



**Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance Staff Handbook
(PKISR HB)**

**First Edition
September 2020**



DEPARTMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS



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Foreword

This first edition of the UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (PKISR) Staff Handbook represents an evolution in peacekeeping-intelligence in UN Missions. The use of PKISR allows us to better understand the environment we are operating in and provides critical support to ensuring the protection of civilians and the safety and security of our own personnel.

This staff handbook builds on the UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence (MPKI) Handbook and is designed primarily to assist staff deployed in military peacekeeping-intelligence roles in UN peacekeeping operations at the Force and Sector levels. But beyond, all elements of the Mission, both uniformed and civilian, should have the ability to make use of the PKISR capabilities within the Mission to have their peacekeeping-intelligence questions answered. This staff handbook therefore supports those not directly involved in the management of PKISR in understanding how to do this.

I thank the Office of Military Affairs for leading the development of the handbook, working with partners in the UN Secretariat. This work also benefited from the engagement of a number of peacekeeping missions, who provided valuable support to ensure that this handbook truly represents the needs of those it is intended for. And I am grateful for the invaluable support of 9 Member States, who offered both their time and staff expertise in developing the handbook, and without whom it could not have been completed. The next steps will see the Department of Peace Operations focus on developing a manual for the units that deploy in peacekeeping missions.

As UN peacekeeping missions operate in more complex and increasingly volatile environments, it is essential that we make the most of the capabilities that can help us enhance situational awareness and the safety and security of UN personnel, and to inform operations and activities related to the protection of civilians. This staff handbook directly contributes to these efforts and represent a growing professionalisation of peacekeeping-intelligence within UN Peacekeeping operations.



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


Preface

I am very pleased to introduce the first UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (PKISR) Staff Handbook. This is excellent progress in the field of peacekeeping-intelligence, where we become more professional in operating in this complex environment.

It could not have been developed without the support of the Member States and peacekeeping missions, whose contribution has ensured that this is an effective and useful handbook.

The PKISR Staff Handbook is a living document and complements the Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook published in May 2019. We will continue to refine both handbooks to ensure they remain relevant to the challenges in peacekeeping operations.



Carlos Humberto Loitey
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INTRODUCTION

PKISR – The Basics

The aim of this Handbook is to support staff deployed in Peacekeeping-Intelligence (PKI) roles in UN peacekeeping operations to manage the Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (PKISR) assets available within the Mission. This Handbook should be read in conjunction with the Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence (MPKI) Handbook.

The term PKISR has two basic meanings. It is used as a term to describe the various entities used to acquire PKI, such as Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) or Long-Range Recce Patrols (LRRP), and it is also the term used as the process of managing the acquisition. The important point to note is that PKISR is the means to achieve the acquisition step in the UN MPKI Cycle.




Figure 1: UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Cycle

The UN MPKI Cycle is described in the MPKI Handbook and the PKISR Handbook supports UN personnel in acquiring the PKI necessary to “enhance situational awareness and the safety and security of UN personnel, and to inform operations and activities related to the protection of civilians”. The management of PKISR drives the MPKI Cycle, which is there to support the UN Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). The MPKI support to MDMP is described in Chapter 10 of the MPKI Handbook.



Figure 2: Flow of the MDMP

This Handbook explains the PKISR related roles of the various elements within UN peacekeeping operations, to include Mission leadership, those actively working within PKI, anyone who might need to request support from PKI entities and those involved in generating PKISR capabilities for UN peacekeeping operations.

It is important to note that UN PKI may not be like national methodologies and this handbook is designed to allow UN staff to bridge the gap between the two. Furthermore, each Mission will likely function slightly differently and therefore this handbook is intended to be a guideline for principles and procedures, which may be altered slightly to suit specific Mission needs.



CHAPTER ONE

1. PKISR: Policy and Guidance

1.1. Purpose and Scope

1.1.1. Due to the incredibly close nature of MPKI and PKISR there are many principles that are common to both. The fundamental purpose of MPKI in UN peacekeeping operations is to enhance situational awareness and the safety and security of UN personnel, and to inform operations and activities related to the protection of civilians tasks of the Security Council mandates. PKISR is the enabler in providing that situational awareness and supporting UN decision-making. The following therefore applies to PKISR as well as MPKI:

- Provide situational understanding and predictive PKI products to better enable military peacekeeping planning and decision-making. Commanders who have access to good PKI are better able to take appropriate actions.
- Provide early warning of threats to the security of UN personnel, both uniformed and civilian.
- Provide early warning of threats of physical violence to the local population, in support of the protection of civilians. Linked to this is early warning of any planned destruction to critical infrastructure or necessary natural resources.
- Enhance the Mission leadership's understanding of shifts in the strategic and operational landscape through the early identification of relevant trends and threats. This will facilitate the identification of risks and opportunities for the protection of UN personnel and civilians within the scope of the mandate.

1.1.2. The difference here between PKISR and MPKI is that it is the responsibility of the analytical element of PKI to provide the situational understanding, early warning of threats to life and enhancing Mission leadership's understanding but they achieve this by tasking PKISR as one means of developing the PKI picture. It is important to note that the tasking of PKISR is not the sole domain of the military element of the Mission.

1.1.3. The Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) and the UN Police (UNPOL) within the Mission may equally request support from PKISR assets to acquire information on their behalf through the U2. Furthermore, the process within the Mission should be established such that all Mission civilian and uniformed components could request information that may be tasked to be acquired using PKISR capabilities. It should be noted that it is very important that the MPKI entity responsible for managing PKISR operates a clear prioritisation process such that any requests can be validated and prioritised.¹ There will never be enough PKISR assets within a Mission to satisfy all the requirements levied against the capabilities and therefore prioritisation is an essential aspect in managing PKISR.

1.1.4. This handbook focuses on the fundamental principles and processes of PKISR within UN peacekeeping missions. Some Missions have so few PKISR capabilities that there is not a dedicated element within the PKI structure to manage that which they do have whereas others have an entire section. The scope of this handbook is to provide guidance for all Missions in the way that PKISR should be managed to make the most out of what is a finite resource.

¹ Chapter 3 will focus on prioritisation.

CHAPTER TWO

2. PKISR Fundamentals

2.1. PKISR Process

2.1.1. The PKISR process is designed to answer PKI questions. It is important to set up the process within the Mission to allow anyone to ask a question such that the U2² can attempt to answer it using the PKISR resources available to the Mission. The core of tasking for PKISR assets should be from the Mission Information Acquisition Plan (IAP), however, a Request for Information (RFI) should also be answered by prioritising the request against other tasking. The third main source of tasking should come from Indicators and Warnings (I&W), which again must be prioritised against other tasking.

2.1.2. The management of PKISR is a complex process and this handbook is intended to simplify it as far as possible to allow UN Missions to establish or refine existing processes to optimise resources. It requires an element of good judgement to make decisions on priorities and a clear understanding of the Mission's mandate and activities.

2.1.3. Peacekeeping-intelligence activities must be conducted with full respect for human rights, including in particular the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly and with particular care not to expose any sources or potential sources of information to harm. Details of the PKI process must not be divulged to non-Mission actors that maintain sensitive relations with partners.

2.2. Definitions

2.2.1. **Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIR).** A CCIR can be anything that the Force leadership determines as information that is required to allow them to make timely and effective decisions and are not necessarily limited to PKI related issues. For the purpose of the PKISR Handbook the U2 should focus on those CCIRs that relate to PKI. It should be noted that in many cases the U2 will need to define the CCIRs on behalf of the leadership and gain endorsement of them before progressing.

2.2.2. **Priority Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirement (PIR).** The PIRs should be drawn primarily from the CCIRs but can also be derived from strategic guidance from Force leadership. Again, the U2 will need to define the PIRs on behalf of the leadership and they should be regularly reviewed to ensure that they are still relevant. The PIRs form the basis of acquisition and therefore time should be spent on ensuring they are well thought out and truly represent the needs of the Force. The successful management of PKISR relies heavily on the ability to prioritise acquisition and therefore the PIRs must reflect the Force's priorities to ensure appropriate coordination. See paragraph 3.2 for detail.

2.2.3. **Specific Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirement (SIR).** Each PIR in turn is broken down into several SIRs which relate back to the PIR. The point of breaking them down is to allow the U2 to get to the point where the acquisition units can start to answer the PIRs. The SIRs are best structured thematically to support this process. The theme of prioritisation of the SIRs is also essential at this stage to support the effective management of the acquisition assets. See paragraph 3.2 for detail.

² The U2 sits at the Force level, G2 at the Sector level and S2 at the Battalion level



2.2.4. Essential Elements of Information (EEI). The EEI is the final step in the PIR relationship and are effectively the individual questions that will be assigned against the acquisition assets. The EEIs relate to the SIR, which in turn relate to the PIR. Once again, clarity is important, as is prioritisation to support effective PKISR management. There are no set rules on how many EEIs relate to an SIR or in turn how many SIRs relate to the PIR. Each Mission will have different issues affecting the ability to deliver against the mandate and therefore there is no right or wrong answer. See paragraph 3.2 for detail.

2.2.5. Request For Information (RFI). The RFI process allows for any individual or entity in the Mission to ask a question that needs to be answered by the PKISR capabilities under the Mission's command and control. This should not be limited to the military side of the Mission; a well-established process should allow for all Mission civilian and uniformed components to submit an RFI, which can be prioritised against the EEIs to allow for the effective tasking of PKISR.

2.2.6. Indicators and Warnings (I&W). An indicator is an observable behaviour or event that points towards a particular outcome, or that confirms or denies a relevant actor's course of action. Generally, the MPKI cell should always ensure that indicators are linked to a NAI, where such behaviours and events can be observed.

2.2.7. Named Area of Interest (NAI). NAIs are geographical areas or points where the required information is expected to be observed or acquired. For example, following reporting of a potential IED emplacement, monitoring the road for activity could verify the reporting as the local population will unlikely use the road if the IED has been placed to target peacekeepers. The continuous monitoring of indicators can help to prevent operational or tactical surprise. For more detailed understanding of NAIs, refer to the MPKI Handbook.

2.2.8. Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirement (IR). In the context of PKISR, an IR is the basis for tasking of an acquisition unit.³ The IR is generated from either an EEI, RFI or an I&W and once it becomes an IR it is irrelevant how it was generated until such point that acquisition is complete, and it must be determined if the question has been answered. All IRs will be prioritised to allow for the most effective tasking of acquisition units.

2.2.9. Information Acquisition Plan (IAP). The IAP is where the PIRs, SIRs and EEIs are listed and lays out what type of acquisition (by PKI discipline) could answer the EEIs and when the information is required by. The IAP is a living document and should be formally reviewed at regular intervals, ideally quarterly, to provide a balance between having an IAP that does not constantly change and to allow the process time to answer the EEIs. It should be routine that there are several IAPs within the Mission at Force, Sector and Battalion level.

2.2.10. Information Acquisition List (IAL). The IAL is the daily list of all the IRs that are planned to be acquired on a given day. It is a combination of the EEIs, RFIs and I&W, which have become IRs in the PKISR process and have been prioritised accordingly. The IAL is a list of IRs that is tasked against the PKISR units across the Mission. The prioritisation is important as it allows those tasking the PKISR to easily understand what should be acquired first.

³ Note that on the civilian side of the Mission, the term IR may be used to cover all requirements and the terms detailed here may not be used or may be used in a different context. It is important for the U2 to clarify this when tasking is received from outside of the military environment to avoid confusion.



2.2.11. Pre-planned tasking. The pre-planned PKISR tasks are those in the IAL scheduled for acquisition the following day.

2.2.12. Dynamic tasking. Dynamic tasking is required when a high priority incident occurs and the PKISR assets that were working on the IAL must be re-tasked. In this case, the accurate prioritisation of the IRs is essential to understand the impact of the dynamic tasking. Those involved in the planning and execution of the IAL must quickly determine if the PKISR asset that had previously been tasked against the IAL was acquiring high priority requirements and if another asset can be re-tasked to cover the highest priority IRs. In smaller Missions it might simply be a case of the IAL is not completed on that day, in which case the following day's IAL will need to be amended to consider the lack of acquisition caused by the dynamic tasking.

2.3. UN PKISR Command and Control

2.3.1. It is important to have a clear understanding of command and control within PKISR and the ability to task PKISR capabilities at the different organisational levels. In some Missions there will be PKISR assets at every level – Force, sector and battalion – and anyone in the Mission should be able to benefit from information acquired by any asset. The key is to implement a system that allows this to occur as transparently as possible for the individual making the request. The requester should not be exposed to the complexity behind how their question is answered. Effective command and control ensures this.

2.3.2. The most effective way to manage PKISR assets is to execute a centralised command and decentralised control structure. In practice this means that whilst the Director/Chief of Mission Support (D/CMS) is responsible and accountable for the effective utilisation and tasking of UN commercial or military PKISR assets,⁴ the process of assigning effective tasking to those assets should be conducted at a lower level and managed by Chief ISR on behalf of the U2.

2.3.3. In the case of PKISR, the Force should command the assets within the Mission on behalf of the D/CMS and they should be controlled at the appropriate level, depending on the task. For example, a Class III UAS should be controlled at the Force level, assigned against high level IRs. However, there may be times when it is appropriate to delegate control of the asset for a defined period of time to support sector level activity or an operation. Smaller, more tactical PKISR units should be commanded and controlled at a lower level (sector or battalion) but still be available for tasking by entities above and below the controlling organisation.

2.3.4. Implicit in command and control is the need to determine whether the task assigned to an acquisition unit is complete. The U2 (or G2/S2 if control is delegated) is best placed to determine if the assigned IR has been successfully answered, which will require coordination with the originator of the IR. If the IR has not been answered, then it will need to be retasked.

2.3.5. In summary, a clear understanding of command and control is essential for the effective management of PKISR. It should not be a complex process and once it is established allows for the greatest flexibility in making the most out of a finite resource. Effective delegation of command and control from the D/CMS and the effective use of CCIRs and PIRs frees Mission leadership up from being involved in routine decision making on how PKISR is tasked.

2.4. Role of Mission Leadership

⁴ Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Policy, 25 October 2019



2.4.1. The Mission leadership holds a key role in directing PKISR. The whole process revolves around closing PKI gaps and such finite resources should be appropriately managed against clear priorities, as set out in the IAP. The CCIRs are a critical part of this process as they provide the U2 with clear direction and guidance on what is important to the Force leadership. The use of PKISR must be against priority tasking otherwise a valuable resource is in danger of being misused. Each Mission undertaken by any PKISR entity must be traced back to a requirement. That way the senior Mission leadership can be briefed on how their resources are being utilised and they can adjust their priorities if the PKI gaps are not being closed.



CHAPTER THREE

3. PKISR in Practice

3.1. Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirements

CCIR

3.1.1. The CCIRs should be relatively broad and will cover a wide variety of aspects and by addressing them, the PKISR process is assisting with decision-making. They must cover any and all aspects that will affect the Force Commander's or Head of Mission's ability to achieve the mandate. They can include the requirement to understand seasonal weather and the humanitarian impact, knowing more about the ambitions of armed groups, requirements to support election activity or information relating to UN Forces.

PIR

3.1.2. Once the CCIRs have been identified and ratified by Mission leadership the PIRs can be developed, which are actively managed within the IAP. Each CCIR may have multiple PIRs and it is important that the PIRs are prioritised from the outset in order to make the tasking of PKISR as efficient as possible.

SIR

3.1.3. Once the PIRs are established, they are broken down into SIRs, which go into greater detail and are again prioritised. For example, the PIR relating to armed groups will be too general to effectively task PKISR against and therefore the PIR must be broken down into SIRs to start to be more specific about what the PKI gaps are. In this example, the SIRs might focus on the individual groups and include an aspect on unknown groups or the threat of groups from other countries moving into the Mission area.

EEl

3.1.4. The SIRs are then broken down further into EEIs and these are the specific questions that PKISR assets are tasked against. Staying with the armed groups theme, the SIR might relate to a new armed group operating in the country called Armed Group X. In the early stages of acquiring information on Armed Group X, the EEI should ask questions such as "who is the leader of Armed Group X?", "what are the main aims of Armed Group X?", "how is command and control exercised within Armed Group X?" and "what are the regional boundaries of Armed Group X?".

3.1.5. As these EEIs start to get answered, during the formal review process the IAP is updated to reflect that, and once the leader or leaders of Armed Group X have been identified then this is no longer an EEI as the question has been answered. The more we learn about Armed Group X the more refined the EEIs become. If the aim of the Mission is to re-integrate Armed Group X the SIR might be adjusted to focus on this and the EEIs become more related to how the Mission encourages the various elements of Armed Group X to reintegrate.

3.2. Translating PIRs into SIRs into EEIs

3.2.1. The following is an example of a different PIR theme broken down into SIRs and EEIs. It is not an exhaustive example but demonstrates the level of detail required of the EEIs to achieve an effective IAL that can actually be answered. The numbering of the PIR, SIRs and EEIs is important as it allows for the PKISR team to very quickly identify the home of the EEI when ensuring that the answer to the question has been delivered to the appropriate organisation.

| PIR | SIR | EEI |
|-------------------------------|--|---|
| 1 Threats against an IDP Camp | 1.1 Ethnic/Tribal dynamics | 1.1.1 What is the ethnic breakdown in the IDP camp? |
| | | 1.1.2 Are there any conflicting ethnic groups/tribes within the IDP camp? |
| | | 1.1.3 Is there any evidence of changes in the ethnic groups/tribe's laydown within the IDP camp? |
| | | 1.1.4 What is the size of the ethnic groups/tribes in the immediate vicinity of the IDP camp? |
| | | 1.1.5 Has the size of the ethnic groups/tribes in the immediate vicinity of the IDP camp changed? |
| | | 1.1.6 Who are the local ethnic groups/tribes' leadership in the vicinity of the IDP camp? |
| | 1.2 Armed group activity in the area | 1.2.1 What armed groups are operating in the local area? |
| | | 1.2.2 What are the known armed groups TTPs? |
| | | 1.2.3 What are the size of the armed groups in the local area? |
| | | 1.2.4 Do any of the armed groups have relations with the local community/UN/host nation? |
| | | 1.2.5 What weapons capability do the armed groups have? |
| | | 1.2.6 Are there any combat indicators associated with the armed groups in terms of uniform or clothing? |
| | | 1.2.7 Where are the armed groups based? |
| | 1.3 Weather considerations | 1.3.1 When is the rainy season? |
| | | 1.3.2 How long does the rainy season last for? |
| | | 1.3.3 In what way is the IDP camp at risk of flooding? |
| | | 1.3.4 What are the road conditions into and out of the IDP camp? |
| | 1.4 IDP relationship with UN and national institutions | 1.4.1 Is there any evidence of propaganda/media directed at the IDP camp (positive or negative)? |
| | | 1.4.2 Are the IDPs supportive of the UN and national institutions? |
| | | 1.4.3 Is there any nationally provided security for the IDP camp? |
| | | 1.4.4 Is there any NGO activity within the IDP camp or in the local area? |
| | 1.5 Key leadership within IDP camp | 1.5.1 Are there any identifiable leaders within the IDP camp? |
| | | 1.5.2 Is there evidence of any formal meetings taking place within the IDP camp? |
| | | 1.5.3 Do the leaders have any obvious political connections? |
| | | 1.5.4 What is the media outlook of the IDP leadership? |
| | | 1.5.5 Do the leaders have any stated agendas or goals? |
| | | 1.5.6 Is the leadership connected to armed groups in any way? |
| 1.6 Freedom of movement | 1.6.1 Are there any restricted areas within the IDP camp? | |
| | 1.6.2 Who is controlling the restricted areas? | |
| | 1.6.3 Is there evidence of illegal taxation within the IDP camp? | |

Figure 3: Beginnings of the Force IAP

3.2.2. The Mission leadership do not need to be exposed to the level of detail within the IAP. It is the PKI professionals' job to develop the PIRs and gain approval for them ahead of the more detailed SIR and EEI work. The SIRs and EEIs are for internal use to support the delivery of PKI against the IAP.

3.3. Force Peacekeeping-Intelligence Acquisition Plan

3.3.1. The IAP is the living document that captures all the PIRs, SIRs and EEIs and which PKISR unit is capable of answering the questions within the EEIs. The Force level IAP should be managed by the IAP Manager, who is responsible to the U2 to report on how the IAP is being actioned. Sectors and battalions should also have their own IAP focussing on the sector commander's and battalion commander's PIRs and managed by the G2 and S2 respectively.

These IAPs will become much more regionally focussed but the concept is still the same. The sector or battalion may have their own organic PKISR assets that they can task against their IAP. They can also raise an RFI to the Force or a different Sector to assist in answering the EEIs.

3.3.2. In its simplest form, the IAP is a spreadsheet that lists all the PIRs, SIRs and EEIs and the appropriate PKI acquisition disciplines capable of answering the EEIs. In order to provide an oversight of the process to acquire the information capable of answering the EEIs the following questions should be answered on the IAP:

- **Who** could acquire the information?
- **What** information needs to be acquired?
- **Where** to acquire it: normally Named Areas of Interest (NAIs)?
- **How** are sources and sensitive information going to be protected and kept confidential?
- **When** is the information required (No Later Than/Latest Time Intelligence Of Value)?
- **How** is the acquisition unit to disseminate the acquired information?

3.3.3. The entire IAP is a management document for the U2 and should not be used as the format for tasking as it is too complex for individual acquisition entities to interpret and action. The IAL is the appropriate means to communicate tasking to each acquisition capability, which is discussed in greater detail further in this chapter.

3.3.4. The following table is an example of the headings for the IAP. The section relating to the “acquiring unit” simply relates to those PKISR capabilities that *could* answer the question to assist in the development of the IAL. This is when the tasking is assigned to a unit. The NAI column relates to a geographic area as defined by the U2. The difference between the No Later Than (NLT) column and Latest Time Information is Of Value (LTIOV) allows time for the analyst to process the information required. For example, a detailed analysis of a village vulnerable to humanitarian violations will take time to conduct and generate a good quality product that will highlight most likely avenues of attack. If the village is anticipated to be attacked on 1 Jun there is no point acquiring the imagery to support the analysis on 1 Jun as there will be no time to analyse the information.

| PIR | SIR | EEI | Acquiring Unit | | | | Source Protection Considerations | NAI | NLT | LTIOV |
|-----|-----|-----|----------------|-------|-----|-------|----------------------------------|-----|-----|-------|
| | | | A Coy | B Coy | UAS | UN Ob | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |

Figure 4: Suggested IAP Headings

3.3.5. It is highly unlikely that a UN Mission will have sufficient PKISR to acquire all necessary information to satisfy the EEIs. However, it is important to maintain a complete IAP to assist the Mission in understanding where there are gaps in acquisition capabilities. For example, if several EEIs can only ever be answered by GPKI and the Mission has no GPKI acquisition assets then without the evidence to support this gap it is difficult for the Mission to provide

evidence of the requirement for additional acquisition capabilities. A consistent record over time that shows persistent PKI gaps is an important piece of management information for Mission leadership. Detail on appropriate tasking against the PKI disciplines will be covered in chapter four.

3.4. Prioritisation

3.4.1. The effective prioritisation of IRs is key to efficient closure of PKI gaps. There is no simple check-list to support the prioritisation process and therefore it is essential that those involved in the management of PKISR have a clear understanding of the Mission's priorities to produce an accurate IAL. The Mission mandate must be central to the formulation of the high-level priorities and core priorities established by the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy, including the requirement to prioritise protection of civilians across the Mission, must be duly factored into the process.

3.4.2. Whilst the Force IAP is a very important part of the process and it exists due to the knowledge gaps within the Mission, it cannot be the only focus of the acquisition process. It should be the basis for prioritising other Mission requirements that need PKISR support. The Mission will also conduct operations or humanitarian efforts that must also be supported with PKISR to enhance decision making. It is important that the PKISR section be represented during Mission planning and update meetings to ensure a clear understanding of Mission priorities.

3.4.3. It is impractical for Mission leadership to be involved in decision making on how the IRs are prioritised to generate the IAL. Therefore a process must be put in place within the PKISR section to establish how the prioritisation occurs. By using the IAP as the foundation for prioritising the U2 has a start point. Additional requirements can be more easily added into the list of IRs if there is a start point. Otherwise an overwhelming list of questions will need to be addressed. If the U2 starts with the IRs from the IAP then the majority of questions are already prioritised.

3.4.4. Military judgement is required to determine where the IRs generated by RFIs and I&W are placed in priority order in the list. The IRs from the IAP are already prioritised and the focus should be on where the remaining IRs are placed to produce the IAL. Factors such as geographic area, timeliness, threat to life, planning to support future operations and access to alternative means of acquisition are all factors to take into consideration.

3.4.5. The most efficient way to carry out the task is for one person to be responsible for producing the IAL. In the early stages of establishing the process, a second person should check and critique prioritisation decisions where appropriate. Attempting to generate the IAL as a team task is an inefficient use of time. Once the process is established and there is generally regular consensus on the prioritisation, the cross check can be done as needed.

3.4.6. A key part of establishing if the prioritisation process is appropriate is to maintain a management database of the completion of the daily IAL. Accurate record keeping of which IRs are satisfied and which are not is an essential part of both ensuring that the prioritisation process is appropriate, and to identify emerging gaps in acquisition capability. For the former, if I&W related IRs are never answered then perhaps a subconscious bias has been in effect favouring either IRs from EEIs or RFIs.

3.5. Force Peacekeeping-Intelligence Acquisition List

3.5.1. Regardless of the source of the IR, a complete list must be maintained in priority order to support the development of the IAL. The IAL will assign IRs against the most appropriate acquisition capability. The IAL should be relatively simple and not involve complex details that may confuse the acquisition unit. It should focus on the who, what, where, when, how.

| IAP Ref | IR | Indicators for reporting | Acquiring Unit | | | | Required by | Dissemination |
|---------|----|--------------------------|----------------|-------|-----|-------|-------------|---------------|
| | | | A Coy | B Coy | UAS | UN Ob | | |
| | | | | | | | | |

Figure 5: Suggested IAL Headings

3.5.2. The unit responsible for answering the IRs will consider everything they have been tasked to acquire for that day⁵ and will plan to answer as many IRs as possible in the most efficient way. It is important to include the “required by” column to allow the acquisition unit to plan effectively and ensure that they meet the timing deadlines for the customer.

3.5.3. Once the IR is incorporated into the acquisition unit’s daily tasking the unit must be prepared to analyse the information it acquires in accordance with the IR, focussing specifically on the “indicators for reporting”.⁶ As part of the detail within the IR, the speed at which a response is required and in what format should be considered. For example, if the unit requiring the information needs it as soon as possible, this could be communicated by voice over radio, via text or a messaging format such as skype for business – this detail should be included in the “dissemination” column.

3.5.4. It is not always necessary to produce a formal PKI product but where the information has been passed it is important for the acquisition unit to confirm with the customer if the information acquired answers their IR. Once this has been determined ISR Ops must be informed if the acquisition has been successful. If it has been successful then the IR can be removed from the IAL. If not, then it will need to be reprioritised against the following day’s IAL.

3.5.5. The following graphic describes the PKISR process and how it links with the MPKI cycle. The PKISR process enables the acquisition part of the MPKI cycle and delivers information to allow analysis to take place. The traditional start point of the PKISR process is the generation of the IR, which is then prioritised against other IRs to create a plan. The plan is then developed into the daily IAL which represents the tasking for the acquisition units. The results of the IAL are analysed and the customers of the IRs are consulted to determine if the information acquired answers the question. If the answer is yes then the IR is marked as complete, if the answer is partially the IR must be adapted to focus on the unanswered part and resubmitted for prioritisation and if the answer is no then the whole IR is resubmitted for prioritisation.

⁵ It should be noted that the nature of some PKISR units means they will be out in the field for several days at a time and this should be factored in when assigning tasking against the unit.

⁶ The indicators for reporting should be developed by the PKISR team to ensure that as much information is included by the acquisition unit to answer the IR.




Figure 6: PKISR Process

3.6. Tasking Process

3.6.1. The life of an IR takes a slightly different approach, depending on its origins. The EEI and I&W source takes a similar route as they are generated by the PKI part of the organisation whereas the RFIs take a slightly different approach. The following flow charts shows the life of each and can be used to develop the process in managing IRs.




Figure 7: Life of an EEI/I&W




Figure 8: Life of an RFI

3.6.2. Regardless of the origin of the RFI, good communication is required throughout the process to ensure that there is an accurate picture of what acquisition is planned and executed. This is essential during the results phase to ensure that there is clear understanding on the success of the acquisition, so tasking is not repeated unnecessarily.

3.7. Phases of Analysis

3.7.1. As part of the acquisition process it is important to define the different phases of analysis to provide a common framework of understanding for those requiring the services of the acquisition process, Chief ISR and the acquisition unit assigned the tasking. This framework should be used for the majority of acquisition, however, units that are out in the field on reconnaissance Missions or HPKI operatives should strive to pass time sensitive information within the timeframe specified, but complete reporting will be outside of the timelines below. The following phases should be used to describe the timeframe and format that acquisition units should use to disseminate responses to IRs.

| Phase | Time frame | Format | Level of detail |
|-------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|---|
| 1 | Immediately – within 10 minutes | Voice or text | Threat to life or time sensitive information |
| 2 | Within 2 hours of event capture | Text or basic product | Basic information relating to EEI, likely single source |
| 3 | Within 24 hours of event capture | Detailed product | Detailed analysis of event capture, possibly multiple sources |
| 4 | Within 72 hours of event capture | Advanced product | Multi source document with detailed analysis and assessment |

Figure 9: Phases of Analysis

3.7.2. The IAL should identify what phase of exploitation is expected of the acquisition unit and more than one could be expected. For example, the generation of a Phase 2 product to support immediate planning might be required whilst a more detailed product is awaited. It would be unreasonable to expect every acquisition unit to generate a Phase 4 report if they do not have the appropriate resources. For example, a Tactical Intelligence Unit should be capable of generating an advanced, Phase 4 level report, however, a UAS unit will not be able to produce anything more than a Phase 3 report. It is essential that Chief ISR has a very good understanding of all acquisition units within the Mission to ensure expectations of analysis are managed.

3.8. Dissemination

3.8.1. Once the IR has been answered in accordance with the defined phase level the next step within the process is dissemination. In all instances the IAP Manager must receive generated products to allow the update of the IAP but also to retain the information for future reference in a central repository. Where the IR related to an EEI or I&W the verified completion of the task can be done by the IAP Manager. If the IR was generated by an RFI then only the demander can confirm if the response meets their requirement.

3.8.2. It is essential that the dissemination requirements are included in the RFI to ensure this process happens smoothly. This is particularly important when the acquisition unit is expected to disseminate threat information. For example, if a UAS unit is tasked to provide over watch of



camp security following PKI reporting that a mortar team is active in the area, if the UAS unit has no idea who or how to disseminate information they might be forced to watch a mortar attack to occur with no means to alert the camp. The role of the RFI manager is essential in this process and RFIs must be rejected if they do not include appropriate dissemination requirements to the task.

3.8.3. Once dissemination is complete the IAP must be updated to reflect open and complete IRs to ensure that an effective IAL is generated for the next day. Once the process is established, IALs can be generated up to 3 days in advance with only minor adjustments taking into account IRs that were not able to be acquired on a given day. Whilst it is a dynamic process it does not need to be last minute.

3.9. Peacekeeping-ISR Management Board

3.9.1. In order to keep the Mission up to date with PKISR activities it is useful to provide a monthly summary of activity. Allowing a visual representation of how PKISR assets are being used will assist the leadership in determining if their priorities are correct. The briefing can be part of routine Mission meetings and does not necessarily need to be a dedicated briefing. It can often help if it is incorporated into wider meetings to increase the visibility of the use of PKISR across the Mission while giving due consideration to confidentiality concerns.

3.9.2. The monthly briefing to the Mission leadership is likely best supported by the PKISR team regularly conducting a PKISR Management Board (PKIMB). The frequency of the board will depend on the volume of PKISR acquisition assets and the complexity of the Mission. The PKIMB is an important part of the PKISR process to ensure effective management oversight of activity and that appropriate command and control is being executed.

3.9.3. The PKIMB can stand alone as a separate meeting or be incorporated into other PKI related meetings such as the Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism (MICM). In some Missions, the JMAC fulfils an important leading role in the MICM that directs and oversees the MPKI cycle within the Mission. If the MICM process is not active within the Mission, then the PKIMB should be led by Chief U2.

3.9.4. The point of the PKIMB is to validate the priorities to support the development of the IAL. The IAL is a daily process but the PKIMB should not be. A simple, regular confirmation that the PIRs remain valid and correctly prioritised allows the PKISR team to have clear direction and guidance. The PKIMB can also be the venue to discuss upcoming operations and PKISR support to the planning and execution process to further assist in prioritising the IRs that will be generated from RFIs and I&W.

3.9.5. The status of PKISR capabilities must also be discussed to ensure a common picture of availability and a formal mechanism to monitor persistent serviceability or availability issues. Emerging gaps in acquisition capability can also be discussed to support Mission leadership decision making on requesting additional support. There is no set formal format for the PKIMB, but a suggested format is discussed in greater detail in Annex A to this chapter.

3.10. PKIMB Participation

3.10.1. The PKIMB should be run by Chief ISR but be chaired by Chief U2 as a minimum. Appropriate participation by other Mission elements such as the JMAC and UN Police should be encouraged. All the major elements of the PKISR team are required to brief and the equivalent

elements within the sectors and representatives from each of the acquisition capabilities should also be required to attend via VTC. Participation should not be limited to those listed and attendance should be encouraged across all elements of the Mission, particularly the U6 or Field Technology Services (FTS) given the reliance of PKISR on robust communications networks. In larger Missions it is possible that the Mission leadership might wish to chair the PKIMB, in which case a monthly update is not required as Mission use of PKISR will be discussed and Mission leadership can provide direction and guidance within the PKIMB process.

3.11. PKIMB Format

3.11.1. The PKIMB should start with a PKI update. Ideally this will incorporate the U2, JMAC and police elements to ensure a complete, common picture of activity and assessment of the Mission. It is important that the finite PKISR acquisition assets are used to support the whole Mission and the PKIMB is a good mechanism to bring the military, police and civilian elements together.

3.11.2. Following a PKI update a review of the previous month's activity should be conducted. A good metric to track is the percentage effort of acquisition against EEIs, RFIs and I&W. This will assist in determining if the weight of activity is appropriate based on the ongoing situation in the Mission. If it is determined that there is a disproportionate effort against a certain area, then adjustments to prioritisation can take place.

3.11.3. Within this section of the PKIMB the persistent inability to address IRs must be covered with detailed discussion on why it has not been possible to acquire information against them. This is an important part of the process to develop a clear picture on acquisition gaps. This will help Mission decision making on requesting additional support for specific acquisition capabilities and will support the definition of requirements to fill the gaps.

3.11.4. The next step within the PKIMB is to review at least the PIR portion of the IAP. It is unnecessary to review it in its entirety as there is too much detail. High-level priorities must be discussed and adjusted, where appropriate. The entire IAP should be comprehensively reviewed at least every 6 months but ideally once a quarter. The point of the review is to ensure that the prioritisation within the IAP is appropriate.

3.11.5. At this stage the Mission's following month's focus should also be briefed to ensure a clear picture of upcoming efforts. The brief should include operational focus and the ongoing humanitarian picture to allow for a discussion on the relative priority of activity to support the development of the IAL. It is also important to manage expectations of PKISR support. For example, if the U35 expects UAS support for an upcoming pre-planned operation but an increase in IDP activity is deemed a higher priority to cover, the U35 needs to factor this into planning. If the UAS is considered essential for force protection, it may be appropriate to delay the pre-planned operation until the IDP verification process is complete. This highlights why full support for the PKIMB should be supported across the Mission.

3.11.6. The final part of the PKIMB should be on the availability of PKISR acquisition capabilities, to the widest extent possible. Patrol tasks should be discussed to emphasise the concept that "every soldier is a sensor" and patrol reporting is an important part of the process. In the early stages patrol reports can be reviewed and the IAP updated with any relevant information. As the process matures patrols could be allocated tasking against the IAP.









3.11.7. For airborne acquisition assets it is useful to capture management data such as 'hours tasked' against 'hours flown'. Other entities within the Mission need to gather such data for a variety of reasons but the U2 must maintain an overview of how successful the assets have been in actually performing their key role as an acquisition asset. This helps with decision making on the long-term viability of the asset to the Mission.

3.11.8. On completion of the PKIMB the appropriate feedback should be captured to brief Mission leadership to support the prioritisation process. If the leadership chairs the PKIMB this will not be necessary as it will be discussed in the meeting.



**Annex A to
Chapter Three of
UN PKISR Staff Handbook**

Example of PKIMB Process

| | |
|--|---|
|  <p>Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Management Board</p> <p>Example Slide Pack</p> |  <p>Agenda</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PKI Update • Previous Month's Acquisition • Unsuccessful Acquisition • IAP Review • RFI Review • Next Month's Acquisition • Acquisition Capability Status |
| <p>UN Confidential 1</p>  <p>Peacekeeping-Intelligence Update</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JMAC Update • Police Update • Military Update <p>Briefed by analysts</p> | <p>UN Confidential 2</p>  <p>Previous Month's Acquisition</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Breakdown of IR activity – IAP, RFI and I&W • Main areas of focus (geographically) • Main emphasis of each discipline <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eg GPKI/HPKI • Examples of reporting • Success stories <p>Briefed by ISR Ops</p> |
| <p>UN Confidential 3</p>  <p>Unsuccessful Acquisition</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Percentage tasking unsuccessful by intelligence discipline or by capability <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small missions might only have UAS so report on that • Airborne assets track hours tasked vs hours flown • Recce patrol track number tasked with acquisition vs number of patrols reporting • So what? • Strategies for resolution • Report any trends <p>Briefed by ISR Ops</p> | <p>UN Confidential 4</p>  <p>IAP Review</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To PIR level • Is it still relevant? • Is it still achievable? • Track how many EEIs have been answered, by what <p>Briefed by IAP Manager</p> |
| <p>UN Confidential 5</p> | <p>UN Confidential 6</p> |



RFI Review

- Number of RFIs returned to unit for reworking
- Number of outstanding RFIs
- Number of RFIs answered in the past month

Briefed by RFI Manager

UN Confidential

Next Month's Acquisition

- Geographic and operational focus

Briefed by ISR Plans

7

UN Confidential

8

Acquisition Capabilities Status

- By acquisition unit
 - Serviceability issues
 - Unit rotation issues

Briefed by ISR Plans

UN Confidential

9

UN Confidential

10

Any Questions?

CHAPTER FOUR

4. The Peacekeeping-Intelligence Disciplines

In order to effectively task PKI acquisition capabilities it is important to know the strength of the individual disciplines and which is most appropriately tasked against the IRs.

The Mission will not necessarily have access to a wide variety of acquisition capabilities and must make the best use of those available. However, it is important to capture the extent to which the IRs are unable to support development of a clear picture of acquisition gaps. This is particularly important to assist with describing what capabilities are required and to determine if they can be resourced by either a commercial solution or by a Troop Contributing Country.

The following is a brief overview of the PKI disciplines and the various considerations for tasking.

4.1. Geospatial Peacekeeping-Intelligence (GPKI)

4.1.1. The GPKI discipline refers to the PKI gained through the analysis of geographic imagery and geospatial data. It includes the sub-discipline of Imagery Peacekeeping-Intelligence (IPKI) and the fundamental difference between the two is that an IPKI product will only use imagery to provide the assessment, which might use multiple imagery sources; once geospatial information is incorporated into the product, it becomes GPKI. An example of this might be providing 3 dimensional products to show an unobserved area in the vicinity of a check point. The product will need to be a visual image but will include shaded areas which shows what is not visible from the checkpoint.

4.1.2. In order to generate a 3-dimensional product, terrain data is required to allow the geospatial analysts to determine what is and is not visible from different locations. Terrain data is more than just elevation, however. It also covers elements such as forestation, waterways and soil samples, for example, all of which are essential to understand the Mission and will assist particularly in protection of civilians tasking.

4.1.3. There are a variety of GPKI capabilities available to the Mission, however, there is usually a cost associated with the resource. Satellite imagery is available from the Geospatial Intelligence Section (GIS), which is part of FTS. The GIS team will have ready access to an archive of imagery, which can be used to support operational planning or provide a baseline image to show how things have changed using other GPKI assets within the Mission. It is possible to task satellites to collect more up-to-date imagery, but this will come at a cost, which must be approved by the Director of Mission Support (DMS) or Chief of Mission Support (CMS) through FTS. Other avenues should be explored before committing to tasking satellite imagery, such as checking if the satellite imagery is already available through free resources or if airborne capabilities such as UAS could acquire the imagery.

4.1.4. Satellite imagery is very good for wide area coverage of an area, providing a relatively detailed overview of an area. There are three main types of commercial satellite imagery: electro-optical (EO), infra-red (IR) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR), each with their own advantages and disadvantages. Satellite imagery is best exploited using specific tools designed to analyse the imagery, which will allow the analyst to adjust the image to sharpen aspects and gain far more PKI value than using basic tools.

4.1.5. The most commonly available imagery type is EO, which will be most easily understood by non-analysts given the image is a familiar view, albeit from overhead. The EO imagery is only useful during the day time as it relies on daylight. An EO image will also be affected by heavy rain and dust, which will make it difficult to see what is happening.

4.1.6. A satellite-based IR image is useful at both day and night and will identify camp fires, hot engines on vehicles and other heat sources not necessarily visible to the human eye. An IR image is a useful indicator of activity which is not possible to determine from an EO source, however, an IR sensor will also suffer from weather such as dust storms and heavy clouds.

4.1.7. A SAR image will require specialised imagery analysis training to exploit and it is difficult for an untrained person to make sense of the image. It is not affected by weather and can be tasked during the day and at night. SAR sensors are particularly useful for monitoring flooding and can be very effective during a humanitarian crisis such as this.

4.1.8. These three space-based sensors are also available on airborne platforms, both manned and unmanned, however weather limitations remain the same for the sensors. There are advantages and disadvantages to manned and unmanned assets, but the principal difference is that an unmanned platform will provide greater persistence as it can stay airborne for longer whereas a manned platform will be able to fly quicker and is more flexible for dynamic re-tasking. To get a better understanding of the different types of unmanned systems the UN's UAS Guidelines published in February 2019 provides a good overview.

4.1.9. It is also possible to use cameras as GPKI capabilities, which is particularly useful for covering areas where persistent surveillance is required, such as within built up areas. These are best used as Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras which can provide an excellent overview of an area of interest. There is an element of inflexibility with CCTV as they can not be rapidly relocated and therefore a detailed assessment of the area must be conducted to ensure they are sighted in the most appropriate locations. Furthermore, the nature of fixed cameras means that they will be blind to areas of dead ground and they will not be able to follow activity behind buildings. They should be used as a blended capability but when used correctly they offer an excellent, cost effective means of surveillance.

4.1.10. The type of tasking most suited to GPKI capabilities relates to the need to see activity or change. Regular satellite imagery tasking can result in a pattern of life over time of strategic areas of interest such as border crossings or IDP/refugee camps. The analysis can be outsourced to a commercial provider, but a detailed set of requirements/questions must be provided to make the most of the service. Alternatively, if the Mission has imagery analysts then the raw data can be procured and re-used several times for different products.

4.1.11. The use of airborne GPKI sensors are appropriate for tasking where activity changes more frequently and is more tactical in nature. For example, a UAS would be very well used providing persistent surveillance of known armed groups. The ability to build a picture of activity and locations associated with an armed group can grow understanding of the network.

4.1.12. Larger UAS with SAR sensors capable of Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) are well used in a wide area surveillance task. The large area that can be covered very quickly allows for efficient tasking in monitoring transhumance or smuggling networks. The GMTI sensor will identify moving objects that can then be verified using the EO sensors on board. Objects of interest may then be tracked over large distances to develop understanding of activity.

4.1.13. Smaller UAS are better used for more tactical tasking such as overwatch of a convoy to look ahead for potential Improvised Explosive Device (IED) emplacement activity. A good communication link between the UAS operators and the unit within the convoy is essential for early warning of activity. Another good task for tactical UAS is enhancing camp security, providing overwatch to alert for potential enemy rocket or mortar action.

4.2. Signals Peacekeeping-Intelligence (SPKI)

4.2.1. There are undoubtedly clear benefits to the use of SPKI in UN peacekeeping missions, however, there are a number of factors that must be taken into consideration ahead of any future deployment of SPKI capabilities. Of note, there will be the need to engage with the host nation's judicial system to determine the boundaries of what can and cannot be acquired to support implementation of the mandate.

4.2.2. It would be premature to develop the SPKI aspect of the PKISR Staff Handbook ahead of the development of policy surrounding how the UN engages with the host nation ahead of any potential deployment. To that end, the PKISR Staff Handbook acknowledges SPKI as an important and valuable discipline, but specific guidance on how to manage the capability will only be developed once the policy and the framework to facilitate the legal process is in place.

4.3. Human Peacekeeping-Intelligence (HPKI)⁷

4.3.1. The use of HPKI in peacekeeping can only be used in a non-clandestine manner. For this reason, Mission personnel may not operate based on a covert or false identity to acquire peacekeeping-intelligence. It can be a very valuable resource to the Mission but must be managed by qualified personnel. The safety of a HPKI source and their family is paramount and therefore it is essential that any HPKI capability is carefully managed. Missions must keep any human sources of information confidential and ensure that measures are in place to safeguard the ongoing safety of the source and his or her protection against any retaliation.

4.3.2. Under no circumstances should the Mission recruit or otherwise cultivate children as HPKI sources given that they cannot form the necessary free and informed consent to engage in such sensitive activities.

4.3.3. HPKI planners must consider what protection risks a potential source may face before they establish any contact. In sensitive settings, merely being seen as being contacted by the UN may arouse suspicion and place a person at risk of reprisals or intimidation. If that risk cannot be contained, the source should not be cultivated. Planners also have to consider contingency protection measures should a source be exposed. Sections with experience in protecting sensitive sources, such as human rights components, can be approached for advice.⁸

4.3.4. In cases of credible threats of physical violence against individual Mission interlocutors or notable personalities or figures, Missions may consider instituting specific measures to protect individuals. Such measures may for example include measures to prevent and address intimidation and reprisals for cooperation with the Mission, advice and guidance on self-protection measures, documentation and reporting of cases and, in certain cases, the static

⁷ For more guidance on the use of HPKI in UN peacekeeping missions, refer to the "Acquisition of Information from Human Sources for Peacekeeping-Intelligence" Guidelines

⁸ For general UN guidance on the protection of sources, see <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Chapter14-56pp.pdf>

deployment of armed units outside the individual's residence or the regular patrolling of its environs. Guidance on such measures must first be sought from UN Headquarters.

4.3.5. It can take a significant amount of time to develop a HPKI source, particularly if they need time to gain access to persons of interest. A HPKI source can be used in a passive or active way; they can be asked to report on atmospherics or can be provided with a list of questions to seek answers to. Both are of immense value to the Mission and a well-placed source can provide invaluable information in supporting the protection of civilians and UN personnel. However, as part of the process of managing HPKI sources, understanding the individual's motivation for providing information is required to determine bias and to allow analysts to apply an appropriate weighting to the value of the information. No amount of money will be paid, nor gifts offered, to HPKI sources, or their relatives, in remuneration for information.

4.3.6. A HPKI source can be asked to gather information relating to the need to establish an armed group's intent to attack UN personnel or villages. It is possible to gather atmospherics on perceptions towards UN operations but a HPKI source can also support reintegration activity by gauging attitudes of individual fighters.

4.3.7. HPKI may be received from contacts in national intelligence agencies of the Host State or third states, however, HPKI sources cannot be Host State employees or affiliated personnel, unless the relationship has been approved in advance by both the Head of Mission and the Host State. Nonetheless, at all times the Mission's PKI process must remain independent and must not air, assist or instigate human rights violations by other actors. In particular, information requests to national intelligence contacts must be carefully examined to ensure that they do not risk instigating any national human rights violations, notably by requesting information that is likely to be gained from torture or other human rights violations. Information must not be shared with national intelligence contacts if there is a real risk that it may assist in the violation of human rights, including torture, arbitrary arrest or the denial of freedom of expression, association and assembly.

4.3.8. Prior to sharing any PKI or intelligence products, a written agreement must be secured from the recipient stipulating that such products will not be used to instigate or facilitate the commission of human rights violations, breaches of international humanitarian law, or any other domestic or international crime. Similarly, should the mission decide to share a PKI or intelligence product, or should a non-UN entity with whom the mission has shared a PKI or intelligence product request its permission to further share the product with non-UN security forces, particular attention should be paid to ensure their full compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces (HRDDP).

4.4. Open Source Peacekeeping-Intelligence (OPKI)

4.4.1. OPKI generates a significant volume of data that needs evaluating to determine its usefulness. An OPKI analyst will be best used using specific tools to allow for the rapid sorting and prioritisation of Publicly Available Information (PAI) such as Twitter, YouTube and Facebook feeds. An OPKI analyst must only use PAI in UN peacekeeping operations, but the resource is an excellent addition to the U2.

4.4.2. An OPKI analyst acts in a passive way by gathering the PAI to analyse attitudes, behaviours or perceptions. It is possible to task OPKI with key I&W, for example, alerting the Mission to videos produced by armed group leaders suggesting future attacks against civilians



or UN peacekeepers, for example. A skilled OPKI analyst will bear in mind the bias associated with news feeds when providing assessments based on these sources.

4.4.3. All Missions should consider a dedicated OPKI analyst within the U2; however, laws and general attitude of the Host State must be taken into account when determining how much resource to apply against the task. Where a government has a high degree of control of the media, the local population may have restricted access to the open internet and mobile telecommunications. If so, consideration must be given to the level of information that could be acquired from OPKI. PAI may be limited in some countries during periods of unrest and a reliance on this a significant source of information could become compromised.



CHAPTER FIVE

5. PKISR Roles

There are a few key roles, which are essential in the management of PKISR. In larger Missions these roles might be undertaken by individuals whereas in smaller Missions one person might need to take on more than one function. Whilst this is not ideal, smaller Missions will have fewer PKISR capabilities, which should mean that the tasks are still manageable.

There are two parts to the management of PKISR, Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirements Management (IRM) and Acquisition Management (AM). The IRM part deals with the RFIs and I&W and manages the IAP whereas AM deals with the planning and tasking of the operation. Communication between the two entities is essential to ensure the most effective use of what are finite resources.

5.1. Force Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirements Management

IAP Manager

5.1.1. Within IRM management of the IAP is fundamental to the whole process. The IAP is a living document and should drive most of the acquisition within the Mission. A good IAP will allow the most effective tasking of PKISR assets. Careful tracking of activity will demonstrate to the Mission leadership how effective PKISR operations are.

5.1.2. The IAP should be updated on a regular basis to ensure that the priorities remain in line with the Mission leadership's intent. This can be achieved through a quarterly meeting with the leadership to discuss their requirements. The IAP must also be updated when information gaps are closed to ensure that PKISR assets are not being misused on tasking. For example, an EEI could relate to a specific village that is under threat of attack. If that village is destroyed by an armed group then unless there is new reporting perhaps relating to people returning, there will be no requirement to continue to monitor the village.

5.1.3. The IAP Manager should also have responsibility for monitoring the I&W process and feeding the IRs generated into ISR Plans for acquisition. There is often a close link between the I&W and the IAP and therefore the IAP Manager should oversee both aspects. To ensure the most efficient management of IRs and a seamless process for handing over the IRs to the AM section for acquisition, the IAP Manager should also take the IRs developed by the RFI Manager (from RFIs received by the U2) and compile all active IRs into a prioritised list. This list is then passed to ISR Plans for developing into an IAL.

5.1.4. The IAP Manager is part of the acquisition process as the monitor of the IAP to determine if EEIs have been answered. Each Mission manages the IAP differently, however, it is generally easier to keep a core IAP and review it periodically than to treat it as a document that is updated every time an EEI is answered. It is important for the IAP Manager to keep track of what has been answered to avoid repeat tasking, however, it is easier to get a picture of how things are developing if there is a periodic review rather than constantly updating the IAP.



RFI Manager⁹

5.1.5. The second key role within the IRM part of the team is the RFI Manager. This manager is the main point of contact for those outside of the PKISR team and responsible for answering PKI requirements.

5.1.6. The RFI Manager's first task is to review every RFI received to ensure that all information has been filled out correctly by the customer. Essential elements of the RFI include a location of where the acquisition is required in as much detail as possible, ideally with a geolocation included, a date and time that the information is required by and how the information is to be disseminated. This is particularly important for requests to support activity that will require real-time updates. For example, a UAS overwatch of a convoy must include the ability to communicate with the convoy. If the UAS team observe an IED being set up ahead of the convoy then it is essential that there is a means to warn the convoy of the activity. RFIs without dissemination information must be rejected and returned to the customer to be updated.

5.1.7. Once the RFI has been accepted by the manager, the next task should be to determine if the information already exists. One of the fundamental principles of PKISR is to "acquire once, use many", meaning that instead of acquiring new information for every request, if the answer already exists then this should be sent to the customer to determine if it meets their needs. It is recognised that in some Missions it will be a challenge to know if the information already exists but if databases are in use, this will be the place to check.

5.1.8. If the information does not exist already, the RFI Manager should consult the IAP to determine if the RFI relates to any of the EEIs, which will assist in the prioritisation process. If the RFI is a PKI request that does not relate directly to an EEI then the topic should be recorded. When the IAP is updated this information should be reviewed to determine if the IAP properly reflects the Mission's PKI requirements. RFIs should not be rejected if they do not relate to EEIs. There will be times when the PKISR capabilities are required for operational purposes rather than PKI. It is however important to track the operational use of PKISR assets to assess over time if the Mission is focused on closing PKI gaps or if the assets are being used for operational purposes.

5.1.9. To support the prioritisation process the RFI Manager should develop the elements within the RFI into IRs. It may be that one RFI contains multiple questions, each of which should be developed into an IR that can be answered. It is the RFI Manager's job to develop these IRs and to ensure that the indicators are appropriate to the topic. Once the RFI has been broken down into individual IRs, they should be passed to the IAP Manager who will develop the complete list of prioritised IRs.

5.1.10. On receipt of the IRs from the RFI Manager, the IAP Manager will assign a priority to each IR. Where the RFI relates directly to the IAP, this is straightforward. If it is operational tasking or if the RFI does not relate to the IAP it becomes more challenging to assign an appropriate priority to the RFI. Prioritisation is essential as without it there is no way to ensure that the critical aspects of the Mission are being covered.

5.1.11. Determining priority of operational RFIs requires a good understanding of what the Mission is focussed on. Guidance should be sought from the U2 when in doubt. For example, a request for seven continuous days of UAS coverage over a route ahead of a planned convoy

⁹ An example RFI format is at Annex A to this chapter

when there are no reports relating to the potential for IED activity might be assigned a low priority compared to building a pattern of life of an area ahead of a new patrol base being built. There are no right or wrong answers in prioritising operational tasking, but sound military judgement based on a clear understanding of Mission priorities and activities is essential.

5.1.12. Once all IRs are placed in priority order, the list is passed to the AM side of the PKISR team to allow them to plan the acquisition of PKI to answer the RFI.

5.1.13. Once the IRs relating to the RFI are successfully answered, the AM team must inform the RFI Manager, who is responsible for contacting the customer to confirm that the RFI has been answered. It is not necessary for the RFI Manager to disseminate the PKI product, particularly when there is a time-sensitive aspect to the RFI, but it is very important to ensure RFIs are closed to maintain an accurate oversight of the scale of unanswered daily tasking.

5.2. Force Acquisition Management

PKISR Plans

5.2.1. The role of the PKISR Planner is to have a short- and medium-term view on what PKI gaps or RFIs need closing and which PKISR capabilities are best placed to answer them. This includes considering geographical locations of acquisition assets as well as whether the asset is physically capable of answering the question. For example, a UAS is not well tasked to determine atmospheric data as it is unlikely the unit will have the context of what they are looking at. In this case a HPKI team is better placed to answer the question.

5.2.2. Whilst the PKISR capabilities should focus on answering PKI gaps, operational planning must be taken into consideration, hence the medium-term view. For example, if a unit has a planned operation in 3 weeks' time, the PKISR planner must factor in pattern of life requirements ahead of the operation and overwatch during execution and ensure that appropriate PKISR capabilities are available to support for the duration, assuming the operation is considered a high enough priority.

5.2.3. When conducting routine PKISR acquisition, the best approach is to have a rolling 72-hour IAL which must be flexible enough to accommodate new time-sensitive tasking. At the 72-hour point a broad review of where the PKISR assets will be tasked is considered against what should be established. This is communicated to the units to determine feasibility. As the time frame closes, the plan should become more mature and at the 24-hour point the plan is passed to the PKISR Ops role to execute.

5.2.4. The PKISR Planner has three "living" IALs: one at the 72-hour point, one at the 48-hour point and one at the 24-hour point. The planner must be able to deal with impact of dynamic tasking and adjust the plans to ensure that deadlines are met. Notwithstanding dynamic tasking, the closer the IAL gets to the 24-hour point the more accurate and refined it is.

5.2.5. The PKISR Planner's job is never complete. There are always unknowns within the Mission and when there are no RFIs or operational tasks to complete, emphasis must be on the IAP and answering the EEIs. The PKISR Planner must have a very good understanding of the IAP and routinely assign tasks to the PKISR assets to close the gaps.

5.2.6. An effective PKISR Planner adheres closely to the prioritisation schema, ensuring that all IRs are appropriately prioritised to develop an effective IAL. There is an art and a science to



this role and the planner must not be too dogmatic about the process. A good understanding of what PKISR assets are available and the optimum acquisition asset to answer the questions will support the process.

5.2.7. Over time the role becomes quite instinctive and the planner develops the ability to blend unplanned events such as poor weather or a changing operational plan with the planned events to minimise the impact to the IAL and maximise the acquisition opportunities.

PKISR Ops

5.2.8. The PKISR Ops function focusses on the 24-hour period before and after the point of acquisition. The IAL is handed over to the PKISR Ops role 24 hours before execution. The PKISR Ops individual should check the plan to make sure it is achievable and liaise with the acquisition elements to ensure they understand the tasking. At this point, priorities should also be discussed such that if a Mission is cut short for any reason, the acquisition unit understands what the key aspects of the task are to focus on these.

5.2.9. The PKISR Ops role is the key position for dynamic tasking situations. It is the PKISR Ops officer's job to determine which asset is most appropriate to support the dynamic tasking and to liaise with the respective unit to ensure that the new tasking is understood. Once the urgency of the situation has subsided, PKISR Ops should then clarify with the unit what tasking was not completed and liaise with PKISR Plans to ensure the missed tasking is incorporated into future plans.

5.2.10. Once the acquisition period is over, it is the PKISR Ops' job to ensure that the acquisition unit disseminates the product to the customer of the RFI or to the U2 in the case of tasking against the IAP or I&W. The PKISR Ops must also track the success or otherwise of the PKISR plan for that day. This is a very important function, most notably to ensure that if PKI gaps were closed such that the U2 can update the IAP to ensure that PKISR assets are not tasked against gaps that no longer exist.

5.2.11. Where commercial PKISR capabilities are used within the Mission, it is the PKISR Ops' function to determine "mission success" regarding a tasking specifically applied to the commercial provider.

5.2.12. The PKISR Ops individual must inform the RFI Manager if the acquisition unit considers that dissemination is complete to allow the RFI Manager to confirm with the customer if the RFI is closed. Where the daily PKISR plan included tasking against the IAP or an I&W, the PKISR Ops post must communicate with the IAP Manager, who will in turn determine with the U2 if the IR is answered.

5.2.13. The PKISR Ops task is also never completed, unless there is no PKISR acquisition planned on a given day. The PKISR Ops role can be very dynamic and the individual must be flexible to accommodate emerging, high priority requirements. For example, if reporting is received notifying the Mission of acts of genocide occurring, the PKISR Ops individual must react to this as a matter of high priority to divert acquisition assets to determine ground truth and to track the perpetrators, if possible.

5.2.14. The following graphic shows where the two sections are represented in the PKISR process.




Figure 10: PKISR Roles and the Process

5.2.15. The management of PKISR is complex and the key to success is good communication across all the roles described here and with Mission leadership and customers. If these processes are new to a Mission then introduce them slowly and consider evolving the roles within the U2 over time to adapt. In time the PKIMB process can be introduced and the Mission should not seek to attempt to adjust too quickly and to allow a phased approach to changing.



**Annex A to
Chapter Five of
UN PKISR Staff Handbook**

Example RFI Form

| RFI Form | | | |
|--|--|--|---|
| 1 Priority | Immediate <input type="checkbox"/> Routine <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 Security Classification | <input type="checkbox"/> Strictly Confidential <input type="checkbox"/> UN Confidential <input type="checkbox"/> Unclassified |
| 4 Reference Number | | 3 DTG of Request | |
| 4 Reference Number | | 5 Subject | |
| 6 Type of situation | | 7 U2 Reference | |
| Life threatening <input type="checkbox"/> Mission critical <input type="checkbox"/> Mission essential <input type="checkbox"/> Mission desirable <input type="checkbox"/> | | | |
| 8 Request | | | |
| 9 When required | | | |
| No later than: | | Date | |
| | | Time | |
| 10 Format | | | |
| Verbal <input type="checkbox"/> Written <input type="checkbox"/> Graphic <input type="checkbox"/> | | | |
| 11 Dissemination information | | Contact details, email, radio call sign, telephone | |
| 12 Location | | Region | |
| | | Name of village/area | |
| | | Grid reference | |
| 13 Point of contact | | | |
| 14 Remarks | | Safety and security issues? | |
| 15 Intent to share? | | With whom? | |



CHAPTER SIX

6. PKISR for the Wider Mission

6.1. PKISR for the JMAC and UNPOL

6.1.1. Whilst PKISR assets are managed within the U2, it is important that the Mission develops a process to allow both the JMAC and UNPOL access to the ability to task against the capabilities within the Mission. The practical elements of this should be conducted by the U2 using processes described within the handbook. This should allow for a straightforward ability of the JMAC and UNPOL to engage in the process.

6.1.2. A challenge for the U2 is the ability to incorporate the IAPs of the different organisations within the Mission into effective tasking. It will take sound judgement and communication to ensure that the IRs generated from the different IAPs are prioritised against the Force IAP to allow for a complete set of Mission priorities for acquisition. The best means to achieve this is through the PKIMB process.

6.1.3. Once all IRs are prioritised then the process for managing the IAL is the same as if it were just for the Force and feedback is still required to determine if the IRs were answered. Likewise, the JMAC and UNPOL may submit RFIs that are not covered within their respective IAPs and these should be treated and prioritised in the same way that any other RFIs are managed.

6.1.4. There may be times when the priorities of the Mission are such that the entire focus of the majority of PKISR assets are dedicated to the requirements of either the JMAC or UNPOL. An example of this could be a large-scale humanitarian crisis within an IDP camp that is exacerbated by aggressive armed group behaviours. Alternatively, unstable national elections could require a heightened level of UNPOL support for security purposes and PKISR is required to support this activity.

6.1.5. In either of these scenarios (or similar situations), the PKIMB can be the mechanism to manage the prioritisation decision making for dedicating PKISR to either JMAC or UNPOL for a specific purpose. Where the periodicity of the PKIMB is not frequent enough for rapidly changing situations, an ad-hoc meeting can be convened to discuss the issue and reach consensus on where PKISR assets should be best used.

6.1.6. The PKISR capabilities within the Mission should be there to support all PKI disciplines and not just the Force. Developing a good process to support the wider areas is essential to support the Mission's efforts in delivering against the mandate.

6.2. PKISR at the Battalion level

6.2.1. The PKISR process is complex and can be overwhelming, which can cause elements within the Mission to not engage fully in the process. This handbook provides guidance at the Force and sector level, which should be operating in a similar way to each other but focussing on their respective IAPs. However, there is also a role at the battalion level, as a critical acquisition resource for the Mission.



6.2.2. The concept of “every soldier is a sensor” is exceptionally valid in peacekeeping operations where unit patrols interact with the local population and can provide valuable information on local issues.

6.2.3. The battalion S2 should also have an IAP covering the area of interest for the unit. The S2 should be very aware of where the unit will be operating ahead of time to provide questions for the patrols to answer. The IAP can be used as the basis for this tasking and the S2 should liaise with the S5 and S35 in time to ensure that the tasking matches the geographic operating area.

6.2.4. Once patrols have been completed the S2 should meet the patrol leader for a debrief on the information gathered as part of the patrol. If possible, the patrols should be tasked to take photographs of areas of interest and if available, micro UAS can also be tasked for observation purposes and the S2 can extract imagery information from either sensor.

6.2.5. The S2 should also be prepared to receive RFIs from either the Sector or Force level or from neighbouring battalions. In these cases, the S2 should incorporate the tasking into the process and request patrols to acquire the information. The S2 does not need to generate a complex IAL process as the volume of IRs would not require that level of detail. Instead, the S2 should maintain a complete awareness of the battalion’s IAP and RFIs that have been received. The S2 will have to act as all parts of the IRM and AM function.

6.2.6. In addition to being responsible for IRM and AM at the battalion level, the S2 also has the authority to submit RFIs up the chain of command where the battalion does not have the means to answer the questions. The S2 will need to keep track of the RFIs that have been submitted and regularly communicate with the G2 and U2 to determine the status.

6.2.7. In summary, the S2 can choose to incorporate various elements of this handbook into their daily working practices, but early emphasis must be on providing tasking to every patrol and debriefing them on their return. The concept of providing information to the S2 must become instinctive within the battalion and once this is in place the S2 can focus on expanding the role to incorporate more aspects of the handbook into their daily work.

CHAPTER SEVEN

7. Role of PKISR Units in the Process

7.1. Overview

7.1.1. The relatively new concept of PKI within the UN means that manuals to support the deployment of PKISR assets are not yet available, however, there is an increasing requirement for PKISR in Missions, that can be filled by either commercial or military units. Until such time that a manual can be developed to support the deployment of PKISR capabilities into Missions, the PKISR Staff Handbook is the most appropriate location to describe how the various PKISR units fit into the process.

7.1.2. Regardless of the type of unit, all acquisition capabilities are in Missions to provide PKI to support decision making against the mandate. The tasking of the units should complement their capabilities such that they are not being asked to acquire information that they are not able to provide. The use of PKISR liaison officers in the U2 helps considerably with this task to ensure that the units are being tasked optimally. The liaison officers can be used to support PKISR Plans to develop the IALs.

7.1.3. It is more efficient to provide multiple tasks to the PKISR units so they can plan more flexibly and adapt whilst on tasking if weather precludes them operating in a certain area, for example. By having a range of tasking the unit can plan to acquire as much as possible in the most efficient manner and communicate to PKISR Ops that which was not possible for acquisition. By using the liaison officers, the PKISR Plans officer can develop a good appreciation for unit's capabilities and reduce the amount of tasking that will not be achievable.

7.2. UAS Unit

7.2.1. There are a wide range of UAS types that can be used to support acquisition in peacekeeping missions. The UAS Guidelines¹⁰ give an overview of the considerations of using UAS. Class I UAS are tactical in nature and are normally used by individual units on the ground given their relatively short range and endurance, Class II UAS are larger and some Missions already use these capabilities at the Force level whereas the larger Class III UAS should always be centrally held at the Force level.

7.2.2. Where UAS are used at the Sector or Force level then it is assumed that the unit is operating via reach back and there are analysts used at the base level exploiting the imagery in addition to the pilots and sensor operators. The Class I UAS will not normally have dedicated analysts and are used more for situational awareness purposes than peacekeeping-intelligence. The Class II and III UAS units used by the Force (and Sectors) should be capable of receiving PKISR tasking in accordance with the IAL.

7.2.3. The UAS unit must have the ability to receive the IAL and plan the following day's tasking accordingly. The unit should be capable of determining if the tasking is achievable and be able to communicate any potential limitations back to PKISR Ops at the earliest possible time. The unit should be able to prioritise the tasking effectively in accordance with the individual IR's priority, geospatially and the time sensitivity of the tasking. For example, if a lower priority IR must be acquired the following day then it should be planned ahead of higher

¹⁰ United Nations Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Capabilities, 8 February 2019

priority IRs that are not essential for acquisition the following day. The UAS unit must work collaboratively with the AM cell (both PKISR Plans and Ops) to allow the flexibility of tasking.

7.2.4. Whilst the majority of the UAS unit's tasking will be pre-planned, the unit must also be capable of reacting to dynamic tasking. It is PKISR Ops' function to determine if the dynamic tasking is more important than the pre-planned tasking and therefore the UAS unit must react immediately to the dynamic tasking and relocate, if required. On completion of the dynamic tasking the UAS unit must inform PKISR Ops how much of the pre-planned tasking was achieved to allow PKISR Plans to reschedule the unsuccessful acquisition. The UAS unit should not make the decision independently as the unit will not be aware of complete tasking picture.

7.2.5. The UAS unit must have peacekeeping-intelligence analysts as part of the organisation who are trained and qualified in exploiting all the sensors onboard. For the majority of UAS these will be imaging sensors, including EO/IR and sometimes SAR/GMTI. The analysts must be familiar with the reporting timelines defined in paragraph 3.7 of this handbook. Furthermore, the unit must check that there are means to disseminate the time sensitive information to achieve the phase 1 deadline of within 10 minutes of event capture.

7.2.6. On completion of the tasking the UAS unit must be able to disseminate the acquisition results to the customer within the described timelines. In addition, the unit must inform PKISR Ops of successful and unsuccessful acquisition to allow PKISR Plans to update future IALs accordingly.

7.3. Manned Airborne ISR Unit

7.3.1. The role of a manned airborne ISR unit is very similar to the role of a UAS. The unit must still have qualified pilots, sensor operators and peacekeeping-intelligence analysts but for units of this type they can either be onboard or offboard (at least in the analysts' case). The data can be exploited onboard or offboard via reach back, which often requires a satellite communications link due to the operating ranges involved. In both cases this can happen in near-real time; the fact that data is exploited offboard makes it no less timely providing there is a good communications link between the ground and air-based personnel.

7.3.2. As described in paragraph 4.1, the main difference between manned and unmanned systems is speed and endurance. The PKISR Plans team should take this into account when assigning tasking as they are both equally suited to the same tasks. The difference between the two should be taken into account when considering dynamic tasking, for example. Whilst a UAS might be operating closer to the incident that needs urgent support, the manned ISR aircraft will be able to reach the location quicker even though it is further away. Likewise, if persistence over a particular location is required then it is more efficient to use a UAS where the pilots can simply swap over in the ground control station once their maximum flight hours have been achieved.

7.3.3. The manned airborne ISR unit must still be capable of coordinating with the AM cell for tasking and disseminating the products accordingly, as described in paragraph 7.2.

7.4. Field HPKI Team

7.4.1. The use of HPKI operators in UN peacekeeping missions is not common. However, where they might be used in the future, the team must be capable of coordinating with the AM

cell for tasking. Where HPKI is used, there should be separate U2X team to act as facilitators for tasking between the CM cell and the teams.

7.4.2. Rather than PKISR Plans assigned specific tasking against the HPKI teams, the U2X should review the prioritised IRs and with their knowledge of access to sources extract what topics could be supported and feed the tasking to the HPKI teams.

7.4.3. It can take considerable time to develop sources with access to the sort of information required and therefore HPKI should not be considered a quick answer, at least not in the early days of a team arriving in the Mission. Often the HPKI tasking will not be able to address the time constraints associated with a task and therefore it is better for the U2X to generate themes based on the IRs and allow the teams to report back on what they are specifically able to acquire. A mature, confident source will be able to react to time-sensitive tasking and could respond to specific questions but for the most part the U2X should focus on tasking for thematic reporting.

7.4.4. The nature of HPKI and the corresponding potential threat to life for informants means this capability must remain highly sensitive. This should include separate, closed networks that the teams operate on to protect the identity of sources.

7.4.5. In terms of reporting, the HPKI teams should not focus on the phases described in paragraph 3.7. The emphasis should be on providing quality products aligned to the themes tasked by U2X. Reporting should include the perceived level of access the source has and the reliability of the source. This allows the peacekeeping-intelligence analysts to apply an element of judgement on how valuable the reporting is. For example, an unreliable source with limited access is unlikely to be able to provide key information compared to a reliable source with good access.

7.4.6. For all HPKI operations, UN policy and guidance must be strictly adhered to.

7.5. Long Range Recce Patrol

7.5.1. The nature of LRRP means that tasking should be assigned ahead of the unit deploying, within the constraints of their geographic operating environment. However, the unit should be contactable whilst on patrol to react to dynamic tasking, if required.

7.5.2. The LRRP liaison officers in the U2 should discuss tasking with the AM cell to develop a clear understanding of the capabilities and constraints of the unit. The LRRP is more suited to surveillance and reconnaissance tasks, particularly when there are no embedded HPKI teams within the unit.

7.5.3. Wherever possible the unit should go beyond the tasking assigned by the AM cell within the U2 and report on the general atmosphere in the areas covered. For example, reporting on a market that is usually very busy but on the day of patrol it is not – this could suggest that the local population are being threatened and prevented from conducting their normal routines. The LRRP is particularly useful in supporting the development of pattern of life and can also work effectively in conjunction with UAS or manned airborne ISR.

7.5.4. Whilst on the ground, the LRRP should be capable of providing time sensitive reporting to the U2 or G2 but non-time-sensitive reporting can wait until the unit has recovered to their



home base to take advantage of more robust communications, particularly if imagery has been captured that requires dissemination.

7.5.5. On return the LRRP should also report to ISR Ops on the level of acquisition conducted during the patrol, who in turn will communicate with the IAP Manager who will ensure that the dissemination of IRs is complete.

7.5.6. The LRRP liaison officer should clearly communicate with ISR Plans how long the team will need in recovery time before deploying out on the ground again.



CHAPTER EIGHT

8. Summary

8.1.1. The intent of this handbook is to support Missions to refine their processes and procedures to improve the way that they manage their PKISR capabilities. PKISR is a complex process and it takes time to develop organisations to allow them to operate effectively. The handbook is intended as a guide and advice to Missions to support the incremental improvement of managing PKISR.

8.1.2. The best way to become effective in PKISR is to follow these processes and adapt them to make them suitable for the respective Mission. There is not a single solution and Missions may choose to take only parts of the handbook and incorporate them into their daily practices.

8.1.3. There is no closure to the PKISR acquisition process as it is cyclical activity. The IAP will never be complete and new RFIs will always be received to support new activity by peacekeepers. Good communication is the single most important factor to underpin success in managing PKISR. Communication within the U2 section filling the various roles, communication between the U2 and the customers, and, critically, communication with the Mission's leadership to ensure that priorities are very well understood.

Glossary of terms

| | |
|-------|---|
| AM | Acquisition Management |
| AR | Acquisition Requirement |
| CCIR | Commanders Critical Intelligence Requirements |
| CCTV | Closed-Circuit Television |
| CMS | Chief of Mission Support |
| DMS | Director of Mission Support |
| EEI | Essential Elements of Information |
| EO | Electro-Optical |
| FTS | Field Technology Services |
| GPKI | Geospatial Peacekeeping-Intelligence |
| GIS | Geospatial Intelligence Section |
| GMTI | Ground Moving Target Indicator |
| HPKI | Human Peacekeeping-Intelligence |
| I&W | Indicators and Warnings |
| IAL | Intelligence Acquisition List |
| IAP | Intelligence Acquisition Plan |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Personnel |
| IED | Improvised Explosive Device |
| IPKI | Imagery Peacekeeping-Intelligence |
| IR | Intelligence Requirement |
| IR | Infra-Red |
| IRM | Intelligence Requirement Management |
| ISR | Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance |
| JMAC | Joint Mission Analysis Centre |
| LRRP | Long-Range Recce Patrol |
| LTIOV | Latest Time Information is Of Value |
| MICM | Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism |
| MPKI | Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence |
| OPKI | Open Source Peacekeeping-Intelligence |
| PAI | Publicly Available Information |
| PIR | Priority Intelligence Requirement |
| PKI | Peacekeeping-Intelligence |
| PKIMB | Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Management Board |
| PKISR | Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance |
| RFI | Request for Information |
| SAR | Synthetic Aperture Radar |
| SPKI | Signals Peacekeeping-Intelligence |
| SIR | Specific Intelligence Requirement |
| TCC | Troop Contributing Country |
| UAS | Unmanned Aircraft Systems |
| UNPOL | UN Police |