-programme.⁴⁹

Programme management*

The centralized and coordinated management of a specific programme to achieve its strategic goals, objectives and expected accomplishments.

⁴⁷ UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.

⁴⁸ Policy Directive on DPKO/DFS Headquarters Self-Evaluation.

⁴⁹ ST/SGB/2000/8 (PPBME).

Programme performance report*

The mandated report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly biennially reflecting implementation and results for programmes in the Secretariat.⁵⁰

Programme/sub-programme plan*

A detailed document stating objectives, expected accomplishments, activities/outputs, performance indicators, responsibilities, and time frames. It is used as a monitoring and accountability tool to ensure the effective implementation of the programme/sub-programme plan. The plan is designed according to the logical framework.⁵¹

Project*

Planned activity or a set of planned, interrelated activities designed to achieve certain specific objectives within a given budget, organizational structure and specified time period. Within the Secretariat, projects are used in technical cooperation activities.⁵² Individual projects within the programme are managed by project managers. The programme manager is responsible for overseeing overlap among the programme/sub-programme projects.

Qualitative data

Information concerned with people's opinions, knowledge, attitudes or behaviours. Qualitative information can consist of numbers and/or text.

Quantitative data

Information measured or measurable by, or concerned with, quantity. Quantitative data typically consists of numbers.

Result*

The measurable accomplishment/outcome (intended or unintended, positive or negative) of a programme/sub-programme. In the Secretariat practice, "result" is synonymous with accomplishment and outcome.⁵³

Results chain

A logically connected hierarchy of expected results from a DDR programme. In a DDR results chain, a set of activities leads to the delivery of an output. A set of outputs should cause the expected accomplishment for DDR. The expected accomplishment contributes, among other achievements, to the overall objective of a peacekeeping mission.

Results-based budgeting*

A programme budget process in which: (a) programme formulation revolves around a set of predefined objectives and expected results; (b) expected results

⁵⁰ UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.

would justify resource requirements which are derived from and linked to the outputs required to achieve such results; and, (c) actual performance in achieving results is measured by objective performance indicators.⁵⁴

Results-based management*

A management strategy by which the Secretariat ensures that its processes, outputs and services contribute to the achievement of clearly stated expected accomplishments and objectives. It is focused on achieving results and improving performance, integrating lessons learned into management decisions and monitoring of and reporting on performance.⁵⁵

Sample

A sub-set of a larger population deemed large enough to provide a meaningful representation of the whole population.

Sample survey

A survey carried out on a sample (subset) of a population. The sample should be large enough to ensure that findings from the sample survey will almost certainly match those that would have been obtained if the whole population had been surveyed.

Secondary data

Data which is not collected by DDR M&E staff, and which is readily available.

Self-evaluation*

Self-evaluation is an integral part of the management process and is undertaken by managers primarily for their own use. The programme manager applies the findings from the self-evaluation to make necessary adjustments to implementation of the programme/sub-programme, or they are fed back into the planning and programming process as proposed changes in the design and/or orientation of the programme/sub-programme.⁵⁶

SMART*

An acronym often used when creating programme and sub-programme planning elements. It stands for specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Results-Based Budgeting, Secretary General's Report (A/53/500).

⁵⁵ UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.

⁵⁶ ST/SGB/2000/8 (PPBME).

⁵⁷ Specific: planning elements that are related to the mandate; Measurable: quantifiable planning elements that are easily monitored and evaluated for programme/sub-programme success and progress, making it easier to report to stakeholders on progress; Achievable: indicated by planning elements that can happen in the specific period; Realistic: although being ambitious in creating programme/sub-programme goals and objectives is encouraged, managers must ensure that planning elements remain both realistic and achievable, Time-bound: managers must ensure that the objectives they have created are achievable within the necessary time frame.

Stakeholder*

An agency, organization, group or individual interested in a programme/sub-programme's end results. Not all stakeholders are involved in completing the actual work of a programme/sub-programme. Common stakeholders include Member States, DPKO/DFS operations, host countries, UN system partners, regional organizations and other external partners.⁵⁸

Survey

A system for collecting information from or about people, to describe, compare, or explain their knowledge, attitudes and behaviour.

I

II

III

IV

⁵⁸ Ibid.

F. References

Normative or superior references

- Guidelines – Programme Management, DPKO/DFS [draft version: to be finalized in 2010]
- Guidelines – Integrated Planning for UN Field Presence, Role of the Headquarters, DPKO, May 2009
- Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards IDDRS, UN 2006
- Integrated Missions Planning Process – Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General in 2006, UN, 2006
- Norms and Standards for Evaluation in the UN System, UNEG, 2005
- Policy – Programme Management Policy, DPKO/DFS [draft version: to be finalized in 2010]
- Policy Directive – DPKO/DFS Mission Evaluation Policy, DPKO/DFS 2008
- Secretary-General's bulletin, Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (PPBME) (ST/SGB/2000)

Related procedures or guidelines

- Fragile States and Peacebuilding Programs – Practical Tools for Improving Performance and Results, Social Impact, 2009
- Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms, UN OIOS, Monitoring, Evaluation and Consulting Division
- How to Guide: Monitoring and Evaluation for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes, BCPR, UNDP, 2009
- Monitoring Peace Consolidation: UN Practitioners Guide to Benchmarking, Peacebuilding Support Office, forthcoming
- Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, UN 2006
- Thematic Evaluation of DDR in peacekeeping operations, OIOS, 2009

G. Monitoring and compliance

All DPKO staff must comply with this SOP. DPKO programme managers at headquarters will monitor this SOP to ensure consistency and compliance.


I. Contact

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should be contacted for information about this SOP.

J. History

This is a new SOP and has not been amended

Approval signature:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'A. L. M.' with a horizontal line underneath.

Effective date: 1 June 2010

Review date: 1 June 2012

Annex 1: Example of a DDR Indicator Framework*

DDR results chain	Indicators	Baseline (month/year)	Target (month/year)	Portfolio of evidence	Frequency of data collection
Expected accomplishment					
Former members of and women associated with armed forces and groups are socially integrated in their communities and economically active	% of ex-combatants who entered a reintegration programme and formally finish it	n/a**	80% (12/2014)	Quarterly reports of implementing partners	Quarterly
	% of ex-combatants who are very satisfied or satisfied with the support received for reintegration	Pending first survey	70% (12/2014)	Satisfaction survey	Annually
	% of women associated with armed forces who are very satisfied or satisfied with the support received	Pending first survey	80% (12/2014)	Satisfaction survey	Annually
	% of all ex-combatants who are economically active at least 6 months after DDR reintegration support stops	Pending first survey	65% (12/2014)	Reintegration survey	Every 2 years
	% of communities who think that demobilized combatants are well integrated in the community	Pending first survey	80% (12/2014)	Reintegration survey	Every 2 years
Output 1					
40,000 combatants of armed forces and groups are demobilized and disarm	No. of combatants disarmed	0 (01/2011)	40,000 (12/2014)	DREAM database	Monthly
	% of disarmed combatants who are children	n/a***	n/a*** (12/2014)	DREAM database	Monthly
	% of targeted units declared non-compliant	0% (01/2011)	3% (12/2014)	Quarterly reports of Nat. DDR Commission	Quarterly
	No. of small arms collected	0 (01/2011)	25,000 (12/2014)	DREAM database	Monthly
	% of collected small arms which are destroyed	n/a	100% (12/2014)	DREAM database	Monthly
	% of disarmed ex-combatants who are provided with a demobilization package	n/a	95% (12/2014)	DREAM database, reintegration module	Monthly

DDR results chain	Indicators	Baseline (month/year)	Target (month/year)	Portfolio of evidence	Frequency of data collection
Output 2					
35,000 ex-combatants and 3,000 women associated with armed forces are provided with reintegration support	No. of ex-combatants formally entering a reintegration programme	0 (01/2011)	35,000 (12/2014)	Monthly reports of implementing partners	Monthly
	% of demobilized ex-combatants who have not started a reintegration programme	n/a	10.5% (12/2014)	DREAM database	Quarterly
	Average no. of days between formal demobilization and start of reintegration programme by quarter	n/a	14 (12/2014)	DREAM database	Quarterly
	% of ex-combatant who joined but drop out of a reintegration programme	n/a	5% (12/2014)	Monthly reports of implementing partners	Quarterly
	No. of women associated with armed forces who are provided with reintegration support	0 (01/2011)	3,000 (12/2014)	Monthly reports of implementing partners	Monthly
Process indicators					
DDR Budget	% of quarterly administrative overhead costs compared to quarterly expenditure	n/a	5% (12/2014)	DDR accounting system	Quarterly
	% of funds mobilized which are spent	2%	100% (12/2014)	DDR financial reports	Quarterly
DDR Human resources	Ratio of international to national DDR staff	1:5 (01/2011)	1:20 (12/2014)	DDR HR records	Quarterly
	% of DDR positions which are vacant	n/a	2% (12/2014)	DDR HR records	Quarterly

* Simplified for illustrative purposes; a full DDR indicator framework would typically include more outputs and/or more detailed indicators.

*** If DDR operations have not yet started, the baseline for some indicators can not be calculated yet.

*** In this case, neither baseline nor target is useful. It is, however, important to track the indicator during the programme cycle.

Annex 2: Example of a DDR indicator tracking sheet*

These columns to be filled, in turn, according to data and reports received each quarter

Indicators	Baseline (month/year)	1 st Q. 2011	2 nd Q. 2011	3 rd Q. 2011	4 th Q. 2011	etc.	Target (month/year)	Frequency of collection
Expected accomplishment: Former members of and women associated with armed forces and groups are socially integrated in their communities and economically active								
% of ex-combatants who entered a reintegration programme and formally finish it	n/a	n/a	70%	70%	70%		80% (12/2014)	Quarterly
% of ex-combatants who are very satisfied or satisfied with the support received for reintegration	Pending first survey	Pending first survey	Pending first survey	45%	45%		70% (12/2014)	Annually
% of women associated with armed forces who are very satisfied or satisfied with the support received	Pending first survey	Pending first survey	Pending first survey	65%	65%		80% (12/2014)	Annually
% of all ex-combatants who are economically active at least 6 months after DDR reintegration support stops	Pending first survey	Pending first survey	Pending first survey	Pending first survey	40%		65% (12/2014)	Every 2 years
% of communities who think that demobilized combatants are well integrated in the community	Pending first survey	Pending first survey	Pending first survey	Pending first survey	65%		80% (12/2014)	Every 2 years
Output 1: 40,000 combatants of armed forces and groups are demobilized and disarmed								
No. of combatants disarmed (cumulative total)	0 (01/2011)	200	400	1000	1200		40,000 12/2014)	Monthly
% of disarmed combatants who are children	n/a	5%	7%	12%	10%		n/a (12/2014)	Monthly
% of targeted units declared non-compliant	0% (2011)	0%	0%	0%	2%		3% (2014)	Quarterly
No. of small arms collected	0 (01/2011)	90	190	300	600		25,000 12/2013)	Monthly

Indicators	Baseline (month/year)	1 st Q. 2011	2 nd Q. 2011	3 rd Q. 2011	4 th Q. 2011	etc.	Target (month/year)	Frequency of collection
% of collected small arms which are destroyed	n/a	0%	50%	70%	65%		100% (12/2014)	Monthly
% of disarmed ex-combatants who are provided with a demobilization package	n/a	0%	90%	70%	65%		95% (12/2014)	Monthly
Output 2: 35,000 ex-combatants and 3,000 women associated with armed forces are provided with reintegration support								
No. of ex-combatants formally entering a reintegration programme (cumulative total)	0 (01/2011)	0	250	700	750		35,000 (12/2014)	Monthly
% of demobilized ex-combatants who do not enter a reintegration programme	n/a	n/a	20%	20%	20%		10% (12/2014)	Quarterly
Average no. of days between formal demobilization and start of reintegration programme by quarter	n/a	n/a	14	10	16		14 (12/2014)	Monthly
% of ex-combatant who joined but drop out of a reintegration programme	n/a	20%	15%	15%	10%		5% (12/2014)	Monthly
No. of women associated with armed forces who are provided with reintegration support (cumulative total)	0 (01/2011)	12	50	110	150		3,000 (12/2014)	Monthly
Process indicators								
% of quarterly administrative overhead costs compared to quarterly expenditure	n/a	10%	10%	10%	7%		5% (12/2014)	Quarterly
% of funds mobilized which are spent	0%	2%	7%	10%	4%		100% (12/2014)	Monthly
Ratio of international to national DDR staff	1:5 (01/2011)	1:5	1:5	1:5	1:7		1:20 (12/2014)	Quarterly
% of DDR positions which are vacant	n/a	25%	25%	25%	15%		2% (12/2014)	Quarterly

* Simplified for illustrative purposes.

Annex 3: Example of a DDR M&E Plan*

DDR Monitoring and Evaluation

- The **DDR Head of Component** will be overall responsible for monitoring and evaluations.
- The **DDR M&E Unit** with five professional staff will be carrying out day-to-day monitoring and oversee and manage the sample surveys, studies and evaluations. Initially, three internationally recruited M&E specialists will be hired. The head of the DDR M&E Unit will report directly to the DDR Head of Component.
- The DDR M&E Unit will work in close collaboration with the **National DDR Commission** and build their capacities in monitoring and evaluation.
- All M&E activities will be **funded** through the DDR budget lines on M&E. Total costs for M&E over the programme lifespan are estimated to be 760,000 USD.
- The programme will use a combination of **quantitative and qualitative tools** to track progress and success of DDR.

Quantitative tools

- **Ex-combatant data base DREAM:** The DDR M&E unit will obtain and analyse data from DREAM on a monthly basis.
- **Survey on satisfaction:** The DDR programme will track the satisfaction of ex-combatants with the reintegration package on an annual basis through a representative sample survey.
- **Sample surveys on reintegration:** In addition, the programme will assess the medium-term success of the reintegration of DDR participants in their communities in year 2 and year 4 of the programme.

Qualitative tools

- **Mid-term and final evaluation:** The programme will commission an external, independent mid-term evaluation at the beginning of year 3 and a final evaluation in year 5 of the programme.
- **Internal evaluations:** The DDR programme will internally assess the efficiency of DDR implementation and identify bottlenecks at the end of year 1 of the programme. In addition, an internal evaluation in year four will assess the effectiveness of the work of implementing partners.
- **Study on special groups:** The programme will assess the extent to which special reintegration packages for children and members of special groups have been effective in year 2, and use the findings to adjust the reintegration support.
- **Field visits:** The DDR M&E Unit will carry out routine field visits to implementing partners at least on a monthly basis.

Indicator Framework

- The key tool to aggregate and track progress towards the expected accomplishment and the two outputs of the programme will be the **indicator tracking sheet**, using the indicators defined at the planning stage.

Table: DDR Indicator Framework (see Annex 1)

Surveys, Studies and Evaluation Plan

	Focus	Type	Timing	Costs
Surveys				
Satisfaction survey	○ to track the satisfaction of ex-combatants with the reintegration packages	Sample survey	1 st year, 3 rd quarter, 2 nd year, 4 th quarter	\$25,000 \$25,000
Reintegration survey	○ to assess how well the reintegration of DDR participants has worked so far ○ to assess to what extent communities are supporting reintegration	Sample survey	2 nd year, 4 th quarter	\$85,000
Studies				
Study on reintegration of special groups	○ to assess the extent to which special reintegration packages for children and members of special groups have been effective so far	External study	2 nd year, 3 rd quarter	\$35,000
Evaluation				
Internal evaluation on efficiency	○ to assess if the DDR programme has delivered timely outputs and as planned so far ○ to identify what the key bottlenecks in the DDR implementation are	Internal evaluation by DDR M&E unit	1 st year, 4 th quarter	\$2,500
Mid-term evaluation	○ to evaluate to what extent the DDR programme has so far progressed towards its planned accomplishment ○ to identify what should be changed to increase the likelihood to achieve the planned accomplishment	mixed (external & internal)	3 rd year, 2 nd quarter	\$65,000
Internal evaluation on effectiveness ... etc.	○ to assess the effectiveness of the reintegration support provided by implementation partners	Internal evaluation by DDR M&E unit	4 th year, 1 st quarter	\$10,000

* Simplified for illustrative purposes.

Annex 4: Example of a DDR Sample Survey

Design

- Since a baseline study had not been conducted and the DDRR program intervention was already in progress, a **non-equivalent control group, post test-only, quasi-experiment** was considered the best available research design.
- The DDR sample survey was primarily designed to determine the **impact of the DDR programme's reintegration training**.
- In addition, the survey aimed at collecting additional **information** about conflict, conflict analysis, reintegration and reconciliation.

Sampling strategy

- The survey used a **nationwide random sampling** strategy. The survey targeted a sample of **550 of an estimated ex-combatant population of 105,000**.
- Assignment of **experimental groups** was selected randomly from the same clusters of geographic locations. The respondents were segregated into two groups – DDR programme participants and non-participants.
- The programme participants were further divided into their respective categories of **stage of intervention** (disarmed and demobilized only participants, participants who had enrolled but had not completed reintegration training, and those participants who had completed reintegration training).
- This method utilized information that was entered into the DDR **database**.

Implementation

- Implementation of the design was conducted in a blended approach that incorporated a **quantitative interview** employment alongside a **qualitative participatory method** (focus group discussion).
- A randomized sample, drawn from across Liberia in February and March 2006, of 590 adult former fighters submitted to an **interview**. The interviews collected information on socio-economic demographics, the ex-combatant geographic locations during the 14-year civil war and their actions while serving with their former factions during the conflict, and their knowledge of and participation in international intervention programmes, and captured their social integration and political expressions.

Key findings

- Empirical evidence supports the finding that those former combatants who registered with the national DDR programme and completed a course of reintegration training have **reintegrated more successfully** than those ex-combatants who chose not to participate and reintegrate on their own.

Based on: What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia, James Pugel, UNDP/African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect (ANPPCAN), April 2007, http://www.lr.undp.org/UNDPwhatFightersSayLiberia_Finalv3.pdf.



disarmament | demobilization | reintegration

How to Guide on DDR Indicators

How-to Guide on Constructing Indicators for DDR

Overview

The How-To Guide complements the **Standard Operation Procedure on Monitoring and Evaluation for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration** (DDR) of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

This guide provides practical guidance to **DDR planners** and **DDR staff** on how to construct indicators for DDR programmes to better **monitor and evaluate** the programme.

It is tailored specifically for constructing **indicators for DDR programme documents**, but can equally be used to identify indicators of achievement for DPKO's **Result-Based Budgeting** (RBB) process.

Why indicators for DDR programmes?

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the volatile post-conflict environment is typically a **complex process**. We cannot afford – in terms of time and money – to monitor every aspect of DDR.

Indicators for DDR programmes can be a highly useful tool to reduce complexities. They help to **reduce the large amount of data** typically collected by a DDR programme down to its simplest form, while retaining the essential information DDR managers need to make decisions based on objective evidence.

Further, constructing and tracking DDR indicators will help DDR management and DDR staff to:

- develop a shared understanding about **realistic targets** within the time-frame of the DDR programme
- build **consensus** among DDR stakeholders on what really counts in DDR
- analyse and communicate **credible evidence of progress and achievements** by the DDR programme
- obtain early warnings and factual information for **fine-tuning** the DDR programme and for necessary **corrective action**

What is a DDR indicator?

An indicator is a **measure**, preferably numeric, **of a variable that provides a reasonable simple and reliable basis for assessing an accomplishment, change or performance**.¹ DDR indicators are useful tools to track the timely delivery of DDR outputs, and to track progress towards the achievement of the expected accomplishment of DDR. An indicator is *not* an output, it is *not* an expected accomplishment or a target, and it is *not* just 'anything in DDR that *can* be measured'.


A complete indicator has four elements: a) the **indicator description**, b) the **baseline** (the status with respect to the indicator at the beginning or at a specific point of the DDR programme), c) the **target** (the expected status at the end of the DDR programme or of a specific process), and d) the means of verification (an explanation as to where the data for the measurement is to come from).

While the indicator description consists of a **phrase** (typically with a numeric sign like 'Number' or 'Per Cent'), baselines and targets are typically a **single number or word** ('23%', '35,000', 'yes')

Indicator description	Baseline (time)	Target (time)	Means of verification
EXAMPLE: % of ex-combatants satisfied with reintegration support	54 % (2011)	70% (2014)	Satisfaction sample survey of ex-combatants

Four steps

Constructing DDR indicators consists of five successive steps: we will need to define key areas we want to measure (**step 1**), think of possible indicators to measure these key areas (**step 2**), check the quality of each possible indicator (**step 3**) and go back to step 2 if necessary. Then we will select the best indicators for each result based on the assessment of quality in step 3 (**step 4**), and finally fine-tune and note down the sets of indicator for the DDR programme (**step 5**)².



¹ UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation.

² This step-by-step approach to constructing indicator draws on a variety of resources on indicators, most notably Jody Zall Kusek and Ray C. Rist, 'Ten Steps to a Results-Based Monitoring and Evaluation System', The World Bank, 2004, Pact's 'Building Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting systems for HIV/AIDS Programs', Pact, 2005, and discussions with Chris Whitehouse.

STEP 1 Define what we want to measure

Review and clarify the DDR result

Indicators can only be as good as the DDR result statements. All DDR stakeholders must be **able to understand and agree on** what the DDR programme plans to deliver (the outputs, that is the goods and services to be delivered by the programme) and what DDR aims to achieve in the medium term (the expected accomplishment).

Before starting work on indicators, we should:

- carefully review the **precise wording** and the **intention** of each DDR output or accomplishment in the RBB framework and other DDR planning documents
- ensure that stakeholders have a **common understanding** of what the results *mean*
- **improve** the wording of DDR outputs and accomplishment statements such that they are as clear as possible

Formulate key questions for DDR

Once we have clarified the results, we need to agree on **what we want to continuously measure** during and after disarmament, demobilization and reintegration support.

To do that, we must decide on a **limited number of key questions** on progress and success of DDR that we will need to ask, so that we can continuously track progress.

Distinguish between questions which relate to a) the expected accomplishment of the DDR programme, b) the specific outputs, and the c) process of DDR itself.

Although there is no fixed number, it makes sense to limit the number of key questions to between **10** and **15**.

The key questions will depend very much on the specific DDR programme and the specific context. However, these are **examples of key questions** for a typical DDR programme:

TIP Look at international benchmarks

When we formulate key questions or indicators, keep in mind how our DDR programme compares with emerging international benchmarks on DDR.

For example: the average costs for DDR per person (based on the past 19 DDR programmes) are around USD 1,450.

Source: escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddroosi.pdf

Result	Example of key questions
DDR expected accomplishment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How has the security situation evolved in the country during, and after, the DDR programme? Does this differ for men and women? ○ Is there credible evidence – and to what extent – that the DDR programme has contributed to a change in the security situation and the stability in the country? ○ Do ex-combatants or groups of ex-combatants still pose a threat to the state? Do they pose a recurrent threat to law and order that can develop into a threat to the State? ○ Are there indications that post-conflict armed violence is linked to the former fighting forces and groups? ○ Do ex-combatants own a higher proportion of weapons than others? To what extent are ex-combatants involved in armed violence? To what extent are ex-combatants involved in weapons trafficking? ○ To what extent have the chains of command been dissolved? Are there new chains of command that could evolve into a threat to the continuation of the State? ○ Are ex-combatants vulnerable to re-recruitment? Have ex-combatants been recruited by groups for activities that could pose a threat to the State? ○ Are communities suffering from security threats attributed to ex-combatants? ○ How many of the male and female ex-combatants who received full reintegration support are economically active after DDR support has stopped? ○ Which types of reintegration options are more successful in providing sustainable reintegration for men and women? ○ How do programme participants and their families perceive the value of the reintegration assistance they received? ○ How content are programme participants with the support provided by the DDR programme? ○ How many ex-combatants ended up abandoning the reintegration support programmes? How many of them are female? Why?
DDR outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To what extent did the DDR programme deliver the outputs as planned, and was this delivered within the planned timeframe? ○ How many of those willing to join the DDR programme qualify and are verified for DDR? ○ How many combatants are disarmed? How many are children? How many are women? ○ How many weapons are surrendered for each combatant who demobilized? ○ How many formations and units are decommissioned or disbanded? ○ How many weapons are volunteered by communities? ○ How many combatants are demobilized? How many are children? How many are women? ○ How many combatants enter reintegration programmes? How many of them are female? ○ Are the reintegration options offered to ex-combatants in line with market needs? ○ How much does reintegration support of combatants cost per head? ○ What are the overall costs for DDR per ex-combatant? How does that compare to international benchmarks?
DDR process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ What are the administrative overhead costs of running the DDR programme? ○ How much of the funds mobilized for the DDR programme have been spent? How much of the committed funds have not been received yet? ○ How many funded positions in the DDR programme are vacant? ○ How well are combatants informed about the DDR process? ○ To what extent are national authorities steering the DDR process? ○ To what extent are communities informed about the DDR process?

STEP 2 Think of possible indicators

Once we have defined and agree on between 10 and 15 key questions for the DDR programme, we need to **develop a list of possible indicators** for **each question**.

We can do that starting from scratch (through **brainstorming**) and by looking at available data for DDR (**research**). A combination of both activities is usually the most promising approach.

Brainstorm about possible indicators

Brainstorm freely and creatively about possible indicators for key questions, disregarding for the moment any concerns about availability of data, data quality, etc.

Imagine **what kind of measurements DDR managers ideally would have** during DDR implementation to make sound decisions based on reliable evidence. Think of what data **DDR beneficiaries** and **donors** are interested in and would like to receive regularly.

Brainstorm both **individually** and in a **group of stakeholders**. The more diverse the group for brainstorming, the better the ideas for possible indicators will be.

Research available data for DDR


Another complementary way to identify possible indicators is to look at **what data is or will be available** that could easily be turned into an indicator.

TIP Result-Based Budgeting

Take into consideration the indicators which might have already have been **defined** for the DDR programme at some point during the planning process. Typically, you might find these indicators in the mission's **Result-Based Budgeting (RBB) framework**.

The RBB defines a very limited set of key indicators for DDR (often 1 to 3) on the level of **expected accomplishments**. The RBB, however, does not define indicators on the **output or the process level**.

For consistency, the **set of indicators** for a DDR programme **must include all indicators in the RBB framework**. However, RBB indicators will not be sufficient to monitor and evaluate a DDR programme in detail. That is why DDR programmes require their own additional indicators for the level of the DDR expected accomplishment, the DDR outputs and the DDR processes.



In addition to brainstorming about possible indicators, research and identify **potential data sources** for DDR indicators to answer the key questions identified in step 1.

Potential source for DDR indicators	Remark
Indicator resources	Typical DDR indicators can be found in DDR specific indicator resources, e.g. in the annex of this How-To Guide or in the DDR M&E How-To Guide of UNDP at unddr.org/docs/How_to_Guide_-_M%26E_for_DDR_Programmes.pdf
Other DDR programmes	Look at planning documents, RBB frameworks, logical frameworks and monitoring systems of ongoing and previous DDR programmes for inspiration. Although the context differs from country to country, many DDR programmes have similar features. Information about other DDR programmes can be found through www.unddr.org .
DDR databases	For indicators on the output and process level, a DDR database (which is typically used for registering, verifying, disarming and referring to reintegration support) provides a wealth of information. Most output measurements will likely come from this source. For brainstorming, it helps to look at what data the DDR database is likely to contain.
National data	Depending on the state of the national institutions after a conflict, national or regional data collection might have resumed. This data will mostly be useful for the DDR accomplishment.
UN and NGOs	UN agencies and NGOs might collect data which is of use for monitoring DDR accomplishments.
Research institutions	Research institutions are useful sources for aggregate and comparative information on DDR. The Barcelona-based <i>Escola de Cultura de Pau</i> , for example, publishes an annual analysis of DDR programmes at http://escolapau.uab.cat/english/programas/ddr.htm .
Researchers	Collaborations with Ph.D. students, individual researchers and/or their universities can be a valuable, economic and credible source of additional data.
DDR operations	Extensive data will typically also be collected and aggregated by operations units of a DDR programme, especially by financial and human resource units. This data can be valuable especially for constructing DDR process indicators.

List *all* possible indicators

The result of Step 2 is a **list of possible indicators for each key question** defined in step 1.

Organize the list of possible indicators according to the key questions identified in Step 1, and note their level in the result chain (DDR process, DDR outputs, expected accomplishment of DDR).

Consider proxy indicators

Ideally, an indicator **measures** the result **directly** and **in time**. For example, a direct indicator for the DDR output 'Ex-combatants provided with reintegration support' would simply be the 'No. of ex-combatants who finish a reintegration support programme'.

However, it will not always be easy or feasible to use indicators which capture results directly or in time for corrective action. In these cases, you might consider more **indirect** indicators or **proxy** indicators.

Example

The amount of **cash** or the amount of funds on **bank statements** directly measure how rich someone is.

DDR example

The '**proportion of ex-combatants who were recruited** again after demobilization' *directly* measures the level of repeated re-recruitment.



Example

The **size** of someone's **car** (or the number of cars) can be an indirect measurement of how rich someone is.

DDR example

The '**cash-dependency** of ex-combatant' or the proportion of ex-combatants who **engage in criminal behaviour** *indirectly* measures vulnerable ex-combatants are to re-recruitment.



Example

Someone's **shoe size** is an incorrect measurement of a person's wealth.

DDR example

The **number of ex-combatants provided with reintegration support** does not measure how successful their reintegration into the local labour force is.



Direct indicators

= Indicators that *directly capture a key aspect of a DDR result*

Direct measurements of a result are preferable. They are more credible and precise than proxy indicators.

Proxy indicators

= Indicators that *track an aspect closely related to a DDR result*

The assumption is that changes in the indicator also reflect changes in progress towards the DDR result.

Unrelated indicators

= Indicators that *track an aspect that is not sufficiently related to the DDR result*

This indicator does not tell us anything credible about the result and **should not be used**.

A proxy indicator is typically not as reliable and meaningful as a direct indicator, but can have other **advantages**: a proxy indicator might be **easier** and/or **less expensive** to measure, or it might be **available more frequently** and **in time** for corrective action.

If you make use of proxy indicators for DDR programmes, consider **combining them with more direct indicators**.

To capture how vulnerable ex-combatants are to 're-recruitment', you might use as an indicator '% of **ex-combatants who were recruited again after demobilization**'. However, this good and direct indicator is based on few expansive sample surveys every two years, starting in year three of DDR.

You can complement this indicator with proxy indicators that are not as meaningful and precise, but will give you a reading much earlier on. Such indicators could relate to the **proportion of ex-combatants who engage in criminal behaviour** or the **cash-dependency of ex-combatants**. The assumption here is that if a high percentage of ex-combatants complete reintegration support, they find the programme useful and it might provide them with valuable know-how to successfully start reintegrating into the local job market.

STEP 3 Check quality of each indicator

After collecting a list of possible indicators, check the quality of each indicator. To be useful and reliable, indicators must be 'SMART'.³ **Use the following checklist:**

Criteria	Examples
Relevant <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the indicator directly relate to the output or outcome? Does it "measure" the right thing? 	Accomplishment: ex-combatants are economically reintegrated <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of ex-combatants who received reintegration support. % of demobilized ex-combatants who are economically active at least six months after DDR reintegration support has stopped.
Objective <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A good, objective indicator does not involve a subjective judgment by somebody. It has no ambiguity about what is being measured. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Communities and community leaders are effectively supported to integrate ex-combatants, especially women. Number of villages with at least 50 ex-combatants that run at least one DDR support programme of \$50,000 or more.
Numeric <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Numeric indicators are more sensitive to change than categorical indicators (i.e. yes/no indicators). The interpretation of numeric data for indicators is generally less subjective than for categorical indicators. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All ex-combatants processed timely and effectively. Average number of days between verification of ex-combatants and their referral to a reintegration support programme.

³ SMART is a mnemonic used in project management at the planning stage. It can, e.g., stand for specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and trackable.

Specific <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The indicator needs to be as clear and specific as possible in terms of quantity, quality, time, location, target groups, etc. of an intervention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Number of ex-combatants treated in a hospital ○ Number of combatants and ex-combatants who are treated in two major hospitals in the capital for gunshot wounds, bomb blasts or knife wounds
Data available <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Is there sufficient (also historical) data for the indicator, and will it be available in the future? ○ The first measurement for the indicator ('indicator baseline') and an indicator target must be included in the definition of an indicator. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Number of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) destroyed; baseline: 0 (12/2010); target: 40,000 (06/2014);
Disaggregation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Are the indicators disaggregated at a level where it is most meaningful, e.g., by sex, age, urban and rural areas etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ % of ex-combatants who complete a reintegration programme ○ % of female ex-combatants who complete a reintegration programme ○ % of ex-combatants from province Y who complete a reintegration programme

Remove or revise any indicator which does not fulfil **each of the criteria** above.

Continue with step 4 *only* if sufficient indicators (at least three per output and accomplishment) pass the minimum quality standards. Otherwise, repeat step 3.

STEP 4 Select best indicators for each result

If we pass step 3 with a sufficient number of indicators which fulfil the criteria, we are now required to **select the best indicators** for the key questions formulated in step 1 and for each DDR result. When selecting the best indicators for each result, keep the following in mind:

- Select **between three and five indicators** for the DDR process, for *each* DDR output and for the DDR accomplishment. Fewer than three indicators, and it is difficult to capture all key dimensions of an output or an accomplishment. To use significantly more than five indicators is cumbersome, reduces the value of indicators, and increases the workload for monitoring.
- Rather than looking at the merit of individual indicators, **assemble indicators in 'teams'**. Think of indicators as a group of complementary perspectives on a single issue of DDR.

For *example*, one indicator for a DDR output might capture the total number of combatants disarmed,

TIP Treat indicator baseline and target as part of the indicator

Once a baseline or a target has been established, treat it as an integral part of the indicator.

Use the following format with the month and year of the target in brackets: '% of ex-combatants verified (baseline: 06/2010: 0%, target: 12/2015: 95%)'.

while an additional indicator tracks the percentage of disarmed combatants who are women. A third indicator could track the percentage of targeted units that are declared non-compliant, while a fourth indicator for this output might track the number of small arms collected. Together, they provide a limited but comprehensive picture of the key aspects of a disarmament output.

- Give preference to **numeric** indicators (e.g. number, percentage, ratio, etc.) over non-numeric indicators (yes/no indicators). Numeric indicators tend to be more sensitive to change over time and are typically less subjective. If we use a yes/no indicator, consider combining it with other numeric indicators.
- A good 'team' of indicators for a DDR output or an expected accomplishment will consist of a mix of **quantitative aspects** of DDR (directly observable, e.g. '% of ex-combatants who were demobilized') with **qualitative aspects** of DDR (incorporating judgements or perceptions, e.g. '% of ex-combatants satisfied with the reinsertion package'). Together, they give us a more complete picture of progress and success in the DDR process.

TIP Looking good is not good enough

Don't be tempted to look for indicators that make DDR look good but hide negative developments.

DDR is a very challenging task – setbacks are normal and to be expected. Indications that something is **not going right** can be more valuable than data that everything is going according to plan.

In the volatile environment typical for DDR, negative developments are often outside the control of DDR staff, and DDR management can only mitigate negative effects. And a good set of indicators can help to do that.

Annex: Indicator shop

Despite their differences, DDR programmes often share similar features. This annex lists indicators for 'typical' DDR programme as examples and inspiration for brainstorming.

For each indicator, the annex describes:

- the **formulation** for the indicator
- a typical **baseline** and **target** of the indicator and a typical source of data for it (the '**means of verification**')
- information on **what we are measuring with this indicator**
- information about **what this measurement can tell us over time**
- information about **potential weaknesses** of the indicator

The indicators are organized in two parts:

- indicators for DDR **outputs**
- indicators for the **expected accomplishment** of DDR

Indicators for outputs

DDR programmes typically deliver the following types of products and services:

- **registering** combatants
- **disarming** combatants
- **demobilizing** combatants
- providing ex-combatants with support for economic and social **reintegration**
- providing **communities** with support to (re-)integrate ex-combatants

The indicators below are organized according to these DDR outputs.

I

II

III

IV

Indicator	Baseline, target, means of verification	What are we measuring with this indicator?	What are the potential weaknesses of this indicator?
a. Registration			
Total number of combatant* registrations completed * for a more detailed analysis, the indicator data should be disaggregated for male/female, youth, disabled combatants.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> baseline: '0' at the beginning of a DDR intervention. target: estimated total of combatants who qualify and are likely to register for DDR. MOV: DDR database (registration module). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This is a basic indicator on the cumulative number of ex-combatants who arrived for registration for DDR and for whom the registration process was completed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The target is often unclear and volatile. It is typically an estimation, often deeply political and might require adjustment with the changing political and military development.
Disparity, in % points, between the proportion of female ex-combatants who have registered, and the proportion of male ex-combatants who have registered.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline prior to first registrations. target should ideally be 0%. MOV: DDR database (registration module). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This additional indicator to the one above tracks if an adequate number of female combatants register for DDR. The indicator shows if there is a mismatch between the female and male registrations over time. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Each proportion figure requires knowledge of, or a good estimate of, the numbers of female and male ex-combatants in the target population.
b. Disarmament			
Number of weapons* collected from combatants * for a more detailed analysis, the indicator data should be disaggregated by types of weapons.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> baseline: '0' before DDR starts. target: based on informed estimation in the DDR context. MOV: DDR database (disarmament module). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator measures if as many weapons are collected in a timely manner, as planned. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An assumption behind this indicator is that few combatants hand in more than one weapon; otherwise, the indicators should be the '% of combatants who hand in at least one weapon'.
Weapon to person ratio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline can be established prior to DDR operations start. targets: based on an informed estimation in the DDR context and international benchmarks.⁴ MOV: calculation based on DDR database (disarmament module). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This indicator compares the number of combatants to the number of weapons collected from them. The indicator measures the depth of the disarmament component of DDR. 	

4 The average weapon to person ratio for the past 19 DDR programmes is 0.50. Detailed benchmark data available at escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddroosi.pdf

Indicator	Baseline, target, means of verification	What are we measuring with this indicator?	What are the potential weaknesses of this indicator?
Number of small arms ammunition* destroyed * defined in detail in the specific DDR context (e.g. rounds of ammunition, hand grenades, rockets). * for a more detailed analysis, the indicator data can be disaggregated by types of small weapons.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> baseline: '0' before disarmament starts. target: based on an informed estimation in the specific DDR context. MOV: DDR database or specific weapons database. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This indicator simply tracks the amount of destroyed small arms ammunition received from combatants during the demobilization process. If all collected small arms are to be destroyed, this indicator also serves as a slightly delayed proxy for 'number of small arms ammunition collected from combatants'. 	
Number of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) destroyed * for a more detailed analysis, the indicator data can be disaggregated by types of small weapons (bombs, bullets, shells, grenades, land mines, naval mines, etc.).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> baseline: '0' before DDR starts. target: based on an informed estimation in the specific DDR context. MOV: DDR database or specific weapons database. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This indicator measures the extent the DDR programme destroys UXOs in a timely manner, as planned. 	
c. Demobilization			
% of active combatants who are formally discharged compared to the overall number of combatants* * alternatively (if overall number cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy): 'Number of active combatants who are formally discharged'.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> baseline: '0%' before DDR starts. target: typically 90% to 100%, depending on what can realistically be expected. MOV: DDR database (demobilization module). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks the proportion of combatants who have already been demobilized. The indicator implicitly measures the extent of demobilization still required. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The validity of this indicator depends on the reliability of the estimations for the overall number of combatants who will apply for demobilization.
% of discharged ex-combatants provided with a complete reinsertion package* * additional, more detailed indicators can be added depending on the type of reintegration support (focusing e.g. on tools, seeds, counselling, cash payments).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> baseline: '0%' before DDR starts. target: typically between 90% and 100%. MOV: DDR database (demobilization module). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This indicator measures the extent to which all discharged combatants receive a full reinsertion package. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator does not capture demobilized combatants who partially received a reintegration package but – for some reason – did not receive it completely. The indicator does not capture differences in the reinsertion package tailored for specific groups among ex-combatants.





Indicator	Baseline, target, means of verification	What are we measuring with this indicator?	What are the potential weaknesses of this indicator?
d. Reintegration			
Number of discharged ex-combatants who formally enter a reintegration programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline: '0' the target depends on estimations; typically between 80% and 95% of the total number of ex-combatants. MOV: calculations based on the DDR database (demobilization module) and administrative data from implementing. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This indicator tracks the total number of ex-combatants who attend at least once a reintegration activity of the DDR programme or one of its implementing partners. 	
% of discharged ex-combatants who have not entered a reintegration programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline possible. the target depends on the specific context; typically between 5% and 20%. MOV: calculations based on the DDR database (demobilization module) and administrative data from DDR implementing partners. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks the extent to which discharged ex-combatants do not want to or cannot enter a reintegration programme. The indicator shows additional information to the previous indicator from a different angle. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator does not explain the reason why a certain group of ex-combatants did not enter a reintegration programme. The indicator will include a certain time lag due to those discharged ex-combatants who are currently receiving reinsertion but will enter a reintegration support programme in the future.
% of ex-combatants who entered a reintegration programme and formally completed it*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline possible the target depends on the specific context; typically between 80% and 95% MOV: administrative data from DDR implementing partners. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This indicator directly tracks the dropout rate of reintegration support. As a proxy, the indicator can track the level of satisfaction of ex-combatants with the reintegration support they receive. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator does not explain the reason why ex-combatants do drop out or do not drop out of reintegration support.

* indicator can also be used as an indirect proxy indicator at the level of DDR expected accomplishment (for the satisfaction of ex-combatants with the reintegration support they receive).

Indicator	Baseline, target, means of verification	What are we measuring with this indicator?	What are the potential weaknesses of this indicator?
Disparity, in % points, between the proportions of female and male ex-combatants entering a reintegration programme who formally completed it	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline possible. target is typically 0%. MOV: administrative data from DDR implementing partners. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This indicator is a proxy and tracks if the reintegration options for male and female ex-combatants are equally well planned and accepted. A positive % figure indicates that fewer women than men complete a reintegration programme (and vice versa). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator does not explain the reason why ex-combatants of one gender do drop out or do not drop out of reintegration support.
e. Communities			
Number of communities* with at least one DDR support programme** * needs to be better defined in the specific context. ** needs to be more detailed according to the specific context of the DDR programme.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Baseline: '0'. the target is based on an estimate of how many communities will ultimately receive DDR support. MOV: typically an agreement between community and DDR programme. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks one aspect of the scope of DDR support to communities. This indicator needs to be complemented by additional indicators (see below) to be meaningful. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator does not capture disparities between DDR communities. A small community with a single support activity has the same weight as a large community with dozens of support programmes.
Total value of goods and services* disbursed to DDR communities by the DDR programme in USD * if needed, this indicator can be separated into a) one indicator on the total value of goods and b) one on the value of services.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Baseline: '0 USD'. the target is based on an estimate of how much DDR support funds communities will ultimately receive. MOV: financial records of DDR programme. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To complement the indicator above on the number of DDR supported communities, this indicator tracks the total value of goods and services disbursed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator lumps together costs for goods and services.
Average value in USD of value of goods and services* disbursed by the DDR programme, per community * if needed, this indicator can be separated into a) one indicator on the total value of goods and b) one on the value of services.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Baseline: '0 USD'. the target is based on an estimate of how much DDR support funds communities will ultimately receive and the estimated number of targeted communities. MOV: financial records of DDR programme. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This indicator complements the previous two indicators and tracks the average level of community-based reintegration per community. The indicator divides the total value of goods and services disbursed by the number of communities who receive or received DDR reintegration support. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator lumps together costs for goods and services. The indicator does not show the level of disparity between communities. The indicator takes no account of size of community.

Indicators for the expected accomplishment

Depending on the specific country context, the expected accomplishment of many DDR programmes will typically be, or will typically include, one or more of the following four elements:

- **economic** (re-)integration of ex-combatants
- **social** reintegration of ex-combatants
- **political** reintegration of ex-combatants
- **stability** and **security** in a country or region

The indicators below are organized according to these four aspects of DDR accomplishments.

Indicator	Baseline, target, means of verification	What are we measuring with this indicator?	What is a potential weakness of this indicator?
a. Economic integration			
Disparity, in percentage points, between employment rate of DDR participants after at least 6 months of DDR support and the general employment rate in country/region * careful disaggregation of data by gender, age or other criteria may reveal disparities that might otherwise not be noticed, and which could point to a need to adjust the programme to better meet the needs of certain groups.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline exists prior to first survey, but the first survey results can serve as baseline for future surveys and can serve as a basis for redefining targets. a typical target will be a disparity of less than half the general employment rate – thus if the general employment rate is e.g. 70%, the disparity aimed for should be less than 35%. MDG: a sample survey of ex-combatants and national or regional employment data from secondary sources. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks to what degree ex-combatants going through a DDR process can become equally economically productive as non-combatants. If the data is reliable, this is a strong and credible direct indicator to track relative success of economic reintegration. This indicator subtracts the employment rate in percentage points of ex-combatants (collected through a sample survey) from the overall employment rate. The strength of this indicator is that it tracks employment levels of DDR participants in relation to employment of the general participation. This indicator captures a six-month period which is short enough to provide DDR management with timely feedback for corrective action, but long enough to obtain an indication on medium-term sustainability. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The underlying assumption is that if an ex-combatant is economically active half a year after DDR support stopped, it is likely that he/she will remain economically active in the long term. 'Employment rate' will need to be adjusted to the country context e.g. by including non-formal economic activities. Part of the indicator data consists of primary data and needs to be collected through a survey of a small but representative sample of ex-combatants by the DDR programme. Because it is a sample survey, there could be a potential bias depending on the sampling methods used.
% of ex-combatants completing a DDR reintegration programme who are economically active* at least six** months after the DDR reintegration support for them has stopped	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline exists prior to first survey, but the first survey results can serve as baseline for future surveys and can serve as a basis for redefining targets. target depends on DDR context, but will typically be between 50% and 90%. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks to what degree ex-combatants who receive DDR reintegration support can actually become equally economically active. This is a strong and credible direct indicator to track medium-term success of economic reintegration. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The underlying assumption is that if an ex-combatant is economically active half a year after DDR support stopped, it is likely that he/she will remain economically active in the long term.



Indicator	Baseline, target, means of verification	What are we measuring with this indicator?	What is a potential weakness of this indicator?
*alternatively: 'economically active in an area related to the DDR training' is a more rigorous indicator to capture causal relations. ** number of months will depend on specific DDR and country context.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MOV: typically a small sample survey of ex-combatants. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This indicator captures a six-month period which is short enough to provide DDR management with timely feedback for corrective action, but long enough to obtain an indication on medium-term sustainability. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Part of the indicator data consists of primary data and needs to be collected through a survey of a small but representative sample of ex-combatants by the DDR programme. Because it is a sample survey, there could be a potential bias depending on the sampling methods used.
% of DDR communities* where community leaders regard the ex-combatants as 'very well' or 'well' economically integrated**	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline exists prior to first survey, but the first survey results can serve as baseline for future surveys. target depends on DDR context, but will typically be between 50% and 70% MOV: typically small sample survey community leaders. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator captures and quantifies the subjective perception of economic reintegration of leaders in communities with a high level of ex-combatants. The indicator is a possible addition or an alternative to the indicator above (if directly surveying ex-combatants is not feasible or desirable). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator data consists of primary data and needs to be collected through a survey of a small but representative sample of community leaders by the DDR programme. Because it is a sample survey, there could be a potential bias depending on the sampling methods used.
% of ex-combatants who are 'very satisfied' or 'satisfied' with the economic reintegration support they are receiving** from the DDR implementing partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline exists prior to first survey, but the first survey results can serve as baseline for future surveys. target depends on context, but will typically be around 50% to 80%. MOV: typically small sample surveys of ex-combatants currently undergoing or about to leave the reintegration support (exit survey). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This is a proxy indicator for short-term success of economic reintegration. Although not directly related to the accomplishment, the indicator gives very early information of progress towards the expected accomplishment. The underlying assumption of this proxy is that a high level of satisfaction is a proxy for future employability. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> By itself, the indicator's credibility is limited. Ideally, this indicator should be used in tandem with a more direct indicator on economic reintegration. Data will need to be collected through a satisfaction survey. Weak survey design may result in bias, e.g. if ex-combatants expect to be rewarded for negative feedback.



<p>% of those ex-combatants entering an economic reintegration programme who formally complete it</p>		<p>○ If the sample is large enough, disaggregated data will allow a comparison to be made of the perceived performances of the various implementing partners.</p>	<p>○ If the sample size is too small, it may be difficult to determine differences in satisfaction with regard to various DDR implementing partners, and/or differences for specific categories of ex-combatant respondents, e.g. males, females, young, old, etc.</p>
<p>% of those ex-combatants entering an economic reintegration programme who formally complete it</p>	<p>○ no baseline exists prior to first data collection, but the first data collection can serve as baseline for future collections.</p> <p>○ target depends on context, but will typically be around 80% to 95%.</p> <p>○ MOV: administrative data from implementing partners; needs to be compiled and aggregated.</p>	<p>○ This is a highly indirect proxy indicator for short-term success of economic reintegration.</p> <p>○ Although not directly related to the accomplishment, the indicator gives very early information on the quality and perceived usefulness of the reintegration programmes.</p> <p>○ The assumption of this proxy is that a high level of completion indicates a high level of satisfaction, which in turn is a sign for future employability.</p> <p>○ The key advantage of this proxy is that data can be compiled easily from the records of implementing partners and does not require a separate survey.</p>	<p>○ By itself, the indicator's credibility is limited. Ideally, we use this highly sensitive and readily available indicator in tandem with more direct indicators on economic reintegration.</p>



Indicator	Baseline, target, means of verification	What are we measuring with this indicator?	What is a potential weakness of this indicator?
b. Social integration % of DDR communities* where community leaders regard the ex-combatants as 'very well' or 'well' socially integrated** * defined as communities where ex-combatants account for more than 5% of community population (adjust to DDR programme) of community population ** categories depend on survey questionnaire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline exists prior to first data collection, but the first data collection can serve as baseline for future collections target depends on specific DDR context, but would likely be between 50% and 80% MOV: sample surveys of communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks what proportion of communities have a positive perception of social re-integration by asking their community leaders. The sample will be a small, representative group of communities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator relies on the ability of a group of community leaders to arrive at a common judgement. The level of discord within a group of community leaders is not recorded. Community leaders could be influenced in their perception by their own interests rather than by an objective assessment of the level of integration. The indicator is based on the assumption that the survey questions on 'social integration' are clear, properly translated and well understood by community leaders.
% of community members in DDR communities* who regard the ex-combatants as 'very well socially integrated' or 'quite well socially integrated'*** * defined as communities where ex-combatants account for more than 5% of community population (adjust according to the context of the DDR programme) *** categories depend on survey questionnaire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline exists prior to first data collection, but the first data collection can serve as baseline for future collections target depends on specific DDR context, but would likely be between 50% and 80% MOV: sample surveys of community members 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks how many community members have a positive attitude towards the success of re-integration. The sample will be a small, representative group of individuals in a small, representative group of DDR communities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator is based on the assumption that the survey questions on 'social integration' are clear, properly translated and well understood by community members.

Amongst ex-combatants, the average % of the 'friends' they identify who are found to be ex-combatants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline exists prior to first data collection, but the first data collection can serve as baseline for future collections target depends on specific DDR context, but would likely be below 80% MOV: for example, a sample survey where ex-combatants are asked to list e.g. the name of ten friends (not family) they would be happy to share a meal with 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks the level of social integration of ex-combatants in their social networks from the perspective of the ex-combatants. The indicator shows that if the proportion is – and remains – high, social integration from ex-combatants remains weak (and vice versa). The indicator is stronger and more credible if combined with the indicator below. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This indicator requires a significant amount of time to collect the data through a small sample survey. This sample survey will typically need to be very small, thus reducing its validity. This indicator relies on a sound method to collected unbiased information on the social network of ex-combatants. This might not in all cases be possible or feasible.
% of non ex-combatants in DDR communities who include, amongst their 'friends', at least one ex-combatant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline exists prior to first data collection, but the first data collection can serve as baseline for future collections target depends on specific DDR context, but would likely be between 10% and 30% MOV: for example, a sample survey in DDR communities where <i>non</i> ex-combatants are asked to list the name of ten friends (not family) they would be happy to share a meal with 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks the level of social integration of ex-combatants with non ex-combatants in the DDR communities from the perspective of the non ex-combatant. The indicator shows that if the proportion is – and remains – low, social integration from non-ex-combatants remains weak (and vice versa). For a more credible analysis, combine it with the indicator above. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collecting data for this indicator is only feasible if ex-combatants form a significant group in a DDR community (otherwise the sample size will need to be too large to capture those non ex-combatants who happen to know an ex-combatant).
c. Political integration			
% of ex-combatants who are satisfied with the political system* * indicator must be adjusted to the national or local context; typically refers to a ceasefire or peace agreement and its implementation, and the electoral process and its outcome	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the first data collection can serve as baseline for future collections target depends on specific DDR context, but would likely be between 50% and 80% MOV: sample survey of ex-combatants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks the level of satisfaction of ex-combatants with the current political system. The indicator is a proxy for the extent ex-combatants identify with the emerging political system and their perceived representation in such a system. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> If the sample is too low for disaggregation, the data can hide disparities in satisfaction among different groups of ex-combatants.



Indicator	Baseline, target, means of verification	What are we measuring with this indicator?	What is a potential weakness of this indicator?
Difference, in percentage terms, in the proportions of ex-combatants from group A, compared to those of group B*, reporting satisfaction with the political system * this assumes only two groups of former combatants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the first data collection can serve as baseline for future collections target depends on specific DDR context, but would likely not be higher than 30% MOV: sample survey of ex-combatants (same as above) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks the extent to which the current political set-up is perceived as fair by different factions of former combatants. The indicator disaggregates the data of the indicator above and compared the level of satisfaction between two groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator can only be interpreted in a meaningful way together with the indicator above.
d. Stability and security			
Compared to the number of armed groups operating prior to the commencement of DDR programme, the proportion (%) of armed groups* currently operating in DDR Theatre * 'armed group' needs to be further defined (e.g. group of over 350 committed combatants)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> baseline: typically 100% target depends on specific DDR context, but would likely be lower than 40% or 30% MOV: credible, fact-based estimations by intelligence units 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator broadly tracks the contribution of DDR to overall stability and security. It captures the overall effect of the DDR caseload, the effects of re-recruitments and the extent to which civilians have found a way to be accepted into DDR programmes. The indicator divides the estimated number of armed groups currently operating by the number of armed groups operating prior to the commencement of the DDR programme. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The value of the indicator depends on the credibility of the estimates. If the estimations are coming from the UN, the data for the indicator cannot be made public in some cases.
Number of combatants and ex-combatants* who are treated in a hospital** for gunshot wounds, bomb blasts or knife wounds*** per year**** * for a more detailed analysis, disaggregate the number by (a) combatants wounded and (b) ex-combatants wounded	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the first data collection can serve as baseline for future collections target can only be established after first data collection and must be significantly lower than the initial data to clearly show a tendency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks the involvement of combatants and ex-combatants in violent acts per year (or per month, per quarter). Continuously falling numbers of combatants and ex-combatants with gunshot wounds, bomb blasts or knife wounds can – over time – indicate that they are less involved in destabilizing the country and become less of a security threat. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This indicator requires a significant amount of time for data collection. In many cases, it will merely be possible to collect this data from a small sample of hospitals or of a single hospital. By itself, the indicator has only limited credibility with regard to DDR (external influences not related to DDR are high).

<p>** if national figures are not available, a proxy indicator could focus only on hospitals in the regional capitals, the capital, a single major hospital or facilities of international organizations like the ICRC</p> <p>*** adjust to the local context and data availability</p> <p>**** or per month, per quarter</p>	<p>○ MOV: typically a small sample of hospital records; due to difficulties with collecting this data, DDR implementing partners might be in the best position to collect this data</p>	<p>○ The indicator is meaningful, however, if other indicators for the DDR accomplishment on social and/or economic reintegration show similar trends.</p> <p>○ The indicator does not distinguish between the perpetrators of a violent act and the victim. The indicator is a proxy for perpetrators of a violent act.</p>	<p>○ For this indicator to serve as a proxy, the underlying assumption is at least a partially functioning law enforcement and policing system in the country/region.</p> <p>○ Access to prison records and linking the records up with the DDR database might not always be feasible in the specific DDR context.</p>
<p>% of custodial sentences* issued for crimes of violence** per year which are to combatants and ex-combatants***</p> <p>*where national data is not available, data from one or more key prison can serve as a proxy</p> <p>** needs to be further defined in the specific context; if data for crimes of violence cannot be obtained, % of custodial sentences issued per year* can be used as a more general indicator</p> <p>*** for a more detailed analysis, disaggregate data for (a) combatants and (b) ex-combatants.</p>	<p>○ the first data collection can serve as baseline for future collections</p> <p>○ target can only be established after first data collection and should be significantly lower than the initial data</p> <p>○ MOV: prison records</p>	<p>○ The indicator is a proxy measure of the extent to which ex-combatants are involved in criminal activities over time.</p> <p>○ The indicator captures the extent to which combatants and ex-combatants were imprisoned.</p>	<p>○ The indicator is only meaningful if it includes what will be considered fact-based, credible evidence of the existence of chains of commands, and data for the indicator is backed up by facts and evidence.</p>
<p>% of ex-combatants* who remain part of chains of command after demobilization</p>	<p>○ the first data collection can serve as baseline for future collections</p> <p>○ the target will depend on what % of ex-combatants are expected to remain within existing chains</p> <p>○ MOV: will depend on specific DDR context, but can include mission security monitoring, NGOs, independent researchers, national intelligence</p>	<p>○ The indicator tracks the proportion of ex-combatants who were not removed from a chain of command through the DDR process</p> <p>○ The indicator divides the number of ex-combatants who are known or estimated to remain part of chains of command after demobilization by the current number of all ex-combatants.</p>	





Indicator	Baseline, target, means of verification	What are we measuring with this indicator?	What is a potential weakness of this indicator?
<p>Number of chains of command which remained in place after demobilization and for which there is credible evidence*</p> <p>* what counts as credible evidence needs to be further defined in the specific DDR context; a check-list approach with key elements is recommended</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the first analysis can serve as baseline for future collections the target will depend on a educated estimation prior to DDR what level of chains of command will still be considered a success MOV: panel of experts or intelligence teams 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks over time the existence of post-DDR chains of command. The indicator adds up all current cases where there is evidence that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has not succeeded in breaking up former chains of command. To be meaningful, the indicator should be used in tandem with the indicator above. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator is only meaningful if it includes what will be considered fact-based, credible evidence of the existence of chains of command, and data for the indicator is backed up by facts and evidence. Since chains of command often fade away gradually rather than get dismantled overnight, the cut-off stage of a check-list is necessarily arbitrary. Data for this indicator is potentially dangerous to collect and may invite criticism from national authorities. The indicator is not calculated in relation to the number of ex-combatants. Because there are more and more former combatants over the life time of a DDR programme, the number of chains of command involving ex-combatants will necessarily rise over time. That is why an initially small number of chains of command of ex-combatants is not yet a meaningful indication.
<p>% of ex-combatants who are currently living less than 10 km* from place of former deployment</p> <p>* adjust accord to local context</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline exists prior to first data collection, but the first data collection can serve as baseline for future collections target depends on specific DDR context, but would likely be above 80% or 90% MOV: sample surveys of ex-combatants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks the proportion of ex-combatants who indicate that their former place of deployment is more than 10 km away from their place of living. This indicator is a proxy indicator for the continued existence of a chain of command. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The underlying assumption of this indicator is that after DDR, ex-combatants will not continue living close to their former place of deployment, but rather return to a (geographically distant) place to commence a civilian life.

<p>% of higher ranking* ex-combatants who say they have at least weekly contact with more than 10 former subordinates*</p> <p>* adjust accord to local context; based upon the rank they were assigned in the demobilization process</p> <p>* alternatively: '3 former superiors'</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline exists prior to first data collection, but the first data collection can serve as baseline for future collections target depends on specific DDR context, but would likely be below 30% or 20% MOV: sample surveys of higher ranking ex-combatants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks the portion of higher ranking ex-combatants who indicate regular contacts with a significant number of former subordinates or superiors. This indicator is a proxy indicator for the continued existence of a chain of command. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator relies on honest information from ex-combatants. The data collection method must ensure that data is accurate. This can e.g. be done by not asking ex-combatants about themselves, but about their perception of other ex-combatants.
<p>% of ex-combatants who say that they would be ready to take up arms again for monetary, political or security incentives*</p> <p>* adjust according to DDR context, or split into separate indicators</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline exists prior to first data collection, but the first data collection can serve as baseline for future collections target depends on specific DDR context, but would likely be below 5% to 30% MOV: sample surveys of ex-combatants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks the portion of ex-combatants over time who show a readiness to take up arms again. This indicator tracks if ex-combatants are vulnerable to re-recruitment for activities that could pose a threat to the State. The sample will be a small, representative group of current ex-combatants. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator is based on the assumption that perceived threat is an indication for an actual threat to the security.
<p>% of DDR community* members** who regard the presence of ex-combatants amongst them as 'a high threat' or 'a threat*** to the security of their community</p> <p>* defined as communities where ex-combatants account for more than 5% of community population (adjust according to the context of the DDR programme)</p> <p>** or: 'community leaders'</p> <p>*** categories depend on survey questionnaire</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> no baseline exists prior to first data collection, but the first data collection can serve as baseline for future collections target depends on specific DDR context, but would likely be below 30% or 20% MOV: sample surveys 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The indicator tracks how many community members have a negative perception towards ex-combatants with respect to security. It is a proxy indicator for the actual impact of the presence of ex-combatants on security. The sample will be a small, representative group of individuals in a small, representative group of DDR communities. 	



disarmament | demobilization | reintegration



Risk Management Template
Users' Guide

Risk Management Template

User's Guide

Introduction

Purpose

To deliver a user-friendly and flexible tool for all DPKO-supported DDR programmes, to minimize and manage their possible risks in an efficient, effective and interactive way.

Why this structure and content?

- The structure of the template (see p. 68) is based on general “DDR Key Business Processes”. They reflect real-life practice and illustrate the environment where risks can occur (risk context).
- The option to add “Specific Mission Processes” ensures that specific requirements of each individual mission are met and ensures ongoing engagement of all staff involved in managing the mission’s risks.
- The content of the template is based on the draft DPKO/DFS Policy Directive and Guidelines on Risk Management.





How to make the template work in the field

The template is designed as an interactive tool to be used in staff meetings and workshops. The intention is to establish risk management as an ongoing learning experience for all involved. The template should help the DDR team to focus on the success of the programme and should not be an administrative burden.

To use the template most effectively the following *actions* should be taken:

- Assign a responsible person/function for the overall risk management process.
- Assign a responsible Risk Management Officer or focal point for follow-up, team communication and reporting.
- Fill in and update the template and hold team workshops with responsible staff involved. Name the responsible Process Owner for action and follow-up.
- Communicate monitored results regularly.

DDR Risk Management Template

1. Risk Context		2. Risk Assessment				3. Risk treatment		4. Risk Monitor		5. Comments
Key Business Process/ Specific Mission Process	Identify risks	Analyse risk category	Analyse risk impact (rank 1–5)	Evaluate risk likelihood (rank 1–5)	Score (impact × likelihood)	Name Process Owner	Identify activities to treat the risk	Highlight resources needed	 Show time frame	
Key Business Process 1 (insert here)										
Specific Mission Process (insert here)										
Key Business Process 2 (insert here)										
Specific Mission Process (insert here)										
Key Business Process 3 (insert here)										
Specific Mission Process (insert here)										

Choose traffic light



Red = Urgent action required
Yellow = Action required
Green = Ongoing monitoring required

The interactive Risk Management matrix may be obtained by contacting the DDR Section, DPKO (please contact hagman@un.org; or sidorowicz@un.org).

Building blocks

- **Step 1: risk context**—Shows the relevant standard DDR key business and specific mission processes
- **Step 2: risk assessment**—Identifies and analyses the possible risks
- **Step 3: risk treatment**—Deals with the possible risks to minimize their effects on the success of the programme
- **Step 4: risk monitor**—Follow-up on the possible risks to show the effects of treating the risks
- **Step 5: comments**—Allows further comments on the risk management process



STEP 1 Risk Context—Shows the relevant standard DDR key business and specific mission processes

What is risk and what does risk context mean?

Risk is defined as an uncertain future event or condition that, if it occurs, has a negative effect on the programme objectives. The DDR programme, its environment, all its activities and outcomes are mapped in processes—these are called the risk context.

What is risk management?

Risk Management strives to ensure continuity and success by conscious planning, practical action and continuous monitoring of programme processes.

What are the standard DDR Key Business Processes?

A business process consists of structured activities or tasks that produce a specific result to a customer. A Key Business Process is essential to each DDR programme and can consist of further Specific Mission Processes to ensure the flexibility and customer focus of each individual peacekeeping mission.

The defined standard DDR Key Business Processes are:

- I. Overall Planning and Negotiations
- II. Management of Expectations and Consensus Building
- III. Capacity Building
- IV. Operational Planning and Delivery
- V. Resource Management
- VI. Monitoring and Evaluation
- VII. Public Information Strategy
- VIII. Exit Strategy, including sustainability of reintegration

Based on each Standard Key Business Process, ask your team:

What specific tasks do we have to carry out in order to deliver the results of the DDR programme in our particular mission?

Cluster these tasks, show the flow of clustered tasks and define headlines for specific groups of tasks. These headlines are the “Specific Mission Processes”.

STEP 2 Risk Assessment—Identifies and analyses possible risk factors

What is risk assessment?

What problems, challenges and/or hurdles can appear which affect the objectives and deliverables of our DDR programme in a negative way? To formulate the risk clearly, use the risk statement format: “If then ”

What are the DDR Standard Risk Categories?

- **Operational:** If there is potential to disrupt or divert programme operations which would result in delays, limited progress or stand-still.
- **Safety:** If there is a potential to harm UN staff and/or property physically or psychologically.
- **Security:** If there is potential to harm persons and/or property.
- **Reputation:** If there is a potential to damage the image and/or the credibility of the UN.
- **Political:** If there is potential to contradict the policy and mandate of the UN and/or impact negatively on its relations with beneficiaries and partners.
- **Financial:** If there is potential for loss or lack of financial resources.






How to analyse the risk category

Check your defined risk with the DDR Standard Risk Categories and choose the appropriate one. While it may be possible for your risk to fit into more

than one category, being precise with your choice will help in determining a risk treatment.

How to analyse the risk impact

To analyse risk impact, use the five standard levels:

-  **5. Severe unbearable impact:** The associated expected outcome would be impossible to deliver if this level of risk event were to occur.
-  **4. High impact:** Delivery of the associated expected outcome would be seriously hampered and possibly jeopardized.
-  **3. Medium impact:** Delivery of the associated expected outcome would be significantly affected but not jeopardized.
-  **2. Moderate impact:** Delivery of the associated outcome would be affected but not jeopardized.
-  **1. Bearable impact:** The associated expected outcome would not be very affected.

What is the risk likelihood

Risk likelihood is evaluated on a scale from **1 (remote)** to **5 (near certainty)**.

When considering the risk impact and the risk likelihood, keep in mind that your evaluation will influence the decisions about priorities and assignment of resources in treating your risks. Therefore, see also the Risk Rating Matrix in the DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Risk Management.

How to score the risk

The score is calculated by multiplying the risk impact by the risk likelihood. The score will help you prioritize among risks.

How to determine the Process Owner

The Process Owner is responsible for the result to be delivered by the respective process. Therefore, the process owner needs to have the competence and authority to ensure the flow of the process, including all activities, tasks and potential risks.

In order to allocate clear responsibility, the Process Owner should be a specific person. If it is not possible to assign a specific person to this task, a function, authority, unit or organization can be named.

STEP 3 Risk Treatment—Deals with the possible risks to minimize their effects on the success of the programme

What does risk treatment mean?

The goal of treating a risk is to minimize or eliminate its effects for the success of the DDR programme. Therefore, efficient strategies and action plans need to be developed and implemented. Responsibilities and resources need to be agreed on and a target date for action needs to be set.

What are the options to treat risks?

- **Avoid**
- **Transfer**—e.g. to external stakeholders
- **Mitigate**—aim to reduce the risk impact and the risk likelihood
- **Accept**

How to identify activities to treat the risk

While discussing the possible and realistic risk treatment options, answer the following questions:

- What do we have to do to avoid, transfer or mitigate the risk?
- Why do we have to accept the risk?

How to identify the resources to treat the risk:

Having chosen the activities to treat the risk, answer the following questions:

- What kind of resources do we need to conduct the activity?
- Is it realistic that we will get the resources?
- What happens if not?
- What alternatives do we have?

STEP 4 Risk Monitor—Follow-up on the possible risks to show the effects of treating the risks

What does risk monitor mean?

The risk monitor ensures the documentation, ongoing monitoring and review of the identified risks related to the Specific Mission Processes. This is important in order to take changing circumstances into account and to measure the effectiveness of risk treatment activities. To make risk monitoring easy and user-friendly, the “Traffic Light Status” is introduced.

How to show the Traffic Light Status

While discussing the status of the appropriate risk, choose the relevant colour of the traffic light.



Red = Urgent Action Required

Yellow = Action Required

Green = Ongoing Monitoring Required

How to show the time frame to treat the risk

Based on the risk assessment and the actual traffic light status, the period of time in which the risk is treated needs to be shown.

STEP 5 Comments—Allows further comments on the Risk Management Process

Comments

Any further statements being relevant for the Risk Management Process.

Field examples

1. Risk Context	2. Risk Assessment						3. Risk Treatment		4. Risk Monitor		5. Comments
Key Business Process/ Specific Mission Process	Identify risks	Analyse risk category	Analyse risk impact (rank 1–5)	Evaluate risk likelihood (rank 1–5)	Score (impact × likelihood)	Name Process Owner	Identify activities to treat the risk (avoid, transfer, mitigate, accept)	Highlight resources needed	Show status	Show time frame	
Key Business Process I) Overall Planning and Negotiations											
Specific Mission Process Liberia: Establishment of a national commission for DDR (NCDDR)	Members are appointed for reasons other than competence and integrity Lack of oversight and control by Government over NCDDR, complicating future negotiations with this body Financial mismanagement by NCDDR	Political Financial Operational	5	3	15	UNMIL Chief DDR/ UNDP Rep.	Lobby Vice President for quality of officials appointed to the body, and request the establishment of oversight mechanism in line ministry No direct project implementation by NCDDR; UNDP to maintain financial responsibility	Human Financial		Mid-May 2004	Discuss with UNDP
Key Business Process II) Management of Expectations and Consensus											
Specific Mission Process Sudan: Management of expectations of key stakeholders, beneficiaries and the society at large	Unrealistic expectations by stakeholders about the DDR programme could lead to a high demand for demobilization as well as disenchantment, lack of trust and loss of credibility	Security Reputation	5	4	20	Chief Integrated DDR Unit/ UNDP Programme Manager	Formulate sound Public Information policy/ strategy and develop clear and consistent information and sensitization messages on DDR Conduct intensive sensitization on DDR processes for both SPLA and SAF commanders and build information networks nationwide	Human Financial		Ongoing	This aspect of the programme is very late and it is critical to put it on the road.
Key Business Process III) Capacity Building											
Specific Mission Process Somalia: Capacity building programmes on DDR planning for members of Joint Security Committee (JSC) and NCDDR	JSC and NCDDR limited to Mogadishu Lack of access	Security Operational	5	4	20	UNPOS DDR Programme Manager/ UNDP RoL Programme Manager	Capacity building programmes to be diversified and implemented hand in hand with TFG reconciliation programmes to allow involvement of more stakeholders from the regions	Human Financial		Ongoing	
Key Business Process IV) Operational Planning and Delivery											
Specific Mission Process Sudan: Negotiations over key details related to locations and operation modalities, such as transport and provision of food	Prolonged negotiations resulting in undetermined timelines for procurement will result in delays and affect the DDR timelines	Political Operational	5	3	15	Chief Integrated DDR Unit	Provide direct and timely support in the areas of capacity building at national and state levels Deploy counterparts or second Integrated DDR Unit staff to work directly with the DDR commissions	Financial Human Logistical support		Immediate	Transport of NFIs to the regional centres is critical

1. Risk Context	2. Risk Assessment						3. Risk Treatment		4. Risk Monitor		5. Comments
Key Business Process/ Specific Mission Process	Identify risks	Analyse risk category	Analyse risk impact (rank 1–5)	Evaluate risk likelihood (rank 1–5)	Score (impact × likelihood)	Name Process Owner	Identify activities to treat the risk (avoid, transfer, mitigate, accept)	Highlight resources needed	Show status	Show time frame	
Key Business Process V) Resource Management											
Specific Mission Process Liberia: Financial planning for reintegration programme, including benefits to ex-combatants	Shortage of funds leads to inability to cover entire caseload, resulting in rioting in the short-term, and destabilization in the long-term due to high risk that this group undertakes illegal activities, including military recruitment to neighboring countries	Security	5	4	20	UNDP Rep, UNMIL Chief DDR	Prepare detailed financial plan covering the entire ex-combatant caseload, assuming no additional funding will be received above already confirmed donor pledges Contingency planning in case additional funding is received (add-on programmes; UNDP to make additional human resources available for financial management)	Human		January 2004	Crucial that all parties stick to agreement since once programme has started, donor fatigue sets in and it will be difficult to raise additional funds. Donors don't like to pay for gaps.
Key Business Process VI) Monitoring and Evaluation											
Specific Mission Process Somalia: Registration of ex-fighters in the DDR database	Limited only to ex-fighters who will be integrated into Joint Security Force and Police UN absent at the screening and verification process	Operational Financial Security	4	4	16	Somali Unity Gov Rep./ UNPOS DDR Programme Manager	Support advocacy to allow for expanded registration UN and JSC to reach consensus on credible screening and verification for registration process	Use of local media Financial Human		Ongoing	
Key Business Process VII) Public Information Strategy											
Specific Mission Process Liberia: Develop joint NCDDR, UNDP and UNMIL public information strategy for reintegration programme	Ex-combatants in remote areas not aware of programme and risk exclusion, which can destabilize Liberia in the future	Security	5	2	10	Director NCDDR, Chief DDR, UNDP Rep.	NCDDR, UNMIL and UNDP to agree on information strategy and roles and contributions of each of the parties Develop matrix with activities/timelines	UNMIL radio and public information Financial (from donor funds; for printing of flyers, leaflets, cartoons, air time on local radio stations)		Plan of activities and use of resources completed by June 2004	Ensure that provisions are made to react to specific incidents immediately and with a specific PI message Ensure process is owned by Government
Key Business Process VIII) Exit Strategy											
Specific Mission Process Sudan: Sustainable reintegration	Large numbers of clients in weak labour market Disenfranchised ex-combatants will turn to crime or violent protest	Security Political Reputation	5	3	15	UNDP Programme Manager, UN Country Team	Close linkages with overall country strategy by Government(s), UN system and IFIs	None		2011 – Onwards	



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Notes

IV

Notes

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II

III

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