

**“RE-HATTING” ECOWAS FORCES AS UN
PEACEKEEPERS: LESSONS LEARNED**

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ACRONYMS USED

AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
COE	Contingent Owned Equipment
DFC	Deputy Force Commander
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOMICI	ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Military Observer Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FC	Force Commander
GFMV	Generic Fair Market Value
INTERFET	UN Sanctioned International Force in East Timor
ISF	International Stabilization Force
JMCC	Joint Mission Coordination Centre
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
LOA	Letters of Assistance
MIF	Multinational Interim Force
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
NIBATT	Nigerian Battalion
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
PAE	Pacific Architects and Engineers
PBPU	Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit
PMCA	Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SC	Security Council
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNLB	United Nations Logistics Base
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

TRANSFORMATION FROM ECOWAS TO UN FORCES “Re-hatting”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the past few years, there have been several examples of re-hatting, in which regional or multinational forces have been deployed followed by a UN peacekeeping force. Through these transitions, some key principles and common problems have emerged. Problems arising from the lack of equivalency between the two forces in the peacekeeping transition context, the lack of basic logistic requirements, differences in force mandates, and capability gaps are a major obstacle for the transition of authority from the existing force to the incoming peacekeeping force. These difficulties were experienced during the re-hatting of ECOWAS forces in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire.

Though the re-hatting of ECOWAS forces has greatly enhanced the peace processes in the three Western African countries, a number of challenges have been encountered related to the preparedness, the transformation and the command and control of the forces. Based on the analysis of the re-hatting experience in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, the report concludes that in all three cases where the UN took over from ECOWAS, the UN was unprepared for an orderly transformation of ECOWAS forces into UN forces, mostly due to the limited time frames. Additionally, the absence of true joint planning meant that the planning process was aimed at solving specific short term issues of deployment, sustainment or capability rather than taking a broader approach that linked the transition to longer term objectives.

The report recommends adopting a joint planning approach if there is a possibility of re-hatting. This would lay the foundation for future transition. Additionally, an essential step in the re-hatting process is to strike a balance between planned tasks and known capabilities, through limiting tasks in the early stages of deployment to those that can be realistically achieved. This report also recommends the establishment of common doctrinal guidelines, key norms to address the critical questions relating to command and control, capabilities required, and the steps that need to be taken to achieve a smooth transition. The absence of these elements is a significant obstacle to a more coordinated approach. Further, the report emphasizes the importance of all troop contributors meeting minimum standards of capability and self-sustainment, which is particularly important in the early stages following transition. Perhaps the most crucial of all issues is the need for effective command and control. In this respect, the report suggests embedding UN personnel in the headquarters of the regional force prior to the transition. Finally, the report recommends examining the potential of the proposed strategic reserve to act as a back up to the new UN mission.

Based on the lessons learned from the re-hatting experience in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, the report makes additional specific recommendations. Prime amongst these are the recommendations that the Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority (PMCA) be made available as soon as the approval has been granted by the Controller and the early deployment of the “core team”. In addition, formalization of support from sister missions, early appointment of mission leadership and early deployment of other key staff are highly recommended. Inclusion of logisticians in reconnaissance teams, increasing the authority of the FC/DFC on logistics in the immediate period following re-hatting, and early integration of civilian and military Integrated Support Services (ISS) staff are other actions encouraged by the report.

A. REHATting

I. Discussion of Lessons

UN relies on others to meet the increasing demands for rapid deployment

The United Nations has been confronted with increasing demands for the rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces in the aftermath of intra-state conflict, but has not been able to meet such demands within an acceptable timeframe. This inability is a reflection of the process by which UN peacekeepers are generated, and has given rise to a reliance on others to bridge the gap until the UN is able to deploy a credible force.

From previous examples of regional and multinational force deployment, key principles and some common problems have emerged

Over the past five years there have been a number of examples in which regional, or multinational, forces have been deployed prior to a UN peacekeeping force: ECOMOG to UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, INTERFET to UNTAET in East Timor, ECOMIL to UNMIL in Liberia, ECOMICI to UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire, the MIF to MINUSTAH in Haiti, and AMIB to ONUB in Burundi. While there can be no standard template for every transition, some key principles and some common problems have emerged. There are also common characteristics associated with the types of forces involved in the transition, and there are undoubtedly better ways of managing what is a complex operation.

The underlying common principle is that missions are most vulnerable at the time of transition due to the inability to generate required capability

The underlying principle of any transition is to sustain a level of capability while transferring operational responsibility from one force to another, and to ensure continuity of operations. This is similar in many ways to the military concept of a “relief in place”. However, relief in place assumes a level of equivalency between the two forces. This equivalency is frequently absent in the peacekeeping transition context. The principle is eroded further through all too frequent pressures to effect the transition within a timeframe that cannot be matched by the ability to generate the necessary capability. As a result, a mission is often at its weakest and most vulnerable, precisely when it needs to be strong.

In UNAMSIL's case, it lacked the basic logistic requirements to undertake the task required of a UN force

In the case of UNAMSIL, ECOMOG had in place a force of 11,000 that had proved itself when tested with fire from spoilers, but it lacked the basic logistic requirements to undertake the task required of a UN force. The UN, on the other hand, planned to replace the 11,000 ECOMOG force with 6000 UN troops, against the advice of the ECOWAS Force Commander. The incoming UNAMSIL Force was soon outnumbered by RUF spoilers and, after two upward adjustments by the Security Council, a UN force of 17,500 was eventually deployed in Sierra Leone.

Incoming UN FCs can learn a great deal from their outgoing regional counterpart

In the case of a take over of a new UN Force Commander from an ECOWAS Force Commander (as in Sierra Leone and Liberia), the incoming UN Commander should not ignore the views of his regional counterpart during the handing and taking over process. In Côte d'Ivoire, the transition worked relatively well. The ECOWAS Force Commander was in place about eight months before ECOMICI was transformed into UNOCI. He was appointed as the UN Force Commander well in advance of the re-hatting exercise. However, Force Commanders and senior leadership on the ground may not be familiar with UN norms and procedures and may require induction

training. The UNOCI force headquarters went through a pre-deployment training exercise at the KAIPTC before deployment.

The key operational question is: How to ensure a higher level of capability in the crucial early days immediately following a transfer of responsibility?

One of the key operational questions is: How can the United Nations ensure a higher level of capability in the crucial early days immediately following a transfer of responsibility? The starting point on the route to increased effectiveness should be to provide as much warning time as possible to facilitate thorough planning and preparation by both the original and the incoming force. However, the reality tends to fall short for a number of reasons. For example, the original force will often have been deployed with little warning to meet the demands of an immediate crisis. The nature of such forces inevitably reflects the sum of the capability of their respective contributors so that at one end of the spectrum there are examples such as INTERFET in Timor and the MIF in Haiti, where a high level of capability was immediately available, and at the other the end, the force may face significant challenges in fielding the necessary capability, such as in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire.

Several foreseeable challenges exist in re-hatting an existing force to form the basis of a UN force

When the emphasis is on re-hatting an existing force to form the basis of a UN mission, there are a number of foreseeable challenges. The original force may have been deployed under a different mandate, with different objectives and Rules of Engagement as was the case with ECOMOG / UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, or it may be structured and equipped in such a way that it does not meet the full requirements of the UN mission such as ECOMIL / UNMIL in Liberia or ECOMICI / UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire. In all cases, the part played by the ECOWAS missions was indispensable to the long term success of their UN successors, but it took time for the latter to be able to build up.

Sustainability issues inhibited ECOMIL and ECOMICI's capability in the longer term

ECOMIL and ECOMICI met the critical requirement to deploy quickly, but sustainability issues inhibited their capability in the longer term. In both cases this problem was well known from the outset and a good deal of coordination took place between the two missions and the UN. ECOMIL's deployment was always seen as a first step towards the longer-term deployment of a UN mission, and it received significant support from UNAMSIL which was able to assist with the deployment of the Nigerian battalion that had been due to withdraw from Sierra Leone as part of the Mission's downsizing. This stands as a significant example of what can be achieved in a spirit of mutual cooperation.

ECOMICI, ECOMIL and MINUCI are examples of an evolutionary response to emerging requirements

With ECOMICI the situation was somewhat different. The ECOWAS mission was deployed alongside a smaller UN mission that deployed almost simultaneously and, while MINUCI was eventually expanded to a full peacekeeping mission, this was not a foregone conclusion at the time. While there was a considerable amount of cooperation in such areas as the support that UNAMSIL gave ECOMIL and the planning assistance provided by DPKO to ECOWAS planners working on Côte d'Ivoire, these examples illustrate what is best described as an evolutionary response to emerging requirements. A more effective long term approach would have placed more emphasis on joint planning.

Close contact between UN planners and those of ECOWAS remains essential during the initial planning stages

Although a future UN peacekeeping mission may not be assured at the time of initial planning, close contact between UN and ECOWAS planners remains essential. While there was a significant element of coordination between UNAMSIL / ECOMIL in support of the deployment to Liberia, and between DPKO and ECOWAS planners for Côte d'Ivoire, much of it was aimed at specific issues. Planning assistance from DPKO with the ECOWAS deployment to Côte d'Ivoire was mostly in the form of advice to make up for a shortfall in Secretariat capacity that existed at the time, rather than a real attempt at joint planning.

The absence of joint planning meant that the product of the planning process was aimed at solving specific short term issues of deployment or capability

The absence of true joint planning meant that the product of the planning process was aimed at solving specific short term issues of deployment, sustainment or capability rather than taking a broader approach that linked the transition to longer term objectives. The result, which had also been seen in the transition of ECOMOG to UNAMSIL in the year 2000, was that the incoming UN peacekeeping mission was placed in a position in which neither the forces it inherited from the predecessor mission nor the additional assets were sufficient for the tasks for which it was mandated.

The issue then becomes a question of what can be done to enhance capability on both sides of transition of authority

In effect, the UN was knowingly embarking on missions with high probabilities of not being able to cope in the event of a crisis in the near term. Notwithstanding some setbacks and plans that have slipped, the potential negative consequences of this approach have been avoided in recent cases. However, the events in Sierra Leone in May 2000 (when some 500 incoming UN peacekeepers were taken hostage by the RUF) clearly illustrate what can happen. Therefore the question is what can be done to enhance capability on both sides of the transition, i.e., the in place force and the incoming UN peacekeeping mission. What can be done to fill the capability gap?

Filling the capability gap presents some significant challenges beyond just meeting the requirements for troops

Filling this capability gap presents significant challenges which go beyond meeting the requirements for troops, although it is important to ensure that any force that deploys is credible in this respect. The reality is that when a crisis occurs, the troop numbers are dictated by what can be made available at short notice rather than what is actually needed. This is a situation that immediately limits what can be achieved. For example, the initial deployment of ECOMIL was constrained to operations in and around Monrovia, and ECOMIL's force movement was tied closely to deployments of the French forces. Therefore the first question is: How to generate greater short term capability in support of regional deployments, while recognizing that it may not be realistic to expect larger numbers?

Bilateral support arrangements are likely to continue to be an important element in delivering this minimum level of capability.

Clearly a minimum level of capability is essential, and the sort of bilateral support arrangements that various donors provided to ECOWAS contingents in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire are likely to continue to be an important element in delivering that capability. Even with such arrangements in place, there are still likely to be considerable difficulties in providing a fully sustainable and cohesive force. Decisions on what is deployed by any regional organization are rightly the responsibility of that organization, as is the responsibility for planning. But where that force is likely to transition to a UN peacekeeping mission or is deployed as the advance guard of such a mission, as in Liberia,

there needs to be much closer coordination between the respective organizations.

Some key observations and recommendations are...

II. Observations and Recommendations

1. Adopt a joint planning approach if there is a possibility of re-hatting

A joint approach to planning would lay the foundation for a future transition, but there is an inevitable reluctance to make such a commitment when it is needed - in the preparatory stages of a regional deployment. The problem is exacerbated by political uncertainty, as well as resource and capacity issues.

While recognizing that the objectives were not necessarily aimed at transition, the precedent illustrated by the close cooperation between the UN and the African Union in preparation for its mission in Darfur, might indicate a way ahead for the future. Notwithstanding some difficulties, the principle of providing expertise and additional capacity to assist is sound, and were it to be expanded in a more integrated approach it would provide essential capacity at a crucial time, regardless of whether or not the mission in question ever transitioned to UN responsibility.

2. Establish common doctrinal guidelines

Joint planning will require a high level of mutual cooperation and it will need UN planners and those of regional organizations to have confidence in each other and understand the planning environment. To this end it is essential that every effort is made to establish common doctrinal guidelines, the lack of which acts as a significant obstacle to a more co-ordinated approach. For example, currently there is no guide as to how a transition should take place and on each occasion mission planners are faced with starting almost from scratch. While it would be impractical to attempt to provide a template that would fit all requirements, it is equally unrealistic to rely on *ad hoc* solutions that too frequently fail to achieve anything close to an integrated approach. At a minimum, it is essential that some key norms are established to address the critical questions relating to command and control, capabilities required, and the steps that need to be taken to achieve a smooth transition.

3. Strike a balance between planned tasks and known capabilities

No plan can work without the resources that are needed to implement it, but this has to be balanced against the ability of regional organizations to provide the necessary capability. From a military perspective, the numbers of troops proposed for a mission should be the result of a detailed troop to task analysis, not just the product of what can be generated, or afforded. However there are finite limits to what can be provided by troop contributors and thus the problem becomes one of balancing the capabilities that can be provided against the envisaged tasks until additional troops can be deployed either under regional or UN control. Whether by design, or force of circumstances, this means limiting the tasks in the early stages of deployment to those that can be realistically achieved and resisting the temptation to take on those that

Adopting a joint planning approach if there is a possibility of re-hatting

Establishing common doctrinal guidelines, the lack of which acts as a significant obstacle to a more co-ordinated approach

Finding a balance between planned tasks and known capabilities, which entails limiting tasks in the early stages of deployment to those that can be realistically achieved

will place excessive demands on the force before it has the necessary capability. This is equally applicable pre- and post-transition, and again underlines the need for joint planning.

4. Meet minimum equipment and self-sustainment levels

Inevitably numbers alone do not represent capability. The troops themselves must be equipped for the tasks and able to meet minimum levels of self-sustainment, a requirement that is accentuated in the early stages following transition to a UN mission when critical infrastructure and support are absent. The problems faced by numerous troop contributors in meeting the necessary capability levels are well known, as are the various initiatives aimed at addressing the problems. However this has been contentious and it remains an issue. Clearly the objective should be to ensure that all troop contributors can meet minimum standards of capability and self-sustainment.

Third party assistance such as the Ukrainian provision of armoured personnel carriers in UNAMSIL, the use of PAE in Liberia or the various bilateral support arrangements that existed in Côte d'Ivoire have gone part of the way to providing the required capability to contingents, but it is essential that they are continued throughout the transition period, and beyond in some cases. The key is to ensure that the necessary capability levels are achieved well in advance of any transition and then maintained at a consistent standard throughout the life of a mission.

5. Focus on essential capabilities

With regard to specific issues of self-sustainment there is a need to achieve an overall capability early in the deployment of a regional mission, but there are certain priority areas that need to be addressed first, such as effective communications, capable medical support and adequate life support. Difficulties in achieving the necessary levels will be compounded by the likelihood that a regional deployment is taking place against a tight timeline that will not allow a steady build up. Consequently, early engagement of UN logistic planners will be fundamental to a successful transition, particularly should the General Assembly approve the use of UN Strategic Deployment Stocks (from the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy).

6. Prioritise command and control

Perhaps the most crucial of all issues is the need for effective command and control. Headquarters deployed by a regional organization may be appropriate in the early stages of a deployment, but they do not necessarily possess the range of capabilities to assume the role in the UN context due to the added responsibilities of the latter. What tends to occur as a consequence is that there is one headquarters responsible for the operation conducted under regional auspices, and another for the subsequent UN operation, with no proper coordinating function to ensure a seamless transition between the two.

Meeting minimum equipment and self-sustainment levels...

...It is essential to ensure that the necessary capability levels are achieved well in advance of any transition and maintained then on.

Addressing difficulties in achieving the necessary levels of essential capabilities

Prioritising effective command and control, by ensuring continuity

This can be achieved by embedding UN personnel in the headquarters of the regional force prior to transition

Continuity of command and control is essential if missions are to avoid the prospect of being outnumbered by potential spoilers. This may be achieved by embedding UN personnel in the headquarters of the regional force prior to transition. This has been tried to a limited extent in the transitions in Liberia and Burundi, but has yet to be established as a routine process. Consideration should be given to a more formalized process to replace the current *ad hoc* arrangements. One solution would be to have a small team of planners available to be deployed well in advance of a transition to prepare and form the nucleus of the new mission headquarters.

7. Support the strategic reserve proposal

Supporting the strategic reserve proposal to ensure the quick deployment of capable forces

The requirement to deploy capable forces quickly remains a major objective but the reality is that it is unlikely that the UN will ever be in the position of deploying all that it needs as fast as it would like it. This will leave the force on the ground relatively weak and with little to back it up should it encounter a major problem during, or shortly after, transition. In this connection consideration should be given to examining the potential for the current strategic reserve proposal¹ to act as a back up to the new UN mission. This would overcome some of the difficulties of providing the necessary command and control and support but it will require close examination before it could be seen as a viable proposal.

B. UN PREPAREDNESS TO “RE-HAT”

III. Discussion of Lessons

In all the three cases related to “re-hatting” of ECOWAS forces, as discussed in section 10 of the conference report², the UN had very little notice to organize the transition.

UNAMSIL was established initially to work alongside ECOMOG, but ECOMOG soon withdrew entirely...

UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, for example, was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999; by December 1999, feeling peacekeeping fatigue, ECOMOG decided to downsize and hand over to a UN peacekeeping operation. UNAMSIL was established initially to work alongside ECOMOG, but it soon became apparent that ECOMOG would withdraw entirely and UNAMSIL would inherit its tasks. The Security Council authorized successive enlargements of UNAMSIL from an initial 6,000 troops to a final strength of 17,500. In the first half of 2000, the UN was obliged to manage the deployment of the new UNAMSIL force, while also taking on the responsibilities of the withdrawing ECOMOG troops. There was no time for a planned and phased hand-over, resulting in

¹ The strategic reserve proposal is currently being considered by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping. In outline it would establish a number of Task Forces of approximately 1250 troops which could be deployed in support of existing UN missions for specific tasks and / or for a limited duration. The Task Forces would be held at high readiness with lead elements probably at 7 days notice to move.

² Report of the ECOWAS Workshop: Lessons from ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations 1990 – 2004. Available at www.un.org/peacekeeping/bestpractices

... with UNAMSIL still not up to full strength, a security vacuum was created, which the rebels exploited.

In Liberia, a multinational force was established to support ECOWAS in the implementation of the ceasefire agreement

In Côte d'Ivoire, ECOWAS forces on the ground became part of UNOCI when the transfer of authority took place

For all the above cases, the UN was unprepared for an orderly transformation of ECOWAS forces into UN forces...

... and there appeared to be no team in the existing operation, or in the UN mission start-up component

considerable lack of co-operation and confusion. With ECOMOG gone and UNAMSIL still not up to full strength, a security vacuum was created, which the rebels exploited.

In Liberia, following ECOWAS' request for greater international support, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution (1497) authorizing the establishment of a multinational force to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. The resolution, passed on 1 August 2003, mandated an International Stabilization Force (ISF) to be deployed no later than 1 October 2003. In line with this, the ECOWAS Vanguard Force began to arrive in Monrovia on 4 August 2003. NIBATT 1 and NIBATT 2 comprised the force. NIBATT 2 was deployed from Sokoto, Nigeria, while NIBATT 1 was deployed from Sierra Leone using logistics from UNAMSIL.

In Côte d'Ivoire, by its Resolution 1528 of 27 February 2004, the Security Council mandated the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) as of 4 April 2004. At the same time, the Council requested the transfer of authority from the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI), and ECOWAS forces deployed on the ground became part of UNOCI on 4 April 2004 when the mandate of MINUCI expired.

Although the UN had considerable experience in handing over and taking over peacekeeping tasks from regional organizations in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Central Africa and other places, in all the three cases related to ECOWAS forces, the UN was unprepared for an orderly transformation of ECOWAS forces into UN forces, mostly due to the limited timeframe. In all three cases of "re-hatting" of ECOWAS forces, the UN had less than two months to prepare and execute the transformation. Unfortunately this appears to be a trend, making it imperative for the UN to have a ready team on hand to make the transformation.

In all three re-hatting cases there appeared to be no team in the existing operation, or in the UN mission start-up component, with sufficient knowledge of Contingent Owned Equipment (COE). The COE system is the basis upon which the TCCs provide personnel, equipment and services to a UN peacekeeping mission and are in turn reimbursed by the UN. The system has been in effect since 1 July 1996 and reimbursement rates are approved by the United Nations General Assembly. There are three key concepts in the COE system: the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); the dry/wet lease arrangements; and the self-sustainment operation capability.³ In none of the three cases was the MOU signed prior to the re-hatting and in most cases very few were signed within five months after the transformation process took place. Without a signed MOU, inspection of the equipment provided by

³ See "Partners in Peacekeeping: Logistics Support Issues of the United Nations and Troop Contributing Countries", Conference Report, Freetown, Sierra Leone 3-5 March 2003. Extract attached to this report

the contingents has always been very difficult and in most cases took a long time to execute.⁴

In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority (PMCA) was only available 90 days after the Resolution establishing UNOCI was passed.⁵ Although MINUCI was already in place, it was not administratively possible to transfer funds from MINUCI to UNOCI. Hence as an interim measure, PAE and the partners supporting the various troops were requested to continue their work for more than a month, from 4 April until 31 May 2003. This arrangement was never formalized, and ECOMICI forces were tossed back and forth between the UN and PAE until this period was over and UNOCI took over full responsibility.

The self-sustainment system was not functioning as expected, neither in Liberia nor in Côte d'Ivoire, leading to troops lacking or receiving insufficient basic provisions such as rations, water, fuel and lubricants. Furthermore there was lack of experienced procurement staff and requisition personnel in the mission areas. This led to lengthy procurement delays to support the troops. There was also lack of sufficient technical staff at the supervisor level to implement and monitor projects, in particular engineering tasks. In addition, there were insufficient vehicles early in the mission build up to support logistics as well as operational tasks, let alone to support the re-hatted troops.

The support provided by PAE was far below the UN standard and in some cases, in view of bi-lateral relations between the US and the troop contributing countries, PAE were not authorized to extend support to certain countries. This led to some troops lacking basic necessities that were available to other contingents. In Liberia, DAF trucks from UNPROFOR donated by the US could not be serviced because parts for such tracks were no longer manufactured.

NIBATT 1 in Liberia came from Sierra Leone already fatigued by the long mission there. Accordingly, it was not only the equipment that was already worn out from the long service; the troops were also not in the best of health. The Level 1 Hospital facility that was available was not sufficient to cater to some of the medical conditions of the troops upon arrival, and some had to be evacuated for medical reasons.

The Force Commanders and Deputy Force Commanders (FC/DFC) expressed frustration over the fact that, at the point of re-hatting, they

⁴ In UNOCI, Senegal signed the MOU on 30 September 2004. Benin signed on 13 January 2005, Ghana on 20 January 2005 and Togo has not signed to date. In UNMIL, Benin signed the MOU on 15 June 2004, Nigeria on 21 July 2004, Senegal on 26 October 2004 and Togo has not signed to date.

⁵ See UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, After Action Report: MINUCI, Use of Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority for Rapid Deployment, <http://pbpu.unlb.org> or www.un.org/peacekeeping/bestpractices

Côte d'Ivoire's experience shows that ECOMICI forces were tossed back and forth until UNOCI took over full responsibility

Malfunctioning self-sustainment system and lack of experienced procurement and technical staff were a major problem in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire

Further, the support provided by PAE was far below the UN

NIBATT 1 in Liberia came from Sierra Leone already fatigued by the long mission there.

At the point of re-batting, FC's and DFC's often lose authority on logistics and are left to take care of operational matters

"Mercy Ships" should be the option of last resort

Key recommendations for transformation are...

suddenly lost authority on logistics and were left only to care for operational matters. In the case of UNOCI, the FC was "inherited from ECOMICI" and was therefore well-informed on issues related to logistic needs of the troops to be re-hatted. At the time of transformation, it is critical to balance troop logistics with operational requirements.

There have been proposals related to the deployment of "Mercy Ships" to speed up transformation - particularly to support medical requirement for a Level II hospital facility.⁶ For this option to be feasible, there would have to be an early signing of Letters of Assistance (LOA), and such ships should be self-sustaining in terms of water and garbage disposal. Normally a mission would not have sufficient water carrying capacity or garbage disposal to service such ships. In all, the "Mercy Ship" option is a very expensive one and should probably be used only as a last resort.

Past experiences with re-hatting have revealed that most of the recommendations related to the start-up phase of a mission would also be relevant to the transformation phase.⁷ However, the recommendations presented below concentrate only on those aspects that are directly and uniquely related in the transformation of ECOWAS forces into UN forces.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Prime among recommendations is that the Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority (PMCA) should be available as soon as the approval has been granted by the Controller. The early deployment of a "core team" is strongly recommended. The team should comprise of experienced technical personnel and experienced mission managers in each functional area, including a MOU Management Unit. This core team should be constituted and assembled before the re-hatting process takes place. One option would be to draw all or part of the team from a "sister mission" or HQ.
2. Where existing missions are already deployed in neighbouring states or in close regional proximity, support from such sister missions should be formalized, as was the case with UNAMSIL and UNMIL, and UNMIL and UNOCI. This support proved to be essential; it is also extremely efficient and cost effective.
3. The early appointment of senior Mission leadership - SRSG, FC, DFC, and Chief of Operations – is essential to enable them to be involved in early planning of the mission. Similarly, the early deployment of other key staff against Rapid Deployment Team (RDT) assignments is recommended.

⁶ Mercy Ships are available through the vendors and can offer variety of services essential for a start-up of a mission such as Level II Hospital.

⁷ See UN Peacekeeping best Practices Unit, Lessons Learned Study on the Start-up Phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia www.pbpu.unlb.org or www.un.org/peacekeeping/bestpractices.

4. Reconnaissance teams should include logisticians, and the FC/DFC must have more authority on logistics in the immediate period following re-hatting. The early finalization of MOU with troop contributing nations is essential to speed up the process of reimbursement of Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) and Self Sustenance expenses.
5. Early Integration of civilian and military Integrated Support Service (ISS) staff is necessary, in order to influence and promote joint support planning. In particular, the establishment of Joint Logistic Operations centre and Joint Mission Coordination Centre (JMCC) is recommended.
6. Contractors who provide logistics support to ECOWAS missions should do so in a manner that is compatible with UN standards, in order to facilitate a smooth re-hatting process. Immediate availability of start-up kits and other equipment from the UN Logistics Base (UNLB) and the early establishment of systems contracts for major equipment - especially vehicles, prefabricated buildings, communications and general camp management supplies – is essential. The early establishment of a Level II hospital in the mission area is also recommended.
7. A mission facility plan must be developed as early as possible. This should include, particularly, the establishment of an Integrated Mission HQ and Regional HQ. The early selection and securing of key facilities under a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or commercial rental arrangements is equally important.
8. Availability of adequate cash advances is recommended, to provide the mission with maximum flexibility in local purchasing, as is the early establishment of procurement procedures for Open Ended Contracts in areas of engineering (general hardware stores, aggregate, cement, building materials etc.). Pre-mission actions should already have commenced for early establishment of key contracted services, such as; fuel (ground and aviation), rations, camp services (water, waste disposal, cleaning, etc).
9. Finally, there is a clear need for the immediate availability and commissioning of mobile satellite earth stations (to later be replaced by static stations as stores build up).

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Logistics Operation Service
Unit Contingent Owned Equipment
Recruitment Section
Human Resources Officer
MOU and Claims Section
MOU and Claims Section (UNOCI)
Change Management
Office of the Assistant Secretary-General
Office of Operations Africa
Office of Operations Africa
Office of Operations Africa

Force Commander
Deputy Force Commander
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Chief Support Services
Chief Personnel Officer
Chief Political Affairs

Special Representative of Secretary-General
Deputy SRSG
Director of Administration
Chief Integrated Special Services
Chief Civil Affairs
Chief Political Affairs
Integrated Special Services
Political Affairs Officer

SRSG
Military (British)
Military (Nigeria)
Chief Budget Officer

THE CONTINGENT OWNED EQUIPMENT (COE) SYSTEM

The three basic elements

The COE system, approved by the UN Member States, has been in effect since July 1996 and has been incrementally improved through a series of working groups thereafter. The COE system is the basis upon which Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) provide personnel, equipment and services to a UN peacekeeping mission and are reimbursed by the UN. Reimbursement rates are approved by the General Assembly. There are three key elements in the COE system: the MOU; the dry/wet lease arrangements; and the self-sustainment operational capability.

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

The MOU is a document that functions as a contractual arrangement between the UN and the TCC, detailing the number of troops, the quality and type of major equipment, and the categories of self-sustainment that will be provided by either the TCC or arranged by the UN in a particular mission. The MOU is usually signed by both the TCC and the Assistant Secretary-General for Mission Support in DPKO.

The key players involved in the drafting of the MOU are staff from DPKO and the TCC who are military planning and operations specialists, field logistics specialists (in areas such as medical support, air transport, communications), and finance specialists.

The troop strength of each deployed unit is agreed with the TCC during the MOU discussions, bearing in mind that the total troop strength for the entire mission cannot exceed that mandated by the Security Council. The TCC is reimbursed a fixed amount per person, with an additional amount as “specialist pay” for 25% of the strength of logistics unit and 10% for other units. The reimbursement rate for personnel is currently being reviewed by the UN Secretariat.

Provision of wet/dry lease

The COE Manual, as approved by the General Assembly, categorizes major equipment items by function (such as support vehicles, engineering equipment, and airfield support vehicles). The monthly reimbursement rates also approved by the General Assembly are listed in the MOU as either “dry” or “wet” lease rates. The monthly dry lease reimbursement rate is essentially a rate which provides a “usage charge” for the specific piece of equipment and is based on the Generic Fair Market value (GFMV) and the expected useful life of an item. The monthly wet lease reimbursement rate consists of the dry lease rate, plus a pre-determined amount for the maintenance of the item (including the re-supply of spare parts, consumables and minor equipment by the TCC to the mission area). Both the dry and wet lease reimbursement rates include an insurance factor, which compensates in advance for potential no-fault incidents. The General Assembly has approved these two monthly reimbursement rates for each category of equipment, irrespective of the maker/ manufacturer or acquisition and upgrade costs to TCCs. As mentioned, the MOU lists both the quantity and type of major

equipment, along with the applicable wet/dry lease monthly reimbursement rates, that the TCC will contribute to a mission. Once deployed to the mission, inspections are carried out to determine the operational serviceability of the equipment. Payment is made accordingly.

Self-sustainment capability

The third key element of the COE system is the provision of self-sustainment, wherein each category reflects an area of logistical and operational support required to sustain a contingent. This includes laundry, catering, accommodation, office, medical, communications, Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD), and observation. The intent of the COE system is to be flexible and easily adapted. While the General Assembly is aware of differing national or cultural aspects of each category of self-sustainment, it has agreed on a minimum standard of capability of each category. Likewise, it has been agreed that the indivisible modular nature of self-sustainment categories does not allow for reimbursement if the TCC is only partially capable.

FINANCING AND THE COE SYSTEM

TCC are reimbursed for the personnel, equipment and services they provide to a UN peacekeeping mission. The reimbursement amount is based both on rates approved by the General Assembly (covering troops, major equipment, and self-sustainment capabilities) and on the quantity/type of troops and equipment that are agreed upon in the MOU.

The steps needed for a TCC to receive financial reimbursement for the UN are relatively simple:

- Discussion and signature of an MOU (which enumerates the amounts applicable).
- Deployment of troops/equipment (major and minor) to the field.
- Verification of the quantity/serviceability of the items upon arrival in the field, periodically thereafter, and upon departure from the field.
- Comparison of the verification reports with the signed MOU and calculation of what is due to the TCC.
- Disbursement of the payments to the TCC depending on the cash-flow situation of the UN.

Financing of the UN remains a politically sensitive issue. Fundamentally, the UN can only provide payments to TCCs when there is adequate cash available in the mission account, i.e. there are adequate funds from assessed contributions from Member States. Moreover, as per the financial rules and regulations of the UN, a payment cannot be made from one mission's funding to another, nor can payments be made in advance of signed contract/provision of goods/services. The challenge for the UN Secretariat is to try to reduce the time a TCC waits for payments, while adhering to acceptable financial principles and practices.

“Fast Cash”

The basic concept of “fast cash” is to provide more immediate reimbursements to TCCs for their troops/equipment in new or expanded missions. Essentially, once a TCC has signed the MOU and deployed troops/equipment, special “first-time” verification would occur. The results would be immediately communicated to the UN Secretariat, and a disbursement of funds in an amount up to the first two months reimbursement, could be provided.

The option of fast cash would therefore hasten the time between first-time deployment and payment.

Equitable Payments from Mission Budget

Another improvement in dispersing payments more quickly has come as a result of a change in Secretariat's procedures. Whereas previously the Secretariat would wait until there were sufficient funds for reimbursement in all Peacekeeping missions, now payments are affected for approved troop/COE claims, for a particular mission, irrespective of whether the other peacekeeping missions have adequate cash or not. Another measure recently introduced by the Secretariat is to process the troop/COE claims in three month blocs. This procedural change provides the Controller with increased ability to adjust the cash-flow of a mission and to disburse cash more often, as the claims amounts are smaller.

THIRD PARTY SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS

Major equipment

“Third party support arrangements” are used in many peacekeeping missions. Under these arrangements, the supply and maintenance of a TCC's major equipment in a peacekeeping mission is achieved by a combination of one or more Member States, the UN, and/or commercial contractors. This system has worked particularly well in the field where on TCC may be capable of supplying the troops, but lacks a specific capability, such as transport or communications.

There are five different ways in which TCCs have provided and been reimbursed for major equipment brought to a peacekeeping mission. With the exception of the first option (wet lease) where a TCC alone provides the equipment and its maintenance, all other options entail some kind of third party support. For example, a TCC may provide the major equipment, but make bilateral arrangements to outsource its maintenance; or, a TCC may lease equipment commercially or from another Member State and bring it to the mission area as contingent-owned equipment. Leasing arrangements can be advantageous since they do not require TCCs to acquire major equipment that they will not need back home.

Even under the first option (wet lease), one TCC may provide the equipment and its maintenance to the UN, but have the equipment actually used in the mission area by another TCC. This is currently the case in UNAMSIL where the Ukrainian Maintenance and Training Unit provides over 200 armoured personnel carriers and medium trucks along with associated maintenance and operator training support to several other contingents. The Ukrainian unit also provides to UNAMSIL a mission-wide transportation capability with 100 medium vehicles under a wet lease.

Self-Sustainment

Third party support arrangements have also been used in self-sustainment categories (accommodation, catering etc). TCCs may make bilateral arrangements with third parties (other TCCs, commercial contractors etc.) to provide all or part of a specific self-sustainment capability. The UN may also provide full or partial self-sustainment support to a TCC directly, or arrange for the support to be provided by a third party.

However, if the UN undertakes this role, the TCC is not reimbursed for self-sustainment even if a portion of the support is provided by the TCC itself. The exception is accommodation, where reimbursement is calculated on the number of personnel accommodated.

DRY/WET LEASE OPTIONS: MAJOR EQUIPMENT

Option 1 – Wet Lease. The TCC provides major equipment and maintenance and receives wet lease reimbursement rates established by the General Assembly. The TCC provides major equipment, related minor equipment, and workshop equipment including tools, spare parts and consumables.

Option 2 – Wet Lease. One TCC provides major equipment, makes bilateral arrangements with another TCC, or a commercial arrangement with a contractor to maintain the equipment, and enters into a wet lease with the UN. The first TCC provides major equipment and receives reimbursement for wet lease. The second TCC provides minor equipment, workshop equipment tools, spare parts and consumables. The UN provides no reimbursement to the second TCC/Contractor.


Option 3 – Dry Lease. The TCC provides major equipment and receives dry lease reimbursement at dry lease rates. The UN maintains equipment and provides minor equipment, workshop facilities, equipment and tools, spare parts and consumables.

Option 4 – Dry Lease. One TCC provides major equipment and receives dry lease reimbursement. The UN arranges with another TCC to provide maintenance. The second TCC receives maintenance reimbursement rates and provides minor equipment, workshop equipment and tools, spare parts and consumables.

Option 5 – Dry Lease. The TCC provides major equipment under a dry lease, receives dry lease reimbursement rates, and requests the UN to provide maintenance. The UN arranges for a contractor to provide maintenance at commercially negotiated rates. The contractor provides minor equipment, workshop facilities, equipment and tools, spare parts, consumables, and maintenance personnel.

UN Wet Lease Verification Reports made at UNOCI “re-hatting” (04/04/2004) indicating:

- (vii) Equipment item
- (viii) The quantity of major equipment as per MOU
- (ix) Actual Quantity
- (x) Condition/UN Colour
- (xi) Quantity of Non-Serviceable
- (xii) Arrival dates

UNITED NATIONS  NATIONS UNIES		Preliminary VERIFICATION REPORT - MAJOR EQUIPMENT				
Mission: ONUCI MOU No. DPKO/UNOCI/BEN/01 MOU Status: 2. Under development Type of Lease WET LEASE VR Type: ARRIVAL		Contingent: Benin Unit: INFANTRY COY Period Covered - From : 04-Apr-2004 VR Status:				
EQUIPMENT ITEM	Qty as per MOU	Actual Qty	UN Color	Qty. Non-Serviceable	Arrived on	
Remarks such as condition of equipment, corrective action taken etc.						
GENERATORS - STATIONARY AND MOBILE	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days	
41KVA to 50KVA	2	0	n/a	0	-	
20KVA to 30KVA	0	3	No	0	04/04/2004	
Remarks:						
MEDICAL & DENTAL EQUIPMENT	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days	
Level 1 Hospital	1	1	n/a	1	04/04/2004	
Remarks: Level 1 - Lack of essential equipment to set up level 1 facility (Resuscitation equipment; ambulance equipment; drugs; oxygen; defibrillator; suction unit; oxygen cylinders; equipment to treat both genders; maintenance of airways; hemorrhage control and a fully equipped trolley; advance life support equipment)						
CONTAINERS	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days	
Other containers	0	1	No	0	01/01/2000	
Remarks:						
ARMAMENTS	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days	
Crew served machine guns (11 to 15mm)	4	0	n/a	0	-	
Mortars (61mm to 82mm)	4	4	n/a	0	04/04/2004	
Crew served machine guns (up to 10mm)	0	18	n/a	0	04/04/2004	
Remarks:						
COMBAT VEHICLES	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days	
Reconnaissance vehicle - wheeled up to 25mm	4	4	Yes	0	04/04/2004	
Remarks:						
SUPPORT VEHICLES (COMMERCIAL PATTERN)	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days	
Truck utility/cargo (under 1.5 ton) (CP)	0	3	Yes	0	04/04/2004	
Remarks:						
SUPPORT VEHICLES (MILITARY PATTERN)	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days	
Truck utility/cargo (1.5 to 2.4 ton) (MP)	8	0	n/a	0	-	
Truck water (under 10000 litres) (MP)	1	1	Yes	0	04/04/2004	
Truck - tanker (up to 10000 litres) (MP)	2	2	Yes	0	04/04/2004	
Truck utility/cargo (jeep type - under 1.5 ton) (MP)	0	8	Yes	0	05/01/2005	
Remarks:						
TRAILERS	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days	
Water Trailer (up to 2000 litres)	0	1	No	0	04/04/2004	
Remarks:						

 UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES	VERIFICATION REPORT - MAJOR EQUIPMENT
Mission: ONUCI MOU No. DPKO/UNOCI/FRA/02 MOU Status: 6. Signed Type of Lease WET LEASE VR Type: ARRIVAL	Contingent: France Unit: MAINTENANCE SUPPORT DETACHMENT Period Covered - From : 04-Apr-2004 VR Status:

EQUIPMENT ITEM	Qty as per MOU	Actual Qty	UN Color	Qty. Non-Service-able	Arrived on
Remarks such as condition of equipment, corrective action taken etc.					
CONTAINERS	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Other containers	0	5	No	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
SUPPORT VEHICLES (COMMERCIAL PATTERN)	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Automobile (4x4) (CP)	0	1	No	0	01/01/2000
Remarks:					
SUPPORT VEHICLES (MILITARY PATTERN)	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Jeep (4x4) with military radio (MP)	6	0	n/a	0	-
Truck maintenance light (MP)	3	0	n/a	0	-
Truck utility/cargo (6 to 10 ton) (MP)	1	0	n/a	0	-
Truck - recovery - greater than 5 tons (MP)	0	1	No	0	04/04/2004
Truck utility/cargo (1.5 to 2.4 ton) (MP)	0	1	No	0	04/04/2004
Truck utility/cargo (jeep type - under 1.5 ton) (MP)	0	6	No	0	04/04/2004
Truck utility/cargo (2.5 to 5 ton) (MP)	0	2	No	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
TRAILERS	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Light cargo single axle	6	6	No	0	04/04/2004
Servicing trailer	1	1	No	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					


VR Comments:
Inspection date(s): 06 September 2004
Remarks:

 UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES	VERIFICATION REPORT - MAJOR EQUIPMENT Draft
Mission: ONUCI MOU No. DPKO/UNOCI/FRA/02 MOU Status: 6. Signed Type of Lease WET LEASE VR Type: ARRIVAL	Contingent: France Unit: NIGER INFANTRY BN Period Covered - From : 04/04/2004 VR Status:

EQUIPMENT ITEM	Qty as per MOU	Actual Qty	Condition	Qty. Non-Service-able	Arrived on
Remarks such as condition of equipment, corrective action taken etc.					
RIGID STRUCTURES	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Ablution facilities (50 man)	6	1	Good	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
ARMAMENTS	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Crew served machine guns (11 to 15mm)	2	1	Good	0	-
Crew served machine guns (up to 10mm)	5	1	Good	0	-
Remarks:					
COMBAT VEHICLES	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Reconnaissance vehicle - wheeled over 50mm	1	3	Good	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
SUPPORT VEHICLES (MILITARY PATTERN)	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Ambulance (MP)	1	-	-	-	-
Truck utility/cargo (2.5 to 5 ton) (MP)	10	7	Good	1	-
Truck - recovery (up to 5 tons) (MP)	1	-	-	-	04/04/2004
Truck - tanker (up to 10000 litres) (MP)	1	-	-	-	-
Truck utility/cargo (1.5 to 2.4 ton) (MP)	0	9	Good	3	-
Remarks: Tyres on 1xTruck utility 2.5 to 5 ton and 3 xTruck Utility 1.5 to 2.4 ton need replacement					


TRAILERS	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Light cargo single axle	4	-	-	-	
Remarks:					

VR Comments:
Inspection date(s): 17 to 19 August 2004
Remarks:

UNITED NATIONS  NATIONS UNIES		VERIFICATION REPORT - MAJOR EQUIPMENT	
Mission:	ONUCI	Contingent:	France
MOU No.	DPKO/UNOCI/FRA/02	Unit:	SENEGAL INFANTRY COY
MOU Status:	6. Signed	Period Covered - From :	04/04/2004
Type of Lease	WET LEASE	VR Status:	
VR Type:	ARRIVAL		


EQUIPMENT ITEM	Qty as per MOU	Actual Qty	Condition	Qty. Non-Serviceable	Arrived on
Remarks such as condition of equipment, corrective action taken etc.					
RIGID STRUCTURES	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Ablution facilities (50 man)	5	-	-	-	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
SUPPORT VEHICLES (MILITARY PATTERN)	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Ambulance (MP)	2	1	Fair	0	04/04/2004
Truck utility/cargo (2.5 to 5 ton) (MP)	11	7	Fair	0	04/04/2004
Truck utility/cargo (6 to 10 ton) (MP)	7	-	-	-	04/04/2004
Truck - recovery (up to 5 tons) (MP)	1	-	-	-	04/04/2004
Truck - tanker (up to 10000 litres) (MP)	2	-	-	-	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
TRAILERS	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Light cargo single axle	5	-	-	-	04/04/2004
Water Trailer (up to 2000 litres)	8	-	-	-	04/04/2004
Remarks:					

VR Comments:
Inspection date(s): 02 to 04 August 2004
Remarks:

UNITED NATIONS  NATIONS UNIES		VERIFICATION REPORT - MAJOR EQUIPMENT	
Mission:	ONUCI	Contingent:	France
MOU No.	DPKO/UNOCI/FRA/02	Unit:	TOGO INFANTRY COY
MOU Status:	6. Signed	Period Covered - From :	04-Apr-2004
Type of Lease	WET LEASE	VR Status:	
VR Type:	ARRIVAL		


EQUIPMENT ITEM	Qty as per MOU	Actual Qty	UN Color	Qty. Non-Serviceable	Arrived on
Remarks such as condition of equipment, corrective action taken etc.					
GENERATORS - STATIONARY AND MOBILE	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
20KVA to 30KVA	0	2	No	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
MEDICAL & DENTAL EQUIPMENT	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Level 1 Hospital	1	0	n/a	0	-
Remarks: No Level 1 Hospital provided by France.					
RIGID STRUCTURES	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Ablution facilities (50 man)	5	0	n/a	0	-
Remarks: Refer to Trailer section.					
ARMAMENTS	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Crew served machine guns (11 to 15mm)	3	3	n/a	0	04/04/2004
Crew served machine guns (up to 10mm)	6	6	n/a	0	04/04/2004

Remarks:					
COMBAT VEHICLES	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Reconnaissance vehicle - wheeled over 50mm	3	0	n/a	0	-
Reconnaissance vehicle - wheeled over 25mm	0	3	Yes	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
SUPPORT VEHICLES (COMMERCIAL PATTERN)	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Ambulance - Truck (CP)	0	1	Yes	1	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
SUPPORT VEHICLES (MILITARY PATTERN)	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Ambulance (MP)	2	0	n/a	0	-
Truck utility/cargo (2.5 to 5 ton) (MP)	10	8	Yes	4	04/04/2004
Truck utility/cargo (6 to 10 ton) (MP)	6	0	n/a	0	-
Truck - recovery (up to 5 tons) (MP)	2	0	n/a	0	-
Truck - tanker (up to 10000 litres) (MP)	2	0	n/a	0	-
Truck utility/cargo (1.5 to 2.4 ton) (MP)	0	18	Yes	7	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
TRAILERS	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Light cargo single axle	5	3	Yes	0	04/04/2004
Water Trailer (up to 2000 litres)	8	2	Yes	0	04/04/2004
(SC) - Trailers	0	1	No	0	04/04/2004
Remarks: (SC) - Trailer - 1 X Shower Trailer (8 man Ablutions)					

 UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES		Preliminary VERIFICATION REPORT - MAJOR EQUIPMENT	
Mission: ONUCI MOU No. DPKO/UNOCI/TOG/01 MOU Status: 3. Under negotiations Type of Lease WET LEASE VR Type: ARRIVAL		Contingent: Togo Unit: INFANTRY COY Period Covered - From : 04-Apr-2004 VR Status:	

EQUIPMENT ITEM	Qty as per MOU	Actual Qty	UN Color	Qty. Non-Serviceable	Arrived on
Remarks such as condition of equipment, corrective action taken etc.					
ARMAMENTS	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Crew served machine guns (11 to 15mm)	2	4	n/a	0	04/04/2004
Crew served machine guns (up to 10mm)	0	15	n/a	0	04/04/2004
Mortars (61mm to 82mm)	0	2	n/a	0	04/04/2004
Anti-Tank Grenade Launcher (Special Case)	0	15	No	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
SUPPORT VEHICLES (COMMERCIAL PATTERN)	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Truck utility/cargo (under 1.5 ton) (CP)	0	15	Yes	2	04/04/2004
Ambulance (4x4) (CP)	0	1	Yes	0	04/04/2004
Automobile (4x4) (CP)	0	1	Yes	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
SUPPORT VEHICLES (MILITARY PATTERN)	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Jeep (4x4) with military radio (MP)	8	0	n/a	0	-
Ambulance (MP)	0	1	Yes	0	04/04/2004
Truck utility/cargo (2.5 to 5 ton) (MP)	0	4	Yes	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					


VR Comments:
Inspection date(s): 24 August 2004.
Remarks:

 UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES	Preliminary VERIFICATION REPORT - MAJOR EQUIPMENT
Mission: ONUCI MOU No.: DPKO/UNOCI/GHANA/01 MOU Status: 3. Under negotiations Type of Lease: WET LEASE VR Type: ARRIVAL	Contingent: Ghana Unit: INFANTRY BATTALION Period Covered - From : 04/04/2004 VR Status:

EQUIPMENT ITEM	Qty as per MOU	Actual Qty	Condition	Qty. Non-Serviceable	Arrived on
Remarks such as condition of equipment, corrective action taken etc.					
GENERATORS - STATIONARY AND MOBILE	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
20KVA to 30KVA	4	4	Good	1	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Water treatment plant up to 2000 LPH / 5000 ltrs Storage	1	0	n/a	0	-
Remarks:					
LOGISTIC EQUIPMENT	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Water Tanks (up to 1000 litres) (SC)	0	10	Good	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
MEDICAL & DENTAL EQUIPMENT	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Level 1 Hospital	1	1	Good	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
RIGID STRUCTURES	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Ablution facilities (50 man)	6	0	n/a	0	-
Remarks:					
CONTAINERS	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Other containers	13	3	Good	0	04/04/2004
Refrigeration/Freezer/Food storage	0	2	Good	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
ARMAMENTS	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Crew served machine guns (11 to 15mm)	8	0	n/a	0	-
Mortars (61mm to 82mm)	6	4	Good	0	04/04/2004
Crew served machine guns (up to 10mm)	0	23	Good	0	04/04/2004
Multiple Rocket Launcher (107mm)(SC)	0	3	Good	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
COMBAT VEHICLES	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
APC(wheeled) Infantry carrier - armed (Class I)	4	1	Fair	0	04/04/2004
(SC) Combat vehicles	0	3	Poor	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
SUPPORT VEHICLES (COMMERCIAL PATTERN)	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Ambulance (4x4) (CP)	2	0	n/a	0	-
Buses (greater than 24 PAX) (CP)	2	0	n/a	0	-
Truck utility/cargo (2.5 to 5 ton) (CP)	12	0	n/a	0	-
Truck utility/cargo (1.5 to 2.4 ton) (CP)	15	0	n/a	0	-
Ambulance - Truck (CP)	0	1	Good	0	04/04/2004
Truck utility/cargo (under 1.5 ton) (CP)	0	24	Fair	5	04/04/2004
Automobile (4x4) (CP)	0	5	Fair	2	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
SUPPORT VEHICLES (MILITARY PATTERN)	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Jeep (4x4) with military radio (MP)	6	0	n/a	0	-
Truck maintenance light (MP)	2	0	n/a	0	-
Truck water (under 10000 litres) (MP)	2	3	Fair	1	04/04/2004
Truck - recovery (up to 5 tons) (MP)	2	1	Fair	0	04/04/2004
Truck - tanker (up to 10000 litres) (MP)	2	0	n/a	0	-
Truck maintenance medium (MP)	0	1	Good	0	04/04/2004
Ambulance (MP)	0	1	Poor	1	04/04/2004
Truck utility/cargo (2.5 to 5 ton) (MP)	0	14	Fair	2	04/04/2004
Truck utility/cargo (jeep type - under 1.5 ton) (MP)	0	2	Fair	1	04/04/2004
(SC) - Support vehicles - (MP)	0	1	Good	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Forklift medium (up to 5 tons)	1	0	n/a	0	-
Remarks:					
TRAILERS	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Fuel Trailer (up to 2000 litres)	4	1	Good	0	04/04/2004
Light cargo single axle	4	0	n/a	0	-
Water Trailer (up to 2000 litres)	8	4	Poor	3	04/04/2004
Remarks:					

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES		VERIFICATION REPORT - MAJOR EQUIPMENT				
Mission: ONUCI MOU No. DPKO/UNOCI/NER/01 MOU Status: 6. Signed Type of Lease WET LEASE VR Type: ARRIVAL		Contingent: Niger Unit: INFANTRY BATTALION Period Covered - From : 04/04/2004 VR Status:				

EQUIPMENT ITEM	Qty as per MOU	Actual Qty	Condition	Qty. Non-Serviceable	Arrived on
Remarks such as condition of equipment, corrective action taken etc.					
GENERATORS - STATIONARY AND MOBILE					
51KVA to 75KVA	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Remarks:	0	3	Good	0	04/04/2004
MEDICAL & DENTAL EQUIPMENT					
Level 1 Hospital	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Remarks:	1	1	Good	0	04/04/2004
CONTAINERS					
Refrigeration/Freezer/Food storage	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Remarks:	0	2	Good	0	04/04/2004
ARMAMENTS					
Crew served machine guns (11 to 15mm)	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Mortars (61mm to 82mm)	5	4	Good	0	04/04/2004
Crew served machine guns (up to 10mm)	4	4	Good	0	04/04/2004
Multiple Rocket Launcher (107mm)(SC)	0	6	Good	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:	0	4	Good	0	04/04/2004
COMBAT VEHICLES					
Reconnaissance vehicle - wheeled over 50mm	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Reconnaissance vehicle - wheeled up to 25mm	3	3	Fair	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:	0	1	Fair	0	04/04/2004
SUPPORT VEHICLES (COMMERCIAL PATTERN)					
Truck - refrigerator (CP)	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Truck utility/cargo (under 1.5 ton) (CP)	0	3	Good	0	04/04/2004
Automobile (4x4) (CP)	0	6	n/a	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:	0	2	n/a	0	04/04/2004
SUPPORT VEHICLES (MILITARY PATTERN)					
Ambulance (MP)	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
Truck - recovery (up to 5 tons) (MP)	1	2	Fair	1	04/04/2004
Truck - tanker (up to 10000 litres) (MP)	1	1	Fair	0	04/04/2004
Truck utility/cargo (2.5 to 5 ton) (MP)	1	0	n/a	0	-
Truck utility/cargo (6 to 10 ton) (MP) X	2	4	Fair	0	04/04/2004
Truck water (under 10000 litres) (MP)	6	0	n/a	0	-
Truck utility/cargo (1.5 to 2.4 ton) (MP)	0	1	Fair	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:	0	2	Good	0	04/04/2004
TRAILERS					
Water Trailer (up to 2000 litres)	MOU	Act.	Srv.	N-Srv.	Days
	8	2	Fair	1	04/04/2004

 UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES	VERIFICATION REPORT - MAJOR EQUIPMENT
Mission: ONUCI MOU No.: DPKO/UNOCI/BELGIUM/01 MOU Status: 6. Signed Type of Lease: WET LEASE VR Type: ARRIVAL	Contingent: Belgium Unit: BENIN - INFANTRY COY Period Covered - From : 04-Apr-2004 VR Status:

EQUIPMENT ITEM	Qty as per MOU	Actual Qty	UN Color	Qty. Non-Service-able	Arrived on
Remarks such as condition of equipment, corrective action taken etc.					
SUPPORT VEHICLES (MILITARY PATTERN)	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Ambulance (MP)	2	2	Yes	2	04/04/2004
Jeep (4x4) with military radio (MP)	8	8	Yes	0	04/04/2004
Truck utility/cargo (2.5 to 5 ton) (MP)	13	19	Yes	0	04/04/2004
Remarks: Please note that the 2 Ambulances are not operational as they were not issued to the unit with the necessary medical equipment required to operate an Ambulance.					
COMMUNICATIONS VEHICLES	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Truck communications medium (Special Case)	0	1	Yes	0	04/04/2004
Remarks:					
TRAILERS	MOU	Act.	Marking	N-Srv.	Days
Light cargo single axle	1	7	Yes	0	04/04/2004
Water Trailer (up to 2000 litres)	6	3	Yes	0	04/04/2004
Remarks: Please note that there are 7 Light cargo single axle trailers and not one as previously reported.					

A Study of the Re-hatting of ECOWAS Forces

Background:

As requested by the Security Council Mission to West Africa in July 2003, UNOWA is in the process of carrying out a systematic study of ways to enhance collaboration with, as well as the effectiveness of, ECOWAS. A number of activities are planned, including a widespread consultation with senior officials working for the individual Member States of ECOWAS, representatives of civil society based in West Africa, and independent experts on the region.

A key element of research for this study, which focuses particularly on ways to improve the effectiveness of ECOWAS in the area of conflict management and peacekeeping, would be to undertake a serious review of each of the peace operations carried out by ECOWAS since 1989 and the lessons to be drawn from each.

Objective:

One of the key elements of ECOWAS intervention has been related to their transformation into UN forces (re-hatted). Since 1999, three different ECOWAS intervention forces have been re-hatted into UN forces. In Sierra Leone on 22 October 1999 ECOMOG forces were re-hatted to UNAMSIL. In Liberia on 1 October 2003 ECOMIL forces were re-hatted to UNMIL, and in Côte d'Ivoire on 4 April 2004 ECOMICI troops (Benin - 305, Ghana - 397, Niger - 366, Senegal - 313 and Togo - 291) were re-hatted to form UNOCI.

While the re-hatting of ECOWAS forces has greatly enhanced the peace processes in those countries, a number of challenges have been encountered related to the preparedness, the transformation and the command and control of the forces. This study will evaluate the challenges encountered during each of the three re-hatting process of ECOWAS forces.

Scope:

For each of the re-hatted forces, namely UNAMSIL, UNMIL and UNOCI, the study will examine:

- The onset of the crisis and its military implication
- The strength of ECOWAS forces sent into the mission theatre
- Challenges encountered upon entry and sustainment issues
- Factors leading to the decision to re-hat
- ECOWAS forces readiness for re-hatting
- UN preparedness to re-hat
- Lessons learned and future implications

Methodology:

Interviews and research will be carried out in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire with ECOWAS and UN officials, re-hatted forces, governments and representatives of civil society. MilDiv and PBPU will assist in providing information related to the Headquarters and help in preparing VTC and telephone interviews with key people in the Headquarters.

A comparative analysis will also be made of other re-hatting processes not involving ECOWAS forces, namely in MINUSTAH, where Chilean forces formerly part of MIF were re-hatted on 1 June 2004, in ONUB where AMIB forces were re-hatted to ONUB on 1 June 2004 and UNTAET where INTERFEF became UNTAET forces on 1 February 2000. UN HQ will assist in providing information on these missions.

Team:

The study will be done by Frederick Mallya (PBPU) and Nickolas Seymour (MILAD) and coordinated by BrgGen Elhadji Mouhamahdou Kandji, Deputy Military Advisor.

Product and timing:

The 10 - 15 pages review of the re-hatting process and its challenges should be completed by the end of January 2005, in time for the ECOWAS Lessons Learned Workshop scheduled to be held in Accra from 3 - 4 February 2005.
